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The Great Depression, the worldwide economic collapse that began in 1929 and ended only well after the outbreak of World War II a decade later, remains a topic of widespread fascination. There are several reasons for such continuing interest. Among them is the fact that the experience was seared into the lives, memories, and outlooks of an entire generation, coloring its members’ views of their subsequent experiences. Another reason for the intense interest in the Depression is that it seemed to contradict the expectations of most Americans and their experiences of relative prosperity throughout most of the time since. Then there is the era’s defiance of the modern trend toward individualism and the identification of personal well-being with material consumption. Those who object to the modern rush toward ever greater selfishness and self-indulgence are drawn to the alternate visions of co-operation and rejection of consumerism evident in the Great Depression.

There are also the facts that the modern presidency emerged, the role of the federal government as a major force in citizens’ lives was established, the partial welfare state was begun, and the political realignment that remained dominant for much of the remainder of the century was forged during the Great Depression.

Perhaps most of all, however, the Great Depression continues to be a matter of great interest because so many people remain uncertain about the economic prospects in their own times. Anyone who is at least vaguely aware that this massive economic collapse was preceded by a period of unprecedented prosperity in the 1920s is apt to ask the question: “If it happened once, can it happen again?” Whenever the unemployment rate raises sharply, as it did in the early 1980s, or the stock market plunges, as it did in 1987 and again, in a much more prolonged slide, between 2001 and 2003, those of us who specialize in the era of the Great Depression are asked to comment in the popular media on whether another depression might be coming. The fear that “hard times” could return has never completely vanished, and this concern stimulates continuing interest in the events of the 1920s and 1930s.

The Great Depression was the worst domestic crisis the United States faced in the twentieth century and the second worst, after the Civil War, in American history. However, it was by no means confined to the United States. Rather, the economic collapse became a global phenomenon. The worldwide ramifications of the Depression constitute another major reason for contemporary interest in the era. It is widely believed that the worst horrors of the twentieth century—the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi followers, World War II, and the Holocaust—would not have happened had
the economic collapse not provided an opening for extremist views to gain credibility.

As its role in the appeal of dictatorship and controlled economies indicates, the Great Depression severely tested both democratic political institutions and market-based economies. It was the principal achievement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal programs in the United States to demonstrate that democratic institutions and a slightly modified free market economic system were viable. Indeed, the Great Depression can be seen as providing a stage upon which Roosevelt and Hitler presented to the world sharply contrasting views of the proper way to organize and lead societies, polities, and economies. That contest was finally to be decided under arms in World War II, which in a real sense can be seen as the final act—the climax—of the Great Depression.

The 542 articles in the two volumes that constitute The Encyclopedia of the Great Depression are intended to provide the widest audience, both the general public and students of history, with accessible information and analysis, reflecting the latest scholarship, on an extensive variety of topics related to the Great Depression.

Although the bulk of the articles in this encyclopedia focus on the era of the Great Depression in the United States, a substantial number of entries address the worldwide dimensions of the economic collapse and deal with specific events and figures from other parts of the world.

The Great Depression was, of course, first and foremost an economic and, consequently, a social phenomenon. As such it brings up images that are—well, depressing. But anyone who sees the era of the Depression as only grim misses much of its flavor and significance. The decade of the 1930s was, to be sure, a time of economic hardship that was, with the exception of the South during the Civil War, unprecedented in American history. But it was much more. It was a period of political and social innovation. It was also a time of extraordinary cultural developments in the new medium of sound cinema as well as in art, literature, music, theater, and photography. Even a cursory look at the list of articles under the heading of “Culture” in the outline of contents should give the reader a sense of how diverse, significant, and, in many cases, “undepressing” the cultural aspects of the decade were.

The Depression decade came to be dominated by the personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but it was also populated by a vast array of other memorable characters—women as well as men, minorities as well as whites, international figures as well as Americans—from the arts, labor, business, politics, government, civil rights, diplomacy, the media, religion, academe, the law, social reform, agriculture, and sports. Biographies of more than two hundred of these individuals are to be found in the pages of this compendium.

This encyclopedia constitutes the most comprehensive resource available on one of the most important periods in our history and one that continues to affect us today in ways subtle and not-so-subtle. A substantial number of articles in these two volumes are, in my opinion, the best short analyses of their subjects available in print. In many cases, the articles are written by the leading scholars on the subject. There is every reason to anticipate that this publication will remain the standard reference for the era of the Great Depression for many years to come.

There are 542 articles in the Encyclopedia of the Great Depression arranged alphabetically for easy reference. The articles range in length from 300 to 5,000 words. Entries are written by 270 scholars from around the world, active researchers in history, American studies, economics, social science, geography, political science, radio and television, literature, and music. Each signed article features several carefully chosen cross-references to related entries as well as a bibliography of print and Internet resources. A topical outline appears in Volume I, just after the alphabetical article list. It groups articles by broad categories, thereby offering teachers and readers alike an informed map of the field. A comprehensive index offers yet another entry point for the set, encouraging readers to explore the information contained in these two volumes.

In addition to the fine work of the contributors, this project is the result of the great work of my associate editors, Roger Biles, Joe Trotter, Tony Badger, and Patricia Sullivan, and I thank them all. Several people at Macmillan Reference USA and the Gale Group have worked on this project over
the course of its development and helped to assure its successful completion. I want to thank Erin Bealmear, Joe Clements, Judith Culligan, Jill Lectka, and Elly Dickason.

My parents, Edward and Ruth McElvaine, lived through the Great Depression, and their stories first sparked my interest in the period and in history in general. That interest was carried forward and developed by a large number of instructors, scholars, and writers over the years, including Carl Youngman, Warren Susman, Lloyd Gardner, Charles Forcey, Richard Dalfiume, Melvyn Dubofsky, James MacGregor Burns, Frank Freidel, Joan Wallach Scott, Susan Ware, Harvard Sitkoff, Lizabeth Cohen, Patrick Maney, the four associate editors of this encyclopedia, and the four friends and sources of inspiration to whom it is dedicated, Lawrence W. Levine, William E. Leuchtenburg, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Studs Terkel.

My wonderful family, as always, deserves the greatest thanks. Anne is my everything. Kerri, Lauren, Allison, Brett, Scott, Evan, and Anna add even more to my life, causing it to overflow with joy.

ROBERT S. MCELVAINE
CLINTON, MISSISSIPPI, AUGUST 2003
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OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

This outline of contents provides a general overview of the conceptual scheme of the encyclopedia, listing the titles of each entry. The outline is divided into twenty-one parts.

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Because the section headings are not mutually exclusive, certain entries in the encyclopedia are listed in more than one section.

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The name Abraham Lincoln Brigade refers to about 3,000 Americans who volunteered to defend the Spanish Republic during Spain’s 1936 to 1939 civil war. The brigade included not only those who fought in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, but also Americans who fought in other battalions or served in medical units. Although the average age of the American volunteers was twenty-seven, the brigade included three members as young as eighteen, and others as old as fifty-nine and sixty. Many volunteers were students or teachers, but others were seamen, autoworkers, steelworkers, electricians, and doctors or nurses.

The International Brigades that fought in the Spanish Civil War were entirely integrated, and more than eighty members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade were African American. In fact, the Abraham Lincoln Battalion was commanded, until he died in battle, by Oliver Law, an African-American volunteer from Chicago, marking the first time in American history that an integrated military force was led by an African-American officer. Most of the American volunteers were unmarried, although, as their letters reveal, many had relationships back home that they tried to sustain by correspondence. Most were from urban areas; about 18 percent came from New York. Perhaps a third were Jews, which was not surprising in view of Adolf Hitler’s support of the rebel general Francisco Franco. About two-thirds of the American volunteers were Communists, but their primary motive for volunteering was antifascism. Many of them believed a world war would ensue if fascism were not defeated, and in fact the Spanish Civil War effectively signaled the opening of World War II.

The Abraham Lincoln Battalion officially entered the war when volunteers fought at Jarama in February 1937, though some American volunteers had fought in Madrid in the fall of 1936 before the International Brigades were organized. After Jarama, the Abraham Lincoln Battalion fought in unbearable heat in the battle of Brunete in July 1937. This battle was followed by battles at Quinto and Belchite in August and Fuentes de Ebro in October. Then, after a brief period of training, the Abraham Lincoln Battalion endured the snows of Teruel in January and February of 1938. In spring of that year
they faced continuous bombing from the air and Panzer-style massed tank assaults at key points. The battalion then crossed the Ebro River southwest of Barcelona during the summer of 1938 to initiate the largest battle of the war. Barcelona and Madrid fell to Franco’s forces in early 1939, and the war ended on April 1 with the surrender of the Loyalist forces. About seven hundred members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade died in Spain.

During the war and after, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade symbolized internationalism for a country that was often isolationist. The heroism and self-sacrifice of the American volunteers, each of whom made a personal decision to join the war effort, became a model for succeeding generations. Although the surviving members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade were often hounded during the anticommunist McCarthy period of the 1950s, by the 1990s sentiment had changed, and several monuments were erected in their honor.

See Also: SPANISH CIVIL WAR.

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ADAMIC, LOUIS

The writer Louis Adamic (March 23, 1898–September 4, 1951) played a key role in the 1930s movement for ethnoracial democracy. A Slovenian immigrant, Adamic came to New York in 1913, but moved to southern California in the 1920s, where he made a name for himself as a chronicler of Los Angeles and established a lifelong friendship with the California leftist Carey McWilliams before moving back to New York in 1929. Like many intellectuals, Adamic was attracted to left-wing ideas during the Great Depression, though he was suspicious of the Communist Party. In the 1930s, Adamic became one of the most prominent advocates of American immigrant groups. Traveling across the United States, he chronicled the experiences of “new Americans” from southern and eastern Europe, concentrating his attention on second-generation Americans. His Depression-era books, My America: 1928–1938 (1938) and From Many Lands (1940), were combinations of autobiographical writings, political journalism, and stories he had collected in his journeys.

Though Adamic was a cultural pluralist who sought to win respect and tolerance for ethnic minorities, he bemoaned the cultural fragmentation of American life. He thus sought both to combat the discrimination faced by ethnic minorities and to craft a notion of American identity that associated the nation not with its Anglo-Protestant roots but with ethnoracial diversity and democratic norms. Like other left-liberals in the 1930s, Adamic saw the labor movement as the most significant political agency capable of achieving his goals. He believed that the new labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), much of whose membership came from the “new American” groups Adamic championed, would be an “important factor in the delicate and vital process of integration of our heterogeneous population” (My America). In 1940 Adamic founded Common Ground, the most significant World War II-era journal advocating ethnoracial democracy.

See Also: CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); MCWILLIAMS, CAREY; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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ADVERTISING IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION

“Every advertisement is an advertisement for success,” claimed an advertising campaign in 1926. During the Depression years of the 1930s, with successes hard to find, the advertising business faced severe challenges. Economic stringency, political attacks, and a need to recast their appeals all made the decade a difficult one for advertisers. Indeed, the advertising industry’s achievements during the 1920s in establishing its cultural and economic importance may have made the challenges of the Great Depression more severe.

Spending on advertisements—from local classified ads to major campaigns in national media—plunged by more than 60 percent between 1929 and 1933, and it did not rise above pre-crash levels until after World War II. Although advertising agencies stressed the foolhardiness of cutting back on promotion during hard times and argued that advertising could help lift the nation out of its slump, many businesses, with revenues plunging, viewed advertising as an unnecessary expense.

After initially attempting to slow the economic downslide by exhortation, advertising agencies themselves began to cut back. High-salaried employees were dismissed, and competition for accounts became more intense. Advertisers pressed agencies to accept lower commissions; agencies in turn wooed potential clients away from their rivals. Despite this anxious environment, several new advertising agencies made headway, some by borrowing the florid techniques of tabloid newspapers and comic strips. Other agencies pioneered in radio advertising as commercials became the main support of the medium.

As might be expected, advertising styles did not respond uniformly to the Depression. In the first few years, advertisers recycled themes of more prosperous times. By about 1932, however, there was a notable shift to hard-sell campaigns. Although ads still portrayed an unrealistically affluent, racially and ethnically homogeneous America, ominous threats, fear appeals, and insistent demands to buy became more prominent. As Roland Marchand observed in Advertising the American Dream (1985), campaigns adopted tropes like the “parable of the sickly child” or displayed images of defeated, prematurely aged fathers to warn of the dire consequences of failing to consume the appropriate products. Coupled with this, images of sunbeams promised a hopeful future and clenched fists symbolized the determination to persevere—and purchase—despite hard times.

While advertisements depicted consumers under pressure, the advertising business found itself beleaguered by a reinvigorated consumer movement and the threat of regulation by New Dealers. A bill introduced in 1933 proposed to give the Food and Drug Administration power to prohibit false and misleading advertising of the products it regulated. Advertising interests worked to kill the measure. The 1938 amendments to the Pure Food and Drug Act contained a less stringent definition of “misleading” than earlier versions. The Wheeler-Lea Act, also passed in 1938, gave the Federal Trade Commission explicit authority to act against advertising that deceived consumers. Previously, the Commission’s mandate had protected only competitors. The new laws themselves made no dramatic difference to advertisers, but industry efforts to preempt government control by self-regulation, along with public revulsion against the most vulgar publicity of the decade, seems to have reduced blatant dishonesty in advertising during the thirties. Still, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor approached, advertising leaders saw themselves under siege from power-hungry bureaucrats and radical ideologues.

Despite the Depression-era’s adversities, in several ways advertising and the consumer culture it promoted gained ground. In big cities, as Lizabeth Cohen demonstrated in Making a New Deal (1990), economic pressures on workers and their families weakened earlier loyalties to ethnic neighborhood retailers and brought consumers into chain stores offering low-priced, mass-produced products. Commercial radio provided an effective way to reach consumers with national advertising.
campaigns. In the countryside, inducements to modernize through consumption accompanied drives for rural electrification. By 1940, nearly all homes served by Rural Electrification Administration cooperatives had radios and more than half had washing machines. Although wartime shortages soon replaced the privations of Depression-era America, the industry’s struggles during the 1930s marked a delay, not a denial, of advertising’s promises of fulfillment through consumption.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; CONSUMERISM; RADIO.

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AFRICA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN

African peasants were deeply affected by the steep fall in agrarian prices caused by the worldwide Depression of the 1930s. Like peasants in Asia, they would not have been affected by a fall in prices if they had relied solely on subsistence agriculture, but colonial taxation forced African peasants to produce for the market to earn cash for paying taxes. Unlike their counterparts in Asia, with its elaborate land revenue systems, African peasants did not pay taxes on land; rather, they paid a poll tax or a hut tax. Such taxes did not require a sophisticated system of assessment or a record of rights in land. Colonial governments in Africa did not bother much about land laws and protected “customary law” if it suited them.

The export of African produce was controlled by large European trading companies, and a few major ports provided the channels through which such exports had to pass. By collecting export taxes in those ports, colonial rulers could conveniently raise additional revenue.

The African colonies did not have currencies of their own; they depended on the currencies of their respective colonial rulers. At the time of the Great Depression, this gave rise to differentiation in the economic fate of the colonies. Great Britain and Portugal left the gold standard in 1931, and their currencies depreciated. France, on the other hand, which had returned to the gold standard only in 1928 but at a much lower parity than other nations, stuck to the gold standard until 1936. This caused competition that was particularly keen when the same type of produce was exported by colonies that were adjacent to each other but used different currencies. In this context, African peasants were sometimes forced to grow cash crops that gave them no returns.

A few regional case studies illustrate the fate of the peasants and the problems of the export of produce at the time of the Depression.

WEST AFRICAN PEASANTS AND EUROPEAN TRADING COMPANIES

The Ivory Coast, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Togo, and Nigeria were producers of palm kernels and cocoa. These products were exported by European companies, which were also active in the import trade. In the latter capacity they were interested in maintaining the purchasing power of their African customers, and lobbied colonial governments for a reduction of the export tax, arguing that this would help African peasants. But when the export tax was lowered, the poll tax had to be increased, which the companies did not mind because it forced the peasants to produce for the market. If the peasants re-
belled, the government could suppress them. In the French Ivory Coast, everybody above the age of fourteen was required to pay a higher poll tax, a tax that had already been increased as recently as the late 1920s. At that time, the tax had been collected without difficulty, but when the government chose to raise rather than reduce it during the Depression, many Ivory Coast peasants left the countryside and disappeared into the slums of the towns.

The British Gold Coast levied no poll tax, and the government relied entirely on the export tax. The British departure from the gold standard gave the Gold Coast a competitive edge over the French colonies, and exports increased. The government in Togo, which was by that time a French mandate territory, relied heavily on the poll tax and had to repress a peasant rebellion in 1933. British Nigeria had a more diversified agrarian production, with palm kernels in the Southeast, cocoa near Lagos, and peanuts in the North. A poll tax, which had been introduced in southern Nigeria in 1927, was vigorously collected by 1931 and promptly caused peasant unrest.

The European companies, however, tried to make profits even at the worst of times. Many of them failed, and only larger companies, such as the United Africa Company and Lever Brothers, survived.

FORCED CULTIVATION IN THE BELGIAN CONGO

Sixty percent of exports from the Belgian Congo consisted of products from the mines; palm kernels and cocoa made up most of the remaining 40 percent. The colonial government in the Congo mainly depended on the poll tax; in 1930 this tax had only amounted to one-sixth of its revenue, but it had risen to one-fourth by 1932. Rebellions were brutally suppressed, and the government resorted to an old system of forced labor that had been replaced by the poll tax in 1910. During the Depression, the Congo’s colonial rulers practically converted the whole colony into a huge plantation, ordering the peasants what to produce, dictating prices, and controlling delivery. While imposing this system of forced cultivation, the government also diversified production, pushing the cultivation of cotton, coffee, rice, and peanuts, in addition to the traditional crops, such as palm kernels and cocoa. Cotton exports from this region tripled from 1929 to 1937. The government could be proud of its economic success, but the peasants suffered.

SETTLERS AND PEASANTS: KENYA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA

The presence of white settlers had a special impact on African peasants because many of them had to provide the settlers with cheap labor. The case of Kenya’s “white highlands” was particularly striking. This area had been extensively cultivated in the past by Kikuyu tribesmen, but when white settlers arrived, they introduced a modern capitalist system of agriculture. The tribesmen, who were tolerated as “squatters” on the settlers’ large landholdings, had few options but to work for them at low wages. Under colonial legislation, the breach of a labor contract was a criminal offence, and those who had entered into such contracts were practically treated like slaves. In shifting the burden of the Depression onto the shoulders of their African laborers, white settlers could survive the Depression. But some of these settlers found it difficult to make ends meet, particularly if they produced maize and not the more profitable cash crops, such as sisal, coffee, and tea.

Maize had become so inexpensive that it was hardly worth growing any longer. The colonial government in Kenya subsidized its cultivation, however, because it was required as food for the African laborers. The maize subsidy ceased when the government could no longer afford it. White maize farmers petitioned for a maize control act to regulate production, but its passage was prevented by other settlers who would have had to pay higher wages to their laborers so that they could afford to buy maize. The maize farmers then stopped producing maize, and turned their land over to African tenants. When the Depression ended under the impact of World War II, the white settlers wanted to recover their land from these tenants, calling them “squatters” once more. This situation contributed to a growing unrest that culminated in the Mau-Mau rebellion.

In Southern Rhodesia maize was a major cash crop produced by white settlers. Since they did not
face the resistance of other settlers here, Rhodesian maize farmers did manage to get a maize control act passed. According to this act, output was severely restricted, produce was procured by the government at a fixed price, and consumers had to buy maize at a price well above the export price. The maize control was exercised in such a way that only white settlers benefited from it. But the government soon realized that the restrictions prevented African peasants from producing for the market, and they were thus unable to pay the poll tax. The government then commuted the poll tax, offering the peasants the option of working for twenty-three days on road construction instead. But so many poor peasants took up this offer that the government had to withdraw it. There could not have been a more striking testimony to the terrible poverty that had hit the peasantry.

FRENCH COLONIES IN NORTH AFRICA
The Arab countries of North Africa that were under French colonial rule also experienced a peculiar competition between European settlers and indigenous peasants. The main crop in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia was wheat, but there were two varieties of it, hard wheat (*Triticum durum*) and normal wheat (*Triticum vulgare*). The latter was mostly grown by European settlers, whereas hard wheat was produced by indigenous people. Both varieties were exported, hard wheat mostly to Italy, where it was used for the preparation of pasta. When wheat became the first major crop whose price fell due to the Depression, the French colonial governments were pressed by the settlers (mostly French) to support the price of normal wheat; they did this to some extent, but showed no interest in the price of hard wheat grown by the Arabs. Similarly the colonial authorities ignored the problems of the indigenous producers of olive oil in Tunisia, many of whom became heavily indebted during the Depression and lost their land to their creditors.

SOUTH AFRICA
At the opposite end of the continent South Africa provided another striking contrast to the rest of Africa. It was dominated by a white minority and enjoyed political independence as a dominion in the British Commonwealth. The country was rich in natural resources and was the world’s largest gold producer. The average annual production in the 1930s amounted to eleven million ounces (311 metric tons). Under such conditions it could hold on to the gold standard even after Great Britain had abandoned it in September 1931.

South Africa was governed by the Nationalist Party, which was caught in a dilemma. It represented the white farmers, who were affected by the fall in prices and stood to gain from a devaluation, but the party was also pledged to upholding national autonomy as embodied in the gold standard. There was a fear that if South Africa abandoned that standard, gold would be given up as a standard of value worldwide and that this would harm South African gold production. The mine owners did not share this fear. Gold prices had risen after September 1931 and this made the processing of low-grade ore profitable, which would extend the life of the mines considerably.

In the meantime, speculators invested their money in the depreciating pound sterling in the hope that they could shift it back to South Africa at a profit once the South African currency was taken off the gold standard. Banking business in South Africa was in the hands of two British banks, Standard and Barclays, whose headquarters was in London. Thus, South Africa was intimately linked with the British financial market. In December 1932, these various pressures combined and forced South Africa to abandon the gold standard. The speculators then repatriated their funds. The South African economy was reflated. In February 1932, the South African currency was pegged to the pound sterling and maintained this relationship for a long time.

Great Britain absorbed the total production of South African gold and built up massive reserves for the sterling area. The fears that going off gold would harm gold production proved to be unfounded. From 1929 to 1936 world gold production increased by 50 percent and the price of gold rose by 66 percent. Because Great Britain and the United States stored vast amounts of gold in their reserves, the increase in the price of gold was not reflected in commodity prices. Nevertheless, reflation did push up prices in South Africa, which helped the farmers. The black farmhands who worked for the
white farmers, and the miners in the gold mines did not share the benefits of reflation because the employers managed to keep wages down.

EGYPT

Egypt stood in contrast to the countries surveyed above. It had been a British colony but had achieved a kind of independent status in 1922. Its currency was still tied to the pound sterling, but the Egyptian government was free to impose a gold export embargo after Britain left the gold standard. In this way the distress gold of indebted peasants, which would have poured out of the country as it did elsewhere at that time, was retained by the Egyptian government and could be used for fighting the deflation of the national economy.

Another special feature of the Egyptian economy was its dependence on the cultivation of cotton. Cotton production was mostly controlled by absentee landlords, who relied on the state for protection of their interests. Egypt had expanded its cotton production from 0.27 to 0.38 million metric tons from 1920 to 1929, and cotton exports constituted about 75 percent of total Egyptian exports. The country was therefore particularly vulnerable to a fall in cotton prices. In June 1929 the world price of cotton stood at eighteen cents; by 1932 it had dropped to six cents per pound, its lowest price during the Depression. This two-thirds reduction within three years was more severe than the price drop for most other commodities. Nevertheless the rate of cotton production was not reduced because demand for it remained stable.

Egypt’s system of taxation, a land revenue system of the Indian type, differed from tax systems in other African countries. The tax was fixed at about one-third of the rental assets, and was collected without remission even during the years of the Depression. The rigidity of this system was due to the fact that the income from this tax had been pledged to Egypt’s foreign creditors.

Despite these problems there were attempts at sponsoring industries that produced goods such as textiles, which previously had to be imported. Egypt was the only country in Africa where such an industry existed. The availability of cheap cotton was a boon to an indigenous textile industry, and a group of Egyptian entrepreneurs who had also been behind the establishment of the Bank Misr as a “national” bank now tried their hand at this type of industrialization.

It is difficult to gauge the deterioration of the standard of living in Egypt, and in other African countries, during the Depression years. There are only a few indicators that throw light on the conditions of the people: The per capita consumption of food and grain, for example, dropped by about 26 percent, even though wheat and barley became much cheaper; school attendance receded; and the number of Muslim pilgrims who performed the hajj dwindled in 1933 to about one-tenth the 1920s figure.

In Egypt, as elsewhere in Africa, the burden of the Depression was mostly shouldered by the rural poor, whereas the urban classes, particularly those who received salaries that had been fixed in better times, lived very well. Thus the gap between town and countryside widened considerably in the 1930s.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEPRESSION

In terms of the value of world trade, Africa suffered less from the Depression than other parts of the world. Whereas the value of world exports declined by 66 percent from 1929 to 1934, the value of African exports declined only by 48 percent. Agriculturists were affected by this drop in value more than mine owners.

The European colonists who depended entirely on export production were discouraged by the experience of the Depression, and the declining revenues affected colonial governments. The possession of colonies was no longer profitable, but colonial rulers were also creditors, who did not wish to relinquish their control. In the long run, the Depression contributed to the decolonization of Africa.

See Also: EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; ETHIOPIAN WAR; GOLD STANDARD; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.

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The Great Depression brought mass suffering to all regions of the country. National income dropped by 50 percent and unemployment rose to an estimated 25 percent of the total labor force. At the same time, twenty million Americans turned to public and private relief agencies for assistance. As the “Last Hired and the First Fired,” African Americans entered the Depression long before the stock market crash in 1929, and they stayed there longer than other Americans. By 1933, African Americans found it all but impossible to find jobs of any kind in agriculture or industry. As cotton prices dropped from eighteen cents per pound on the eve of the Depression to less than six cents per pound in 1933, some 12,000 black sharecroppers lost their precarious footing in southern agriculture and moved increasingly toward southern, northern, and western cities. Mechanical devices had already slowly reduced the number of workers required for plowing, hoeing, and weeding, but now planters also experimented with mechanical cotton pickers, which displaced even more black farm workers. Despite declining opportunities in cities, the proportion of blacks living in urban areas rose from 44 percent in 1930 to nearly 50 percent by the onset of World War II.

HARD TIMES AND RISE OF NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS

As the number of rural blacks seeking jobs in cities escalated, urban black workers experienced increasing difficulties. Black urban unemployment reached well over 50 percent, more than twice the rate of whites. In southern cities, white workers rallied around such slogans as, “No Jobs for Niggers Until Every White Man Has a Job” and “Niggers, back to the cotton fields—city jobs are for white folks.” The most violent episodes took place on southern railroads, as unionized white workers and the railroad brotherhoods intimidated, attacked, and murdered black firemen in order to take their jobs. Nearly a dozen black firemen lost their jobs in various parts of the South. As one contemporary observer succinctly stated, “The shotgun, the whip, the noose, and Ku Klux Klan practices were being resumed in the certainty that dead men not only tell no tales, but create vacancies.” For their part, in the North and South, black women were forced into the notorious Depression era “slave market,” where even working-class white women employed black women at starvation wages, as little as $5 per week for full-time laborers in northern cities. In their studies of the market in Bronx, New York, two black women compared the practice to the treatment of slaves in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin.

Despite mass suffering, the Republican administration of Herbert Hoover did little to aid the poor and destitute. Instead, the federal government established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which relieved the credit problems of large banking, insurance, and industrial firms. Although Hoover believed that such policies would create new jobs, stimulate production, and increase consumer spending, benefits did not “trickle down” to the rest of the economy and end the Depression. Still, African Americans rallied to the slogan “Who but Hoover” in the presidential contest of 1932. In the
During most of the 1930s, African Americans found it all but impossible to find jobs of any kind in agriculture or industry. The father of this impoverished family, photographed in 1937 by Lewis Hine, was a miner who lost his job in the Scott’s Run area of West Virginia. National Archives and Records Administration

eyes of blacks, the Republican Party remained the party of emancipation, partly because Democratic candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt had embraced the segregationist policies of the Democratic Party.

Following his inauguration, Roosevelt’s attitude toward African Americans changed little. He not only opposed vital civil rights legislation like the anti-lynching bill, designed to make lynching a federal offense, but showed little interest in challenging even the most blatant manifestations of racial injustice in the proliferation of New Deal agencies. The National Recovery Administration (NRA), Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), to name only a few, all failed to protect blacks against discriminatory employers, agency officials, and local whites.

When the AAA paid farmers to withdraw cotton lands from production, county officials barred African Americans from representation and deprived them of government checks. For their part, by exempting domestic service and unskilled labor from minimum wage and participatory provisions, the NRA and the social security programs eliminat-
Many African-American children in the rural South, like these photographed by Dorothea Lange at their farm in Mississippi in 1936, lived in extreme poverty during the Depression years. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

ed nearly 60 percent of African Americans from benefits. When the jobs of African Americans were brought under the provisions of the NRA in southern textile firms, employers reclassified such jobs and removed them from coverage of the higher wage code.

As they encountered various forms of discrimination in New Deal Agencies, many African Americans concluded that the so-called New Deal was indeed a “raw deal.” Only during the mid-1930s would African Americans gain broader access to the New Deal social programs. By 1939, income from
New Deal work and relief programs nearly matched African-American income from private employment. African Americans occupied about one-third of all federal low-income housing projects, and gained a growing share of CCC jobs, Federal Farm Security loans, and benefits from WPA educational and cultural programs. African Americans now frequently hailed the New Deal as “a godsend.” Some blacks even quipped that God “will lead me” and relief “will feed me.”

The emergence of a “new deal” for blacks was closely intertwined with the growth of the Communist Party, the resurgence of organized labor, and the increasing political efforts of blacks on their own behalf. When the Communist Party helped save nine black youths, the Scottsboro Boys, from execution and secured the release of their own black comrade Angelo Herndon from a Georgia chain gang, the African-American community took notice. When the party helped to initiate hunger marches, unemployed councils, farm labor unions, rent strikes, and mass demonstrations to prevent the eviction of black families from their homes, its work gained even greater recognition within the African-American community. As one black newspaper editor, William Kelley of the Amsterdam News, reported, “The fight that they are putting up . . . strike[s] forcefully at the fundamental wrongs suffered by the Negro today.”

The rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1935 facilitated the emergence of a
During the Depression, thousands of black sharecroppers lost their precarious footing in southern agriculture and moved increasingly toward southern, northern, and western cities. This family was evicted from their farm in 1938 after drought caused their crops to fail. They were photographed while encamped along the highway in New Madrid county, Missouri.

real New Deal for African Americans. Unlike the old American Federation of Labor (AFL), the CIO made a firm commitment to organize both black and white workers. The organization soon launched the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC), the United Automobile Workers (UAW), and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC). The new unions appealed to civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban League, recruited black organizers, and advocated an end to unequal pay scales for black and white workers. Although most AFL unions continued to exclude black workers, the national leadership gradually supported a more equitable stance toward black workers. The union finally approved an international charter for the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) in 1935 and endorsed efforts to free the Scottsboro Boys and Angelo Herndon.

Following the lead of anthropologist Franz Boas and his associates, social scientists encouraged the lowering of racial barriers in American society. As early as the 1920s, they had gradually turned away from earlier biological definitions of race, which defined African Americans as innately inferior. The new social scientists challenged the biological determinists to “prove” that African Americans occupied a lower socioeconomic and political status in American society because of their hereditary inferiority. Legal change lagged significantly behind the new intellectual perspectives on race; yet, even
here, African Americans witnessed the slow transition to a new deal. As early as 1935, the Maryland Court of Appeals ordered the University of Maryland to admit blacks to the state’s law school or set up a new separate and equal facility for blacks. Rather than face the expense of establishing a new all-black law school, university officials lowered racial barriers and admitted black students to the all-white institution.

COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

Despite the rise of interracial alliances and the emergence of anti-racist movements among whites, African Americans developed their own strategies for social change and helped to create their own “new deal.” African Americans cared for each other’s children, offered emotional support, and creatively manipulated their family’s resources. As one Georgia relief official noted, “These people are catching and selling fish, reselling vegetables, sewing in exchange for old clothes, letting out sleeping space, and doing odd jobs . . . Stoves are used in common, wash boilers go their rounds, and garden crops are exchanged and shared.” Urban blacks also maintained vegetable gardens, staged rent parties, played the numbers game, and expanded their church-based social welfare activities. While rent parties provided “down home” food, drink, music, and a place to dance for a small ad-
mission fee, the “policy” or numbers game employed large numbers of African Americans as runners and as bookkeepers. According to some observers, for example, Chicago’s south side employed seven thousand people in the numbers business and cushioned them from unemployment even as it provided hope for thousands of blacks seeking to make a “hit.” For their part, some “numbers kings” provided donations to black churches and charitable organizations, but religious organizations launched their own social welfare activities. In addition to the work of established denominations, new religious movements also expanded their efforts to feed the poor. Started during the 1920s, for example, Father Divine’s Peace Mission moved its headquarters from Sayville on Long Island to Harlem in 1932 and gained credit for feeding the masses and offering relief from widespread destitution. At about the same time, Bishop Charles Emmanuel Grace, known as “Daddy Grace,” founded the United House of Prayer of All People, opened offices in twenty cities, and offered thousands of people respite from suffering.

As African Americans used their community-based social networks and institutions to address their needs, they also turned toward the labor movement. Under the growing influence of the new CIO unions, African Americans expanded their place in the house of labor. Perhaps more than any other single figure, however, A. Philip Randolph epitomized the persistent struggle of black workers to organize in their own interests. Born in Crescent City, Florida, in 1889, Randolph had migrated to New York City in 1911 and spearheaded the formation of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and Maids in 1925. When New Deal federal legislation (the Railway Labor Act of 1934) legitimized the rights of workers to organize, Randolph and the BSCP intensified its organizing drive among black porters. By 1933, the union represented some 35,000 porters. Two years later, the union defeated a company union and won the right to represent porters at the bargaining table with management, which signed its first contract with the union in 1937. The BSCP victory not only helped to make African Americans more union conscious, but increased their impact on national labor policy.

The NAACP, Urban League, and other civil rights organizations also increased their focus on the economic plight of African Americans. In 1933, these organizations formed the Joint Committee on National Recovery (JCNR) and helped to publicize the racial inequities in New Deal programs. African Americans also launched the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign in New York, Chicago, Washington, D. C., and other cities. They boycotted white merchants who served the African-American community but refused to employ blacks except in domestic and common laborer positions. When Harlem store owners refused to negotiate, New York blacks formed the Citizens League for Fair Play and set up pickets around Blumstein’s Department Store. In 1938, their actions produced concrete results when the New York Uptown Chamber of Commerce and the Greater New York Coordinating Committee for Employment agreed to give African Americans one-third of all new retail executive, clerical, and sales jobs.

African Americans usually expressed their grievances through organized and peaceful action, but sometimes they despaired and turned to violence. Racial violence erupted in Harlem in 1935 when a rumor spread that a black youth had been brutally attacked and killed by police. Although the rumor proved false, African-American crowds soon gathered and smashed buildings and looted stores in a night of violence that left one person dead, over fifty injured, and thousands of dollars in property damage. Some blacks believed that radicalism offered the most appropriate response to the deepening crisis of African Americans. Some African Americans joined the Socialist Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU) and the Communist Alabama Sharecroppers Union. Nate Shaw (Ned Cobb), whose life became the subject of an oral biography, recalled that he had joined the sharecroppers union to fight the system that oppressed him. Shaw later recalled that he had to act because he had labored “under many rulins, just like the other Negro, that I knowed was injurious to man and displeasin to God and still I had to fall back.” In Birmingham, the Communist Party’s League of Struggle for Negro Rights (LSNR) and its energetic fight on behalf of the Scottsboro Boys also attracted unemployed workers, such as Al Murphy and Hosea
Hudson. As Hudson put it, “I always did resent injustice and the way they used to treat Negroes. . . . My grandmother used to talk about these things. She was very militant herself, you know.”

BLACKS AND THE NEW DEAL COALITION

Although some blacks joined radical social movements and parties, most worked hard to broaden their participation in the New Deal coalition. As Republicans continued to take black votes for granted, blacks increasingly turned toward the northern wing of the Democratic Party. As early as 1932, the editor of the black weekly Pittsburgh Courier had urged African Americans to change their political affiliation: “My friends, go turn Lincoln’s picture to the wall . . . that debt has been paid in full.” By the mid-1930s, nearly forty-five blacks had received appointments to New Deal agencies. Referred to as the Black Cabinet, these black advisors included Robert L. Vann, editor of the Pittsburgh Courier, Robert C. Weaver, an economist, and Mary McCleod Bethune, founder of Bethune-Cookman College in Florida. In 1936, African Americans formed the National Negro Congress (NNC), which aimed to unite all existing political, fraternal, and religious organizations and push for policies designed to bring about the full socioeconomic recovery of the black community. Spearheaded by Ralph Bunche, a professor of political science at Howard University in Washington, D.C., and John Davis, executive secretary of the Joint Committee on National Recovery, the founding meeting of the NNC brought together some six hundred organizations and selected A. Philip Randolph as its first president. The NNC symbolized as well as promoted the growing political mobilization of the African-American community. In the presidential election of 1936, African Americans voted for the Democratic Party in record numbers; Roosevelt received 76 percent of northern black votes.

After the election of 1936, African Americans intensified demands on Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. They placed justice before the law high on their list of priorities. As early as 1933, the NAACP organized a Writers League Against Lynching and intensified its national movement for a federal anti-lynching law. The Costigan-Wagner anti-lynching bill gained little support from Roosevelt and failed when southern senators filibustered the measure in 1934, 1935, 1937, 1938, and 1940. Despite failure to pass a federal anti-lynching law, partly because of the campaign, the number of recorded lynchings dropped from eighteen in 1935 to two in 1939.

During the 1930s, black attorneys like Charles Hamilton Houston and William Hastie assaulted the legal supports of Jim Crow, while black historians, social scientists, and writers challenged its intellectual underpinnings. Under the leadership of historian Carter G. Woodson, the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History (founded in 1915) continued to promote the study of African-American history, emphasizing the role of blacks in the development of the nation. African-American intellectuals (e.g., E. Franklin Frazier, W. E. B. Du Bois, Charles S. Johnson, Langston Hughes, and Richard Wright) reinforced the work of Carter G. Woodson.

As suggested by the role of black intellectuals and attorneys on the one hand and the rent parties of poor and working-class blacks on the other, African-American responses to poverty were by no means uniform. They varied across class, gender, and generational lines. Women manipulated household resources, while black men predominated in the organized labor and civil rights movements. Moreover, elite men dominated the leadership positions of civil rights and social service organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League. Yet, African Americans during the period were united through a common history, color, and culture. The emergence of Joe Louis as a folk hero symbolized African Americans’ sense of common plight, kinship, and future. The exploits of Louis helped to unify African Americans and gave them hope that they could demolish the segregationist system. When Joe Louis lost, African Americans lamented, as in his first fight with the German Max Schmeling, who symbolized Adolf Hitler’s doctrine of Aryan supremacy. When Louis knocked out Max Schmeling in the first round of their rematch, black people celebrated. The singer Lena Horne later recalled that Joe Louis “was the one invincible Negro, the one who stood up to the white man and beat
him down with his fists. He in a sense carried so
many of our hopes, maybe even dreams of ven-
geance.”

Despite the transition from a raw deal to a new
deal between 1935 and 1939, the persistence of ra-
cial discrimination within and outside governmen-
tal agencies limited the achievements of the Roose-
veld administration. As whites returned to full-time
employment during the late 1930s, African Ameri-
cans remained dependent on public service and re-
lief programs. While the CIO aided blacks who
were fortunate enough to maintain or regain their
jobs during the Depression years, it did little to en-
hance the equitable reemployment of black and
white workers as the country slowly pulled itself out
of the Depression. The Communist Party helped to
change attitudes toward racial unity, but the bene-
fits of such changes were largely symbolic as racial
injustice continued to undermine the material posi-
tion of African Americans. As the nation increas-
ingly mobilized for War after 1939, African Ameri-
cans resolved that World War II would be fought on
two fronts. They wanted a “Double-V,” victory at
home and victory abroad.

See Also: AMERICAN NEGRO LABOR CONGRESS
(ANLC); BLACK CABINET; BLACK METROPOLIS;
BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS
(BSCP); LYNCHINGS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE
(NAACP); NATIONAL NEGRO CONGRESS;
SCOTTSBORO CASE.

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**J**OE W. TROTTER

**AGEE, JAMES**

James Rufus Agee (November 27, 1909–May 16, 1955) was a gifted man of letters who in his brief but intense life left an indelible touch on a variety of literary forms: poetry, novels, film criticism, screenplays, essays, and journalism. Born in Knoxville, Tennessee, Agee was one of America’s best film critics (for *Time* and *The Nation*, 1941–1948), and the first to raise the mechanics of weekly reviewing to the level of prose art. His scripts for such films as *The African Queen* (1951) and *The Night of the Hunter* (1955) were generally judged superior to their novelistic sources. His posthumous autobiographical novel, *A Death in the Family* (1957), which won the 1958 Pulitzer Prize for fiction, remains a much-loved period evocation of southern Americana, as well as an aching memoir of parents, children, and the negotiation of loss. Arguably, his greatest achievement was a product of his late youth, the Depression-era classic *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1941), co-authored with the photographer Walker Evans. Part anatomy of the impoverished conditions surrounding a tenant farmer’s life, part poetic and metaphysical inquiry into the mysteries of existence, part intimate confession of the author’s search for his aesthetic identity and family roots, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* is a book like no other. Admittedly unclassifiable, it is without doubt one of the most brilliant and original junctures of image and text in the annals of mixed media creation.

In the summer of 1936, *Fortune* magazine sent Agee and Evans to the South “to prepare an article on cotton tenantry in the United States.” The co-authors spent approximately six weeks on assignment, much of the time actually living with three tenant families in Hale County, Alabama. Agee meant for the resulting text of almost five hundred pages and Evans’s thirty-one plates (later expanded to sixty-two) to be understood as analogous but very different views of the same subject. Accordingly, the images were lucid, surgical, and selfless, while the prose was turbulent, extravagant, and self-reflexive. Evans’s models were connoisseurs of fact, the photographers Eugène Atget and Matthew Brady; Agee’s were visionary poets, William Shakespeare, Walt Whitman, and William Blake. Occasionally self-indulgent, the author’s language is frequently breathtaking in its intellectual passion, moral force, and near holographic reproduction of the physical reality. Equally characteristic is the way Agee refuses to view the farmer as a ready-made protest symbol, or in any way as an applicant for the reader’s pity or patronization. *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* remains honorably distinct in the literature of the Depression in its vision of the imperiled family as exalted in tragedy, inheritors of a moral aristocracy, and virtual gods in ruins.

*See Also:* EVANS, WALKER.

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**ALAN SPIEGEL**
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT

The Agricultural Adjustment Act was signed into law on May 12, 1933, and was a crucial part of the New Deal recovery program of the First Hundred Days. It passed Congress after many weeks of debate between the Roosevelt administration, farm organization leaders, and agrarian militants and their representatives in Congress. Led by Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, the administration wanted a farm program based on voluntary production controls. Farmers who agreed to curtail production would receive a benefit payment financed by a tax on agricultural processors, such as flour millers. The amount the farmers would curtail production would be determined by a decentralized system of farmer committees in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. Led by Wallace and his advisers, the Farmers would reduce the massive surpluses glutting American markets and engage farmers themselves in the administration of the new farm program. Farm leaders wanted a price-raising measure to boost prices and incomes, but they were reluctant to endorse production controls for fear such measures would entail a large bureaucracy. Agrarian militants also opposed production controls and demanded some form of currency inflation and the power for government-mandated prices to bring about immediate increases in farm income. While Congress debated the bill, frustrated farmers in the Midwest launched farm strikes and mortgage foreclosure protests that sometimes turned violent.

In its final form, Title I of the act authorized the secretary of agriculture to create a production control program for eight major commodities and to impose a tax on the processors of these commodities. It also authorized the secretary to establish marketing agreements among producers of other commodities, such as dairy goods, in order to permit greater control over production and distribution. It committed the Department of Agriculture to raising farm prices to a level that would gain farmers the same purchasing power they had enjoyed for the years 1909 to 1914 in order to achieve “parity” between the farm and non-farm economies. Title II became the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, which authorized emergency mortgage loan refinancing. Title III, introduced by Senator Elmer Thomas, a Democrat from Oklahoma, granted the president discretionary power to undertake currency inflation and to reduce the gold content of the dollar. The act became the basis for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. On January 6, 1936, the Supreme Court ruled the processing tax and production control features of the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional in the Butler decision.

The act advanced farm policy beyond the failed actions of the Hoover administration’s Federal Farm Board, made possible programs that contained farm protest movements, and initiated a fundamental change in the role of the federal government in the American farm economy.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); FARM POLICY; HUNDRED DAYS.

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DAVID HAMILTON

AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA)

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) was established in 1933 to carry out the production control and marketing agreement provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Unlike the Federal Farm Board of the Herbert Hoover administration, the AAA was made a part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The AAA was originally conceived as an emergency program to meet the farm crisis of the Great Depression, but it evolved
into a permanent system of price and income supports for American farmers. Although much criticized, the AAA was able to resuscitate a devastated system of agriculture and overcome the deep-rooted constitutional and political obstacles to an enlarged role for the federal government in American life.

THE CRISIS, CHALLENGES, AND PROGRAMS

At the start of the New Deal, agriculture’s condition was grim. Prices of staple commodities and annual farm incomes were lower than they had been in decades; the farm credit system had nearly ceased to function, and massive unemployment and a gnarled system of international trade were depressing prices and causing commodity stocks to pile up. The effects of the deflation were brutal because farmers could not shield themselves from credit and price risks in the increasingly capital-intensive farm economy of the twentieth century. How to respond to the immediate crisis and how to rebuild the farm economy posed formidable challenges because of deeply ingrained fears that governmental programs would mean the creation of
coercive bureaucracies, and maybe even a police state, in agriculture.

Deep divisions over the AAA's objectives further complicated its task. Farmers, farm leaders, members of Congress, and some USDA officials wanted the AAA to restore farm purchasing power to the more profitable levels of the 1909 to 1914 period, or what had come to be known as *parity* price levels. Major figures within the Department of Agriculture, including the economists M. L. Wilson, Mordecai Ezekiel, and Howard Tolley, saw the AAA as an short-term “adjustment” program that would stabilize the farm economy and serve as a transition to a long-term farm program based on trade liberalization, land use planning, and soil conservation. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace hoped for both higher incomes and long-term adjustments.

From 1933 through 1935, the AAA focused on establishing production control programs for wheat, cotton, tobacco, hogs, corn, milk and milk products, rice, and potatoes. Participation was to be voluntary and farmers who agreed to cooperate would be paid a benefit payment for reducing acreage. The payments were financed by a tax on the processors of agricultural goods. The program would be administered through a decentralized system of farmer committees in collaboration with county extension agents, land-grant universities, and the USDA. Curtailed production would improve domestic prices while the benefit payments would supply desperate farmers with immediate income. The cooperative and voluntary nature of the program, Wallace and other USDA officials hoped, would create new forms of grassroots democracy within agriculture.

Implementing the AAA programs was an unprecedented undertaking. It required establishing a three-year production base for all participating farmers, determining how much each farm would have to cut back on acreage, ensuring compliance, allocating benefit payments, and adjudicating disputes. This array of tasks was made easier by the prior development of the Department of Agriculture’s data-gathering capabilities, its county and state extension system, and its economic research divisions, but even so the AAA administrators faced constant challenges.

**CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION**

The AAA was engulfed in controversy from the start. Faced with gluts of hogs and cotton before production controls could be instituted, the AAA paid producers to slaughter pigs and plow up planted cotton. Critics denounced these attempts to create artificial scarcities when many millions of Americans were in need of food and clothing. Internal policy divisions marred the AAA’s early months as well. Its first administrator, George N. Peek, was a prominent farm leader who objected to the emphasis on production controls and frequently clashed with Wallace. He resigned after seven months and was replaced by Chester Davis, also a farm leader, but one who was more sympathetic to reducing acreage. Under Davis, the AAA’s cotton program became the center of a national controversy when southern landlords began exploiting the production control contracts to evict sharecroppers or deny them an equitable distribution of AAA benefit payments. Davis investigated but, in spite of extensive evidence indicating wholesale violations of the contracts by growers, he was unwilling to impose new rules that would protect the South’s rural poor. When Jerome Frank, the head of the AAA’s legal division, tried to impose a stricter interpretation of the contract for the benefit of tenants and sharecroppers in 1935, Davis responded by hastily firing Frank and many of his staff. The New Deal then tried to address rural poverty outside the AAA by creating first the Resettlement Administration in 1935 and then the Farm Security Administration in 1937.

Economic and political crises also forced frequent changes in AAA policies and programs. In October and November of 1933, a sharp increase in the prices of manufactured goods, caused in part by the policies of the National Recovery Administration, brought new threats of farm strikes and demands for currency inflation and price-fixing. President Roosevelt responded to the protests with an executive order creating the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to make commodity loans to farmers and to serve as an adjunct to AAA programs. The CCC could establish loan rates for commodities, and if prices fell below the rate, farmers did not have to repay the loan. Political pressure from growers also minimized the voluntary features...
of some commodity programs. Angry at the effect non-cooperators were having on prices, growers of potatoes, tobacco, and cotton succeeded in pressuring Congress in 1934 and 1935 to make participation in their acreage control programs virtually mandatory.

The processors and the Supreme Court posed a more formidable problem. Bitterly resentful at having to pay the processing tax, the middlemen challenged its constitutionality and in a six to three vote the Supreme Court ruled in their favor in the United States v. Butler decision of January 6, 1936. During the nearly three years before Butler, the AAA succeeded in injecting $1.1 billion in benefit payments into the farm economy and contributed to a modest but desperately needed $2.5 billion increase in gross farm income. The AAA did succeed in involving many thousands for farmers in its committee system, but the results were not always what the advocates of grassroots planning had envisioned. In the south, the committees empowered white landlords who took advantage of black and white tenants and sharecroppers. The AAA also encouraged a dramatic growth in American Farm Bureau Federation membership, which in turn fostered a narrow interest group orientation on the part of many farmers.

Following Butler, AAA programs shifted yet again. In response to the devastating droughts of 1934 and 1936, which had greatly curtailed grain production, Henry Wallace began to advocate the creation of an Ever-Normal Granary. This would involve extensive CCC commodity loans and storage operations, which, Wallace argued, would ensure stable food supplies and also help maintain higher levels of farm income. In addition, Congress approved the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (1936), which authorized the AAA to pay farmers to shift some portion of their acreage to soil-conserving crops in place of surplus commodities. In 1937 Wallace campaigned for a more extensive farm bill, which became the second Agricultural Adjustment Act (1938). The act formally established the CCC commodity loans and crop storage programs, provided conservation payments for growers who restricted production, established a system of crop insurance, and provided mandatory production controls, or marketing quotas, if two-thirds of the producers of a commodity voted to accept them. The act was a compromise between Wallace, who favored price supports as a means of establishing economic security for farmers, and the Farm Bureau, which wanted rigid production controls and high price-support loans to ensure parity prices.

Unlike the original Agricultural Adjustment Act, the second act envisioned the Department of Agriculture having a permanent role in supporting farm prices and incomes. The efficacy of the new tools, however, was almost immediately overwhelmed by the combination of an economic recession, favorable growing weather, and a deteriorating world trade situation. Faced with a new round of crises, the AAA and the CCC struggled to sustain prices and needed both supplemental appropriations from Congress and massive export subsidies for wheat, cotton, and corn to avoid sharp price breaks. Only the sudden increase in wartime demand prevented a major farm crisis at the start of the 1940s.

ASSESSMENT

Economists have criticized the AAA for its ineffective production controls, for limiting American agricultural exports by pushing U.S. prices out of line with world prices, and for impeding adjustments in crop and livestock specializations. Historians and other critics have criticized the AAA for programs that benefited successful commercial farmers at the expense of the rural poor and for spurring the growth of narrowly focused farm interest groups. Such criticisms have validity, but they should not obscure the fact that the AAA ended the catastrophic unraveling of the farm economy during the early Depression years, allowed many farmers to survive the 1930s, and stabilized the farm economy in ways that encouraged new investment in tractors and technology later in the decade. Nor should the AAA’s critics overlook the limited tools and strategies available for devising a farm program amidst the Great Depression.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT; COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION (CCC); FARM POLICY; SUPREME COURT.
AGRICULTURE

Agriculture underwent fundamental changes during the Great Depression because of the crushing need of farmers to find relief from severe economic hardship and their need to make adjustments to their new position in American society. American farmers had been shifting away from self-sufficiency to commercialism since the Civil War, but the speed of the process began increasing at the start of the twentieth century and particularly since World War I. In the mid 1920s the prices of commodities such as wheat and cotton slipped downward, and they fell harshly in 1930. Only with World War II did substantial improvement come. During that interval the position of the farmer as an independent yeoman changed to that of a businessman dependent on government support. This development had been steadily creeping forward for the past generation, and the farmer now had to accept this role to remain a viable part of the American economy.

In 1930 agriculture found itself facing old and unresolved problems. To begin with, farm prices were simply too low. Cotton had been 28.7 cents per pound in 1924, but hit bottom at 5.9 cents in 1931, and never rose above 12.4 cents during the Depression. Wheat followed a similar pattern, rising in price but never reaching the level it had held in some years of the previous decade. Exports, long a vital part of the commodity market, also fell dramatically, but the loss of this market had begun in the 1920s, partly because of America's new position as a global creditor after World War I. This new condition, along with the country's protective tariffs, severely hampered the ability of foreign buyers to tap the U. S. market and led to the collapse of export sales in 1930. By the 1920s, furthermore, the United States had a surplus farm population, and with their incomes falling, farm workers were underemployed. In the South and Midwest, tenant farming reached high proportions, about 40 percent by 1930, and these farmers lived in extreme poverty. Once the Depression hit, consumer demand for farm produce dropped and sent agriculture spiraling downward. Since farmers had been steadily becoming less self-sufficient and more dependent on cash flow, they fell into one of their most extreme periods of hardship.

Wretched conditions in agriculture during the Depression had severe ramifications. For one thing, the rural farm population in 1930 made up about 25 percent of the total U.S. population, but a larger percentage of Americans depended on agriculture. During the past generation urban America had become more cosmopolitan, but rural residents lacked the amenities of modern living, such as electric lighting, radios, running water, adequate health care, and education. For this segment of the population, the standard of living was below the national level, and rural educational and cultural opportunities were not keeping pace. Until farm incomes im-
During the 1930s many farmers continued to rely on mules and horses to work their fields. These brothers, photographed in 1939, worked the land on their father’s farm near Outlook in Yakima county, Washington.

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proved, the gap in lifestyles between urban and rural Americans would remain. For these reasons, the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that agriculture had equal importance with industry in restoring prosperity to the nation, and therein lay one of the important Depression-era changes related to agriculture.

Under the aegis of the New Deal, numerous assistance and relief programs went into operation in hopes of bringing prosperity back to agriculture.

The price support programs, particularly the first, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), which started in 1933, and the second AAA of 1938, set a guaranteed minimum price under staple crops. New Dealers thought improvements in staple prices would also bring hikes in other agricultural goods. Along with the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), which offered farmers an opportunity to store their crops in government warehouses until commodity prices rose, the support
programs managed to raise prices, but only modestly. On the eve of America’s entry into World War II, the United States still had large surpluses, or carriesovers, in cotton, corn, and wheat.

Price supports constituted only a portion of the federal assistance programs initiated during the Depression. In 1933 the Farm Credit Administration began refinancing mortgage loans at low interest. Two years later the Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act implemented a three-year moratorium against seizure of farm property, which helped debt-laden farmers refinance their farms. That same year the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) went into operation, and the Resettlement Administration (RA) undertook to furnish assistance to small farmers trying to buy land or relocate into different areas. The RA also offered assistance to tenants and sharecroppers trying to establish their own homesteads. In 1935 Roosevelt created the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) by executive order, but Congress gave it statutory authority in 1936. The REA began a program using farmer-owned cooperatives to provide rural residents with electricity. In 1936 the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act temporarily replaced the first AAA, which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Later in 1937 the Farm Security Administration went into operation. It absorbed and expanded
the operations of the RA by offering small landowners, tenants, and sharecroppers opportunities to buy land, refurbish their homes, and participate in rural health cooperatives.

These New Deal agencies represented a new effort to extend assistance and relief to agriculture. They offered help to all classes of farmers and landowners, large and small, and to tenants and sharecroppers. Not all the agencies survived past the New Deal, but a number of them, such as the REA, continued. What was probably the most important new concept of the Depression, the introduction of subsidized farming, became a regular feature of the American economy and continued into the twenty-first century. At the close of the Depression, agriculture relied heavily on federal supports in various forms, ending the independence of farmers as individualistic yeomen. Farming was also on the road to becoming more commercial, a practice that had begun, however, prior to the Depression.

NEW AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES

Mechanization continued to advance during the Depression, though at a much slower rate. The Cotton Belt lagged drastically behind in the use of tractors and other implements owing to the technical difficulty of developing machines to pick cotton and remove weeds in cotton fields. Southern farmers continued to rely heavily on hand labor and animal power, but there were efforts nonetheless to develop a mechanical cotton picker by the Rust brothers and International Harvester. It was not

This farmer in Door county, Wisconsin, stopped cultivating his field to discuss his plans with the Farm Security Administration county supervisor in 1940. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION
until after World War II, however, that a mechanical picker became available.

In 1937 rubber tires became available for tractors, which made them more attractive for a variety of chores and tasks other than the cultivation of crops. During the nine-year period after 1930, the number of tractors used in agriculture nearly doubled; most were general purpose tractors used in the grain belt, Corn Belt, and areas of specialized production, such as dairying and vegetable farming. Improvements in other devices like water pumps, irrigation systems, and small motors also greatly aided the farmer.

Advances in seed varieties greatly aided production. Hybrid corn replaced much of the open-pollinated varieties in the Corn Belt, and wheat that was resistant to “rust” began to be more widely cultivated during the Depression. Similar progress occurred with sugar beets, soybeans, and grain sorghum. New cotton varieties resistant to wind damage encouraged the spread of cotton on the Texas plains. And California began to expand its acreage of cotton with the development of the acala variety. Research into livestock production continued with advances in cross breeding, artificial insemination, nutritional feeds, and disease prevention. All of these advances enabled farmers to obtain greater yields and thereby increase the country’s total production. As animal power declined, more land became available for food crop production rather than animal feed. By the late 1930s manpower needs were expected to drop, particularly in the southern states where advances in mechanization would soon occur.

Improvements in mechanization and technology caused farmers to have greater capital needs, shoving them into commercial operations. In order to earn profit, landowners needed to expand the size of their operations, meaning more land, larger herds of livestock, and the use of more hybrid varieties of crops. Higher production per acre and greater total volume of output became mandatory to remain a viable part of the economy.

CONCLUSION

Once war broke out in Europe in 1939 and the economy began to improve from the effects of the war, agriculture was on the threshold of entering a new era. The federal government had become a partner in farming operations. Small family farms, or “dirt farmers,” faced greater difficulty surviving in the competitive economics of commercial farming, and tenants and sharecroppers began to sense the draw of city life as the United States started industrializing for the war.

The Depression had brought recognition that agriculture needed to modernize and overcome its reliance on hand labor and animal power. It was clear that small family operations would no longer provide an adequate standard of living, and if farm residents intended to keep pace in the increasingly modern and cosmopolitan world, they would have to abandon farming or operate on a commercial basis. This process had been underway prior to the Depression, of course, but the compelling hardship of the era forced this realization upon agriculture.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT; AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION (AFBF).

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D. CLAYTON BROWN

AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (ADC)

Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, provided federal matching grants to state programs for poor, “dependent” children. Although it was one of the least controversial provisions of the 1935 law, ADC paved the way for the single-parent family entitlement (“welfare”) that has provoked so much opposition and public criticism since the Depression.

ADC federalized the state mothers’ aid programs that had been passed during the World War
The Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program was established to provide assistance to low-income families with minor children, like these in Hale county, Alabama, photographed by Walker Evans in 1936. 

I era. These were state laws mandating that local governments assist mothers in homes where the "breadwinner" was incapacitated. A product of the Progressive-era reform crusade, mothers’ aid programs were often justified as a way of keeping low-income families intact and keeping children out of institutional care. The caseloads were generally small, as authorities sought to restrict mothers’ aid to a few "deserving" recipients who conformed to middle-class norms. Mothers’ aid programs spread quickly and were implemented by nearly every state in the two decades that preceded the Great Depression. In most localities, mothers’ aid programs were administered separately from traditional public and private "general relief" programs that assisted impoverished families and single individuals.

During the early years of the Great Depression, however, it was general relief that absorbed the bulk of unemployed workers seeking aid. Mothers’ pension caseloads increased, but these programs were dwarfed by the national unemployment relief system, which by late 1932 was bankrolled in part by federal funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Mothers’ aid programs were initially not eligible to receive federal funding under the New Deal’s relief program, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration.

When the Committee on Economic Security (CES), which wrote the Social Security Act, was created in June 1934, it was assumed that state mothers’ aid programs would receive federal funds under the new legislation. This fact, coupled with the decision later in the year to abandon the federal...
general relief program, represented an abrupt about-face for the New Deal. Now so-called “categorical” programs (programs targeted to the elderly, children, and the disabled) would receive federal aid, and general assistance would be returned to the states.

The planning and legislative process that produced ADC attracted little public attention, yet there was a good deal of behind-the-scenes maneuvering for control of the program. Initially it was assumed that the United States Children’s Bureau, the federal agency that oversaw national child welfare polices, would administer ADC. Children’s Bureau officials actually wrote the initial policy draft for the CES. But these officials were a minority on the advisory committees that assisted the CES. Just prior to the submission of the legislation to Congress, the ADC program was taken from the Bureau and given to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the New Deal agency that had been administering relief since 1933. This was a small and short-lived victory for the new federal bureaucracy of the early New Deal.

Congress eventually decided to have ADC administered by a Bureau of Public Assistance located within the new Social Security Board. The Bureau of Public Assistance was also charged with administering the larger and more politically important grant program for the elderly (Old Age Assistance). ADC, as the name implied, was now targeted to children and the term “mothers’ pensions” was abandoned. Initially, federal grants provided for one-third of state program expenditures. This was expanded to a fifty-fifty matching grant in 1939.

The overall impact of the new federal program was to liberalize the mothers’ aid policies inherited from the Progressive era. To be eligible for federal aid, states were required to allocate funds for ADC and operate programs in all local areas. As a result, many states that had previously resisted appropriating funds for needy families were now forced to do so, and programs were established in many localities that had never implemented mothers’ aid. State and local policies that restricted aid to a limited number of “worthy” widows were weakened, particularly by the influx of single parents who had worked their way onto the federal general relief rolls during the early years of the Depression.

Still, ADC incorporated many of the restrictive features of the old mothers’ pension programs. No adequate standard of aid was established, and payments varied widely from state to state. States were allowed to keep traditional mothers’ aid provisions requiring that aid be given only to those who maintained a “suitable home” for their children. While such language could be used to increase benefit payments to make the homes more “suitable” (the approach federal officials advocated), it was also used to deny aid to needy applicants who did not conform to white middle-class norms. In southern states, suitable home requirements were widely used to deny aid to needy black families.

Some historians have argued that the limitations inherent in ADC and the flaws in its early implementation sowed the seeds of the modern welfare dilemma. The New Deal’s Social Security legislation, it is suggested, created a two-tiered welfare system: one set of popular national programs (old-age insurance and unemployment compensation) existing side-by-side with an unpopular and politically vulnerable welfare entitlement (ADC). Others argue that the New Deal established a limited but politically defensible entitlement for children and suggest that the “welfare explosion” of the 1960s altered the original intent of ADC. Yet all agree that the ADC policy, which received virtually no attention when the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, produced unforeseen consequences in social policy and politics.

See Also: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.

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ALABAMA SHARECROPPERS’ UNION

The Alabama Sharecroppers’ Union was the largest Communist-organized, black-led mass organization in the Deep South during the Great Depression. Composed of African-American sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and agricultural wage laborers, the union at its peak numbered an estimated ten to twelve thousand members. However, due to persistent opposition from white southerners, shifts in agricultural production, unfavorable New Deal policies, and, ultimately, lack of Communist support, the union was never able to effect permanent change in working conditions for rural blacks in the South.

Founded in 1931, the Alabama Sharecroppers’ Union was part of a larger Communist Party effort to organize African Americans as a separate group of Americans that required “liberation” from capitalist society. Most of the union’s first members were semi-independent African-American farmers and sharecroppers who had been displaced by increasing farm mechanization and depressed commodity prices. Within months of the group’s founding, many members and nonmembers had to go into hiding after local white authorities killed an African-American union leader, Ralph Gray, in a dispute over working conditions.

After Gray’s death the organization regrouped and adopted the name Sharecroppers’ Union. Fearing more white violence, the new secretary of the union, Al Murphy, an African-American Communist from Georgia, turned the group into a secret underground organization whose members were armed for self defense. Under Murphy’s leadership, the union spread into Alabama’s “black belt” counties and beyond to the Alabama-Georgia border; white violence spread along with it. A confrontation between white authorities and Sharecroppers’ Union members in Reeltown, Alabama, in 1932 left three dead and several others wounded; eventually, five Sharecroppers’ Union members were convicted and jailed for assault with a deadly weapon.

Still, the Sharecroppers’ Union continued to grow as African-American sharecroppers faced with evictions resulting from New Deal acreage reduction policies joined in large numbers. By June 1933 the union’s membership was estimated at two thousand; fifteen months later estimates ran as high as eight thousand members.

In 1934, a new white Sharecroppers’ Union leader, Clyde Johnson, tried to merge the group with the newly formed Socialist-led Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union, but the effort failed when the leadership of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union denounced the Sharecroppers’ Union as a Communist front. Meanwhile, white violence persisted. Two strikes in Alabama in the spring and summer of 1935 left six dead and dozens of strikers jailed and beaten.

In 1936 the Sharecroppers’ Union, now at its peak membership, moved into Louisiana and Mississippi as its leaders tried again to merge with the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union. When that attempt failed, the Communist Party ordered the Sharecroppers’ Union to disband. Sharecroppers and tenant farmers were transferred to the National Farmers’ Union, while the agricultural wage laborers of the Sharecroppers’ Union were told to join the Agricultural Worker’s Union, an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). However, some Sharecroppers’ Union locals in Alabama and Louisiana chose not to affiliate and remained independent into the 1940s.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; COMMUNIST PARTY; SOUTH, GREAT DEPRESSION IN THE.

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ALLEN, FREDERICK LEWIS

Frederick Lewis Allen (July 5, 1890–February 13, 1954) was a writer, magazine editor, and popular historian. The son of an Episcopalian minister, Allen was descended from a line of estimable New Englanders that went back to the Mayflower. He received a superb education at Groton School and then at Harvard University, where he helped edit the literary magazine, and earned a B.A. in English in 1912 and an M.A. in modern languages in 1913. In 1914, he was hired by the prestigious Atlantic Monthly. After working for the Council on National Defense from 1917 to 1918 and a stint as Harvard’s publicity manager from 1919 to 1923, Allen was hired as an editor for Harper’s Magazine and spent the rest of his career there, becoming Harper’s editor-in-chief in 1941. A skillful and sensitive editor, Allen attracted distinguished contributors to Harper’s and solidified the magazine’s reputation for intelligence and literary brilliance. He stole evenings and weekends from his editorial duties, however, to write the books that were to make him famous.

In 1931, Allen published his best-known work, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties. It was a remarkable survey of American popular culture from 1919 to 1929, written in a lively and engaging style, and filled with dramatic anecdotes and colorful personalities. Notable both for its acute perceptions of recent times and for its appeal to the general reading public, Only Yesterday sold more than a million copies and ran through twenty-two printings. Although Allen’s book, along with numerous other influences, may have helped to fasten to the 1920s its exuberant, carefree, jazz-age image, it should not be dismissed as mere popularization: The historian William Leuchtenburg remarked that Only Yesterday was “written in such a lively style that academicians often understate its soundness.”

Allen tried to duplicate his success with a look at the 1930s, Since Yesterday: The Nineteen-Thirties in America, published in 1940. It was inevitably a more somber and serious portrait, emphasizing economic hardship, Franklin Roosevelt, and the darkening international scene. Since Yesterday retained the absorbing literary style of the earlier work and also became a best-seller, although it never reached the success of Only Yesterday. In addition to these two works, Allen wrote three important books in his trademarked manner: The Lords of Creation (1935) was a study of Wall Street high finance, centering on the figure of J. P. Morgan, a subject to which Allen returned in The Great Pierpont Morgan (1949). Finally, Allen attempted a survey of the first half of the twentieth century in The Big Change: America Transforms Itself, 1900–1950 (1952).

Allen was respected and admired by his colleagues, not only for his literary talents, but also for his generosity, modesty, fairness, and compassion. He died in New York City at the age of sixty-three.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; HISTORY, INTERPRETATION, AND MEMORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.

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DAVID W. LEVY

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS (ACW)

Founded in 1914, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACW) was one of the nation’s first independent industrial unions. Its leadership was largely drawn from the Jewish political left, including socialists like president Sidney Hillman, anarchists, syndicalists, and others. Targeting workers in the profitable men’s clothing industry, the ACW actively organized women and immigrant—especially southern and eastern European—workers. The ACW experienced its first suc-
cesses in the 1910s, in an industry rapidly undergoing structural changes, where labor organizers were bedeviled by production divisions between “primary sector” firms like Hart, Schaffner & Marx that operated on a large-scale, rationalized shop basis, and garment industry subcontractors who engaged in the most exploitative forms of sweat-labor production. By the time of the Great Depression, the ACW had established itself as one of the leading independent industrial unions, although the most skilled workers in some shops, like cutters and tailors (called “labor aristocrats,” sometimes derisively), remained outside of the organization.

The economic contraction of the early Depression years devastated the ACW. By some estimates, only 10 percent of the members of the ACW were employed in January 1932, while union officials negotiated temporary wage cuts (euphemistically termed “loans”) to keep shops open and members employed. Both child labor and sweat labor expanded within the industry; in Baltimore, nearly 25 percent of women workers in the industry labored in illegal conditions, and enforcement of local labor codes proved impossible. Open shop employers organized to protect their interests. In New York, racketeering and criminal activity affected several locals; Hillman himself brought charges against corrupt union officials associated with the Jewish underworld. As conditions worsened, president Hillman vilified both the Herbert Hoover administration and the craft-based American Federation of Labor for their staunch adherence to the ethic of voluntarism. Militant leaders like Hillman called for a “new unionism” that linked workers’ demands to government intervention in the economy, a development realized with the 1932 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the institution of the New Deal.

The ACW was a founding member of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). With support from the CIO, the union expanded its membership, taking in garment workers in the manufacture of nightclothes, work pants, and coveralls, as well as workers in laundry and dry-cleaning establishments. The ACW successfully negotiated its first nationwide contract in 1937, including a significant wage increase. At the same time, Hillman and ACW organizers embarked on an ambitious plan to organize southern textile workers into the Textile Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC), an undertaking that achieved only moderate success despite favorable rulings from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in North Carolina and elsewhere.

By the end of the 1930s, local ACW officials often found themselves at odds with national union officials, particularly in times of economic recession when local officials negotiated “local agreements,” often calling for lower wages or “give-backs,” to the national contract. On political issues, however, the ACW rank-and-file generally worked in concert with its leadership. Like Hillman and other leaders within the union, workers had flirted with third party movements, including New York’s American Labor Party, in the mid-1930s. But most had returned to the Democratic Party by 1940, when Hillman turned the ACW annual convention into a vehicle for Roosevelt’s reelection in a grand “labor unity” pageant. Members responded enthusiastically, voting in record numbers for Roosevelt and
thus helping to further solidify the labor-government coalition that characterized much of the ACW’s activities during the Depression years.

*See Also:* AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); HILLMAN, SIDNEY; INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS UNION (ILGWU); ORGANIZED LABOR.

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NANCY QUAM-WICKHAM

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**AMERICAN EXODUS, AN**

In 1939 photographer Dorothea Lange and sociologist Paul Schuster Taylor collaborated to publish a record of their social science observations and conclusions drawn from their experiences in the Great Depression. They had collected the data for that record, *An American Exodus: A Record of Human Erosion,* over the previous five years and while traveling through rural America under the aegis of the Resettlement Administration and, after the agency’s name changed on January 1, 1937, the Farm Security Administration (RA-FSA). The book is divided into five sections: Old South, Plantation Under the Machine, Midcontinent, Dust Bowl, and Last West. All but nine of the photographs in the book are Lange’s.

Agricultural reform, the agenda of the RA-FSA, shaped *American Exodus.* Lange and Taylor concluded that the migrants who fled to California from devastated rural areas in the South and Midwest could be compared to Europeans who had fled agricultural disasters to immigrate to America. Lange and Taylor saw a close parallel to one cause of European emigration: a process of agricultural consolidation known as *enclosure,* which dissolved small family-occupied or family-owned farms into large single-owner tracts. Enclosure in America was exacerbated by secondary hardships: agricultural mechanization and disfranchisement due to the poll tax. In addition, Lange and Taylor set the book in the wider cultural narrative of Frederick Jackson Turner’s then-popular frontier thesis.

Many of the captions accompanying the photographs are descriptive of the subject of the photograph or of conditions that Lange and Taylor perceived had created the opportunity for the photograph to be taken; other captions consist of reported statistical data or historical quotes. Still others are quotations recorded by Lange and Taylor from the subjects in the photographs; some of these captions are extracts from longer statements, reproduced out of context.

Lange and Taylor had difficulty persuading a publisher to assume the expensive project. The success of John Steinbeck’s *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939) and widespread attention drawn by Carey McWilliams’s *Factories in the Field* (1939) ultimately convinced Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., to take the project on. The book’s distribution on January 19, 1940, five days before the release of John Ford’s highly popular film version of Steinbeck’s novel, gave sales a boost. Nonetheless, contemporary critics unfavorably compared Lange and Taylor’s self-styled social science reportage/argument to the compelling dramatic narrative of the Joad family, notwithstanding *American Exodus*’s subsequent and enduring critical acclaim.

With national attention turning to World War II, *An American Exodus* went quickly out of print. It was reissued by Yale University Press in 1969 for the Oakland Museum of California and was published in a facsimile edition in 1999 by Jean-Michel Place.

*See Also:* AGRICULTURE; LANGE, DOROTHEA; MIGRATION; PHOTOGRAPHY.

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KATE SAMPSELL

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION (AFBF)

Organized in 1919, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) initially sought educational and cooperative marketing solutions to the economic emergency gripping agriculture throughout the 1920s. However, as these failed and the crisis deepened, membership waned. From a 1921 high of 466,422 families, membership fell to 205,348 by 1932.

Desperate, the traditionally Republican AFBF offered its support to Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt repeatedly declared that insufficient farm income was at the root of the Depression and promised to direct the nation’s attention to the farm crisis. Even before his election, Roosevelt met with farm leaders, including AFBF President Edward O’Neal, to discuss solutions to the emergency.

What ultimately arose was the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). Allotting each producer a share of the domestic market required the involvement of tens of thousands of farmers. Counting pigs, measuring ground, and examining productivity records dictated that extension agents enlist volunteers, most of whom were farm bureau members. Indeed, some argue that the AFBF’s support for the AAA was predicated on the use of extension agents, assuming that their close association would revive flagging membership and finances.

Membership climbed steadily during the 1930s, particularly in the cotton states. Some farmers may have been misled into joining the AFBF as a presumed prerequisite for participation in the AAA. Elsewhere, membership rose with the suggestion that dues be deducted from benefit checks. Others joined hoping membership would gain them favor from county agents. In 1937, the AFBF recorded 409,766 memberships.

The substitution of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act for the AAA gained initial support from the AFBF. Both programs relied upon the oversight of county agents and their associated farm bureaus. The price supports and economic assistance provided by the Commodity Credit Corporation and the Farm Credit Administration also garnered AFBF favor. Members and leadership alike perceived of both agencies as relief mechanisms for commercially oriented, land-owning farmers. Support for the second AAA was similarly based.

Not all New Deal agricultural enterprises found favor with the AFBF. Particularly distasteful to the organization were the Resettlement Administration and its successor, the Farm Security Administration (FSA). According to the AFBF, FSA aid to tenant and small-scale farmers hindered agriculture’s recovery and prevented its efficient growth. The FSA focused more on reform than relief and did not have a particular role for county agents or farm bureau members.

Whether a response to the increased visibility of the AFBF during the New Deal years, the perceived necessity of membership in the organization, or the improved farm economy of the 1930s, membership by 1940 reached 444,485 families. By 2003 the organization had grown to 5,000,000 members.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT (AAA); FARM POLICY.

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The American Federation of Labor (AFL) began as a conservative response to earlier labor unions in the United States. Late nineteenth-century labor leaders who opposed the socialist ideals of the Knights of Labor, as well as its belief in a centralized labor movement, organized what became the AFL. The organization’s founders believed that each member union should have a considerable degree of self-rule and the power to bring its concerns and views to an executive board that would work to implement agreed upon goals. Toward that end, representatives of a number of craft unions met in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1881 and formed the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions in the United States and Canada. Five years later at a meeting in Columbus, Ohio, this group reorganized and changed its name to the American Federation of Labor. Samuel Gompers was behind the move of the cigar workers and other craft unions to make a clean break from the Knights of Labor. Gompers became the first president of the AFL and held that post, except for one year (1895), from 1886 until his death in 1924.

Under the AFL’s plan of organization, individual workers held membership in craft unions, while those unions belonged to, or were affiliated with, the AFL. These craft unions were made up of skilled workers, such as plumbers or electricians. The AFL resisted organizing or affiliating with industrial unions that were made up of all the workers in a particular industry, such as automobile workers.

In conformity with its conservative nature, the AFL refused to form a labor party, generally refrained from political action, and tended to emphasize its ability to promote labor-management harmony. Because the AFL opposed Socialist and Communist influence, it considered itself a truly American labor movement. The fact that it obtained significantly improved working conditions for its members is undeniable, and the federation pointed to its record of gaining higher wages, shorter hours, workmen’s compensation, laws against child labor, an eight-hour workday for government employees, and the exemption of labor from antitrust legislation as proof of the success of its conservatism in comparison with other unions of its day.

**THE AFL DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION**

During the Great Depression, the AFL began to chart new paths while adapting older approaches to new conditions. At the beginning of the Depression, for example, the AFL called for a broad approach that took into account production, employment, and consumption. The AFL’s program called for a federal employment service, public works, and a federal program to stabilize management and labor, with labor input. Moreover, the AFL called for the establishment of a federal bureau of labor statistics to compile accurate unemployment data.

The AFL also called on the president to establish a national relief committee, and supported Herbert Hoover’s President’s Emergency Committee on Employment. The AFL’s member unions donated time and aid to get the relief movement working, and later in the decade the federation supported what became the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, 1935), which protected organization efforts and gave unions federal protection.

Although the AFL initially rejected unemployment insurance, branding it as un-American, member unions supported it and pressed the federation’s executive council to do likewise. The council however, repeated its stand that unemployment insurance would foster idleness and retard recovery, citing the experience of Great Britain and Germany to support its opposition. During the year the AFL executive council indicated repeatedly that it would not alter its stand against unemployment insurance. The council’s further argument against unemployment insurance was that it would require registration of every worker and lead to control by federal and state governments. This control would, the council argued, lead to a limit on the rights of union workers to fight for better conditions and
would weaken unions by forcing workers to take jobs in non-union plants.

The AFL, in sum, had three basic ideas about the Depression: (1) The Depression was caused by the failure of wages and salaries to keep up with industry’s power to produce; (2) management caused the Depression because of its failure to maintain a balance between production and consumption; and (3) government had a responsibility to help workers find jobs and should push management toward adopting policies that promoted stability. To combat the effects of the Depression, the AFL urged that working hours be reduced to help stabilize industry. The federation also called for the government to establish a national economic council to maintain economic equilibrium through a national employment system, efficient industry planning for production, public works, vocational guidance and retraining, studies of technological unemployment and relief proposals, and a general program of education to meet the changing needs of industry. The AFL called, additionally, for a five-day workweek and six-hour workday. Finally, the AFL called on Hoover to convene a joint management-labor meeting to develop a plan to end the Depression.

During the Depression, the AFL began to take more notice of industrial unions. There were two major industrial unions in the AFL at the beginning of the Depression, the Brewery Workers and the United Mine Workers. The United Mine Workers, under John L. Lewis, began to push the AFL toward organizing other industrial workers, and the federation was receptive to this stimulus. The problems faced by the railway unions further moved the AFL into support of industrial unionism. The mass-production industries, including steel, automobiles, and rubber, required organization on an industry-wide basis. John L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers of America, recognized the need for industrial unions, and he became leader of the group within the AFL that formed a Committee for Industrial Organization in 1935. The CIO left the AFL in 1938, and changed its name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations, immediately launching organizing drives in the industrial sector and achieving spectacular success with the aid of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s strong support.

A large minority of the AFL’s members recognized the necessity of organizing industrial workers. The two confederations of unions remained separated until 1955 when George Meany of the AFL and Walter Reuther of the CIO led a drive to merge them. The new organization, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), elected George Meany as its president. Despite some problems, including Reuther’s withdrawal of the automobile workers and the expulsion of the Teamsters Union, the merger has held. The decline in union membership and power since the 1950s has been a major factor in keeping the AFL-CIO together.

See Also: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); GREEN,
WILLIAM; INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION; LABOR’S NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE; ORGANIZED LABOR.

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FRANK A. SALAMONE

AMERICAN GUIDE SERIES

Published between 1935 and 1943, the American Guide series of more than one thousand books and pamphlets provided travel guides of the American states, as well as the territories of Alaska and Puerto Rico. The state volumes average five hundred pages in length, and include a brief history of the state, as well as descriptions of its geography, culture, industry, and agriculture. In addition to the state guides, the series also produced shorter guides and pamphlets for major cities, including Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Philadelphia; regional guides for such areas as the Oregon Trail and U.S. Route One, which ran from Fort Kent, Maine, to Key West, Florida; and local guides to such sites as Death Valley and Mount Hood.

Produced by the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the American Guide series, like other WPA ventures, aimed to give meaningful skilled work to unemployed Americans. No comparable guide series existed, while the seemingly neutral content of the guides promised not to attract controversy. Generically, the guides represent a combination of encyclopedia and travel narrative; their prose is economical. Although the writing in most guides is not credited, the American Guide series employed the talents of more than 7,500 writers, including major figures. For instance, the Illinois guide featured the work of Richard Wright, Saul Bellow, Nelson Algren, and Jack Conroy.

The guides demonstrate Americans’ growing fascination with the country’s regional variations and its history. Each guide includes detailed directions for recommended tours of each state, thus encouraging domestic travel and tourism. The guides also represent the New Deal’s concern with regional interdependence and national planning. The series asserted the vitality of the nation during its worst economic crisis. Finally, because of its size, the series stands as a testimony to the New Dealers’ faith in large-scale projects.

See Also: FEDERAL ONE; FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT (FWP); WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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TRENT A. WATTS
AMERICAN LABOR PARTY

In 1936 it was feared that traditional anti-Tammany Democratic voting habits among New York’s immigrant and first generation working-class voters, especially Jews, might cost Franklin D. Roosevelt the electoral votes of his home state. Two pro-Roosevelt labor leaders, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union and David Dubinsky of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, formed the American Labor Party (ALP) to appeal to voters who otherwise might have voted for Socialist and even Republican candidates. The effort was successful: More than a quarter million voted for Roosevelt on the ALP line.

The formation of the ALP coincided with other third party efforts aimed at pressuring the New Deal from the left, especially the midwestern Farmer Labor Party movement. Many independent radicals, as well as members of the Communist Party, joined these movements. In New York, leftist trade unionists, Communists, and others organized local constituency clubs. In return, the ALP was courted by liberal candidates in both the major parties. In 1937, New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia, who had formed his own ad hoc “Fusion” party in his first election, and had previously run for Con-
gress on Republican and Socialist tickets, received nearly a half-million ALP votes, providing his margin of victory. La Guardia became an enrolled member of the party. The ALP also elected two New York city council members (something it continued to do for the next decade under New York’s proportional representation laws). In 1938 the ALP secured the radical Vito Marcantonio’s return to Congress.

Providing unions and community activists with an electoral voice—and maintaining an uneasy coalition of Communist and anti-Communist constituencies—the ALP championed racial equality in schools, housing, and employment, and subsidized public housing and an array of welfare programs, at the same time that it effectively muted the corrupt Tammany machine’s hold on political life. The ALP’s arrangement of constituent community service, pioneered by Marcantonio, replaced Tammany’s corrupt system, involving bribes, payoffs, and election fraud. The party also played a central role in the election of African Americans and Hispanics to the New York city council, the U.S. Congress, and the New York state legislature.

But with the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, the Communist/non-Communist split became irreparable. Marcantonio and his pro-Communist supporters gained control of the party and in 1944 the anti-Communist wing left to form the Liberal Party. The ALP provided large vote totals for Roosevelt in 1944, for Henry A. Wallace’s independent presidential candidacy in 1948, and for Marcantonio’s mayoral race in 1949. But with the Cold War, anti-Communism, and suburbanization sapping the ALP’s working-class voter base, the party vanished in the mid-fifties.

See Also: LA GUARDIA, FIORELLO H.; MARCANTONIO, VITO; ORGANIZED LABOR.

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JOHN J. SIMON

AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE

On August 22, 1934, spokesman Jouett Shouse announced the creation of the American Liberty League. According to Shouse, the group was formed to defend the Constitution, to protect private property rights, and to encourage the public to support traditional American political values. The league’s founders were disgruntled business conservatives, Wall Street financiers, right-wing opponents of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, and defeated rivals within Roosevelt’s Democratic Party. The league’s benefactors included the du Pont brothers (Pierre, Irenee, and Lammot); their business partner and former Democratic Party chairman, John J. Raskob; financier E. F. Hutton; and executive Sewell Avery of Montgomery Ward. Many of the politicians active in the league were Republicans, but more visible were anti-Roosevelt Democrats such as 1924 and 1928 presidential nominees John W. Davis and Alfred E. Smith. Many league activists had worked together earlier for the relegalization of the U. S. liquor industry through the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment.

Motivating league founders was a growing distaste of the expansion of federal power and of government intrusions upon the prerogatives of private businessmen. They condemned early New Deal relief and public jobs programs, agricultural production controls and subsidies, sponsorship of collective-bargaining rights, federal regulation of the banking and securities industries, and creation of public power facilities. Expansion in 1935 of federal regulation and taxation of business, promotion of labor rights, and income support for the poor and elderly through the Works Progress Administration, the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Wealth Tax Act infuriated leaguers even more. But critics effectively lampooned league members as champions of privilege, ungrateful critics of an administration that had saved capitalism, and vindic-
tive and selfish individuals seeking revenge on a
president for betraying his social class.

The Liberty League raised money and financed
legal critiques of New Deal measures, published
anti-New Deal pamphlets and political propagan-
da, and aided the effort to defeat Roosevelt in 1936.
Despite the organization’s help for Republican
nominee Alfred M. Landon, the incumbent won in
a landslide. With the 1936 election seen as a repudi-
ation of the league, it rapidly faded into obscurity,
playing but a minimal role in such battles as the
1937 court-packing fight. By 1940, the Liberty
League had ceased active operation. However, its
legacy of fund-raising tactics, ideology-driven is-
issues research and public education, and coordina-
tion with partisan legislative and electoral cam-
paigns foreshadowed today’s political action
committees and independent-expenditure organi-
izations.

See Also: CONSERVATIVE COALITION; ELECTION OF
1936; RASKOB, JOHN J.; SMITH, ALFRED E.

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ROBERT F. BURK

AMERICAN NEGRO LABOR CONGRESS (ANLC)

Organized in Chicago in October 1925 by the
American Communist Party and its Trade Union
Educational League, the American Negro Labor
Congress (ANLC) sought “the abolition of all dis-
crimination, persecution, and exploitation of the
Negro race and working people generally.” In a sig-
nificant shift from the party’s earlier strategy to or-
ganize black laborers along separatist black nation-
alist or “Pan-Africanist” lines in the African Blood
Brotherhood (ABB), the ANLC, led by former ABB
proponents Lovett Fort-Whiteman, H. V. Phillips,
Edward Doty, and Harry Haywood, planned to
achieve its goal by bringing black and white work-
ers and farmers together in a nondiscriminatory
trade union movement—an interracial proletarian
movement. The ANLC hoped to form local councils
in all centers of African-American population, es-
pecially in the South. The councils in turn would
form interracial labor committees to eliminate all
practices that divided black and white workers and
to support all efforts to unite them.

The few hundred black laborers who attended
the ANLC’s opening session, however, quickly be-
came disenchanted with the organization when the
evening’s entertainment turned out to be a Russian
ballet and a play by Alexander Pushkin, performed
in Russian. Only a handful attended the next day’s
organizing meeting, and even fewer local councils
were formed. The National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, the National Urban
League, and the African-American press each casti-
gated the ANLC for being under the thumb of
Communists. Lacking popular support, the
ANLC’s major activity became its opposition to the
Socialist and anti-Communist A. Philip Randolph,
the head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Por-
ters (BSCP). When the BSCP applied for affiliation
with the American Federation of Labor in 1926, the
ANLC criticized Randolph and the BSCP leaders
for selling out: “They have forsaken the militant
struggle in the interests of the workers for the policy
of class collaboration with the bosses.” By then,
however, the ANLC, beset by African-American in-
difference and disunity, as well as white hostility,
barely existed. Outside of several tiny units in Chi-
cago, only the ANLC’s official paper, the Negro
Champion, subsidized by the American Communist
Party, struggled on. After several years of stagna-

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE
GREAT DEPRESSION ON; BROTHERHOOD OF
SLEEPING CAR PORTERS (BSCP); RANDOLPH, A.
PHILIP.
The American Scene emerged in the 1920s and was related to the earlier Ashcan school of New York realists. It became the prevailing form of fine art expression during the 1930s as the economic Depression and the developing international crisis prompted American artists to become more culturally introspective and more socially committed. Echoing the New Deal’s own values, its most salient characteristics were nationalism and democracy.

The American Scene is associated most closely with the regionalist school of painters based in the Midwest, such as Thomas Hart Benton (1889–1975) of Missouri, Grant Wood (1892–1942) of Iowa, and John Steuart Curry (1897–1946) of Kansas. The regionalist artists were committed to an art of the locality and produced engaging images of their region, its landscape, and its people. Their ideal of America was rural, and it is resonant in spirit of the significance that historian Frederick Jackson Turner attached to the frontier in molding American values and institutions. Such an American particularism was often sharpened by the fact that their practice drew upon the “naïve” school of nineteenth-century American art. Unlike the “Lost Generation” of the 1920s, their work was inspired by “commitment” and a determination to engage with their society. This involved not only relating their work to “the people,” but also making it accessible for their subjects to appreciate. Its strong representational emphasis and the incorporation of readily recognizable symbols and images have given some of their work lasting iconographic significance. Wood’s American Gothic (1930), for example, has been copied, parodied, and recycled in diverse forms.

Visits to Europe during the 1920s reinforced the regionalists’ determination to work with American themes and idioms. In 1932 Benton claimed that “No American art can come to those who do not live an American life, who do not have an American psychology, who cannot find in America justification for their lives.” Modernism provoked the scorn of the regionalists. In 1935 Wood wrote a manifesto, “Revolt against the City,” which proposed that American art free itself of European influences, especially from abstractionism. The regionalists’ fierce patriotism, localism, anti-urbanism, and anti-Marxism provoked the scorn of some critics who regarded the group as parochial and complacent. Their celebration of such embattled qualities in Depression America as social order, organic community, and the work ethic was dismissed as an embittered restorationism. The regionalists were also resented because of their influence in New Deal agencies and the prestigious commissions that they received.

However, the regionalists’ work was never as uncritical or unproblematic as is often claimed. Benton’s decoration of the Missouri State Capitol in Jefferson City (1936) and Curry’s murals for the Kansas Statehouse in Topeka (1937–1942) provoked considerable controversy. Despite the regionalists’ identification with the people of the Midwest, some of their constituents complained that the murals presented them as caricatures and they objected to their states being associated with the James Brothers, John Brown, and tornadoes. Indeed, the regionalists’ anti-modernism should not be overemphasized, their rhetoric notwithstanding. In the rhythmical lines and cartoon figures of Benton’s canvases and the satirical and surreal aspects of Wood’s work, influences other than American ones are readily apparent, and it should not be forgotten that Jackson Pollock was one of Benton’s pupils. The work of Benton, Curry, and Wood was more diverse and less given to cliché than that of their many imitators who worked for the Treasury Department’s Section of Fine Arts or the WPA’s Federal Art Project.
While the American Scene is often associated with the midwestern regionalists, it should include, also, social realist artists whose outlook was more urban and whose point of view was more critical of existing institutions and values. The didactic paintings of Philip Evergood, Ben Shahn, Moses Soyer, and their metropolitan colleagues provided critiques of the capitalist system, and by affirming working-class lives and satirizing those of the upper classes, they sought to prompt militant political consciousness and action. Like the regionalists, they were committed to an aesthetic of place and to the principle of relating their work to ordinary people, although their focus was upon the everyday experience of the urban working class and the impact of the Depression upon them. Stylistic accessibility was also essential for art as a political project and the social realists condemned the development of modernist abstractionism as politically and socially irrelevant. Although some social realists hoped that the people would become their patrons under the auspices of the union movement, more artists gained the opportunity to communicate to a wider public through federal employment. Their style was ubiquitous, although necessarily politically constrained, and social realists received major commissions, such as Shahn’s decoration of the Social Security Building in Washington, D.C. (1941–1942).

Both groups became objects of growing criticism as the decade progressed and they came to be associated with representational art in totalitarian states. According to the influential critic Clement Greenberg, “art for the millions” was tantamount to “kitsch” that could be manipulated by the state for its own purposes. He believed that cultural preservation and progress was possible only through the promotion of a politically innocent avant-garde. It is ironic that for all the strident Americanism of the 1930s, it would be abstract expressionism that would become recognized globally as the first truly authentic American form of art.

See Also: ART; FEDERAL ART PROJECT (FAP).

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AMERICAN STUDENT UNION

The Depression decade witnessed the rise of the first mass student protest movement in American history. This movement, which crusaded against war and fascism, and initially promoted a political agenda to the left of the New Deal, was led by the American Student Union (ASU), the largest U.S. student activist organization of its time (1935–1941). At its peak years of influence in the mid and late 1930s, the ASU had some 20,000 members, mobilized almost half the nation’s college students in antiwar protests, lobbied for greater federal aid to low income students and unemployed youth, became a campus voice for racial equality and workers’ rights, championed student free speech rights, attracted the support of Eleanor Roosevelt, and even generated student activism in some of the nation’s high schools.

Although it arose during the Depression, the ASU-led student movement’s most massive mobilizations focused on peace rather than the economy. Convinced that World War I had served plutocracy rather than democracy, and had paved the way for the rise of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, many college students embraced isolationism, pacifism, and anti-interventionism. This antiwar mood facilitated the rise of a mass peace movement on campus, which beginning in 1934 featured the first
national student strikes in American history, annual one-hour peace rallies, and boycotts of classes held on the anniversary of U.S. intervention in World War I. These strikes, which mobilized 25,000 students in April 1934 and more than 100,000 students in 1935, were organized by the Communist-led National Student League (NSL) and the Socialist-led Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). The success of these strikes, together with the Communists’ new Popular Front movement, which urged unity against fascism, led NSL and SLID to merge into the ASU during a national unity convention of student activists in Columbus, Ohio, in December 1935. The ASU’s biggest successes in its early life were the 1936 and 1937 antia war strikes, each of which rallied more than 500,000 students for peace.

The ASU was emblematic of the shift leftward of American student politics in the 1930s, marking a sharp break with the conservatism that had dominated the campuses in the 1920s, when students endorsed Republican presidential candidates by even larger majorities than did the American electorate. Although its leaders were predominantly leftists, the ASU found much common ground with liberals as it urged students to show solidarity with the burgeoning labor movement, supported the New Deal’s more egalitarian measures, and criticized racial discrimination both on campus and off. With this kind of left–liberal ideology setting the tone of campus politics, Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 became the first Democratic presidential candidate in decades to win a plurality of the national student straw vote. It is little wonder, then, that Eleanor Roosevelt, attracted by their youthful idealism, befriended several ASU leaders, worked with them in their campaign to expand federal aid to needy students, and defended them when they were attacked by the red-hunting House Committee on Un-American Activities.

International events, most notably the Spanish Civil War, rocked the ASU and the student peace movement and undermined their anti-interventionist ethos. That war seemed to prove that U.S. neutrality could not preserve peace, for while the United States embargoed the Spanish Republic, Hitler gave military assistance to the fascist rebels who ultimately crushed the young republic. The ASU, influenced by these events—especially by the deaths of several ASU members who joined the International Brigade in its fight to save the Spanish Republic—and by the Popular Front line of the Comintern, shifted its emphasis from anti-interventionism to collective security against fascism. Although this shift alienated left–wing socialists, pacifists, and isolationists, it conferred upon the ASU the elan of being at the forefront of the battle against Hitlerism.

The ASU’s demise was rooted in the machinations of its Communist faction, which forced the organization into a series of disastrous flipflops on foreign policy. This began in fall 1939 when, in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the ASU dropped its anti-fascism in favor of an isolationist “Yanks Are Not Coming” position at a time when Hitler seemed more threatening than ever. This, together with the ASU’s refusal to criticize the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1940—which found an ostensibly antia war organization unwilling to protest Stalin’s military aggression—discredited the ASU with both mainstream students and such key liberal allies as Dorothy Blake, who saw the organization as a puppet of the USSR and the American Communist Party, causing the collapse of the ASU by the time the United States entered World War II. Not until the 1960s would a student organization duplicate the ASU’s initial success in leading a mass protest movement on American campuses.

See Also: AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS; COMMUNIST PARTY; FASCISM; PEACE MOVEMENT.

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Coming of age at a time of war crises abroad and economic crisis at home, Depression generation youth embraced new forms of political activism. They organized, for the first time in American history, a national youth lobby, the American Youth Congress (AYC), which promoted a left-liberal agenda, demanding expanded government assistance to underprivileged youth and rallying against war and fascism. At its peak in the late 1930s the AYC assembled a broadly based youth coalition, which claimed to represent some 4.5 million young Americans from civil rights, labor, student, religious, fraternal, political party, and peace organizations. Arising in an era when the voting age was twenty-one, and in a political system that had traditionally ignored young people—especially blue collar, unemployed, student, and minority youth—the AYC found daring and effective ways to give voice to the needs of the young. The AYC organized the first national youth marches on Washington (demanding jobs and education), held international congresses of young people, and sponsored its own youth assistance legislation—the American Youth Act. This activism made headlines and for a time attracted influential allies to the AYC, most notably First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, who befriended AYC national officers, raised money for the Youth Congress, attended some of its meetings, and defended the Youth Congress’s leaders when they came under attack by the red-hunting House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Although the Youth Congress’s founder, Viola Ilma, was a political moderate, the organization would be dominated by the Left, beginning at its first national meeting in 1934 when Ilma was ousted from the Congress’s leadership by a coalition headed by young Communists and Socialists. Reflecting the radicalism of this new leadership, the AYC was initially critical of the New Deal for failing to solve the problems of unemployed youth and needy students and for its other shortcomings, including its refusal to challenge the discriminatory racial practices of the Jim Crow South. Complaining that the National Youth Administration (NYA), the New Deal’s primary youth relief organization, assisted only a fraction of the five to eight million unemployed young Americans and that NYA work-study jobs were too few to assist most low income students, the Youth Congress in 1935 wrote the American Youth Act as an alternative to the NYA. Unlike the NYA, the Youth Act would have helped all unemployed youth and needy students. But the Youth Act proved too expensive to ever get out of committee on Capitol Hill. Critics estimated that its annual cost would have been $3.5 billion, as opposed to the $50 million allocated to the NYA.

Even though the Youth Act never became law, the AYC’s campaign for this legislation, which included a national march of some three thousand young people on Washington in 1937, helped to spotlight the problems of Depression-era youth, calling attention to the “youth crisis”—the lack of employment and educational opportunity that confronted millions of young Americans in the 1930s. By raising public awareness of the need for expanding federal aid to low income youth, the AYC helped to sustain a political climate friendly to the New Deal’s youth program. Indeed, by 1938, the Youth Congress had dropped its advocacy of the American Youth Act and instead campaigned for an expanded NYA. This growing alliance with the New Deal emerged because the Youth Congress was concerned about Republican threats to cut the NYA and because the AYC’s influential Communist faction—in accord with the new Comintern line advocating liberal-radical unity against fascism—embraced Franklin Roosevelt and stressed the need to defend the New Deal from the forces of reaction. The high point of the AYC’s alliance with the Roosevelt administration came in summer 1938 when Eleanor Roosevelt played a prominent role at the AYC-sponsored World Youth Congress meeting, which united young people from around the world on behalf of a progressive antifascist platform.

The AYC’s alliance with the Roosevelt administration collapsed in a very public way during the Youth Congress Citizenship Institute in February
1940, sending the AYC into a tailspin from which it would never recover. Five thousand Youth Congress delegates had come to Washington for this Citizenship Institute, which was supposed to be a pro-New Deal event, teaching young people about government and involving them in lobbying for federal jobs and student aid programs. But the AYC’s Communist faction—having dropped its antifascism in the wake of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact—converted the Institute into a demonstration against Roosevelt’s foreign policies, especially his opposition to the Soviet invasion of Finland. President Roosevelt, irritated that the Youth Congress had portrayed him as an imperialist war monger merely because he had criticized that invasion, responded by delivering an angry speech to the Institute delegates who had assembled on the White House lawn. Roosevelt told the delegates and a national radio audience that the Youth Congress’s charge that he was seeking war with Russia was “unadulterated twaddle.” This and other criticisms that Roosevelt made of the Youth Congress and of the Soviet Union provoked the Communists in the crowd to raucous booing, and a similar response followed when Eleanor Roosevelt addressed the delegates. This public relations disaster, the Youth Congress’s flipflop on antifascism, and the organization’s refusal to criticize Soviet policy, led young people to abandon what once had been Depression America’s most dynamic youth lobby. With the collapse of the AYC both the American Left and the younger generation lost an invaluable political asset, for the Youth Congress had represented one of the most diverse movements of young Americans—uniting black and white, rural and urban, student and nonstudent, religious and secular, lower and middle-class, immigrant and old stock, liberal and radical—even to organize on behalf of egalitarian social change.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; NATIONAL YOUTH ADMINISTRATION (NYA).

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ROBERT COHEN

AMERINGER, OSCAR

Oscar Ameringer (August 4, 1870–November 5, 1943) was a Socialist labor organizer, journalist, and architect of the Socialist Party in Oklahoma. Born in Germany, Ameringer immigrated to Cincinnati, Ohio, as a teenager, furthering his education at public libraries. He made unsuccessful bids for the Ohio legislature and mayoralty of Columbus. Married to Lulu Woods, he fathered three sons and supported his family by selling insurance. In 1901, Ameringer joined the Socialist Party and embarked on full-time labor activism.

In 1934 and 1935, H. L. Mitchell and Clay East, founders of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union, turned to Ameringer’s organizing tactics and writings for guidance. Ameringer had organized poverty-stricken Oklahoma tenant farmers by blending Jeffersonian theories, Socialist positions, Marxist philosophy, and homespun humor into a unique agrarian socialism. Ameringer reached rural people through speaker encampments and numerous publications. Although Ameringer lost the 1911 race to become mayor of Oklahoma City by a narrow margin, by 1914 he had so broadened the appeal of the Socialist Party that it won six seats in the state legislature. Rebuilding after World War I, Ameringer merged socialists with progressives in the Farmer-
Labor Reconstruction League to win the Oklahoma governorship for the Democrat fusion candidate, John Walton.

Throughout the 1930s, Ameringer, with his second wife, Freda Hogan, published a variety of newspapers, including the influential weekly *The American Guardian*. His acclaimed columns, written under the cryptic pseudonym Adam Coaldigger, reached across the United States. Ameringer supported Frank Farrington over John L. Lewis for control of the United Mine Workers, losing an Illinois publication because of the schism. Ameringer campaigned extensively for Socialist candidates in other states, and he testified about the desperation of labor before the House Subcommittee on Unemployment in 1932. Borrowing $55,000, he launched an agricultural relocation project in Louisiana on behalf of destitute miners and farmers. The enterprise succeeded without endorsement from the New Deal Resettlement Administration. By the end of the 1930s, Ameringer had completed his memoirs, *If You Don’t Weaken*, found rapprochement with John L. Lewis’s leadership, and expressed interest in the War Resisters League.

See Also: SOCIALIST PARTY; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).

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LINDA REESE

AMES, JESSE DANIEL

Jesse Daniel Ames (November 2, 1883–February 21, 1972) was a southern progressive, suffragist, and proponent of rights for African Americans. Ames rose to national prominence as an anti-lynching advocate during the 1930s. She was born in Palestine, Texas, the third of James and Laura Daniel’s four children. Three years after graduating from the “ladies annex” of the local college in 1902, she married army surgeon Roger Post Ames. When Roger died in 1914, Ames entered into a life of social reform, eventually holding a leadership position in the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC).

In 1930, Ames founded the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL). As historian Jacquelyn Hall explains, Ames believed that lynchers justified their crimes on cultural assumptions that degraded white women as well as black men. A women’s campaign to end lynching, Ames contended, could be particularly effective in exposing the myths that gave rise to “lynch law” in the South.

Historian Christopher Waldrep notes that Ames’s narrow definition of the crime was central to her efforts to achieve a lynchless year in the United States. She held to the popular view that a murder could be considered a lynching only if it received community sanction. Her reform tactics thus centered on efforts to deprive lynchers of a supportive environment in which to operate. Ames believed that whites would cease to lynch if they thought they no longer had the community’s backing. A strict definition ensured that newspaper accounts of lynching would be rare, suggesting that most southern whites did not consider the practice normal or routine. Stripped of a supportive environment, whites would hesitate to lynch, according to Ames. The ASWPL’s goal of a lynchless year, as Waldrep notes, demanded this narrow definition.

Ames’s insistence on a strict definition of lynching increasingly put her at odds with other anti-lynching activists. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for example, pushed for a broadened definition as it vied for members with rival organizations on the left that sought to eclipse it as the premier anti-lynching organization and defender of African-American rights. The NAACP eventually abandoned the established view of lynching, arguing instead that race-based murders perpetrated by individuals who operated without community support should be considered lynchings. The dispute be-
tween ASWPL and the NAACP revealed a fundamental difference in the way in which the two organizations understood the nature of the crisis confronting the New South. Ames and the ASWPL saw lynching as a blight on an otherwise healthy southern society, whereas the NAACP regarded the crime as merely symptomatic of a larger problem. The NAACP recognized that the abolition of lynching would not necessarily signal an end to the pervasive and intractable racism that plagued the South. Ames’s definition, however, proved the more persuasive.

On May 9, 1940, Ames announced that for the first time in the history of the New South a year had passed without a single lynching. Defenders of the more expansive definition, however, argued that Ames’s pronouncement was premature. As Waldrep suggests, the debate has endured.

Ames’s 1940 announcement that the ASWPL had reached its goal signaled the beginning of the end of the organization. Ames returned to her work in the CIC but felt increasingly at odds with those directing the course of modern liberalism. Ames, forced to retreat from the national political scene, turned her attention to local reform and to the strained relationship with her family. She died in an Austin, Texas, nursing home in 1972.

See Also: ANTI-LYNCHING LEGISLATION; LYNCHINGS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP).

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Sarah E. Gardner

AMOS ‘N’ ANDY

Amos ‘n’ Andy, the first and most popular daily series in the history of radio, made its debut on the NBC Blue network in August 1929, some ten weeks before the stock market crash. The comedy series, in which two white actors played a pair of African-American migrants to the big city, sometimes commented on the Great Depression. The program’s characters occasionally talked about the need for citizens to spend money to boost the economy, and some of their adventures in the mid-1930s revolved around a fictional New Deal-era model town called Weber City. Andy’s self-important but incompetent performance as “president” of the pair’s perennially cash-strapped one-car Fresh Air Taxicab Company seemed to satirize the pretensions of business executives who had promised the moon in the 1920s and then helped lead the country into economic disaster.

Amos ‘n’ Andy’s creators developed their major themes and characterizations and built the show into a national sensation before it reached NBC, and before the Depression began. Though some historians identify the series as the quintessential Depression comedy, the mid and latter 1930s actually saw the show’s nightly audience of forty million dwindle.

Amos ‘n’ Andy’s history began when Freeman Gosden and Charles Correll, former professional directors of minstrel shows, created a series called Sam ‘n’ Henry for a Chicago radio station in 1926. They changed stations and renamed the show Amos ‘n’ Andy in 1928, and moved to the network the following year. The pair adopted many comic stereotypes of African Americans from minstrel shows and vaudeville. But Gosden and Correll also used their continuing storyline to develop vivid characters with universal human traits; they won listeners ranging from ultra-racists to outspoken racial egalitarians such as Eleanor Roosevelt. Amos ‘n’ Andy’s creators were also the first popular artists to depict, however distortedly, characters experiencing the era’s most profound change in African-American life—the great migration to northern cities, which had begun during World War I and renewed itself in the 1930s.
The responses of African Americans to the series likewise reflected Depression-era tensions that had deeper roots. Many eagerly tuned in to *Amos ’n’ Andy*, hearing in it elements of genuine African-American humor, while other black individuals and institutions protested that the series slandered African Americans’ intelligence and economic strivings. That debate, like *Amos ’n’ Andy* itself, outlived the Great Depression; the show remained on radio in one form or another until 1960 and spawned a televised version, and a new black protest, in the early 1950s.

*See Also:* RADIO.

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MELVIN PATRICK ELY

**MARIAN ANDERSON**

Marian Anderson (February 27, 1897–April 8, 1993), best known as an opera singer, broke the color barrier when she performed on Easter Sunday in 1939 at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington,
Marian Anderson, 1937. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, NEW YORK WORLD-TELEGRAM AND THE SUN NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTION

D.C., marking the symbolic beginning of the civil rights movement. Born in Philadelphia, Anderson began her singing career in church, where her congregation dubbed her the “baby contralto.” She gained public recognition in 1924 after winning a New York Philharmonic voice competition. Racism, however, forced her to study and perform in Europe, where she met the impresario Sol Hurok, who became her manager. While she was performing at the Salzburg Festival in 1935, conductor Arturo Toscanini, impressed by her voice, said, “A voice like yours is heard once in a hundred years.” That year, Hurok brought her back to the United States for a successful New York concert. Thereafter, she toured the United States, singing at the White House in 1936 and performing seventy recitals in 1938.

Although Anderson had become an internationally famous recitalist and opera singer, racism denied her many opportunities. Hurok tried to shelter her from mounting racial hostilities by only booking her in certain cities. In 1939, the Daughters of the American Revolution refused to allow her to perform at Constitution Hall in Washington, D.C., claiming that the venue was for “white artists only.” The incident created such a surge of protest that First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt publicly resigned from the organization. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), along with African-American leaders at Howard University and Mrs. Roosevelt, worked to find Anderson another setting for her concert. In the end, Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes invited Anderson to perform at the Lincoln Memorial. On Easter Sunday, April 9, 1939, Anderson sang before a crowd of 75,000. The performance was broadcast over national radio, making it one of the most noteworthy concerts in American history. In addition to inspiring a generation of African-American artists and activists, Anderson’s performance at the Lincoln Memorial caught the attention of Hollywood. Twentieth Century Fox, which was producing John Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln starring Henry Fonda, invited her to sing at the film’s premiere in Springfield, Illinois, on May 30, 1939. On July 2, at the NAACP conference in Richmond, Virginia, Anderson was reunited with Mrs. Roosevelt, who presented her with the Spingarn Medal to celebrate her accomplishments as a singer.

After World War II, Anderson resumed touring abroad and in 1952 made her television debut on the Ed Sullivan Show. In 1955 she sang the role of Ulrica in Verdi’s A Masked Ball, making her the first African American to perform with New York’s Metropolitan Opera. In 1957, she traveled throughout Asia as a goodwill cultural ambassador for the U.S. Department of State. She also performed at the inaugurations of presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. In 1963, Anderson returned to the Lincoln Memorial to sing at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, at which Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech. That same year, she won the presidential Medal of Freedom. She died from congestive heart failure in 1993.
A business man turned writer, Sherwood Anderson (September 13, 1876–March 8 1941) was called by H. L. Mencken, “America’s most distinctive novelist.” Anderson grew up in a series of Ohio towns, the second of seven children of an unsuccessful harness maker and itinerant house painter and a long-suffering mother. His spotty education ended when at age twenty-three he graduated from Wittenberg Academy. He sought his fortune in advertising and then the mail-order business, and found it with an Ohio company that manufactured roof repair materials. By 1907 he was its president.

In fiction that he wrote at night, Anderson sought to transcend the world in which he worked by day. The worlds clashed in 1912 when he walked out of his office in a fugue state and wandered for days, ending up in a Cleveland hospital, not knowing who he was. When he recovered he dedicated his life to writing. His midlife crisis became legendary. Anderson was heralded as proof that America was growing out of its infatuation with material prosperity.

Anderson wrote seven novels, several autobiographies and plays, and innumerable prose pieces. He was at his best in his four volumes of short stories, the most famous of which is Winesburg, Ohio (1919). In the late 1920s he bought and edited two rival weeklies in southwestern Virginia.

It was there that he met Eleanor Copenhaver, a social worker in the Industrial Division of the YWCA. He accompanied her in her travels to textile and steel mills, union halls, and workers’ homes throughout the South. In 1933, Eleanor joined him in a happy marriage (his fourth) that lasted until his death. Although drawn to radical causes and meetings, he was too much the artist to toe any party line; instead he wrote about workers’ conditions and the governmental and company policies that improved or worsened them. In Perhaps Women (1931) Anderson glossed his accounts of the dislocations southern workers were experiencing with the theory that men were being emasculated by their machines and needed to turn to women for their salvation. In Puzzled America (1935) he was content to let those workers, the unemployed, preachers, and the down-and-out speak for themselves. He discovered no prospect of revolution, no danger of fascism, but instead “a hunger for belief,”
a determination to find and follow the leadership “we are likely to get out of democracy.” The result, according to Irving Howe, was “one of the few books that convey a sense of what it meant to live in depression America.” In the years that followed, he wrote Kit Brandon (1936), a novel about a female bootlegger, and several plays. He died en route to South America, where he had hoped to learn and write about communal life in a version of his famous Winesburg.

See Also: LITERATURE.

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ANTICOMMUNISM

Domestic anticommunism—fear of “red” subversion—had once reflected the apprehensions of economic and political elites of an insurrection from below, but in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and between the two world wars the red menace was redefined. The threat now seemed to lie less in class revolt than in conspiracy, directed from Moscow and using infiltration and ideological seduction. This image of an invisible red menace underlined the need for systems of surveillance, whether by government agencies or by patriotic groups. With the communist movement apparently controlled by a hostile power, the issue increasingly became one of national security, and hence of compelling interest to politicians and bureaucrats. From the 1930s, party competition became a primary engine of anticommunist politics, but an array of interest groups—the American Legion, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation of Labor, among others—also urged action against the dangers of domestic communism.

During the Depression the Soviet experiment won some sympathetic interest among U. S. intellectuals, and the American Communist Party itself enjoyed a new vitality. At the same time the New Deal’s expansion of government and its closeness to the labor movement evoked right-wing accusations that it was subject to communist influence. The Republican platform in the 1936 election claimed that American liberties were for the first time “threatened by government itself.” Labor activists and political dissidents had long been denounced for their alleged communist proclivities, but now the federal government itself was being targeted. Such charges had little effect in that election, which Franklin Roosevelt resoundingly won, but the course of events soon enhanced their plausibility. U. S. communists were associating themselves with the Democratic Party and its allies, and popular front formations (in which liberals, radicals, and communists made common cause) appeared in some states and among industrial union, farmer-labor, and welfare groups. By 1938 a conservative reaction was underway against the New Deal, whose popular front associations rendered it vulnerable to red-baiting tactics. What is sometimes known as “the little red scare” focused largely on these popular front alignments, and was promoted by conservative Republicans and Democrats and right-wing patriotic and fringe groups. The scare was aided in 1939 by the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, when U. S. communists suddenly seemed to be the accessories of Nazi aggression. While the pact devastated the popular front formations, it left U. S. communists isolated and encouraged the development of a liberal (as well as conservative) anticommunism. The Roosevelt administration itself began to act against domestic communists (Communist Party leader Earl Browder was arrested on a passport charge) and liberal leaders of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began exploring ways of easing communists out of CIO positions. As it turned out, the gathering anticommunist momentum was stalled by the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941; when the United States joined the war in December it found itself an ally of the Soviet Union, and U. S. communists enthusiastically joined the war effort. But the varieties of anticommunism—
corporate, patriotic, liberal, labor, Catholic, and others—did not disappear, and anticommunist politics were to emerge more strongly than ever with the coming of the Cold War.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (HUAC).

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M. J. HEALE

ANTI-LYNCHING LEGISLATION

Because certain white people in the United States chose mob terrorism as a means of interracial social control, 3,445 of the 4,742 lynching deaths reported between 1882 and 1964 were black men and women. Local and state governments might have provided some protection, but Jim Crow laws had stripped African Americans of basic citizenship rights, especially the right to vote. Consequently, white officials felt no political obligation to defend a beleaguered minority or prosecute lynchers.

Often less concerned about black rights than about the harm that violence could do to a state’s reputation nationally and to its citizens’ respect for the law, forty states from the 1890s to the early 1930s adopted codes to deal with lynching and race riots. Not uniform by any means, some addressed the protection of prisoners once in custody, some held sheriffs liable if a lynching occurred, and some established dependents’ rights to sue the town or county for damages or specified grounds for invoking state militia help against an impending mob. Especially in the South, these laws proved largely inefuctual. Officials too often condoned mob action; whites pretended that the victim had not been in police custody, thereby absolving the county and its leaders; coroners’ juries compliantly ruled that death had come “at the hands of parties unknown”; and in the 1930s lynchers increasingly utilized small death squads to avoid public detection. Since the states had failed to halt lynching, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) launched its own crusade for a federal anti-lynching statute.

Founded in 1909, the NAACP gathered evidence to inform the public of racist inequities, lobbied legislators, and initiated litigation in pursuit of liberal reforms. In 1919, the association held a national conference on lynching and published its famous *Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889–1918*, which was followed by annual supplements into the mid-1940s.

Under James Weldon Johnson’s leadership, the NAACP helped to formulate a model anti-lynching bill that Republican Congressman Leonidas Dyer from Missouri sponsored throughout the 1920s. These NAACP-Dyer bills provided fines and imprisonment for local officials who allowed a lynching or failed to prosecute mob members, and they set a fine of up to $10,000 on the county in question. In January 1922 the Dyer bill passed the House of Representatives but died under threat of a lengthy filibuster in the Senate. House passage, nonetheless, indicated the growing strength of black voters in northern and midwestern districts, brought about by the heavy migrations of blacks from the South during the preceding three decades.

With their emphasis on federal remedies, the New Deal and Fair Deal eras seemed a suitable time to renew the drive for a federal anti-lynching law, and the NAACP, then headed by Walter F. White, did so vigorously in the years from 1933 to 1950. The chief House sponsor in the 1930s was Democrat Joseph Gavagan from New York, while Robert F. Wagner, also a New York Democrat, headed the Senate effort. The NAACP mobilized impressive support among ethnic minorities, labor unions, women, liberal churches, and civil rights and civil liberties groups, a coalition that effectively set in motion the mid-century civil rights movement.
though opposed to lynching, the Communist Party–USA distanced itself from the anti-lynching bills because of ideological differences with the NAACP. The Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching also stood apart from the NAACP bills for fear of federal intervention in southern life. Eleanor Roosevelt, however, lent the NAACP her open support and consulted regularly with Walter White about strategies in the Capital. She urged her husband and his White House advisors to back the cause, but the administration gave only tacit encouragement rather than offend southern Democrats who largely controlled both houses of Congress through committee chairmanships.

The NAACP bill passed the House in 1937 and in 1940, but the customary alliance of northern conservative Republicans and southern segregationist Democrats stopped its progress in the Senate. They protested that a federal law would violate states rights prerogatives, but they really worried that expansions of federal authority would undermine the economic and social controls that their various supporters had long enjoyed.

NAACP anti-lynching bills suffered the same obstructions after World War II, despite being part of President Harry S. Truman’s civil rights packages from 1947 to 1952. Nevertheless, the threat of a federal law had put the South on notice and helped to
hasten lynching’s decline after the mid-1930s. In the expansive social justice climate of the 1960s, Congress enacted a section of the 1968 Civil Rights Law that established some federal protections against lynching.

See Also: AMES, JESSE DANIEL; LYNCHINGS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP).

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ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO

ANTI-SEMITISM

Anti-Semitism during the Depression and into World War II reached levels that had not been seen before in the United States and have not been seen since. The fear and insecurity that accompanied the severe economic downturn exposed and fueled a hostility and distrust of Jews that escalated as the economy tumbled. Moreover, the hatred in the United States was intensified by Adolf Hitler’s assumption of power in Germany in 1933. The viciousness of hate mongering on both sides of the Atlantic grew throughout the 1930s, only to abate in the United States well after the fall of Hitler and the end of the World War II.

Anti-Semitism in the United States was not a new phenomenon. Immigrant Americans had not been immune to the prejudices of Christian Europe that saw the Jews as perverse and stubborn in their rejection of Christ and ultimately responsible for his death. These notions had led over the generations to all manner of discrimination, persecution, and outright violence. Yet the United States was different. Ancient prejudices had been submerged in the business of nation building. Although negative religious images had persisted, the promise of American democracy and opportunity had lured Jews and so many other immigrants to its shores. However, the levels of anti-Semitism escalated in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth century as several million Jews from Eastern Europe came to the United States fleeing Russian persecution. Americans of various stripes, including Henry Ford, had raised their voices against Jews, who were increasingly seen as unassimilable and even a threat to the United States.

Yet the anti-Semitism of the 1920s was to pale in comparison to its shrillness in the 1930s. The Depression set the stage for the search for scapegoats and for extensive Jew baiting by a variety of demagogues, such as William Pelley, the leader of the Silver Shirts, who fancied himself the American counterpart of Hitler. Gerald B. Winrod headed up the Defenders of the Christian Faith, another of more than one hundred anti-Semitic organizations formed mostly after 1933. One of these organizations, the German American Bund, was directly financed by the Nazis. An exposé by *Look* magazine in 1939 indicated that there were sixty-two offices in the United States that were distributing material coming from Hitler’s propaganda ministry in Germany.

The most popular anti-Jewish preacher of the era however, was a homegrown product, Father Charles Coughlin. Through his weekly radio program and his publication *Social Justice*, Coughlin reached millions of people. By 1938 he was attacking Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, and claiming that the United States and Christianity were being threatened by a vast conspiracy of bankers and Communists whom he increasingly identified as Jews. His Christian Front organization urged sympathizers to “buy Christian,” and his followers on occasion attacked Jews on the streets of
Marchers parade through Cleveland, Ohio, on May 16, 1933, to protest Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, COURTESY OF UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM PHOTO ARCHIVES

several cities and desecrated synagogues. Since Coughlin was not silenced by his Church superiors until after the war started, his words carried weight, particularly among many Catholics.

Jew baiting was not just a phenomenon of the streets; it was a practice in upper-class circles, in the halls of Congress, and in American political discourse in general. Anti-Roosevelt partisans, in their attack on the New Deal, blasted it as the “Jew Deal.” Moreover, in what they deemed a smear on Roosevelt, they claimed he was of Jewish origin (which he was not). The 1936 presidential election and particularly the 1940 election were rife with allegations of a Jewish conspiracy and untold Jewish power endangering the United States. Charles Lindbergh and other members of the America First organization accused Jews, along with the British and the Roosevelt administration, of trying to push the United States into an unnecessary and ill-advised war against Hitler.

Although card carrying anti-Semites numbered in the thousands rather than in the millions, their hate literature was widely disseminated in the United States. Jews were likened to octopuses controlling much of American government, industry, and public opinion. They were seen as Communist conspirators bent on takeover. The so-called “Jewish problem” became a topic in the general press. The
level of anti-Semitism reached such proportions that Fortune magazine in 1936 investigated the extent of “Jewish control.” They found that, to the contrary, Jews had virtually no control in major manufacturing and banking sectors, and they represented no more than 15 percent of the members of the Communist Party. In fact, Jews faced discrimination in getting jobs in corporate America and there were quotas limiting the number of Jews in many institutions of higher learning.

But despite the reality of American Jewish life, suspicions persisted. In a public opinion poll in March 1938, 41 percent of Americans believed that Jews had too much power in the United States. When asked what to do about it, 18 percent were in favor of restricting Jews in business, 24 percent believed Jews should be kept out of government and politics, and 20 percent were ready to drive Jews out of the United States. By April 1940, the percentage of those in favor of restricting Jews in business had risen to 31 percent. In August 1940 the question was “what nationality, religious, or racial groups in this country are a menace to America?” Jews were cited by 17 percent of the respondents, whereas Germans were cited by 14 percent and the Japanese by 6 percent. Ironically even at the end of the war, after six million European Jews had been brutally murdered, 20 percent of Americans still believed that Jews in the United States had too much power.

For the 4.5 million American Jews, many of whom were immigrants or second-generation Americans struggling like other Americans to earn a living during hard times, the anti-Semitism that accompanied the Depression and the rise of the Nazis in Germany provoked profound anxiety. How different was the United States after all? Could the persecution evidenced in Europe take hold here? What did the future hold? How much would pushing for the cause of Jews overseas subject American Jews to charges of disloyalty and provoke an even greater anti-Semitic backlash in the United States?

The Jewish community in the United States faced serious challenges as it sought not only to respond to anti-Semitism at home, but to events overseas as the number of Jewish refugees desper-
Congress to liberalize the immigration law, they were warned that if anything, an unsympathetic Congress would act to cut the numbers, not increase them. Neither Congress nor the American public had an interest in increasing immigration into the United States, particularly if some of those immigrants would be Jews. Thus, the indifference, suspicion, and outright anti-Semitism palpable to so many American Jews in the 1930s had an impact on the country’s response to Hitler and the Holocaust. Ultimately, American Jews were stymied in this cause by their own fears and impotence, and by the determined opposition of the American public to offering any more Jews a refuge in the United States.

See Also: CASTE AND CLASS; COUGHLIN, CHARLES; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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BARBARA S. BURSTIN

APPALACHIA, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The Great Depression came early in Appalachia, a mountainous region of the southeastern United States. The lumber industry faded soon after World War I, and two other major regional employers—textiles and coal—struggled with overproduction, low wages, and rising unemployment throughout the 1920s when most industries were enjoying prosperity. Moreover, subsistence-oriented mountain agriculture ceased to provide a viable livelihood for large numbers of people well before the stock market crash of 1929. Fifty years of industrial abuse of the environment and the lack of a scientific approach to agriculture and forestry had left much Appalachian land exhausted.

Mountain farm families struggled to survive on subsistence family farms that produced food but little cash. Often the burdens of tending the farm fell upon women and children as men worked elsewhere to earn needed cash. By the 1920s, many families had abandoned the farms for work in coal or textiles (in mills both within Appalachia and beyond the southeastern periphery). The coal industry excluded women but employed African Americans and immigrants, broadening the racial and ethnic mix in the region. The textile industry employed white men and women, but excluded African Americans. Both industries faced bitter interregional competition, and management in both insisted that survival required non-union operations. Sympathetic state and local governments supported the anti-union efforts.

As industrial employment both inside and outside the region collapsed in the late 1920s, workers who had earlier abandoned farming returned, increasing pressure on land already unproductive and overpopulated. The great southern drought of 1930 hit Appalachia especially hard, adding to the woes of mountain farmers and stranded refugees from the region’s faltering industries.

In 1929, violent strikes erupted in mill towns of the Appalachian foothills like Gastonia, Elizabethton, Marion, and Danville. Young mountain women emerged as prominent leaders among the strikers. Embittered by the low wages, long hours, poor working conditions, and demanding production goals (the “stretch-out”), many workers welcomed organizers of the American Federation of Labor’s United Textile Workers (UTW) and the Communist-led National Textile Workers. The coal fields also stirred as the National Miners Union and the West Virginia Mineworkers Union sought to steal the march on the United Mine Workers of America (UMW), which was left virtually moribund by its falling membership and failed organization drives of the 1920s.

The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and the coming of the New Deal had immediate
political consequences as Democrats ousted an entrenched Republican regime in West Virginia, and Democrats generally prevailed in other parts of the traditionally Republican region. While congressional Democrats usually supported the New Deal, such conservative state governors as Guy Kump of West Virginia and Ruby Laffoon of Kentucky clashed bitterly with federal relief administrators.

Before 1933, organizing efforts in both coal and textiles failed. The New Deal’s National Industrial Recovery Act affirmed labor’s right to organize and to bargain collectively. Soon after passage, the UMW conducted a successful organizing drive throughout the region. On September 21, 1933, union and industry representatives signed an agreement that set the eight-hour workday as standard and ended mandatory payment in scrip and the requirements that employees live in company houses and trade at company stores. Soon thereafter, West Virginia ended its practice of deputizing mine guards.

Coal operators in Bell, Harlan, and Whitley counties in eastern Kentucky remained defiant of public opinion and pressures from the state and federal government. Violent clashes characterized labor-management relations as operators crushed organizing drives of both the National Miners Union and the UMW. Not until 1941 did the coal operators of “Bloody Harlan” accept UMW contracts. Despite a vigorous effort in 1934, neither the UTW nor, later, the Congress of Industrial Organization’s Textile Workers Organizing Committee
had much enduring success in breaking the anti-union tradition in textiles.

By 1930 both agricultural and industrial counties reported growing unemployment and distress. Local governments and community agencies sought to fill their traditional roles as relief providers, but agents of President Herbert Hoover’s unemployment committee found the efforts inadequate. Hoover, hoping to avoid direct federal action, enlisted the Red Cross and the American Friends Service Committee to provide emergency relief, especially food for children, in the hardest-hit Appalachian counties. In 1932, federal loans through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation moved the states to establish relief agencies for the first time.

Relief workers were shocked to discover the extent of need in Appalachia. Unemployment rates in some counties reached as high as 80 percent. Even with moderate economic recovery, welfare dependence became an intractable problem. New Deal programs provided much needed help through both work relief and direct payments, and, with Social Security, these programs sounded the death knells of the orphanage and the poor house. In generating work relief, the federal government also invested heavily to help upgrade roads, bridges, and public buildings. In addition, relief agencies took care to see to work relief for women. African Americans, although suffering discrimination from some agencies, received desperately needed work relief from the Works Projects Administration. The effort to build a modern welfare system, however, was compromised by the persistence of spoils politics and the reluctance of states to adequately fund welfare agencies.
This farmer living near Barbourville, Kentucky, built this new barn in 1940 with assistance from the Farm Security Administration and the Southern Appalachian Project. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

New Deal policy toward Appalachian agriculture reflected New Deal economic ambivalence, tending at first to favor planning ideas, and later seeking a suitable setting for capitalist enterprise to flourish. Some tobacco growers benefited, but most Appalachian farmers found the early New Deal’s main agricultural legislation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, irrelevant to their needs. Resettlement ideas flourished for a time, but subsistence community experiments, such as Sublimity Farms in Kentucky, which relocated farmers from poor lands, and Arthurdale in West Virginia, which relocated stranded miners, aroused much conservative opposition. Beginning in 1937 with the Farm Security Administration, the focus shifted to rehabilitating poor farms rather than moving farmers. The planning concept reemerged in the later New Deal years in combination with the idea of organizing farmers for land-use planning and the removal of land with excessive slopes from agricultural uses. Federal and state parks absorbed some lands judged agriculturally submarginal. New Deal policies helped some mountain farmers and promoted erosion prevention and soil conservation, but the long-term decline of mountain agriculture continued.

Another New Deal program that profoundly affected a large part of Appalachia was the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), authorized by Congress in the early days of the New Deal. TVA built dams to control floods, encouraged farmers to combat soil erosion, promoted reforestation, and sought to
remove submarginal lands from agriculture. Most important, the TVA provided hydroelectric power, despite the philosophical opposition of some in Congress and the opposition of private utility companies. TVA’s many useful improvements came with a substantial cost. Thousands of rural residents were compelled to sell and relocate as TVA dams inundated their homes and farms. Paradoxically, TVA, whose purpose was largely conservation, also became in time a major consumer of strip-mined coal to generate power, contributing to the principal source of environmental degradation in the region.

The Depression years brought great trials to the people of Appalachia. The New Deal provided relief, but only the coming of World War II brought a business recovery. Mountain agriculture continued to fade, however, and for many, migration to wartime industrial plants outside the region provided the best hope of a better future.

See Also: ARTHURDALE, WEST VIRGINIA; GUFFEY-SNYDER ACT OF 1935; GUFFEY-VINSON ACT OF 1937; HARLAN COUNTY; LEWIS, JOHN L.; RURAL LIFE; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA); UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).

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**ARCHITECTURE**

The economic crisis in the 1930s upstaged but did not alleviate the upheaval within the architectural profession. A new austere, ahistoric architectural language, imported from Europe, won fiery adherents who proclaimed that tradition had no place in the production of contemporary architecture. The term *modernism* is used to denote this new style. Despite the zeal of the converts, others, with equal passion, rejected the new vocabulary. The debate over modernism polarized the architectural community as a new generation of architects not only rebelled against historic styles but also challenged the privileged place held by prominent and established practitioners. Patronage patterns also shifted as the federal government, responding to the economic distress, commissioned an unprecedented body of work. While the production of architecture for the private sector did not entirely cease, the federal government gave new prominence to specific building types and activities. Federal and civic buildings, as well as regional planning and its attendant architecture, constituted important arenas for New Deal design. The 1930s reshaped American architecture and the national landscape. By the end of World War II, modernism had triumphed, a new elite occupied the pinnacle of the architectural profession, and the federal government had blanketed the country with emblems of the federal presence.

**STYLES AND THE ARCHITECTURAL PROFESSION**

Formally, the most striking characteristic of the architecture of the period was the diversity of expressions competing for the label *modern*. Three styles dominated. Classicism remained a viable architectural language throughout the decade. John
Russell Pope’s National Gallery of Art (1935–1941), on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., reaffirmed the time-honored notion that American public architecture should be classical. Pope’s classicism, however, was restrained and sober rather than lavish and opulent. He simplified and reduced the classical apparatus. Orders were suggested by slightly projecting planes, and the whole was bound together by sleek horizontals and delicately scaled moldings. Despite the austerity of Pope’s classicism, proponents of modernism labeled his continued commitment to the past as reactionary. The style most often associated with the period was an even more restrained, spartan interpretation described as modernized classicism. Paul Cret’s Folger Shakespeare Library (1928–1932), also in the national capital, was a seminal work. The library was a simple rectangular mass of taut, thin planes. The orders, reduced to a series of fluted piers, were detailed in a stripped, simplified manner. Twin entry pavilions flank the screen of piers, which distill to a minimal essence the image of a classical colonnade. Cret’s modernized classicism served as the model for many federal buildings in the New Deal period.

In the commercial realm, the comparatively reserved streamlined moderne tempered and replaced the flamboyant Art Deco of the 1920s. Exuberant flourishes, such as the telescoping spire of semicircular aluminum panels articulated with radiating lines and punched triangular openings of William Van Alen’s Chrysler Building (1926–1930) in New York City, seemed out of place in the bleak economic climate. Streamlined moderne originated in the work of industrial designers such as Norman Bel Geddes and Walter Dorwin Teague. For designers of the period, the characteristic flat planar wall surfaces, rounded corners, banded windows, thin decorative horizontal stripes, and flat roofs gave built form to the idea of speed. Streamlined moderne appeared on buildings ranging from vernacular roadside diners to Frank Lloyd Wright’s high-style Johnson Wax Building (1936–1939) in Racine, Wisconsin. Like Art Deco, streamlined moderne represented an attempt to create a language appropriate for the machine age.

Unlike the promoters of revival architecture or Art Deco, proponents of modernism insisted that all connections to the past be broken. As a style, modernism burst onto the architectural scene in the United States through Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson’s exhibition on “Modern Architecture” at New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 1932. Photographs, models, and drawings of recent buildings, primarily by European architects, supported Hitchcock and Johnson’s claim that a new language, which they named the International Style, had emerged. The new vocabulary, characterized by exposed structural framing, non-load-bearing walls, and absence of applied ornament, constituted a self-conscious rejection of tradition. In addition to the architecture of the Europeans, the two curators identified George Howe and William Lescaze’s Philadelphia Savings Fund Society Building (1929–1932) in Philadelphia as a seminal work. The first American skyscraper inspired by European modernism pointedly turned its back on the aesthetics that had guided the design of the relatively new building type. The architects gave the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society Building’s functional components distinct expressions on the exterior. The base, containing shops and the banking hall, the shaft for the offices, and the service tower were each distinguished by different materials and window treatments. The building was defiantly asymmetrical. The presence of the structural frame was clearly expressed on the exterior. There was no traditional ornament or detailing at door and window openings. The building and others included in the exhibition redirected American architecture in the subsequent decades. The influence of modernism was broad as well as deep.

Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater (1936–1937) at Bear Run, Pennsylvania, was an idiosyncratic blend of romantic rusticity and influences from the International Style. Eliel and Eero Saarinen and Robert F. Swanson’s 1939 competition-winning but ultimately unrealized design for the Smithsonian Gallery would have defiantly placed a fully modern building directly opposite Pope’s National Gallery on the Mall in the federal capital. Supplanting the stylistic diversity of the 1930s, modernism triumphed as the appropriate language for high-style buildings following World War II.

Within the architectural profession, the ascendance of modernism represented more than the tri-
umph of a novel architectural language. Aesthetic allegiances polarized the profession along generational lines. The economic distress of the 1930s exacerbated the breach, as architects, like much of the country’s workforce, faced the bleak lack of employment opportunities. Older, established architects, who were also most likely to receive commissions for prominent buildings, clung to traditional modes of expression. Aspiring architects, eager to make a mark in the field, championed modernism as they also challenged the privileged place that their established colleagues held. At the convention of the American Institute of Architects held in Washington, D.C., in 1939, the Smithsonian Gallery design served as the rallying point for the younger architects eager to overturn professional as well as aesthetic hierarchies. At stake was the design of buildings not only in the private sector but also for the architecturally activist federal government.

PATRONAGE AND BUILDING TYPES

To stimulate the depressed economy, the federal government emerged as the primary architectural patron of the period. Government agencies commissioned and produced a staggering body of work during the Depression decade. The most well-known fruit of government patronage was the federal building program that placed thousands of post offices and courthouses in cities and towns across the country. The Office of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury Department oversaw the vast building program. The style most often associated with the Supervising Architect in the 1930s was modernized classicism. Shreve, Lamb, and Harmon’s post office (1931–1932) for Chattanooga, Tennessee, was one of many reinterpretations of Cret’s facade composition for the Folger. However, the Office of the Supervising Architect produced federal buildings in a range of revival styles. Reginald Johnson’s post office (1936–1937) for Santa Barbara, California, was a moderne Spanish colonial revival. Donald G. Anderson’s Petersburg, Virginia, post office (1934–1936) was a federal reinterpretation of a fanciful, contemporary reconstruction. The facade drew heavily from the rebuilding of the colonial capitol (1928–1934) at nearby Williamsburg, Virginia. Federal architects and their collaborators made revival architecture the language of New Deal federal buildings.

Where Hitchcock and Johnson’s International Style was a purely aesthetic language divorced from ideology and social purpose, a utopian tradition that extended from the English garden city movement to twentieth-century Radburn, New Jersey, inspired the New Deal’s suburban town program. The project brought together a talented group of landscape architects, planners, and architects, including Henry Wright, Clarence Stein, and Catherine Bauer. The goal was to use architecture as a tool of both economic and social reform. While the work did provide models for city design, ultimately, the numbers diminished the influence of the idealistic experiment. Of the several satellite cities planned, only Greenbelt, Maryland; Greendale, Wisconsin; and Greenhills, Ohio, were built.

The boldest act of New Deal planning was the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933. Treating the entire 900-mile river valley that cuts through seven states as a single unit, the government corporation planned and erected a string of dams to control flooding, create inexpensive electricity, repair adjacent damaged forest and agricultural lands, and stimulate industry. The goals of the ambitious and visionary project were to bring the backward and blighted region into the twentieth century and to demonstrate the power and benefits of coordinated regional planning. At Norris Dam, Roland Wank, the authority’s first chief architect, played off architecture treated as severe rectangular masses against the dynamism of water in the massive spillway beyond. Wank’s grave, simple buildings of textured concrete ornamented only with crisply cut rectangular openings containing bands of windows or integral sans-serif lettering created an architectural image that vividly expressed strength, efficiency, and faith in the power of technology to produce change.

The period of the Great Depression witnessed the transformation of the architectural profession. On the other side of the decade, modernism emerged as the style of choice for high-style American buildings. A new group of talented designers, promoters of modernism, replaced the masters of academic architecture as the new leaders of the
profession. The Depression-driven Roosevelt administration had commissioned an extensive body of architecture that also attested to the expanded presence of the federal government in the daily lives of its citizens.

See Also: ART; PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION (PWA); TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA).

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SARA A. BUTLER

ARMSTRONG, LOUIS

Louis Armstrong (August 4, 1901–July 6, 1971), also known as Pops and Satchmo, pioneered jazz music as both a trumpet player and vocalist. Armstrong created a musical style and image that reflected his times and served as a catalyst for cultural change. His early life was characterized by a struggle to overcome poverty and racism. Growing up penniless in New Orleans’ red light district, Armstrong received his first formal musical training at the Colored Waifs’ Home. By 1918, he was playing cornet in the Ory Creole Orchestra, replacing King Oliver, who had moved to Chicago. Before long, Armstrong began playing on steamboats that sailed north up the Mississippi River. He followed Oliver to Chicago in 1922 and played second trumpet in his band. Armstrong made his recording debut during his tenure with Oliver. Legend has it that Armstrong was instructed to stand twenty feet behind the band during recording sessions because of the magnitude of his sound.

Armstrong developed an unerring sense of swing and a virtuoso range. By 1925, he was leading his own groups, which showcased his melodiousness, edgy rhythms, and breathtaking harmonic leaps. These influential smaller ensembles became known as the Hot Fives and the Hot Sevens. In 1929 Armstrong traveled to New York, where he began to experiment with singing. His vocal work included a rendition of Fats Waller’s “Ain’t Misbehavin’” that was featured in the 1929 Broadway revue Hot Chocolates.

During the Great Depression, jazz helped to lift the spirits of the country and created a popular culture that broke down many social barriers. At the beginning of this era, Armstrong faced one of the problems that threatened the nation—warring gangster factions. Now a hot musical commodity, Armstrong was courted by several potential managers, including representatives from key crime families in New York and Chicago. In order to avoid the conflict, and guarantee his own safety, Armstrong toured the United States in 1930, carefully side-stepping New York and Chicago. In 1933 he embarked on the first of what would be many European tours. By 1935, the dispute was resolved when he began a long association with manager Joe Glaser. But Armstrong’s challenges were far from over. Years of touring had injured his lip and hampered his recording career, leaving him without a recording contract.
Under the management of Glaser, a nightclub manager associated with the gangster Al Capone, Armstrong began to brand himself as an entertainer. Armstrong’s musical style changed as he began leading larger bands, which would back him on popular songs. In 1936 he became the first jazz musician regularly featured in Hollywood movies, appearing with Bing Crosby in *Pennies from Heaven*. Although he often performed for segregated audiences and played movie roles that perpetuated racial stereotypes, his music transcended racism and appealed to audiences of all races. Armstrong’s hit 1932 version of “All of Me” became closely associated with the trials and losses that Americans faced during the Great Depression, and his noble spirit and dignity became a model for facing these challenges.

Critic Stanley Crouch argues that Armstrong intensified the “central ethos of American culture”—be yourself and do it well. After the Depression, Armstrong expanded his audience through world tours, and he served as a spokesperson for racial equality during the civil rights era. His popularity was such that in 1964 he even replaced the Beatles atop the Billboard charts with a recording of the song “Hello Dolly.” By the time of Armstrong’s death in 1971, he had served as musical innovator, cultural ambassador, and entertainer.

*See Also:* Jazz; Music.

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*William R. Bettlер*
particularly conspiracies which are blocking the defense effort.”

Arnold was never part of President Roosevelt’s inner circle of policy advisers. He was brought to Washington when the Temporary National Economic Committee’s investigations into business practices were underway, and senior members of Roosevelt’s economic team were uncertain about the future direction of industrial policy. For a time, Arnold was allowed to operate with a relatively free hand. However, longstanding veterans of the New Deal’s economic bureaucracy, such as Leon Henderson, became increasingly dissatisfied with Arnold’s publicity-seeking and with the economic perspective that informed his decisions. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, when policy makers were attempting to promote business-government cooperation, little welcome was left for Arnold’s approach. In 1943, he was effectively kicked upstairs with an appointment to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a position from which he resigned in 1945.

Arnold then returned to the private practice of law. In the early 1950s, he again came into national prominence when representing a number of persons whose loyalty had been challenged during the McCarthy period.

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William J. Barber

ART

The character and value of art produced in the United States during the 1930s has been the subject of continuing controversy within the discipline of art history since the 1960s. Though it is true that all art is necessarily accounted for retrospectively, in partial and selective histories, it is especially significant that art from the Depression continues to present a range of intellectual, political, ideological, and aesthetic problems for historians and critics.

In orthodox survey histories, 1930s U. S. art is represented as realist or documentary in form and intention, highly parochial in relation to developments in European modern art, and mostly contaminated by left-wing political motivations. The artists Andrew Wyeth, Ben Shahn, and Edward Hopper are claimed to be the most significant in the period, producing paintings, drawings and photographs that supposedly transcend the specific sociopolitical circumstances of their production. But many others who worked in various neoabstract, expressionist, naturalist, realist, social-realist, or socialist-realist styles, motivated by an equally wide set of artistic and sociopolitical interests and values, have little, if any, presence in post-1945 art-history accounts of the so-called “dirty decade.” William Gropper, Lucienne Bloch, Jerome Klein, William Zorach, Raphael Soyer, and Berenice Abbott, for example, were all artists with reputations already established by the mid-1930s, and their exhibitions and views were discussed and advertised in contemporary mainstream art magazines such as The American Magazine of Art and Art Digest, but they virtually dropped out of history as work of the 1930s was repressed or villified in the Cold War climate of the later 1940s and 1950s.

By the mid-1960s there was a reappraisal, for a variety of complex and interrelated reasons. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s creation of the National Endowment for the Arts evoked Franklin D. Roosevelt’s subvention of the arts in the United States as part of the New Deal. The emergence of the New Left, organized around civil rights for minorities and women and opposition to U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War, sparked interest again in the left politics and debates of the 1930s in which artists, through such organizations as the Artists’ Union (AU) and the American Artists’ Committee Against Racism and Fascism (AACARF), played an important part. The high modernism of U. S. art in the 1950s, symbolized by abstract expressionism, had begun to give way to a wide range of styles and an interpenetration of art forms and practices that, in
This Art Center in Gold Beach, Oregon, was established during the 1930s by the WPA. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

Unsurprisingly, when scholars turned back to the 1930s they found aspects that linked art practice then to developments in the post-World War II period. These included the art of the proto–abstract expressionists, many of whom had used relatively realist styles during the Depression, often as employees of the WPA’s Federal Art Project (for example, Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, and Willem de Kooning). Other 1930s artists who produced relatively abstract paintings, prints, and drawings, such as Stuart Davis, Balcombe Greene, Hans Hofmann, and Georgia O’Keeffe, also found their latter-day champions, though for Stuart Davis the cost of this revival in his artistic reputation was substantial neglect of his pivotal role in left-wing art politics in New York in the late 1930s. Francis V. O’Connor’s research into art in the Depression, conducted in the later 1960s and published in the early 1970s, highlighted the sociology and demography of U. S. artists, and reconfirmed the significance of New York City as the home and inspiration of perhaps a third of all professional or aspiring professional artists in the country. Study of black and women artists active in the 1930s, including Vertis Hayes, Aaron Douglas, Marion Greenwood, and Minna Citron, reflected the growth of 1960s civil rights and feminism as political and scholarly movements for radical social change. What the 1930s meant in art-historical terms had changed dramatically by the end of the 1970s, though the determinants within this process of reassessment were broadly social and political.

No other decade in the last century attracts such questions or analytic problems, nor commands such putative coherence. To be called a 1930s artist is no mere chronological label: The term implies that artist and his or her paintings or sculptures somehow reflect or embody the combi-
The New Deal, a mural in the auditorium of the Leonardo Da Vinci Art School in New York City, was painted as a WPA project in the mid 1930s by Conrad Albrizio, who dedicated the work to President Roosevelt. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

The New Deal, a mural in the auditorium of the Leonardo Da Vinci Art School in New York City, was painted as a WPA project in the mid 1930s by Conrad Albrizio, who dedicated the work to President Roosevelt. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

nation of realist intent, style, and socialist or Marxist political motivation associated with the Depression and the New Deal. Edward Hopper, then, though active in the 1930s, is not a 1930s artist and his painting Early Sunday Morning (1930) is not in any significant way a piece of art of the 1930s. Georgia O’Keeffe, similarly, though productive in the decade, created works such as Ram’s Skull with Brown Leaves (1936) whose value escapes the ideological posturings and political machinations of the 1930s. In contrast, Stuart Davis, socialist chairman of both the AU and the AACARF (but always highly skeptical of the U. S. Communist Party doctrine on art and political matters), will never escape his association with the 1930s. His Swing Landscape (c. 1938), for instance, is far more in debt to Piet Mondrian and Fernand Leger than to any indigenous social art influence, but it remains a permanent prisoner, too, of the “art of the 1930s.” The 1930s, then, means the Great Depression, the optimism
This relief at the Forest Hills Station post office in New York was completed by Sten Jacobsson in 1937 as part of the Federal Art Project. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

(or naiveté, depending on one’s perspective) of the New Deal, the moral disaster of the U.S. left's alignment with Soviet communism, and the early moves toward disengagement from ideological commitment toward what Arthur Schlesinger influentially called “the vital center” (Schlesinger 1962).

Roosevelt’s reorganization and direction of the Democratic Party and the federal government in the 1930s shaped significant aspects of both artistic production and major art institutions and agencies. The Federal Art Project (FAP, 1935–1943) and the Public Works of Art Project (1933–1934), run by two faithful New Dealers, Holger Cahill and Edward Bruce, respectively, are examples of sui generis New Deal activity. Bruce purchased art works for the nation throughout the decade within United States Treasury-funded programs, though he always claimed that acquiring masterpieces was his goal, rather than developing what more radical New Dealers called the “democratization of culture.” The progressive and populist image of the New Deal attracted Thomas Hart Benton, one of the regionalist painters of the period (along with Grant Wood and John Steuart Curry). Benton’s mural cycle America Today (1930–1931) describes and celebrates small town American life. The Museum of Modern Art in New York City, though indebted to European artists and styles for its major exhibitions from the decade, supported aspects of New Deal arts policy with its 1936 show of federal art, New Horizons in American Art. The Whitney Museum of American Art was much more programmatic in its support of contemporary artists in the United States, and had initiated economic support for Depression-hit artists before the federal government intervened in 1933.

The FAP and other agencies that employed artists, designers, and photographers in the 1930s had considerable autonomy from federal government policy, perhaps because, on the whole, New Deal administrators had little or no interest in culture initiatives, which only ever received a minute proportion of federal money. Even this support was often cut off for a variety of political and budgetary reasons, undermining the efforts of artists and people in arts management who wished to see culture become a central element in what they believed was a genuine New Deal revolution. But this autonomy/lack of interest meant that, for the most part, art created by federal employees was free of any required propagandistic meaning. If anything, federal art was accused of left-wing bias. This was the case with August Henkel’s Mural (1938) at Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn, New York, which was censored by the FAP on the doubtful grounds that it contained communist symbolism, and with Diego Rivera’s Man at the Crossroads (1933–1934) at Rockefeller Center in New York City, which also was embroiled in ideological controversy.

By 1940, the network of organizations (overwhelmingly based in New York City) set up by artists to lobby for the extension of federal aid, or to support socialist and communist activities against fascism in Europe and capitalism in the United States, had begun to unravel under the weight of
The Federal Art Project sponsored free art classes for children and adults in many cities, including these underway in 1941 at the WPA Art Center in Oklahoma City. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

state-supported anticommunism. But throughout the 1930s, the thriving of complex and intellectually rich debates formed what was arguably the most significant activity of these groups. This vitalization had never been entirely, or even mostly, dominated by the U. S. Communist Party; it involved independent thinkers and artists such as Meyer Schapiro and Stuart Davis, and it supported and sponsored diverse art forms, ranging from the highly abstract to the doctrinally socialist-realist. This creative plurality is the real legacy of the art of the 1930s.

See Also: AMERICAN SCENE, THE; FEDERAL ART PROJECT (FAP).

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The groundbreaking for the small new town of Arthurdale, West Virginia, in late 1933 inaugurated one of the New Deal’s most ambitious and eventually most notorious projects in economic and social engineering. The project began with efforts led by Eleanor Roosevelt to expand American Friends Service Committee relief work in Scott’s Run, a long-depressed coal mining area near Morgantown, West Virginia. Mrs. Roosevelt helped turn Arthurdale into the showcase effort of the recently established Division of Subsistence Homesteads. Arthurdale was a prototype for a rural-urban synthesis in which destitute farmers and miners from the area were resettled into new homes with enough land to maintain a household subsistence, while planners also sought to provide homesteading families with newly decentralized industrial jobs.

Beyond such economic schemes, Mrs. Roosevelt herself saw the new town as a “human experiment station.” She led a coterie of social and cultural reformers aiming to build “community” among residents, particularly by enlisting them in an array
of cooperative ventures that eventually included a health clinic, a general store, a cemetery, an interdenominational church, a forge, a weaving room, and a furniture factory, along with various agricultural projects. But at the heart of the community’s experimental first years lay the school, designed by educator Elsie Clapp around philosopher John Dewey’s pragmatic pedagogy. The school mirrored the project by seeking to integrate a progressive social and economic agenda with revivals of residents’ “folkways,” presumed lost over decades of industrial expansion. This emphasis on cultural rehabilitation was abetted when planners acceded to local pressures to select families of largely Scotch-Irish descent, despite intense interest on the part of local non-native and African-American applicants.

During the 1930s, Arthurdale’s political reputation, and to some extent its residents, suffered from confused and over-optimistic planning during the ongoing Depression. Clapp’s experimental school closed in 1936 due to lack of private funding. Worse, homesteaders endured years without steady wage work after Congress denied plans to give federal manufacturing contracts to homesteaders, citing unfair competition with private industry. Through the 1930s, Resettlement Administration and later Farm Security Administration officials struggled to maintain employment at Arthurdale, until the coming of the war effort brought lasting jobs. By then, the government had begun selling off the 165 homes and other properties built there, at a significant loss against its total outlay.

In following decades, Arthurdale’s families prospered in relative anonymity. Following its fiftieth anniversary in 1984, however, residents created Arthurdale Heritage, Inc., a small nonprofit organi-
zation that maintains the town’s remaining community structures and offers a look back on its storied past.

See Also: APPALACHIA, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR; SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEADS DIVISION.

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STUART KEITH PATTERSON

ASIA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN

All Asian countries were deeply affected by the steep fall of agrarian prices that began in 1930 and reached its lowest point around 1933. There was a slight upward trend in subsequent years, but in general, prices stagnated at a low level until they rose again during World War II. Wheat and cotton, which were widely traded in the world market, led the downward trend, and they were soon followed by other types of produce, such as millets, which were grown only for local consumption. Normally, prices reflect supply and demand; in the Depression years there were no major changes in this respect in Asia, but the prices were halved nevertheless. The contraction of credit was the main cause of this catastrophic decline. It upset forward trading, which otherwise served to stabilize prices. Panic sales spread like wildfire. Rural marketing was disrupted and it took years to overcome this upheaval.

Economic historians have hardly taken note of this Asian crisis of the 1930s. Theoretical assumptions caused this neglect: If a country did not experience industrial unemployment and a balance of payments crisis, it was supposedly not affected by the Depression. Most Asian countries were only marginally industrialized at that time and the balance of payments was settled by an outflow of gold, so on these two counts there was no depression in Asia.

The fate of the Asian peasant has been disregarded, too. If the peasants had only practiced subsistence agriculture, prices would have been irrelevant, but most Asian peasants were forced to market much of their produce because they were indebted and had to pay taxes. Debt service and taxation were not adjusted to their reduced income. There was widespread agrarian distress in Asia, but governments faced serious peasant revolts only in a few areas. Long-term political effects that were not immediately evident turned out to be more important than these incidents of violent revolt.

GOLD AND SILVER: THE FATE OF ASIAN CURRENCIES

Before World War I the international gold standard had maintained an automatic equilibrium in the world market, due to the powerful position of London, which controlled the flow of gold worldwide. After the war the United States emerged as the arbiter of the flow of gold, but instead of letting it flow, it hoarded it in the interest of internal price stability. In spite of this, there was a concerted effort, led by London, to restore the international gold standard. Great Britain returned to it at the prewar parity in 1925 and had to abandon it again in 1931. Japan returned to it as late as 1930, only to abandon it again in 1932; its currency then experienced a dramatic devaluation.

British India was completely at the mercy of the currency policy made by the secretary of state for India in London. India’s silver currency had served its colonial rulers very well, because it absorbed a large amount of the silver that became redundant in Europe when most countries demonetized it and shifted to the gold standard. But the colonial government of India collected taxes in depreciating silver while it had to pay its “home charges” (such as debt service) in gold. When it could not make both ends meet any longer, the Indian mints were closed to the free coinage of silver in 1893. The silver rupee became a token currency that was managed by the
secretary of state. In 1927 a currency act was passed that pegged the rupee to the gold standard at a rate above the prewar parity. This feat had been accomplished by a slow and steady deflation. Used silver coins were not replaced by new ones but melted down. The silver was quietly sold abroad by the British. When the Depression hit India, the exchange rate of the overvalued rupee was defended by further deflationary measures. This finally led to an enormous outflow of “distress gold” (mostly gold coins and ornaments) that indebted peasants turned over to the moneylenders. Since the respective colonial governments did not impose gold export embargoes, this gold flowed freely to London and other centers. This export filled the gap caused by the decline of the value of commodity exports and thus cured India’s balance of payments problem with a vengeance.

In the meantime, China was shielded against the initial impact of the Depression by its silver currency, because the price of silver fell like that of all other commodities. Whereas some countries that were in full control of their respective currencies resorted to competitive devaluation, China’s currency was devalued automatically. Overseas Chinese then converted their savings (in gold) into silver, which they invested in China in a big way. But this spree did not last long. President Roosevelt helped the U. S. silver interests by means of a silver purchasing policy that dramatically increased the price of silver in the world market. The silver that had poured into China around 1930 left it again in 1934, and the Depression hit China in a delayed but very dramatic action.

Other Asian countries that were colonies of different European powers were affected by the peculiarities of the currency policies of their respective masters. France had joined the gold standard only in 1928—and at one-fifth of the prewar parity. It was thus in a more comfortable position than other countries and could stay on the gold standard until 1936. In Indochina, the French maintained a colonial currency, the piastre, which they pegged to the French franc in 1931 in order to protect French investments. This aggravated the impact of the Depression on Indochina. In the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) there was no colonial currency. The Dutch currency circulated in the colony, but here, too, a deflationary policy led to an outflow of gold that benefited the colonial power.

Most Asian countries suffered from the combined impact of deflationary policies and credit contraction. Both were caused by creditors in the central places of the world market who wanted to prevent the depreciation of Asian currencies so as to protect their investments, but also did not want to provide fresh credit. This depressed prices, and also subverted the old argument that access to colonial raw materials was essential for the European powers, and could only be secured by political control. In a world where raw materials were available at very low prices, colonialism did not pay any longer. Colonial control was required only to keep under control debtors who might cancel their debts. The deflationary policy was an integral part of this control of debtors. Its immediate effect was the sharp decline of prices of agricultural produce.

WHEAT, RICE, AND SUGAR: THE FALL OF AGRARIAN PRICES

All Asian crops were affected by the fall in prices in the 1930s, but wheat, rice, and sugar were by far the most important. Wheat was grown and traded globally. Its overproduction in the United States was one of the chief causes of the Depression. For some time the storage of wheat in the United States had helped to keep prices at a comfortable level, but when credit contracted in the United States due to the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Board, wheat poured out of the storage houses in an avalanche of panic sales. Credit signals then reached India, Australia, and other wheat-producing regions very quickly.

Rice was not immediately affected by these events. Wheat could not be easily substituted for Rice: This was not just a matter of taste, but also of the skills and implements required for preparing the respective foods. Thus the rice price remained high everywhere in Asia in the summer of 1930. Moreover, rice was only marginally traded in the world market. It was almost exclusively an Asian crop, produced and consumed locally. Japan was a crucial exception, and it played a decisive role in triggering the global fall of the rice price. After
World War I, Japan was a rice-deficit country. Rice riots had shaken the government and arrangements were made for a timely import of rice. In Japan rice is harvested at the end of summer, whereas in monsoon Asia (South and Southeast Asia) the main harvest reaches the market in January. Rice from Burma (now Myanmar) and, to a lesser extent, from Thailand and Indochina, would reach Japan in March when it was needed most. But by 1928 Japan had achieved self-sufficiency and imposed an import embargo on rice. In 1930 Japan had a very plentiful rice harvest. At that time the Japanese government was pursuing a deflationary policy in order to support the yen, which had just been pegged to the gold standard. The double impact of deflation and the rich harvest caused the rice price to fall by about one-third in October 1930. This should have been a purely domestic concern since Japan did not export or import rice, but grain traders all over the world interpreted this as a signal that the rice price would now share the fate of the wheat price. In November 1930 the rice price in Liverpool was reduced by half, and Calcutta followed the Liverpool precedent in January 1931. At that point, the rice price experienced a free fall, and by 1933 rice was cheaper than wheat in India. Actually, the production, consumption, and export volume of rice did not decline very much in this period—only the price remained low, and so did the income of the producers.

In 1930 in lower Burma, the world’s major rice export region at that time, the peasants rose in a violent revolt led by the charismatic Saya San. Burmese peasants had to pay both poll tax and land revenue. The poll tax was collected before the winter harvest, forcing the peasants to market their rice. Moneylenders and grain dealers usually eagerly provided credit for the tax payment against the coming harvest, but in late 1930 they knew that the price of rice would fall in January and thus they did not provide any credit when the tax collector pounced on the peasants. In response, Saya San, who had earlier petitioned the government on behalf of the peasants, led the peasants in a violent rebellion that took the British two years to suppress. Other rice-growing provinces of British India remained quiet during the period because peasants did not have to pay poll tax or even land revenue, but only rent to landlords. A peasant could get away with paying no rent for some time, but then the landlord could sue him and he would forfeit his occupancy right. This produced an atmosphere of smoldering discontent but no immediate revolt. Unrest was more pronounced in India’s wheat-growing region, where peasants were in more direct contact with the revenue authorities. The National Congress, an Indian political party, had sponsored agrarian campaigns in this region in 1930, and this contributed to the subsequent emergence of the Congress as a peasant party.

Sugarcane was a major cash crop in several Asian countries, particularly in India, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. Before the Depression, the Netherlands East Indies was the major exporter of refined white sugar. Much of this white sugar was exported to India, where sugarcane was mostly converted into brown sugar for rural consumption, and imported refined sugar was in demand in urban areas. In 1931 the British Indian government imposed a prohibitive tariff on sugar, thus greatly encouraging Indian sugar production. By 1937 India was ready to export sugar, but the International Sugar Agreement of that year classified India as a sugar importing country, so India was denied an export quota. The protective tariff of 1931 did not affect British imperial interests. But if India had been permitted to export sugar in 1937, the (British) Caribbean sugar planters would have faced Indian competition. Thus the year 1937 marked a setback for India. On the other hand, sugar production expanded in the Philippines because of its free access to the U. S. market.

**ASIAN INDUSTRIES: LIMITED POSSIBILITIES OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION**

Some scholars of Asian history have tried to prove that the Depression was a boon in disguise for Asian countries because they benefited from import substitution (the replacement of imported industrial products such as cotton textiles by indigenous production). Actually, the scope of import substitution was severely limited by the reduced buying power of the rural masses. The textile industry was the only major industry in Asia in the early twentieth century. Japan did make a major advance in the Depression years by buying cheap Indian
cotton and using the cheap labor of Japanese peasant girls to produce textiles. The devaluation of the Japanese yen by about 60 percent in 1932 gave Japanese products an enormous competitive advantage. The British in India responded to this by instituting protective tariffs and securing preferential access to the Indian market for their own products. Under these arrangements the Indian textile industry progressed somewhat in the 1930s, but the main beneficiaries were the handloom weavers who got cheap food and cheap cotton and competed with the mills, which could not cut their costs easily. Actually, the Depression remains the only period in which the real wages of labor increased in India. China experienced similar developments. The investment spree of the early 1930s encouraged industrial growth. Even the Japanese invested in Chinese mills. But all this was soon engulfed by the delayed impact of the Depression, and then by the ravages of war after the Japanese invasion of China. Other Asian countries had hardly any industry that could have profited from import substitution.

See Also: AGRICULTURE; GOLD STANDARD; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.

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DIETMAR ROTHERMUND

ASIAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The Great Depression had important political, economic, and cultural implications for “Asian-American” communities. In the United States, the ethnic label Asian American encompasses groups of people with diverse geographical, cultural, and historical backgrounds, and ancestral roots in a number of different countries. The earliest Asian immigrants arrived in the United States from China, with the first massive wave coming in the mid-nineteenth century. As with other ethnic minorities, the Chinese—and later the Japanese, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Koreans, and a host of other groups—emigrated to the United States to serve primarily as a source of cheap labor. These migration patterns were related to larger global transformations initiated by industrial capitalism and Euro-American colonialism. By the beginning of the Great Depression, these groups formed the largest Asian populations in the country. According to U.S. census data and other published reports, there were close to 75,000 Chinese, 140,000 Japanese, 56,000 Filipinos, and several thousand Asian Indians and Koreans living in America in 1930, most residing on the West Coast.

Like most other Americans, Asian Americans endured hardships related to and caused by the economic fallout of the late 1920s, with its effects lasting well into the 1930s. Stories of massive unemployment, housing evictions, lost savings, starvation, and in some cases suicide, were reported throughout Asian-American communities in the United States. In her autobiography, Quiet Odyssey: A Pioneer Korean Woman in America (1990), Mary Paik Lee, a Korean immigrant, describes the devastating impact of the Depression on her and her family. She recalls how her family’s savings, generated from over a decade of operating a fruit stand in southern California, were completely wiped out during those years, forcing the family to move from place to place in search of available land to support a minimal level of subsistence. Preexisting levels of racial hostility in most industries in California led many Asian immigrants, such as the family of Mary Paik Lee, to be disproportionately represented in
agriculture as laborers, farmers, and small entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, as the Depression dramatically reduced the demand for specialized agricultural goods (agricultural profits in California dropped by more than 50 percent from 1929 to 1932), the economic fallout of the Depression led to particularly harsh consequences for Asian Americans in the region. The economic effects of the Depression were also felt by Asian Americans on the East Coast. Chinese hand laundrymen, operating more than three thousand such businesses in New York City, saw their earnings and wages decline by about one-half during the Depression.

As the economic crisis of the early 1930s deepened, its impact, at least for Asian-American communities, was felt beyond the boundaries of America’s borders. Many Asian immigrants, despite being separated by long distances and long periods between visits, maintained close ties to their families and villages in their homelands. In particular, the Chinese, as a result of international migration, developed what some historians have called “transnational communities.” The combination of exclusionary immigration laws, cultural norms in China, and the prohibitive costs involved in the immigration process created an immigration population overwhelmingly male, leading some observers to
mistakenly characterize the Chinese communities in America as “bachelor societies.” Familial ties across vast physical spaces were sustained by letters, occasional visits, and scheduled remittances. These remittances went to building new homes, schools, hospitals, and orphanages for families and villages back in China. However, the Depression substantially reduced the funds that Chinese immigrants were able to send home, undoubtedly worsening conditions for their families and villages in China, which had come increasingly to rely on these remittances. In short, for Asian immigrants, the impact of the Great Depression was experienced on both sides of the Pacific.

THE IMPACT OF RACISM
For Asian Americans, the debilitating effects of the economic crisis were compounded by the historical legacy of racism. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the American public increasingly charged Asian immigrants, beginning with the Chinese, with being “unassimilable,” “racially inferior,” and a threat to the “American” way of life. These anti-Asiatic sentiments were eventually encoded into American law. In 1882, the U.S. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, making Chinese immigration to the United States illegal. By 1924, Asians, which by law included peoples from countries stretching from Afghanistan to the South Pacific, were effectively excluded from the United States as immigrants (with the exception of Filipinos and certain exempt classes including merchants, diplomats and students), were deprived of the right to own land, and were denied the legal right to citizenship. This history of exclusion and oppression by racial and national proscription profoundly effected the way Asians Americans and their children experienced and responded to the Depression. For example, Asian Americans, along with other ethnic minorities, occupied the bottom of a racially stratified labor market, making them especially vulnerable during times of economic crisis. Community histories describing, for instance, New York City’s Chinatown, have shown that the unemployment rate among the Chinese population was considerably higher than state and national averages during the peak years of the Depression. Furthermore, racist employment practices precluded many university educated Asian Americans from entering the professional and white-collar ranks. The comments of a certain college educated Nisei (the American-born children of Japanese immigrants) reflected the frustrations of a generation of educated Asian Americans: “They go to college, learn a heterogeneous body of facts relating to anything from art to architecture and end their days in a fruit stand.”

As with previous periods of economic crisis in American history, racial antipathies toward Asian Americans were expressed more frequently and with greater intensity during the Depression. In the face of an ever-diminishing labor market, white Americans throughout the West Coast systematically and violently drove out Asian-American laborers, with Filipinos being the most frequent targets. As colonial subjects, Filipinos were given the juridical status of U.S. nationals, which allowed them, unlike other Asian groups, to move freely back and forth from the Philippines to the United States.
Many Asian Americans earned a living as itinerant field hands during the Great Depression. This Chinese-American laborer worked in a potato field near Walla Walla, Washington, in 1936. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

States. However, Filipinos did not begin to arrive on American shores in significant numbers until the 1920s and 1930s. During this period, Filipinos experienced the same pattern of treatment as previous generations of Asian immigrants; initially, they were frequent victims of physical violence, and eventually, they were excluded through governmental legislation. During the Depression, the U.S. government offered to repatriate Filipinos with the stipulation that they forfeit the right to reentry into the United States; not surprisingly, few Filipinos took up the offer, though there were reported cases of coerced repatriation. In 1935, Filipino immigration to the United States was all but halted with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. Economic uncertainty also produced similar efforts to discriminate against Asian Americans on the East Coast. For example, in 1933, a group of businessmen in New York City, in an attempt to eliminate Chinese competition from the industry, unsuccessfully advocated for a city ordinance that would require U.S. citizenship to obtain a laundry license.

Asian-American Response to the Depression

Asian-American communities responded to these difficult times in a variety of ways. Like many Mexican Americans, some Asian immigrants sim-
ply decided to return to their homelands; some returned with the hope of finding better prospects, and others returned as a temporary strategy, at least until the situation improved in the United States. A small number of Asian immigrants and their children relocated to Central and South America. The vast majority of Asian Americans, however, looked to ethnic institutions and organizations to survive the Depression. Long before the 1930s, mutual aid societies, welfare agencies, and business organizations provided resources and services, such as relief, job placement services, and legal counsel. Such organizations were generally located in ethnic enclaves in large cities—the most notable being in San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle—where, due in part to racism in the housing and employment markets, the highest concentration of Asian Americans resided. In addition, there were informal community networks through which families and friends could mutually assist one another in times of emergency. These institutions and networks worked to shelter Asian-American communities from the most debilitating effects of the Depression. In San Francisco’s Chinatown, for example, the expanding tourist industry (which was facilitated by the repeal of prohibition laws in 1933), together with New Deal federal assistance, helped dramatically reduce Chinese unemployment in the city by the late 1930s. Growing numbers of Chinese men and women began finding jobs in newly renovated restaurants, bars, and coffee shops. Similarly, in Little Tokyo in Los Angeles, Japanese merchants and community leaders organized the “buy in Lil’ Tokio” campaign, through which they hoped to revive slumping Japanese-American businesses by appealing to the community’s sense of ethnic loyalty.

However, the depth of the Depression crisis severely tested the limits of ethnic institutions and networks, leaving them, in many instances, unable to adequately address the unprecedented levels of need to be found in their respective communities. As a result, Asian Americans, many for the first time, turned to the federal government for assistance. Government reports indicate that the rate at which Asian Americans participated in public assistance varied widely from city to city. For example, San Francisco’s Chinatown had the highest percentage of Chinese receiving relief benefits, nearly approaching the national average. On the other hand, in Chicago and New York, only 2 to 5 percent of the Chinese population was on relief. In general, Asian Americans were less likely to seek relief assistance for a number of reasons. First, as frequent victims of state powers in the past, Asian Americans understandably feared government authorities. Moreover, discriminatory federal policies excluded them from certain government programs and benefits. One clear example of this was the statutory requirement that an individual must be an American citizen to be eligible for a job through the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Consequently, Asian Americans, many of whom by law were ineligible for citizenship, composed a disproportionate small percentage of people on WPA employment rolls. Based on the calculations of one historian, among the three largest Asian-American groups in California in 1940, less than 14 percent of their unemployed had jobs with the WPA as compared to more than 60 percent of unemployed black Americans. In addition to all of this, many Asian Americans were simply unaware that they were entitled to relief assistance, which also helps to explain their lower participation rates.

Despite these shortcomings, the federal government did make positive contributions to Asian-American communities during the Depression, and in doing so, may have helped to bring about a change in these groups’ attitudes and perceptions of the state. In San Francisco’s Chinatown, for example, New Deal legislation improved housing conditions, established public health clinics, and expanded educational and job-training programs, in addition to traditional public relief allowances. Furthermore, many of these federal programs provided professional opportunities for Asian-American women in the fields of education and social work in a time when few professional occupations were considered suitable for women.

The growing emergence of women professionals was part of a larger trend in which Asian-American women were gradually to become more visible in the workplace and in the public more generally. As a result of the Depression, many Asian-American women were forced to find employment
outside of the home, mainly in low-wage, service-oriented industries. For some, this development only created additional work—wage labor during the day and household chores in the evening. Asian-American women, like many women across the country, had to work increasingly hard to keep the family together in these trying times. Yet, for other women, some of whom became household breadwinners, the Depression presented opportunities to challenge traditional gender roles. Indeed, some Asian-American women, albeit a limited number, actively participated in public affairs such as local politics, union organizing, and community reform.

As all this suggests, Asian Americans were active participants in the unfolding drama that was the Great Depression. Certain everyday scenarios—Japanese-American families applying and receiving federal aid, Chinese-American women walking to the garment factory to begin their workday, and Filipino-American workers organizing in California’s strawberry fields—reflected important social and cultural changes taking place within Asian-American communities at this time. Yet these developments, prompted by the Great Depression, were only a prelude to even larger changes and struggles that lay ahead for Asian Americans. Nevertheless, the crisis of the 1930s prepared them for a future that included World War II, wartime internment, and the postwar struggle for equality.

See Also: ASIA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; MIGRATORY WORKERS; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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ASSOCIATION AGAINST THE PROHIBITION AMENDMENT (AAPA)

The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA) was the leading political pressure group helping to secure repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Historians credit the AAPA with fostering Republican-Democratic polarization on the issue, giving repeal greater respectability, and greatly speeding up the repeal process.

Founded in 1918, the AAPA became the first anti-prohibition organization operating outside the affected industry. Its founder, William H. Stayton, was a former naval captain concerned about centralized encroachment on state and local rights. Although unable to block the Eighteenth Amendment, he kept the organization alive, had it...
incorporated, and by 1926 was claiming 700,000 members. Initially, Stayton worked to secure voter pledges, but he soon began stressing quality over quantity and seeking members whose stature and resources could sway public opinion and enhance respectability. Among such recruits were John J. Raskob, James W. Wadsworth, Henry H. Curran, and Lammot, Pierre, and Irenee du Pont; in 1928 these men restructured Stayton’s association. Stayton became chair of a showcase board, while Curran became president, and operating power went to a small committee headed by Pierre du Pont.

Following its reorganization, AAPA influence grew, in part because Raskob became national chairman of the Democratic Party and worked to link the party with repeal. An outpouring of publicity, stressing prohibition’s costs and tying repeal to economic recovery, also helped to change public opinion. In addition, cooperation with upper-class women, particularly the new Women’s Organization for National Prohibition Reform, produced positive images of repeal’s supporters. In 1932 the AAPA succeeded in getting repeal into the Democratic platform, and subsequently Jouett Shouse, having moved from Democratic headquarters to become president of the AAPA, worked to make repeal a central campaign issue and took encouragement from the sweeping Democratic victories. Lawyers associated with the AAPA helped to shape the Twenty-First Amendment and get it through Congress; state ratification, completed in December 1933, proceeded largely according to AAPA guidelines.

Its mission achieved, the AAPA disbanded. Its leaders, however, later became the core of the American Liberty League, dedicated to fighting New Deal centralization. This time they soon became discredited, lending support to charges that repeal had come through undemocratic manipulation by selfish plutocrats. For a time this became the standard historical interpretation, but further study of the AAPA has brought greater appreciation of its anti-centralist philosophy and its effectiveness and influence in the context of changes being wrought by the Great Depression.

See Also: AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE; PROHIBITION; RASKOB, JOHN J.

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AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, GREAT DEPRESSION IN

The Great Depression began in Australia and New Zealand with a collapse in demand for their primary products, which caused export prices to fall 40 percent from 1929 to 1932. The loss of earnings caused a severe liquidity crisis from mid-1929 in two countries that relied heavily on foreign borrowing to finance economic development, while disequilibrium in the balance of payments forced a reduction of imports in 1930 to half their pre-Depression level. The gross domestic product, measured in constant prices, fell by nearly 10 percent between 1929 and 1932 in Australia and 20 percent in New Zealand.

Both countries had enjoyed prosperity as enterprising and progressive colonies of British settlement. The United Kingdom was the principal market for Australian wheat, wool, and agricultural products, as well as for New Zealand meat, wool, and dairy products; these rural exports accounted for over 20 percent of their nations’ production. Yet both countries were highly urbanized: The majority of wage earners lived in the four principal cities of New Zealand, while Sydney and Melbourne both had more than one million inhabitants. Australia, with a population of 6.5 million in 1930 (when the New Zealand population was 1.7 million) was the more ambitious in promotion of secondary industry by tariff protection and government assistance. Both sought to guarantee living standards through national tribunals that determined minimum wage levels.
A Labor government took office in Australia at the onset of the Depression and responded to the crisis by encouraging greater production of rural exports and raising tariff levels to reduce imports. But the serious deterioration in the balance of payments caused difficulties in servicing the foreign debt, and the Bank of England sent Sir Otto Niemeyer to advise on appropriate remedies. With the support of the Australian banks, he made the federal and state governments agree to reduce expenditures, balance their budgets, and curtail borrowing. The Arbitration Court cut the minimum wage by 10 percent in January 1931, and the Australian currency was simultaneously devalued against sterling by 30 percent. The federal Labor government suffered defections and lost office at the end of 1931 to a reconstituted United Australia Party, which maintained the retrenchments. The Labor premier of New South Wales, Jack Lang, who defied the financial arrangements, was dismissed from office in 1932.

In New Zealand, two non-Labor parties with rural and urban bases of support, the United and the Reform parties, dominated the parliament and came together in a coalition in 1931, leaving Labor in opposition. The government followed deflationary policies similar to those in Australia, though New Zealand resisted devaluation until January 1933, when a 25 percent cut in the exchange rate with sterling was made. The New Zealand Court of Arbitration imposed a 10 percent wage cut in May 1931.
Recovery began in Australia and New Zealand by 1933, assisted by the increase in the volume of exports. The Ottawa Agreement of 1932, which gave preferential trade arrangements to the British Dominions, probably assisted Australian and New Zealand producers. Their Depression was less severe than in the United States. Estimates of unemployment vary, ranging from 20 to more than 30 percent of the workforce in Australia; the New Zealand economy had a smaller proportion of employees, so its rate of unemployment was lower. There was less work rationing than in the United States and a high incidence of long-term unemployment. Relief measures in Australia were initially in the hands of local government and charities, and took the form of food handouts. From 1930 state governments levied emergency income taxes to finance sustenance payments and enlist unemployed men in public works. The New Zealand government followed similar policies, with a strong emphasis on working for the “dole.”

These measures were barely sufficient. Eviction and homelessness became common. Shanty towns sprang up on the outskirts of cities, while many unemployed resorted to an itinerant existence in the rural interiors. Protest demonstrations erupted occasionally into violent city riots in 1931 and 1932, and encouraged governments to provide public works. The requirement that married men work for the dole on such projects, often far from home, imposed strains on marriages, and younger men were especially vulnerable to the social dislocation of prolonged hardship. Marriages were deferred, and the birthrate fell to an unprecedented low. Those indigenous peoples of the two countries, the Aboriginals and Maori, who were in the paid workforce were mostly rural, casual workers, and were hit hard. There were some cases of antagonism to
foreign workers, mostly southern Europeans employed in mining and agriculture, though the cessation of migration during the Depression defused such animosities. In societies that had valorized the male breadwinner, there was also criticism of the displacement of men by female workers, but the trade unions were powerless to prevent such changes in employment policy.

Several regional studies of the Depression suggest that the unequal sacrifices it imposed on different classes strained social cohesion and dented the egalitarian ethos of these new-world nations. Oral history and fictional treatments attest to the humiliations the Depression inflicted as well as the resourcefulness of its victims. The failure of the Australian Labor Party allowed the previously ineffective Communist Party to channel discontent into its Unemployed Workers Movement. Communism and the defiant radical populism of the premier of New South Wales alarmed conservatives, who formed secret armies to defend God, king, and empire. That was unnecessary in New Zealand, where the Labour Party first gained office in 1935. Its extensive program of economic management and social welfare was heavily influenced by the lessons of the Depression.

See Also: CANADA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.

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STUART MACINTYRE
BACK-TO-THE-LAND MOVEMENT

The back-to-the-land, or back-to-the-soil, movement of the 1930s was a collection of relief and reform projects that sought agrarian solutions to the decade’s social and economic crises. A single basic goal united the various groups and schemes associated with the movement: to open the nation’s unused lands to a new class of small producers. But this common theme found expression through initiatives ranging greatly in practical scope and intellectual sophistication.

In the broadest sense, movement back to the land in the United States began soon after the stock market crash of 1929, when the country saw a temporary but significant reversal of decades of urbanward migration as city jobs dried up and millions sought what seemed simpler, cheaper living on old family farms or bits of unused, marginal land. The popular press fueled this widespread but largely unorganized upwelling of interest in subsistence gardening and small farming through a drumbeat of articles from such leading figures as longtime physical culture advocate Bernarr Macfadden.

A more organized movement took shape as a variety of public and private initiatives to resettle and retrain families for small production on both individual and collective small farms. A number of such programs were mainly ad hoc efforts by states and municipalities to reduce relief rolls, reprising similar efforts during previous depressions to use open lands as a safety valve for urban overcrowding and unemployment. But some leaders envisioned more concerted, long-term land use planning, often seeking to combine industrial decentralization with workers’ gardens in small new towns. Franklin Roosevelt proposed such a plan as governor of New York, as had industrialist Henry Ford in his 1926 book Today and Tomorrow.

Indeed, much of 1930s back-to-the-land activity predated the Depression, though the crisis lent it new impetus. Sectarian groups like the American Friends Service Committee, the rural life sections of the Catholic church and various Protestant churches, and the Jewish Agricultural Society brought an emphasis on economic and social cooperatives to their own long-standing efforts at communal rural rehabilitation. Newly mobilized county agricultural and domestic agents revived a program for rural improvements codified in 1908 by Theodore Roosevelt’s Country Life Commission. But all of the foregoing strands of the movement had their culminating expression in a series of resettlement colonies built by the New Deal’s Division of Subsistence Homesteads beginning in late 1933, which joined plans for regional and cultural rehabilitation to a
new rural-urban synthesis of part-time farming and factory work in localized, cooperative settings.

Beyond rural resettlement and rehabilitation projects, the movement offered intellectual updates to the tradition of Jeffersonian agrarianism. The movement’s unifying ideological positions included ambitious calls for a general redistribution of property and a return to localized production and government. These common themes found their most forceful expression through the Southern Agrarians, a group of intellectuals at Vanderbilt University in Nashville who argued for a return to the institutions and traditions of the landed Old South in their volume *I’ll Take My Stand* (1930), and Ralph Borsodi, who had begun in the early 1920s to preach and practice household production as an alternative to unhealthy, wasteful mass consumerism.

See Also: AGRICULTURE; SOUTHERN AGRARIANS.

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STUART KEITH PATTERSON

**BAKKE, E. WIGHT**

Edward Wight Bakke (November 18, 1903–November 22, 1971) was a sociologist and professor of economics at Yale University. Bakke is best known for his investigations of long-term unemployment in the Great Depression, published in the two-volume 1940 study *The Unemployed Worker and Citizens without Work.* He played an important role in shaping the fields of industrial relations, human resource management, and labor economics as they were emerging in the 1930s through the post World War II decades. As director of Yale’s Labor and Management Center, Bakke strove to bring an empirically grounded, “real world” perspective to union-management relations and labor market policy. Bakke held key advisory positions on the New Deal Social Security Board, the National War Labor Board, and in the Department of Labor, among other government appointments. Amidst this distinguished record, Bakke’s study of Depression-era unemployment remains his most influential and far-reaching work.

Conducted while he was director of Unemployment Studies at Yale’s interdisciplinary Institute for Human Relations, Bakke’s eight-year study explored the social psychological, cultural, and economic impact of joblessness on unemployed men in New Haven, Connecticut. The study combined methods of survey research, case study, ethnographic observation, and personal interview, through which Bakke tracked how workers who fully embraced broader cultural values of work and self-reliance coped with “the task of making a living without a job.” While capturing their frustration, loss of dignity, fear, and, eventually, despair as the Depression lingered on, Bakke also emphasized the resourcefulness with which workers and their families made “adjustments” to long-term joblessness. Especially striking to contemporary readers was the degree to which traditionally male providers would exhaust every possible alternative—turning to savings, credit, cutting back on necessities, and finally to the earnings of their wives and children—before accepting public assistance, or “the dole.” While frequently invoked to shatter the stereotyped imagery of the unemployed “welfare chiseller,” for Bakke this pattern was also a sign of something more troubling: the unemployed worker’s tendency to blame himself for a situation over which he had little control.

In its time and for future generations, Bakke’s study stood as a powerful statement of the importance of stable, adequately-paying work opportunities for individual well-being, as well as broader social well-being. For Bakke himself, it was also a statement of the need for a strong and lasting public sector commitment to making those opportunities available and protecting workers’ rights to achieve them.
“BALLAD OF PRETTY BOY FLOYD”

Dust Bowl balladeer Woody Guthrie wrote the “Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd” in March of 1939. Guthrie, best known for singing and composing songs about the plight of people dislocated from their homes by poverty and the Dust Bowl, wrote a series of ballads about outlaws, celebrating them as populist heroes, poor people who preyed on the rich. He composed songs about the Dalton gang, the brazen female outlaw Belle Starr, and most famously, Charles Arthur Floyd, a bank robber and killer known as Pretty Boy Floyd.

Born in Bartow County, Georgia, in 1904, Floyd began his life of crime in the 1920s as a bootlegger and petty gambler, but his criminal activities had escalated to armed robbery and murder by the 1930s. During the Great Depression, poor individuals frequently lost their homes and property to banks, and criminals like Pretty Boy Floyd, who robbed the banks that foreclosed on their homes and farms, became popular figures of the era. Even before Guthrie immortalized Floyd in song, he was already known as “the Sagebush Robin Hood.”

When Guthrie first composed the “Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd,” the song was intended to mock the government, banks, and wealthy people. Guthrie’s Pretty Boy was transformed into a heroic figure, a victim of circumstance who killed a deputy sheriff in a fair fight, and then had to seek refuge in the backwoods and live as an outcast because “every crime in Oklahoma was added to his name.” Although the police considered Pretty Boy Floyd to be a criminal, he was a hero to the poor farmers, who gave him food and shelter and, in return for their hospitality, often discovered, according to the song, that their mortgage had been paid off or a thousand-dollar bill had been left on the dinner table.

Guthrie’s song describes a hero who, like an American Robin Hood, sent a truckload of groceries to provide Christmas dinner for all the families on relief in Oklahoma City. The last lines of the song made Guthrie’s message clear: “And as through your life you travel/Yes, as through your life you roam/You won’t never see an outlaw/Drive a family from their home.” Songs such as the “Ballad of Pretty Boy Floyd” helped victims of the Great Depression vocalize their anger against banks, while reinforcing growing class tensions. In a time of absolute poverty, this song offered hope, as well as a cathartic release of indignation.

See Also: GUTHRIE, WOODY; HEROES.

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MARY L. NASH

BANKHEAD-JONES FARM TENANT ACT OF 1937

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act was passed by Congress on July 22, 1937. It authorized a modest credit program to assist tenant farmers to purchase land, and it was the culmination of a long effort to secure legislation for their benefit. The law was one part of the New Deal’s program to address the massive problems of rural poverty and landlessness, but its impact proved to be so limited that its importance was mainly symbolic.

Federal financing of farm purchases by tenants was first considered in Congress as the Bankhead bill of 1935. That measure proposed a billion-dollar bond issue to enable the government to purchase...
land, evaluate its suitability for cultivation, and resell it on easy terms to tenants and sharecroppers whose loans would be secured by mortgages and supervision of their farming. Although promotion of small farm ownership was hardly a radical concept, the bill received strong conservative opposition. The Senate passed it in June 1935, but it died in the House of Representatives.

By 1936 farm purchase lending was an administration objective, advocated by the Resettlement Administration (RA) and supported by the president. But the Bankhead–Jones Act of 1937 was far short of what the RA desired. Instead of a large bond issue, it appropriated a token $10 million for loans for fiscal 1938, rising to a maximum of $50 million per year by fiscal 1940. Provision for government purchase and resale of land, regarded as crucial by the RA, was eliminated; instead, all loans and farms being financed required approval by committees of local farmers. No farms could be financed unless they were deemed viable family units by local standards. Credit preference went to an upper stratum of tenants who owned implements and who could make down payments. Although not satisfied with such limited legislation, RA leaders considered it the best that could be obtained at the time. The new lending program was assigned to the RA, which was renamed the Farm Security Administration (FSA).

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act was passed near the end of the New Deal, as conservative opposition increased in Congress. Beginning in 1941, Congress tied loans to average farm values in each county, a restriction that shut down the program in hundreds of poor counties. From 1938 until Congress terminated the FSA in 1946, the agency made only 44,300 purchase loans. Moreover, analyzing the program in 1949, economist Edward Banfield concluded that many of the farms financed by the FSA had proved to be inadequate units as requirements for successful farming rapidly increased.

See Also: Farm Policy; Farm Security Administration (FSA); Resettlement Administration (RA).

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PAUL E. MERTZ

BANKING ACT OF 1933

More than nine thousand banks failed in the United States between 1930 and 1933, equal to some 30 percent of the total number of banks in existence at the end of 1929. This statistic clearly represents the highest concentration of bank suspensions in the nation’s history. The data reveal at least four separate intervals when there was a marked acceleration and deceleration in the number of bank failures: November 1930 to January 1931, April to August 1931, September and October 1931, and February and March 1933. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz designated these four episodes as banking panics, only one of which had causal macroeconomic significance. If the 3,400 banks that were not licensed by the Secretary of the Treasury to reopen in March 1933 are excluded, only two out of five bank suspensions occurred during banking panics. It is well to bear in mind that 60 percent of bank closings between 1930 and 1932 were not panic induced and that the problem of understanding why so many banks failed during the Great Depression goes beyond simply explaining what happened during banking panics. For example, one of the causes of the nonpanic-induced failures during the
Great Depression may have been related in part to the over expansion of small, rural banks in the twenties as well as to the distressed state of American agriculture following World War I. These factors may have operated during banking panics as well but would have by no means been confined to panic episodes.

Unlike previous banking panics of the national banking era, the banking panics of the Great Depression occurred during the same cyclical contraction from 1929 to 1933, each compounding the effects generated in the previous panic.

DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BANKING PANICS

A banking panic may be defined as a class of financial shocks whose origin can be found in any sudden and unanticipated revision of expectations of deposit loss and during which there is an attempt, usually unsuccessful, to convert checkable deposits into currency. There are two principal characteristics of banking panics: an increased number of bank runs and bank suspensions and currency hoarding as measured by the amount of Federal Reserve notes in circulation seasonally adjusted. Table 1 shows the number of bank suspensions, amount of hoarding, and panic severity in each of the panics of the Great Depression, 1933 excepted. Panic severity is measured by the number of bank suspensions in each panic divided by the total number of banks in existence.

BANKING PANIC OF 1930

During the banking panic of 1930, over eight hundred banks closed their doors between November 1930 and January 1931, and Federal Reserve notes in circulation seasonally adjusted increased by $164 million, or 12 percent (see table). The largest number of bank closings was concentrated in the St. Louis Federal Reserve District with approximately two suspensions out of every five banks. These closings were related to the failure of the largest regional investment banking house in the South, Caldwell and Co. of Nashville, Tennessee. The firm controlled the largest chain of banks in the South with assets in excess of $200 million and also the largest insurance group in the region with assets of $240 million. The failure of Caldwell and Co. had immediate repercussions in four states: Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and North Carolina. The collapse of Caldwell’s financial empire raised expectations of deposit loss throughout the surrounding region. The 1930 panic was region specific, inasmuch as at least one-half of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts had fewer than 10 percent of bank suspensions. Four Districts accounted for 80 percent of total bank suspensions and slightly over one-half of the deposits of suspended banks. The consensus view in the early twenty-first century was that the 1930 banking crisis was a region specific crisis without perceptible national economic effects.

THE TWO BANKING PANICS OF 1931

No more than two months elapsed between the end of the first banking crisis in January 1931 and the onset of the second in April. The number of bank suspensions was lower (573), but the amount of hoarding doubled. One-third of the bank suspensions were in the Chicago Federal Reserve District; there was a mini panic in Chicago in June and a full scale panic in Toledo, Ohio, in August. The Cleveland Federal Reserve District had two-thirds of the deposits of suspended banks. Nevertheless, in six Districts there was little or no change in currency hoarding.

The onset of the third banking panic coincided with Britain’s departure from the gold standard in September 1931. Bank failures, deposits of failed banks, and hoarding rapidly accelerated after the
British announcement. The immediate response of the Federal Reserve was to raise the discount rate in October 1931; this action was followed by an increase in interest rates. The harmful effects of the increase may have been exaggerated since increased bank suspensions and hoarding had preceded the increase. Mini panics in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Chicago with their reverberating effects occurred between September 21 and October 9, before the discount rate was increased. Sixty percent of the increase in hoarding occurred before the rate increase. The discount rate increase played no causal role in precipitating the panic. Nor did the Fed’s failure to offset the decline in the money stock represent ineptitude. Knowledge of the role of the currency-deposit ratio as a determinant of the money stock was simply unavailable. In sum, 60 percent of the 2,291 bank closings in 1931 occurred during the two separate banking panics.

**The Banking Panic of 1933**

The 1933 panic was idiosyncratic. In no other financial panic was there such a widespread use of the legal device of the “bank holiday,” whereby a state official, usually the governor, closed all of the banks for a short time. In March 1933 one of the first acts of Franklin Roosevelt, the incoming president, was to announce a nationwide banking holiday, an event without precedent in U.S. history. Prior to Roosevelt’s action many states had de-
declared their own bank holidays. Such action was the mechanism through which depositor confidence was further eroded and was spread to contiguous states. Officials in the individual states panicked. Uncoordinated state initiatives led to a nationwide banking debacle. The use of statewide moratoria was not new. Five states had declared banking holidays during the 1907 panic. What was new was its use by the president.

The timing of the national banking holiday was dictated by two considerations simultaneously. First, a banking system had virtually collapsed without any prospects for recovery in the absence of national leadership. The outgoing president, Herbert Hoover, and the Federal Reserve had abdicated their responsibility for what was happening. Second, an external drain of gold allegedly threatened gold convertibility of the dollar.

CAUSES OF BANKING PANICS

The importance of banking panics for understanding the Great Depression resides in determining their causal significance. Did bank failures cause the decline in income and interest rates or did the decline in income and interest rates cause bank failures? To have exerted a causal role, panic-induced bank suspensions would have had to be independent of interest rate and income changes. Friedman
Like many banks around the country that closed during the Great Depression, this small bank in Haverhill, Iowa, remained deserted when it was photographed by Arthur Rothstein in 1939. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

and Schwartz assigned a causal role to bank suspensions in order to explain why the money stock fell; an autonomous increase in the currency-deposit ratio, a money stock determinant, provoked a rash of bank suspensions that caused the money stock to contract, income to decline, and the conversion of a mild recession into a major depression. James Boughton and Elmus Wicker, in 1979 and 1984, showed that interest rates and income were, in fact, important determinants of the money stock. Their finding that the currency-deposit ratio was sensitive to interest rate and income changes is consistent with Peter Temin’s view that causation went from income and interest rates to the money stock and not vice versa. As of the early twenty-first century, a consensus was slowly emerging that panic-induced bank suspensions were not causally significant.

Why, people may ask, were there any banking panics at all? Had not the Federal Reserve been established to eliminate banking panics? Yet the worst banking panics in U.S. history occurred thereafter. How was that possible? Did the fault lie in imperfect legislation creating the Fed or was Fed leadership culpable? Friedman and Schwartz attributed panics to inept Fed leadership. But they rejected a compelling alternative explanation that
deserves serious reconsideration. Structural weaknesses in the original Federal Reserve Act can explain equally well, if not better, why the Fed failed to prevent the panics of the Great Depression. There were at least three important structural weaknesses in the original Federal Reserve Act: 1) membership was not compulsory for state bank and trust companies, 2) paper eligible for discount by member banks was too narrowly defined and restricted access to the Fed, and 3) power was so decentralized between the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and the Board in Washington that leadership was weak and ineffective. These combined structural weaknesses contributed to the Fed’s poor performance.

EMERGENCY BANKING ACT OF 1933

The Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933, granted the government the necessary powers to reopen the banks and to resolve the immediate banking crisis. Only one-half of the nation’s banks with 90 percent of the total U.S. banking resources were judged capable of doing business on March 15; these banks were presumably safe, meaning that they were solvent. The other half remained unlicensed. Forty-five percent of those were placed under the direction of “conservators” whose function it was to reorganize the banks for the purpose of eventually returning to solvency. The remaining 5 percent (about 1,000) would be closed permanently. The reopening of the banks on March 13 witnessed a return flow of currency into the banks for first time since the banking panic of 1930. By April 12, some 12,817 banks had been licensed to open with $31 billion of deposits.

See Also: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1933; MONETARY POLICY.

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ELMUS WICKER

BARUCH, BERNARD

Bernard Mannes Baruch (August 19, 1870–June 20, 1965) was a Wall Street financier and adviser to numerous presidents. He was born in 1870 in Camden, South Carolina, but moved to New York in 1881. After graduating from the City College of New York, he began working on Wall Street as an office boy. By 1900 Baruch had become a millionaire through speculation and stock trading.

Baruch financially supported Woodrow Wilson’s presidential campaign in 1912. During World War I, Baruch’s developing relationship with Wilson led to his becoming a member and, in 1918, chairman of the War Industries Board (WIB), the principal government agency involved in the wartime economic mobilization effort. Adept at self promotion, Baruch gained a lasting reputation as an effective public servant, though historians have raised questions about the WIB’s performance. Baruch advised Wilson on economic matters at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

During the twenties, Baruch contributed heavily to Democratic congressional candidates, gaining significant influence with such party leaders as Senator Joseph Robinson. In response to the Great Depression, Baruch quickly called for the establishment of a government agency modeled on the WIB to spearhead recovery efforts. He initially opposed Franklin Roosevelt for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, but when Roosevelt initiated the New Deal, two men closely associated with Baruch, Hugh Johnson and George Peek, were appointed to head the National Recovery Administration and Agricultural Adjustment Administration, respectively. Both men had worked on the WIB and had business ties to Baruch during the 1920s, but Baruch had little to do with either man’s appointment and did not approve many of their actions in
office. Although Baruch’s position in the Democratic Party made him too important for Roosevelt to ignore, the two men never had a close relationship and Baruch’s influence over the New Deal was often exaggerated in press accounts.

After 1938, Baruch hoped to play a central role in the nation’s mobilization for war. He had influence in the War Department and in the various mobilization agencies that were established, but the only official position he held during World War II was as head of a 1942 committee to make recommendations for dealing with a critical rubber shortage. Following the war, President Harry Truman entrusted Baruch with developing a plan to present to the United Nations for controlling all forms of atomic energy. Failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union over the Baruch Plan contributed to the emergence of the Cold War. Baruch retained the status of elder statesman until his death in 1965, but his influence in Washington was minimal during the last fifteen years of his life.

See Also: BUSINESSMEN; JOHNSON, HUGH; NEW DEAL.

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BASIE, “COUNT.” See BIG BAND MUSIC.

BAUER, CATHERINE

Author of the acclaimed Modern Housing (1934), a renowned “Houser” and urban planner, during the mid-1930s Catherine Bauer (May 11, 1905–November 22, 1964) served as the activist executive secretary of the Labor Housing Conference. She was the driving force behind passage of the 1937 Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, which established public housing in America.

Born in 1905 in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Bauer traveled extensively in Europe after graduating from Vassar in 1926, writing articles for Vogue, Ladies Home Journal, and the New York Times. Her fascination with Europe’s modern housing drew her abroad again in 1930 and 1932, the second time with author-intellectual Lewis Mumford (then her lover), whom she met while working at the publishing company Harcourt-Brace and who enlisted her in the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA). Bauer’s 1934 book Modern Housing extolled Europe’s experiment with government-aided shelter, much of which, like Romerstadt in Frankfurt, Germany, and Vienna’s Karl Marx Hoff, featured the streamlined, functionalist Bauhaus architecture of the period. The United States, exhorted Bauer, must, like Europe, make housing a right and a “public utility.”

Mass evictions and mortgage foreclosures during the early Great Depression vindicated Bauer’s fears about the inadequacy of American housing. Although President Herbert Hoover’s 1931 Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1933 Public Works Administration (PWA) Housing Division both included monies for low-income housing, Bauer believed that impetus for a real modern housing program must come from workers themselves. Her model became Philadelphia’s 184-unit Carl Mackley Homes, a hosiery-worker-sponsored RFC project completed in 1935 by the PWA. With Bauhaus design, it epitomized her ideal of “modern housing,” although few hosiery workers could afford the rents.

In 1934 Bauer took the executive secretary post of the Labor Housing Conference and toured the United States promoting a permanent, state-aided low-cost housing program modeled on Mackley. But Bauer’s plan, embodied in the 1935 Robert Wagner-Henry Ellenbogen bill, failed. The public housing legislation that emerged—and Bauer supported—lacked the working-class stamp of the
1935 bill. Introduced by Wagner but cosponsored instead by Alabama’s hard-line conservative congressman Henry Steagall, it emphasized slum clearance for the very poor, not the working class. Bauer campaigned vigorously for Wagner-Steagall, and it was passed in 1937. The projects built by the new United States Housing Authority (USHA) evinced much of “modern housing,” but stripped of frills, they bore a stark, institutional appearance. Bauer briefly (1938–1939) administered the USHA’s Division of Research and Information, which as a New Deal insider she had founded to be the research and public relations arm of the new federal housing agency.

After World War II she married the architect William Wurster and took a professorship at the University of California at Berkeley. She became active in regional planning and an incisive critic of 1950s public housing policy. Bauer died in 1964 while hiking the rugged hills near her home north of San Francisco.

See Also: HOUSING; MUMFORD, LEWIS; REGIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (RPAA); UNITED STATES HOUSING AUTHORITY (USHA).

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BERKELEY, BUSBY

Busby Berkeley (November 29, 1895–March 14, 1976), innovative stage and film choreographer and director, was born William Berkeley Enos in Los Angeles into a theatrical family (his father was a director; his mother an actress). After graduating in 1914 from Mohegan Lake Military Academy, Berkeley worked at various jobs, and during World War I he became an “entertainment officer” with the U.S. military in France. During the 1920s he became a successful, well-known stage dance director, working on over twenty musicals.

In 1930 Berkeley went to Hollywood at the behest of independent film producer Sam Goldwyn for whom he successfully choreographed various musicals. He also worked for other producers. Between 1933 and 1939 Berkeley was employed by Warner Brothers, primarily as a dance director whose efforts were strikingly innovative and exciting, and in the main deservedly well received. He also directed various features, some of them not musicals, such as the melodrama They Made Me a Criminal (1938), for which he garnered a mixed reception.

Berkeley, especially in his Warner’s musicals, which benefited much from the studio’s technical excellence, produced an exciting, intriguing blend of sophistication, precision, and vulgarity. For film critic David Thomson, Berkeley’s dance sequences in films such as Footlight Parade (1933), Dames (1934), and Gold Diggers in Paris (1938) demonstrated that he was “a lyricist of eroticism.” Bevies of beautiful, scantily clad girls performing in military precision in lavish settings resulted in beguiling almost shameless images. His work must be seen to be appreciated. Berkeley developed exciting new techniques of filming in order to achieve the effects that he wanted: his cameras operated directly above the action. What became known as “the Berkeley top shot” allowed daring angled shots and stunning rhythmic patterns. His films understandably appealed to weary Depression-era audiences. He was also capable of injecting social realism into his dance fantasies as in the biting “Forgotten Men” sequence in Gold Diggers of 1933.

Berkeley moved to MGM in 1939, his initial stay there ending in 1943 with the camp classic The Gang’s All Here. Subsequently he picked up occasional feature film directing jobs, the last being MGM’s Take Me Out to the Ball Game (1949), and
continued to stage musical numbers until the mid-1950s. His last significant contributions were spectacular water ballets in two MGM films of Esther Williams, the swimmer/actress. He died in Palm Springs, California, in 1976.

See Also: GOLD DIGGERS OF 1933; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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BERLE, ADOLF A., JR.

Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr., (January 29, 1895–February 17, 1971) was a member of the “Brains Trust” that advised Franklin D. Roosevelt from March 1932 until his inauguration. Berle was born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1895. His father was a clergyman and an educational reformer. Berle was a child prodigy, entering Harvard University at the age of fourteen and graduating at eighteen. A corporation lawyer and foreign policy specialist, Berle served in the Dominican Republic and in the Russian section in Paris during his army service in 1918 and 1919. While pursuing a career in law during the 1920s, he developed an interest in social reform. He had connections with Lillian D. Wald’s Henry Street Settlement in New York City and John Collier’s American Indian Defense Association. In 1927 Berle became a professor of law at Columbia University in New York.

In 1932, Berle and the economist Gardiner C. Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property. The book had a major impact on contemporary thinking about the structure and philosophy of American capitalism. Not only did Berle and Means reveal the separation between ownership and control of America’s largest firms, but they documented the power and influence of large corporations in the modern economy. The book challenged the assumption that competitive principles underlie economic activity and emphasized the power that corporate executives had gained as a result of the diffusion of stock ownership. Berle associated scale with stability and public service, but he looked to corporate executives to develop a greater sense of social responsibility, and to the state to exercise economic management.

In 1932, when he joined the Brains Trust at the suggestion of Raymond Moley, Berle was committed to vigorous federal intervention to initiate national planning and, in particular, he favored the revision of antitrust law, the coordination and rationalization of transportation, and an expansion of credit. He supported Roosevelt’s campaign by writing position papers, speeches, and articles. His most notable contribution was Roosevelt’s September 1932 Commonwealth Club address in San Francisco, which was based on a draft written by Berle. Unlike other Roosevelt advisors, Berle did not seek a permanent appointment after Roosevelt’s election, but served as general counsel of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and advised the president on an ad hoc basis. In 1933, New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia appointed Berle to the post of city chamberlain. In 1938, Berle became assistant secretary of state, a post that he held until 1944. In this capacity Berle supported hemispheric defense and economic development and attended the Pan-American conferences of the 1930s. Berle served as U.S. ambassador to Brazil in 1945 and 1946. He also vigorously pursued American interests in the development of postwar aviation agreements, and he chaired the International Conference on Civil Aviation in Chicago in 1944.

Despite his support for Roosevelt, Berle remained politically independent. In 1947, he became chair of New York City’s Liberal Party, which he had helped establish, and, beginning in 1951, he chaired the Board of Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund. Berle was a strident critic of British imperialism and Soviet expansionism, a view he expressed through his membership in the National Committee for a Free Europe during the 1950s and, later, through his support of America’s involvement in Vietnam. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy ap-
pointed Berle chair of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America, which became associated with the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

See Also: BRAIN(S) TRUST; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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STUART KIDD

BETHUNE, MARY MCLEOD

Born to former slaves on a rice and cotton farm near Mayesville, South Carolina, Mary Jane McLeod (July 10, 1875–May 18, 1955) was the fifteenth of seventeen children. Instilled with the belief that God did not discriminate and that she could "achieve whatever was worth achieving," she progressed through various Christian schools and, choosing to be a missionary, enrolled in Dwight Moody’s Institute for Home and Foreign Missions, graduating in 1895.

When her application for a missionary post was rejected, McLeod returned to the South to teach. In Sumter, South Carolina, in 1898, she met and married Albertus Bethune, and bore a son, Albert, in 1899. Five years later, with "a dollar and a half, and faith in God," she started the Daytona Educational and Industrial Training School for Negro Girls in Florida. Stressing vocational education, the school grew gradually, and in 1923 Bethune agreed to merge her 315 students and twenty-five faculty and staff members with Cookman Institute, a Methodist school for African-American boys, creating the Bethune-Cookman College.

Bethune gained national acclaim as an educator, and served on presidential commissions for Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover. She also served two terms as president of the National Association of Colored Women (1924–1928), and, in 1935, founded and became president of the National Council of Negro Women—a broad coalition of organizations that she headed until 1949. Dedicated to developing female black leaders and to the integration of African Americans in all walks of life, the National Council of Negro Women campaigned against lynching and the poll tax, pushed for the inclusion of African-American history in public school curriculums, and protested racial discrimination in the armed forces and defense industry during World War II. Bethune made a special effort
to get African-American officers into the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps.

A personal friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, who supported her reform agenda, Bethune was appointed to the National Advisory Committee of the newly formed National Youth Administration (NYA) in 1935. The following year she became administrative assistant in charge of Negro affairs of the NYA, and in 1939 the director of the NYA’s Division of Negro Affairs. As such, she was the first African-American woman to head a federal agency. Her goal was to gain African Americans equal participation, and equal pay, in NYA programs. Only partially successful, Bethune did get the NYA to eventually enroll black youths in numbers approximating their proportion of the national population, but not in proportion to their need for assistance.

At the same time, Bethune helped organize the Federal Council on Negro Affairs, an informal group of African-American federal officials popularly known as the Black Cabinet. It sought to secure increased benefits for African Americans from the federal government, as well as to increase the number of blacks serving in New Deal agencies. While she publicly acknowledged the benefits that the New Deal brought to blacks, Bethune often met privately with President Franklin Roosevelt to criticize the administration for not doing enough to aid African Americans.

After World War II, President Harry Truman appointed Bethune as a consultant to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and as his personal representative at the presidential inauguration of William Tubman in Liberia in 1952. Bethune died of a heart attack at her home in Daytona Beach, Florida, in 1955. The recipient of many awards and tributes, including a dozen honorary degrees and the Spingarn Medal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Bethune became the first woman and the first African American to be honored with a statue in a public park in Washington, D.C.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; BLACK CABINET; NATIONAL YOUTH ADMINISTRATION (NYA).

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HARVARD SETKOFF

BIDDLE, FRANCIS

Francis Biddle (May 9, 1886–October 4, 1968) was a leading New Deal lawyer and labor reform proponent who served during the 1940s as attorney general under Franklin Roosevelt. Biddle was descended from the prominent Randolph family, with roots in seventeenth-century Virginia. He was educated at Groton School and Harvard University in Massachusetts. Like Roosevelt, Biddle was the model of a distinctive New Deal type: the son of privilege turned social reformer. Biddle’s transformation was especially sharp. As a prominent Philadelphia attorney in the 1910s and 1920s, he was a registered Republican and counsel to various corporate clients. But the onset of the Depression led to his disillusionment with his earlier political commitments. Biddle was particularly frustrated with President Herbert Hoover’s failure to support the cause of workers’ rights, an issue to which Biddle would become increasingly committed in the coming years.

Biddle’s support for Roosevelt and labor advocacy led to his 1934 appointment as chairman of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Working with tools ill-suited to the task, Biddle nonetheless did an admirable job of employing the limited powers of the NLRB to establish critical federal labor law precedents. Although his tenure on the committee was brief (he served for less than a year), Biddle was a consistent and forceful defender of the important role served by the Board. His testimony before Congress influenced the shaping of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which included a strengthened NLRB.
After leaving the NLRB, Biddle returned to private practice in Philadelphia, but by 1938 he was back in Washington, serving as chief counsel in congressional hearings investigating accusations of mismanagement of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The hearings cleared the TVA of wrongdoing, an accomplishment Biddle would later recall as one of his most satisfying of the New Deal era. Biddle went on to serve on the Federal Reserve Bank for a brief period before being appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, based in Philadelphia. But almost as soon as he settled into his new job, he was again moving back to Washington, this time to serve as the nation’s solicitor general. In 1941 he became U.S. attorney general, a job he held until 1945. As attorney general, Biddle continued to support New Deal reform, although he is most remembered for his role in coordinating the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Following his service in the Department of Justice, Biddle went on to serve on the international war crimes tribunal at Nuremberg and to author numerous books.

See Also: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (WAGNER ACT); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB); TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA).

BIG BAND MUSIC

The 1920s may have been the “Jazz Age,” but the 1930s was the era of “The Big Band.” Big band jazz provided the soundtrack for a generation coming of age in hard times. And from the big bands came swing, a phenomenon that briefly made jazz the most popular music in America and the first to truly define a mass youth culture.

Already popular by the late 1920s, big bands usually included at least ten musicians and emphasized written arrangements with consistent melodies over spontaneous soloing and improvisation, although band leaders like Duke Ellington, the most innovative composer-arranger of his time, often constructed such arrangements around the strengths of soloists. While the stock market crash of 1929 precipitated a drastic fall in record sales and rising unemployment among musicians, the Depression actually proved to be a catalyst for big band music. An excess of musicians looking for work brought down wages and made it easier for leaders to hire bands of a dozen or more. Increasingly accessible radio broadcasts from venues like the Cotton Club in Harlem helped to popularize the big band sound and made stars of bandleaders like Ellington, Louis Armstrong, and Cab Calloway. Thousands of musicians spent the decade traveling by any means available to dance halls and clubs in virtually every city, town, and county in the nation.

Jazz musicians used the term swing as early as the 1920s, and in 1932 Ellington’s band had a hit with “It Don’t Mean a Thing If It Ain’t Got That Swing.” But the birth of the popular swing era came on the night of August 21, 1935, when teenage fans at the Palomar Ballroom in Los Angeles burst into dancing excitement during the performance of the band led by twenty-six-year-old clarinetist Benny Goodman. While the definition of swing itself remained elusive, performers and fans could recognize it when they heard it in the rhythm and when it moved them to the dance floor. From the loose jam-session-inspired performances of Count Basie’s band in Kansas City to the polished pop sound of Glenn Miller’s globetrotting orchestra, swing became the most popular music in America during the later Depression and World War II years.

Swing appealed to both genders and across class lines. It transcended racial divisions, but failed to bridge them. The music introduced millions of young whites to African-American music and led them to appropriate the slang, or “jive talk,” of black musicians. But segregation remained the rule in both the bands and the dance halls, although exceptions did occur, such as Goodman’s hiring of the black vibraphonist Lionel Hampton and Billie Holiday’s singing performances with the white Artie Shaw band. White bandleaders and musicians gen-

See Also: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (WAGNER ACT); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB); TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA).
erally enjoyed better working conditions and greater public acclaim than their black peers, who often found themselves playing to all-white audiences. And despite the deep roots of jazz in African-American culture, the public and press still crowned a white man, Benny Goodman, “the King of Swing.”

See Also: ELLINGTON, DUKE; GOODMAN, BENNY; HOLIDAY, BILLIE; JAZZ; MUSIC.

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BRADFORD W. WRIGHT

BILBO, THEODORE

Theodore G. Bilbo (October 13, 1877–August 21, 1947), a major figure in twentieth-century Mississippi politics, was an ardent and notorious advocate of both white supremacy and white economic democracy. A native of south Mississippi’s Piney Woods, he rose to political prominence as the champion of the state’s poor farmers and laborers. With white supremacy a settled issue, Bilbo considered racial politics a sham that obscured the real struggle for power between his poor white constituency and the planter-business elite who had ruled the state since the overthrow of Reconstruction. Consciously subordinating race to economics, he sought to recast Mississippi politics as a battle between “the classes and the masses.”

The youngest of ten children in a farm family of modest means, Bilbo graduated from Poplarville High School in Pearl River County, not far from New Orleans. He attended Peabody College and Vanderbilt University Law School, but earned a degree from neither. After several years of teaching school, he made a successful bid for the state legislature in 1907, beginning a spectacular political rise that carried him to the lieutenant governorship (1912–1916) and two terms as chief executive (1916–1920, 1928–1932).

The dramatic difference between his two gubernatorial administrations underscores the impact of the Depression on Mississippi and its politics. Bilbo’s first term was, as even his most severe critics conceded, a resounding success, the culmination of two decades of rising agrarian progressivism. His second administration was a disaster. Thwarted by a hostile legislature, he achieved none of his progressive goals and bequeathed to his successor an empty treasury and a devastated economy.

Local impotence in the face of economic disaster converted many Mississippians into advocates of what they had long considered anathema—federal intervention. Bilbo led the way, embracing a doctrine of New Deal liberalism that strained the sensibilities of some other southern progressives. Elected to the United States Senate in 1934, he became arguably the most dependable New Dealer among southern Democrats. He eagerly followed the president’s lead, not only on agriculture, relief spending, and social security, but also on public housing and labor legislation. He was one of only twenty Democratic die-hards who backed Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme to the bitter end, and in 1940 he became Mississippi’s self-proclaimed “original third-termer” in favor of Roosevelt’s unprecedented re-election.

By the time of Bilbo’s 1946 re-election campaign, however, Harry Truman was edging Roosevelt’s refashioned Democratic Party inexorably toward civil rights for black Americans. The tension between Bilbo’s commitment to economic equality for whites and his increasingly virulent opposition to political equality for blacks became unbearable. In the end Bilbo succumbed to the very racial politics he had long sought to exorcise from public debate in Mississippi. He won his own third term not as an economic liberal but as the “archangel of white supremacy.” His enduring infamy for racist bigotry ironically obscures a remarkably consistent record as a loyal, if undistinguished, New Dealer.
See Also: NEW DEAL; SOUTH, GREAT DEPRESSION IN THE.

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CHESTER M. MORGAN

BLACK, HUGO

Hugo Lafayette Black (February 27, 1886–September 25, 1971) was a U.S. Senator from 1926 to 1937 and associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1937 to 1971. Raised in Alabama’s hill country, Black handled personal injury suits and cases involving injuries to workers in his Birmingham law practice. He served briefly as a police court judge and county prosecutor. Black joined the Ku Klux Klan in 1923, resigning just before he began his 1926 campaign for a seat in the U.S. Senate, which he won with support from many Klan members.

Black became one of the Senate’s most prominent and vociferous defenders of the New Deal after his reelection in 1932. His principal legislative proposal sought the adoption of the thirty-hour work week, which many in Roosevelt’s circle regarded as irresponsible and radical. The Senate approved Black’s bill, but the administration’s National Industrial Recovery Act superseded it. Black chaired two Senate committees to investigate what he regarded as corrupt ties between business and the government in awarding government contracts and in more general business lobbying. Black’s methods, which included extensive searches of the personal files and papers of business leaders, were intrusive, provoking outrage among those he investigated. Civil libertarians, however, had little to say against Black’s investigations. Black was one of the most ardent defenders of Roosevelt’s court-pack ing plan.

Black’s support of the New Deal made him an ideal nominee for the Supreme Court from President Roosevelt’s point of view after the court-packing plan collapsed and Senate majority leader Joseph Robinson, Roosevelt’s first choice for the Supreme Court, died unexpectedly. Black’s performance in the Senate generated substantial opposition from the business community, but the Senate approved his nomination by a vote of sixty-three to sixteen. Newspaper reports of Black’s Klan membership were published after the Senate had approved his appointment, and the revelation provoked a flurry of controversy, which died down soon after Black gave a radio speech confirming his former membership and pledging his fidelity to the Constitution.

Black became one of the intellectual leaders of the Roosevelt court. His guiding principle was that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of its words’ plain meaning and its authors’ understandings. Black sometimes had idiosyncratic views on what those original understandings were. Compatible with the New Deal’s economic focus, Black believed that the Constitution’s grant of power to regulate interstate commerce gave Congress essentially unlimited power to develop national economic policy. Reacting against Supreme Court decisions finding economic regulations unconstitutional because they violated a liberty of contract protected by the due process clause, Black became an adamant opponent of those who concluded that the Constitution protected other unenumerated rights more readily described as civil liberties. Nevertheless, Black vigorously defended civil liberties that were listed in the Constitution. His insistence that “‘no law’ means ‘no law’” in the First Amendment’s provision that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” led Black to a rigid stance on free expression, which came under pressure early in his court career in cases involving labor picketing.

One of Black’s early opinions as a justice seemed addressed to those who thought his Klan
membership demonstrated hostility towards civil
rights and civil liberties. Reversing a conviction
based on a confession beaten out of an African-
American suspect, Black wrote, the courts “stand
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for
those who might otherwise suffer because they are
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are
non-conforming victims of prejudice and public ex-
citement” (Chambers v. Florida, 1940).

See Also: BLACK THIRTY-HOUR BILL; SUPREME
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MARK TUSHNET

BLACK CABINET

Encouraged by African-American and interracial
organizations at the start of the New Deal, the Roo-
sevelt administration appointed over one hundred
prominent blacks to race relations advisory posi-
tions within federal departments and newly estab-
lished agencies throughout the 1930s and the war
years. Although some blacks had been given feder-
al positions by Republican administrations follow-
ing the Civil War, the Depression-era experience
was unique. Although the increased importance of
the black vote to the Democratic Party during the
Roosevelt years certainly influenced the decision to
bring racial advisers into the government, few
blacks were actually chosen because of their in-
volvement in partisan politics. An exception was
the former Republican stalwart, Pittsburgh Courier
editor and publisher Robert L. Vann, who became
an assistant attorney general in the Department of
Justice and whose selection was clearly aimed at
producing a favorable political response.

Most appointees, however, came from back-
grounds that more closely resembled that of the
black educator and activist Mary McLeod Bethune
or the Harvard educated economist Robert Clifton
Weaver. Bethune, adviser to the National Youth
Administration, and Weaver, first in the Depart-
ment of Interior and Public Works Administration
and later in the United States Housing Authority,
were also key figures in the formation in 1936 of the
Federal Council on Negro Affairs, also known as
the Black Cabinet. An informal organization in
which Bethune often served as chair and Weaver
vice chair, the Black Cabinet met on an irregular
basis, frequently at the home of individual mem-
ers. Its primary purpose was to coordinate Afri-
can-American opinion both in and outside the
Roosevelt administration. Black advisers often
shared information among themselves and kept
close ties with certain black and interracial organi-
izations. Some advisers, such as Forrester Washing-
ton in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
and Eugene Kinckle Jones in the Department of
Commerce, had held positions in the National
Urban League. The majority of black advisers were
middle-class and most were college graduates and
trained professionals. The Black Cabinet provided
them with the opportunity to communicate com-
mon personal struggles in government as well as to
develop strategies to ensure African-American par-
ticipation in critical New Deal programs.

The impact of these advisers on departmental
and agency policies and in affecting conditions of
black people during the 1930s depended upon a va-
riety of factors. The ability to actually shape policy
was determined frequently by whom they worked
for and the willingness of their superiors to circum-
vent bureaucratic restrictions and resist adverse
public opinion. For many government administra-
tors, the adviser’s role was viewed simply as provid-
ing information and serving as a public relations
spokesperson for existing New Deal programs. Bethun’s relationship to Aubrey Williams in the
National Youth Administration and Weaver’s with
Clark Foreman and Harold Ickes in Interior were
unique in terms of the support and authority that
those white New Dealers gave to their black ap-
pointees. In contrast, Attorney General Homer
Cummings never even knew Robert Vann was in
the Justice Department, and Edgar Brown, who served with the Civilian Conservation Corps, worked out of a makeshift office at the end of a corridor. Moreover, civil rights legislation and racial desegregation were never central to New Deal reform in the 1930s. Instead, New Deal economic and class-oriented policies affirmed the ideal of equal opportunity through the inclusion of all groups and classes, and black advisers had to work within the restraints of that political and ideological framework. Few blacks were satisfied ultimately with those limits, and some left in frustration. Yet the Black Cabinet remained important as a symbol of the New Deal’s special recognition of black needs, in the educating of white New Dealers on racial issues, and the precedent established for future black participation in the Democratic party and the national government.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; BETHUNE, MARY MCLEOD; VANN, ROBERT; WEAVER, ROBERT CLIFTON.

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JOHN B. KIRBY

BLACK LEGION

Part of a native fascist movement that grew to menacing proportions in the United States in the midst of the economic crisis occasioned by the Great Depression, the Black Legion stood out as an American counterpart to the rise of Nazism and fascism in Europe. Probably started in Ohio in 1931 by a group of former Ku Klux Klan members who dyed their robes black after their expulsion from that group, the organization experienced its greatest success in the industrialized regions of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. Its influence spread to a dozen or more other states. Though claiming as many as six million adherents, it is more likely that around forty thousand different individuals joined the Black Legion over time before legal investigations and prosecutions led to its collapse in 1939.

Having attracted publicity for a series of floggings during 1935, the terrorist group became headline news after the ritual murder of a 32-year-old Detroit relief worker by a dozen of its members in May 1936. The Black Legion was an authoritarian, quasi-military organization, which forced discipline upon its heavily-armed members by initiating them at the point of a gun and threatening death if they ever disclosed the secrets of the group to outsiders. To join the organization, a person had to swear that he was a white, native-born, Protestant American citizen and agree to take up arms, when called upon, against the group’s enemies.

Racial prejudice, religious bigotry, union-bashing, and red-baiting characterized the organization. Murder, intimidation, and violence were its calling cards. Many of its members were former rural residents who felt alienated in unfamiliar conditions in northern cities. A typical member, according to one journalistic account, was a southern-born male, in his mid-thirties, and Anglo-Saxon in background. While composed mostly of poorer, marginalized, working-class whites, the Black Legion also attracted a considerable number of middle-class businessmen and white-collar workers to its banner. Politicians and even law-enforcement officials sometimes became members.

Like the Ku Klux Klan and other similar groups, which provided a fertile recruiting ground for the Black Legion, its members spouted anti-black, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic rhetoric. Religious symbolism stood out prominently, and members acted in authoritarian fashion to try to impose their morality on others. Exposure of the organization in news articles, along with legal investigations and prosecutions, led to its precipitate decline during
the late 1930s. The Black Legion’s rapid demise resulted from its heavy dependence on violence, as opposed to voluntary support, to attract members. Afterwards, many of its adherents drifted into other similar native fascist groups.

See Also: RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS; ANTI-SEMITISM.

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JOHN E. MILLER

BLACK METROPOLIS

In 1945 social scientist St. Clair Drake and his research associate, Horace R. Cayton, published the two-volume Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City, which attempted to provide the empirical foundation for the notion of a “black metropolis.” The term, as used by the public as well as by social scientists, referred to a large and diverse African-American social enclave composed principally of professionals, small business owners, and a large working class of both unskilled and semi-skilled laborers. These enclaves emerged during the interwar years in large urban industrial areas in midwestern cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee. The south side of Chicago, the site of Drake and Cayton’s study, contained an elaborate institutional structure that replicated those of native-born whites, as well as those of recent immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, who occupied distinct ethnic enclaves in the city.

Black metropolises were the direct product not only of residential segregation and other blatant forms of discrimination, but also of the hard work and ingenuity of their inhabitants. African Americans’ overall prosperity during the 1920s was possible primarily because of the dire need for their labor as unskilled workers in midwestern factories.

With the onset of the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s, the notion of a black metropolis was transformed. In Chicago, for example, many working-class African Americans were discharged from unskilled jobs in factories in which many of them had been gainfully employed since World War I. Many African-American domestics also were fired, and banks in Chicago’s south-side ghetto were closed.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policies provided public relief programs, employment, and housing. Furthermore, presidential support for initiatives in collective bargaining between management and labor benefited unskilled African-American workers who had been able to retain employment. Additionally, many African Americans left both the rural and urban South during the 1930s—a direct result not only of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) crop reduction policies, but also because African Americans in southern cities received less than their proportionate share of allocations of relief and emergency employment. In short, the notion of a black metropolis was transformed from that of a community with a solid working class that had the potential to make advances in the mass-production industries and narrow the income gap between themselves and whites to one in which most of its members were on the dole or dependent on their working spouses for support.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE.

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VERNON J. WILLIAMS, JR.
BLACK THIRTY-HOUR BILL

The Black thirty-hour bill was introduced by Senator Hugo L. Black, a Democrat from Alabama, in December 1932 to establish a thirty-hour maximum workweek. The bill had diverse origins. During the 1920s some economists argued that the shorter workweek would improve the quality of life for working people and offset labor displacement resulting from technological change. The dramatic claims of the Technocracy movement, which emerged in 1932, reinforced concerns that technology contributed to unemployment. However, the shorter workweek was primarily viewed as a short-term expedient to ameliorate the Depression. During the Hoover years, it was central to the strategies of the President’s Emergency Committee for Employment (1930–1931) and its successor, the President’s Organization for Unemployment Relief (1931–1932). These agencies popularized work-sharing on the basis of its voluntary implementation by corporations to combat the unemployment emergency.

Herbert Hoover’s establishment of the Share-the-Work movement in September 1932 reflected the president’s commitment to this strategy. While there were many dissenting voices who believed that work-sharing was tantamount to spreading misery rather than relieving it, others believed that to be effective, work-sharing would have to be mandatory. Black’s bill would have prohibited the interstate or international shipment of products that had been manufactured in any establishment where workers were on the job more than five days per week or more than six hours per day. Black contended that the shorter workweek was an alternative to public relief and a way of promoting economic recovery by spreading purchasing power.

Despite widespread reservations, the Senate passed the Black bill on April 6, 1933. This action spurred the Roosevelt administration to formulate a more comprehensive industrial recovery bill. Roosevelt was particularly concerned that the hours provision was too rigid and he condemned the measure as a “one paragraph bill” that would not contribute to economic recovery. After the bill’s passage by the Senate, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins formulated a “substitute” bill that made provision for minimum wages, as well as maximum hours. Perkins’s bill received widespread criticism from the business community, and business organizations sought to further their own interests in antitrust reform and self-regulation through trade associations. In April Roosevelt established a planning group that became the focus of intense lobbying by business groups seeking to promote industrial self-regulation through cooperative agreements, subject to government approval in the public interest. Organized labor demanded a government guarantee of the right of workers to belong to unions and to bargain collectively through them. In addition, Roosevelt’s planning group considered a number of schemes to “start up” the economy, including federal subsidies and public works. Ultimately, a comprehensive recovery program emerged out of the brainstorming and lobbying that the single-issue Black bill had provoked. Federal regulation of working hours was one dimension of the National Industrial Recovery Act signed by Roosevelt on June 16, 1933.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (NIRA).

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STUART KIDD

BONNIE AND CLYDE (BONNIE PARKER AND CLYDE BARROW)

During an era when the exploits of gangsters such as Pretty Boy Floyd, Machine Gun Kelly, and the Karpis-Barker gang filled the pages of newspapers and provided plots for popular movies, Bonnie Parker (October 1, 1910–May 23, 1934) and Clyde Barrow (March 24, 1909–May 23, 1934) stood out as...
Between 1932 and 1934, when they drove through Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, committing the crimes for which they became notorious—twelve murders, scores of robberies, and nearly a dozen incidents of hostage-taking—Bonnie and Clyde came to stand for a variety of sometimes conflicting images. They were known as romantic lovers, and as a modern-day Robin Hood and Maid Marian who fought back against the predatory rich. Tabloid readers knew them as the “snake-eyed killer” and “cigar-smoking gun moll” (an image Bonnie despised but helped create). The recipients of an enormous amount of publicity on the radio, in newspapers, and in crime magazines, they contributed to their own legend through photographs they took of one another, poems written by Bonnie, stories they sent to detective magazines, and even through a letter Clyde sent to the Ford Motor Company, extolling the Ford as the car he always stole when he had the opportunity.

Both Bonnie and Clyde came from poor families—Clyde, the son of tenant farmers, was born in Ellis County, Texas, and Bonnie was born in Rowena, Texas, and raised by a poor widow. They met in 1930, when Bonnie was working as a waitress in a Dallas café and Clyde was wanted by the police on burglary charges. During the time that they spent together, they became famous for their abilities as escape artists. They drove their stolen cars through the Texas countryside at speeds of up to seventy miles an hour, evading police traps while other gang members, including members of both their families, were caught. They even managed to smuggle weapons into the Texas prison system to free their confederates.

Their crimes seemed to many emblematic both of the frontier spirit of the West, and of the new freedom made possible by the mass production of the automobile. Before meeting Bonnie, Clyde was just another two-bit crook—their romantic partnership elevated their criminal status. His love of his many guns, all of which he named, placed him squarely in the tradition of the western outlaw. However, as an armed woman during a period when marriage rates plummeted, male unemployment rates were high, and pundits decried a crisis of masculinity, Bonnie Parker simultaneously inhabited the gun-toting role more familiar to men and played the role of the supportive girlfriend, highlighting the cultural contradictions of American womanhood.

Bonnie and Clyde were shot down by lawmen in an ambush on May 23, 1934, in rural northwest Louisiana. They died almost literally in one another’s arms; their “death car,” which was exhibited at public events for years thereafter, as well as their bodies, became targets for souvenir hunters. Clyde’s funeral attracted thirty thousand spectators, and Bonnie’s was mobbed, too—the largest wreath there was sent by an organization of Dallas newspaper boys, perhaps in thanks for the half million newspapers the account of the final ambush had helped them to sell.

See Also: “BALLAD OF PRETTY BOY FLOYD”; CRIME; HEROES.
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LAURA BRODNER

BONUS ARMY/BONUS MARCH

The veterans’ bonus, more properly called “adjusted service compensation,” was approved by Congress in both 1922 and 1924 and vetoed by presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Harding’s veto was upheld, but Coolidge’s was overridden and the bonus bill became law. Its enactment came after four years of agitation by veterans and veterans’ groups. The law provided a cash payment equal to one dollar for each day of wartime military service, with an extra twenty-five cents for each day spent overseas. Certificates with varying face values were issued, but payment was deferred until 1945. An insurance provision provided for full payment to heirs in case of death. The accrued interest made the maximum possible payment some $1,800, a tidy sum at a time when the average annual earnings of non-farm workers came to just over $1,400. Other provisions allowed veterans to borrow limited amounts of the value of their bonus certificates at relatively high rates of interest.

THE BONUS: A DEPRESSION ISSUE
The payment deferral was widely accepted in 1924, but the end of the prosperity of the 1920s and the onset of the Great Depression created widespread agitation for “immediate cash payment.” The initial response of Congress during the Depression winter of 1930 to 1931 was to pass a bill allowing veterans to borrow larger amounts on their certificates at lower interest rates. President Herbert Hoover vetoed the bill, but a majority of the Republicans in each house joined almost all the Democrats to override Hoover’s veto.

There were those in Congress who wanted to do more. A growing bloc led by three House Democrats—William Connery of Massachusetts, John E. Rankin of Mississippi, and Wright Patman of Texas—campaigned for full and immediate cash payment. All had served as enlisted men during the war. Patman soon became the acknowledged leader of the bonus forces in Congress. The bills he and others introduced made the bonus a national issue and were a spur for most of those who came to Washington.

MARCHING ON WASHINGTON
As early as January 1931 a few veterans had demonstrated in the nation’s capital for immediate cash payment, and a number of other demonstrations took place before May 1932, none of which had a significant impact. The one Washington demonstration that caused a stir was the “National Hunger March,” a one-day affair on December 7, 1931, which was sponsored by a Communist Party front, the Unemployed Councils. Early in May 1932 the Communist press announced that another front organization, the Workers’ Ex-Servicemen’s League (WESL or Weasels), would lead a similar one-day March on June 8, 1932. But before that happened an unheralded group of veterans from Portland, Oregon, had crossed the nation in boxcars and trucks, captured national attention, and begun what would now be called a sit-in in the nation’s capital.

The Oregon veterans were led by an unemployed ex-sergeant, Walter W. Waters, who had spent almost eighteen months overseas with the medical detachment of the 146th Field Artillery until he was discharged in 1919. A handsome and glib six-footer who had drifted from job to job in the 1920s, Waters inflated his resume in his 1933 memoir, B.E.F.: The Whole Story of the Bonus Army. Even there, however, he admitted that “my inability to take root in fertile soil may have been due to the unsettling effects of the war on me” and he referred to an unspecified post-discharge illness with the words “my health failed.”

Waters and fewer than three hundred other veterans set out riding in empty boxcars on March 11 or 12, 1932. Their slow but peaceful passage east
was ignored by the national press until railroad officials at Council Bluffs, Iowa, tried without success to stop them from reaching Saint Louis; the brief stand-off in the Iowa rail yards was news. Waters gave his first press conference on May 20 when the bonus seekers arrived in Saint Louis. He said that when they got to Washington they were going to stay until a bonus bill was passed “if it takes until 1945.” That statement, publicized nationally, acted as a signal for groups of veterans across the country to come to Washington. By the time the Oregonians reached the capital on May 29, hundreds of other veterans were already there and thousands more were on their way.

By mid-June some twenty thousand had come to participate in what the press called a “bonus march,” although almost no one walked to Washington. Some drove their own cars and trucks. The Washington, D.C., police force was commanded by Pelham D. Glassford, a West Point graduate who had been the youngest general in the American Expeditionary Force and had retired from the army in 1931. Glassford sympathized with his fellow veterans but understood that their cause was all but hopeless. Interested in public order, he encouraged the men to organize as a Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF), helped them obtain relief supplies, and got most of the veterans to set up an encampment on park land in Anacostia at the edge of the District of Columbia. Some also camped in partially demolished buildings on lower Pennsylvania Avenue near the Capitol. There were few arrests and no significant violence for almost two months.
Patman’s bonus bill had been locked up in committee, but after the veterans arrived it was easy to pry it out. On June 15 it passed in the House, 211 to 176. The Senate leadership agreed to a quick vote, hoping that the men would go home once it was defeated. On the evening of June 17, with several thousand veterans massed in front of the Capitol, the Senate defeated the bill. Only twenty-eight of ninety-six senators favored it. Some feared that the massed veterans would riot in response. Instead they sang “America the Beautiful” and returned to their encampments. But large numbers of them stayed in Washington and some reinforcements arrived.

THE BATTLE OF WASHINGTON

Before adjourning on July 16, Congress offered railroad fare home plus a seventy-five cent per diem allowance to any veteran who left by July 25. Some five thousand veterans took advantage of this offer. The Red Cross, which had refused any aid to the veterans, financed the travel of nearly five hundred accompanying wives and children. Once the July 25 deadline had passed, the Hoover administration, acting through its appointees, the District Commissioners, issued orders to force the now fewer than ten thousand veterans to leave Washington. The first step was ordering the police to remove the veterans camped on Pennsylvania Avenue. Glassford and his police commenced that task on July 28; two violent outbursts occurred as some men resisted eviction. The first, in the morning, caused no fatalities, but resulted in the commissioners asking the president for federal troops. Hoover obliged, ordering that the veterans be taken into custody. A few minutes later, another fracas broke out and a policeman who had been attacked drew his pistol and fired several shots, which killed two veterans. Glassford restored order and shortly thereafter learned that the Army had been called out.

About six hundred soldiers—some two hundred cavalry, three hundred infantry, and five tanks—under the personal command of Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, formed on the Ellipse behind the White House, and at 4:30 p.m. they moved up Pennsylvania Avenue at the height of the evening rush hour. The resulting “Battle of Washington” was no battle at all: Not a shot was fired by the troops or the veterans, although the latter threw a few bricks and a lot of curses and the former used the points of sabers, bayonets, and tear gas. The troops then moved toward Anacostia, positioned three tanks on the bridge, and took a break for supper. Those in the Anacostia encampment were given notice, and then the soldiers advanced, driving the veterans and whoever was with them out of the district and into Maryland like so many refugees. MacArthur deliberately disobeyed Hoover’s order to take the veterans prisoner.

The Hoover administration claimed that most of the expelled bonus marchers were Communists and not really veterans, but such changes did not sit well with the public. Rexford Guy Tugwell wrote in *The Brains Trust* (1968) that he had an appointment with Franklin Roosevelt on the morning of July 29. Entering the governor’s Hyde Park, New York, bedroom about 7:30 a.m., Tugwell found Roosevelt, characteristically, in bed with the papers spread around him. He told Tugwell that the pictures of the troops driving the veterans from the nation’s capital were like “scenes from a nightmare.” Tugwell believed that from that point on Roosevelt felt assured of his election, which almost certainly would have come in any event.

In a letter written a few days before the 1932 election, Roosevelt, who, like Hoover, opposed a bonus prepayment, told a correspondent that he would have handled things differently. Roosevelt got that opportunity when a smaller and more radical group of veterans came to Washington in May 1933. The president had Harry Hopkins arrange for billets at underused military facilities outside the district, sent his wife to meet with the veterans, and changed the rules so that those who wished could enroll in special veterans’ units of the newly created Civilian Conservation Corps.

In 1936 Congress passed a bill to pay the bonus at once; Roosevelt vetoed it, but did not strenuously attempt to stop Congress from overriding his veto. Although the imaginative World War II programs for veterans commonly known as the G. I. Bill of Rights might have come about in any event, the
bonus experience spurred planning for future veterans’ benefits.

See Also: Hoover, Herbert.

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ROGER DANIELS

BOONDOGGLE

During the years of the New Deal, its critics used the term “boondoggle” to refer to various work relief programs that fell under the aegis of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), a federal agency created in 1935 and run by Roosevelt’s federal relief administrator, Harry Hopkins. The word implied a politically motivated, trivial, wasteful, or impractical government project funded to gain political favor.

The word originally meant a braided cord worn by Boy Scouts as a neckerchief or ornament, that is, a handmade article of simple utility and practical use. It may have been used earlier to refer to a device rigged by Daniel Boone to carry his equipment across rivers so that his hands would be free to swim. Thus, the term can be used to refer to anything people created for themselves to help them work more easily and effectively.

During the 1930s, however, boondoggle became a politically charged word expressing disdain for government programs that provided various types of work for the unemployed during the Great Depression. Hopkins’s WPA work relief programs were especially vulnerable to criticism as “make-work,” especially those that had to do with the arts. Although most WPA projects consisted of building or repairing roads and public buildings, parks, hospitals, and highways, one of its components, the Federal Arts Project (known as Federal One), paid thousands of unemployed artists, musicians, actors, and writers for working at their craft.

Artists suffered inordinately during the Great Depression because the market for art works virtually disappeared. In desperation, some artists would barter their work for food and rent while others tried selling on the street. The hard fact that the unemployment rate for artists was even greater than for the general population led the government to create jobs for them. When critics accused Hopkins of giving boondoggling jobs to people committed to the creative impulse, he defended Federal One as a way to keep the talents of millions of Americans alive. Art patronage, in Hopkins’s opinion, was healthy and defined the artists’ relationship to their society as an ultimately useful one. Government patronage made art accessible to the public and insured that the artist would have a creative role in American society that would be democratizing and culturally enriching for the entire nation.

See Also: Federal One; Hopkins, Harry; Works Progress Administration (WPA).

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BORAH, WILLIAM

William Edgar Borah (June 29, 1865–January 19, 1940) was a prominent Republican senator during the Great Depression. Known as the “Lion of
Idaho,” he defended Jeffersonian principles, upheld civil libertarian doctrines, espoused constitutionalism, and safeguarded the special interests of his home state. Despite his lengthy service in the upper chamber, Borah lacked an understanding of power plays in American politics. He remained a political maverick whose oratorical skills outweighed a plan of action, a characteristic that curtailed his effectiveness as a leader. Essentially he remained a loner. Yet for all his shortcomings, Borah possessed the ability to arouse people on public issues.

Born in Jasper Township, Wayne County, Illinois, Borah attended Tom’s Prairie Public School and Southern Illinois Academy but never completed high school. He matriculated at the University of Kansas for a time in the 1880s. Thereafter Borah studied law in his brother-in-law’s office, relocated to Idaho in 1890, earned a reputation as a good criminal lawyer, became interested in politics, chaired the Republican State Central Committee, attacked the trusts, and supported William Jennings Bryan, a Democrat, for president in the free silver crusade of 1896. In 1902 Borah led the progressive Republican faction that defeated Idaho’s Old Guard candidates. Five years later state legislators elected him to the U.S. Senate, where he remained until his death.

Borah was a reformer and individualist. He embraced Theodore Roosevelt but declined to follow him in the Bull Moose campaign of 1912. Borah endorsed legislation for labor revision and backed constitutional amendments for a graduated income tax, the direct election of U.S. senators, and national prohibition. He also belonged to the irreconcilable wing of senators who opposed any version of a League of Nations. After World War I, Borah surfaced as a major voice for progressivism, isolationism, and the outlawry of war. Although he wholeheartedly championed Herbert Hoover for president in 1928, Borah assailed the president’s farm and tariff policies and berated him for not pursuing more aggressive action to relieve the suffering in the nation. Borah demanded relief for the needy and unemployed. In a blistering Senate speech in 1931, he challenged the administration to respond to the crisis. Borah’s crusading voice against Hoover’s economic philosophy helped prepare the way for the New Deal.

The severity of the Great Depression in the 1930s convinced Borah of the necessity for government intervention to combat the economic catastrophe, monitor the nation’s financial condition, and protect the general interest. He accepted much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal domestic program, especially legislation that aided farmers and arranged for work remedies and alleviation. The senator favored the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission, Social Security, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Revenue Act of 1935, and the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, but he remained steadfastly against the National Recovery Administration with measures designed to benefit the industrial segments of American society. He suggested currency expansion as a means to ameliorate the Depression. Although the expansion of federal bureaucratic agencies and the possible dangers to individual rights worried Borah, he focused attention on the activist role of government in the 1930s.

By the end of the 1930s, Borah devoted his time primarily to foreign affairs and endeavors to avoid United States entanglement in case of war. He died at his home in Washington, D.C., three days after a cerebral hemorrhage.

See Also: NEW DEAL.

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LEONARD SCHLUP

BOULDER DAM

Located in the Black Canyon of the Colorado River on the Arizona-Nevada state line, thirty-five miles southeast of Las Vegas, the Boulder Dam, known since 1947 as the Hoover Dam, stands as a monu-
Laborers install steel bar reinforcements at the mid-section of Boulder Dam during construction in 1934. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

ment to modern engineering. It is a concrete gravity arch dam that spans 1,244 feet across the canyon and rises to a height of 726 feet; its width ranges from 660 feet at the base to forty-five feet at the crest. By controlling unpredictable floods, providing water to drought-ridden areas, and generating electrical power, the dam transformed the West and encouraged settlement of the region.

On December 21, 1928, following extensive debate over water rights and fiscal concerns, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Boulder Canyon Project bill, providing over $165 million to construct the dam. The Bureau of Reclamation awarded the contract to Six Companies, Inc., on March 11, 1931, ensuring employment for five thousand workers at the depths of the Depression. The government built Boulder City, complete with a school, a hospital, a general store, and a mess hall that served four thousand meals a day, to provide housing for single men and families.

Work on the dam began in May 1931 with the excavation of two tunnels on each side of the canyon to divert the river during construction. Workers then drained the site, stripped canyon walls of loose rock to provide a smooth surface for abutment, and drilled the canyon floor for the dam to rest on solid bedrock. In June 1933 workers started pouring concrete blocks in a series of columns using bottomdrop buckets hoisted into position by a cableway that spanned the canyon. A U-shaped powerhouse, with two arms extending downstream on either side of the canyon and connected by an arm spanning the face of the dam, housed generators that produced over 700,000 kilowatts of electricity, ren-
dering Boulder Dam the largest hydroelectric facility in the world until the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington exceeded that level in 1949. Twin sets of intake towers controlled the flow of water to the powerhouse and reservoir outlets.

On February 1, 1935, workers sealed the diversion tunnels and allowed water to rise behind the dam, creating Lake Mead reservoir, named for Elwood Mead, the former commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation. President Franklin Roosevelt dedicated the dam on September 30, 1935, proclaiming it “a twentieth-century marvel” that transformed the Colorado River “into a great national possession.” Congress renamed the structure Hoover Dam in 1947, ending a controversy that began in 1930 when supporters proposed naming the dam after President Herbert Hoover for his contribution to the project. However, as more Americans began blaming Hoover for the Depression, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, rejected the proposal and named the project Boulder Dam in 1933. Once public opinion of Hoover softened, Congress restored his name to the project that he helped to initiate.

The Boulder Dam harnessed the power of the Colorado River for the public good. It encouraged settlement and development of the West by thousands of farmers and businessmen who required a stable water supply, power generation, and protection from unpredictable floods. Combined with its contributions to municipal and recreational needs, Boulder Dam eventually benefited millions of Americans.

See Also: Grand Coulee Project; Public Power; West, Great Depression in the American.

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Todd J. Pfannestiel

BOURKE-WHITE, MARGARET

Margaret Bourke-White (June 14, 1904–August 27, 1971) was born in the Bronx, New York, the daughter of Joseph White and Minnie Bourke, and grew up in New Jersey. She acquired a fascination for photography from her father and from a teacher, Clarence H. White, a member of Alfred Stieglitz’s Photo-Secession movement. After briefly attending two colleges, and getting married and divorced, she enrolled in Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, and supported herself by selling photographs of the campus to students and alumni. She graduated in 1927 with a degree in biology. Bourke-White then opened a photography studio in Cleveland, where her dramatic industrial photographs of foundries gained the attention of Henry Luce in 1929. Luce brought her to New York to become a photographer for his new magazine, Fortune. Bourke-White’s assignment to take pictures of industrialization in the Soviet Union in 1930 led to her first book, Eyes on Russia (1931). After completing celebrated picture essays on the meatpacking plants of Chicago, glass blowing in upstate New York, and Indiana stone quarries, Bourke-White’s emphasis changed from industry to the human condition while she photographed the Dust Bowl conditions of the Plains states in 1934. She collaborated with writer Erskine Caldwell, whom she would later marry and divorce, on a photo-documentary of the life of poor southern sharecroppers, You Have Seen Their Faces (1937). In 1936 she signed on as one of four photographers for Luce’s new pictorial magazine, Life. Her photographs of the construction of Fort Peck Dam in Montana were chosen for the first cover illustration and lead article of Luce’s new venture.

As a Life correspondent during World War II, she was the only foreign photojournalist to be in
the Soviet Union when the Germans invaded, the only woman to be accredited by the U. S. armed forces as a war photographer, the first female to accompany and record an Army Air Force bombing mission, and the first to document the horrors of the German concentration camp at Buchenwald. After the war, she covered the Korean War, the miners of South Africa, and the independence of, and strife between, India and Pakistan. Discovering that she had Parkinson’s disease in 1956, Bourke-White gradually turned from photography to writing, producing an autobiography, *Portrait of Myself* (1963). She died in 1971 at the age of sixty-seven. A pioneer in photojournalism who thrived on adventure and craved a crisis, tirelessly and ruthlessly doing whatever it took to get the photograph she wanted, Bourke-White was widely hailed as a woman doing a man’s job in a man’s world.

*See Also:* CALDWELL, ERSKINE; LANGE, DOROTHEA; PHOTOGRAPHY; SHAHN, BEN.

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Grinding poverty, shattered family relationships, and financially strapped schools that locked their doors were among the reasons most kids went on the road. They usually did so with the blessing of parents at their wits end to feed and care for them. The first weeks away from home could be euphoric, filled with a sense of romance and adventure. Minehan observed that after six months on the road, however, the boys and girls lost their fresh outlook and eagerness. Trips across the country were no longer educational, but were quests for bread. “There comes a day when the boys are alone and hungry, and their clothes are ragged and torn,” wrote Minehan; “breadlines have just denied them

**BOY AND GIRL TRAMPS OF AMERICA**

In 1933 and 1934, Thomas Minehan, a young sociologist at the University of Minnesota, disguised himself in old clothes and hopped freight trains crisscrossing six midwestern states. He joined the bands of boys, and more than a few girls, who formed the ranks of a roving army of 250,000 children torn from their homes in the Great Depression. Over a two-year period, Minehan associated on terms of intimacy and equality with several thousand transients, collecting five hundred life histories of the young migrants. The result was a vivid portrayal of their harrowing existence, *Boy and Girl Tramps of America,* a work unique in its ability to reach beyond statistics and reveal the opinions, ideas, and attitudes of the boxcar boys and girls.

During the Depression, some 250,000 young people took to the road, often with the blessing of parents at their wits end to feed and care for them. These boys were photographed hopping a freight car in California in 1940. National Archives and Records Administration
food, relief stations an opportunity to work for

clothes. A brakie [brakeman] has chased them from
the yards. An old vagrant shares his mulligan with
them and they listen.”

Riding with the road kids, Minehan estimated
that 10 percent of those he met were girls, dressed
in overalls or army breeches and boys’ coats. They
traveled in pairs, sometimes with a boyfriend,
sometimes with a tribe of ten or twelve boys. Mine-
han described “Kay,” who was fifteen: “Her black
eyes, fair hair, and pale cheeks are girlish and deli-
cate. Cinders, wind and frost have irritated but not
toughened that tender skin. Sickly and suffering
from chronic undernourishment, she appears to
subsist almost entirely upon her fingernails, which
she gnaws habitually.”

For African-American youths, the road was
even rockier. They were often turned away from a
door where a white hobo would get a handout; on
occasion, too, black youths riding the rails in the
South were threatened with a lynching.

Danger was a constant companion that could
turn deadly in an instant. Railroad detectives, called
“bulls,” handled illegal riders savagely. By 1932, the
Southern Pacific Company reported 683,457 tres-
passers on its property, 75 percent of these estimat-
ed to be from sixteen to twenty-five years old. In the
first ten months of 1932, the Interstate Commerce
Commission recorded 1,508 trespassers under
twenty-one killed or injured.

Minehan completed his research even as the
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was being es-

tablished by the Roosevelt administration, the sin-
gle most vital program to meet the needs of the rov-
ing army. By July 1933, a quarter of a million young
men were serving in the CCC in 1,468 forest and
park camps. The National Youth Administration
later provided fifty camps that offered job training
and education for girls.

Minehan found that desperate as their lives
were, the child tramps remained defiant: “I can’t
get a job anywhere,” said a boy called Texas. “I
can’t get into the CCC because I have no depen-
dents. I can’t remain in any state unless I go to a
slave camp. What chance have I got? Less chance
than a man with two wooden legs in a forest fire.

I’ve seen a lot of the country in the last year and I’m
glad I’ve seen it but if a guy travels too much he be-
comes a bum, and I don’t want to be a bum.”

See Also: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT
OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; CIVILIAN
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ERROL LINCOLN UYS

BRAIN(S) TRUST

The Brains Trust was a small group of academics se-
lected by Franklin D. Roosevelt and his political ad-
visors to help the Democratic candidate in 1932 in
his presidential bid. The term was originally coined
by Louis Howe, a long-time associate of Roosevelt.
It was later shortened to Brain Trust and made pop-

Given the complexities of the modern Ameri-
can economy and the enormity of the Great De-
pression and its effects, Roosevelt’s law partner,
Sam Rosenman, suggested to the Democratic can-
didate that he seek the advice of academics in at-
tempting to deal with the economic issues of the
day, a practice Roosevelt had used previously during his governorship of New York. Rosenman recruited Raymond Moley, a political science professor at Columbia University in New York, to help Roosevelt organize this academic group.

Raymond Moley had already worked with Roosevelt during the Seabury investigation into corruption in the New York City government. An expert in criminal justice, Moley was to help the candidate in political matters and introduce him to other academics. After another Roosevelt law partner, Doc O’Connor, joined the small group, Moley recruited two more Columbia professors: Rexford G. Tugwell and Adolf Berle.

Tugwell was a professor of economics at Columbia and a highly prolific author who had written on the causes of the Great Depression and Herbert Hoover’s failure to address the crisis. Tugwell was also familiar with the novel approaches being suggested to resolve America’s agricultural problems. Adolf Berle was a well known legal expert who published with the economist Gardiner Means an important work on the modern corporation, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1933). Moley, Tugwell, and Berle served as Roosevelt’s Brains Trust throughout the 1932 campaign.

The purpose of the Brains Trust was to educate Roosevelt on current economic issues, assist in speechwriting, and help the candidate formulate his own ideas on how to approach and resolve the Depression. Although the three academics would later follow their own distinctive beliefs and career paths, in 1932 they all agreed that big business was inevitable, that the Wilsonian approach of breaking up corporations into small units was unacceptable, that regulation was the key to dealing with big business, and that some form of planning in the economic sector was necessary.

Throughout the 1932 campaign, the Brains Trust met frequently with Roosevelt. They often researched topics the candidate needed to know about or was embracing, and they helped him draft speeches, although Roosevelt typically put his own imprint on any speech, sometimes changing the wording and content as he delivered it. Moley worked with Roosevelt on the “forgotten man” speech in April 1932. Moley also helped Roosevelt draft a speech delivered in Saint Paul, often referred to as the “concert of interest” speech, in which the term *New Deal* was first used. Berle helped Roosevelt write the San Francisco Commonwealth Club speech, which called for economic planning in the future. Tugwell worked on a number of speeches, usually writing parts of the draft, especially if the speech dealt with agriculture and the domestic allotment proposal.

In addition to speech writing, Moley tutored Roosevelt on political issues, Tugwell on agricultural matters, and Berle on finance and corporations. Tugwell, for example, worked hard to educate Roosevelt on *domestic allotment*, a plan to control farm overproduction by paying farmers to not plant crops. Although some Democratic leaders disliked the idea of professors advising their candidate, there was little they could do about it. Roosevelt relied on his Brains Trust and listened to what they had to say, whether or not he incorporated what they told him into his speeches or, later, into his New Deal programs. Election day marked the official end of the Brains Trust, but not the end of the role each member of the group played in Roosevelt’s administration.

Of the three, Berle was the only one who chose not to accept an official appointment in 1933. Rather, Berle returned to New York where he advised Fiorello La Guardia in his mayoral campaign and helped the newly elected mayor address New York’s financial crisis. Berle continued to help the president in a variety of ways, however. For example, he advised Roosevelt on the banking crisis, the railroads, and foreign policy, especially concerning Latin America and Cuba.

Raymond Moley was appointed assistant secretary of state in 1933. Working under Cordell Hull, Moley was closely associated with the president. Moley advised Roosevelt for the 1933 London Conference, but Roosevelt seemed to endorse Hull’s views, rather than Moley’s, when he sent his famous “bombshell” message to the conference announcing his decision to promote American economic nationalism to resolve the economic crisis. This announcement so undermined Moley’s position that he gradually drifted away from the president. He eventually left the administration and be-
came a magazine editor. Moley’s disappointment with Roosevelt deepened as time went on, and he finally broke openly with the president during the 1940 campaign. Thereafter, Moley became a consistent critic of the Roosevelt presidency.

Rexford Tugwell fared much better. He remained with Roosevelt after the election, serving as an advisor until the inauguration, after which Tugwell was officially appointed assistant secretary of agriculture under Henry Wallace. Tugwell worked diligently in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to implement domestic allotment under the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. His clash with the director of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, George Peek, and Peek’s eventual resignation, was seen as a victory for Tugwell, however short-lived. Although Peek’s replacement, Chester Davis, was committed to domestic allotment, he was also a determined administrator who did not tolerate disagreement from subordinates. His famous “purge” of liberals in the USDA over Southern sharecropping agreements was a direct attack on Tugwell. Tugwell was so livid about Davis’s actions that he threatened to resign from the New Deal. Roosevelt convinced him to stay, and Tugwell became director of the Resettlement Administration (RA) in 1935. Despite his good intentions and administrative capabilities, Tugwell was targeted by the press as a radical and as a threat to America. He resigned from the RA in 1936, only to return to the administration in 1941 when Roosevelt appointed him governor of Puerto Rico. For the rest of his life and career, Tugwell remained loyal to Roosevelt, despite the disappointments he felt with Roosevelt and the New Deal after 1936.

With Tugwell’s departure from the administration in 1936, all three original members of the Brains Trust were gone. Other advisers with academic backgrounds and business expertise joined the administration, and the term associate member of the Brains Trust is sometimes applied to such individuals as Hugh Johnson of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and Donald Richberg of the NRA and the National Economic Council. Later advisers like Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran are also sometimes referred to as Brains Trusters. In the end, though, the Brains Trust remained what it had started out to be—a small advisory group of academics who helped Roosevelt in his 1932 bid for the presidency.

See Also: BERLE, ADOLF A. JR.; ELECTION OF 1932; MOLEY, RAYMOND; TUGWELL, REXFORD G.

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BRANDEIS, LOUIS D.

In November 1931, as the American economy was sinking into frightening decline, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis (November 13, 1856–October 5, 1941) turned seventy-five. Behind him was an illustrious career as a prominent Boston attorney, a leading reformer active in a dozen progressive crusades, a close adviser to Woodrow Wilson, and, after 1914, the leader of the American Zionist movement. He had been on the Supreme Court since 1916, and had earned a reputation as an eloquent defender of civil liberties, a champion of the rights of labor, a supporter of state and local prerogatives against centralized federal authority, and a bitter foe of “the curse of bigness,” both in business and in government. By the time of the Great Depression he had transcended much of the controversy that had characterized his turbulent years as a social activist, and he enjoyed nearly universal respect and admiration as a wise elder statesman. Franklin D. Roosevelt occasionally referred to him as “Isaiah.”

His activities during the 1930s centered in three general areas. First, he maintained his interest in the Zionist project of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He paid close attention to Jewish...
affairs, assiduously studied Palestine developments, and grew increasingly worried about British policy there. He was one of the earliest to see the dangers to Jews in the rise of Adolf Hitler. Second, of course, he continued his work on the Supreme Court until his resignation in February 1939. Although he joined in declaring some key New Deal measures unconstitutional, he was numbered among the Court’s liberal wing. One of his most significant opinions in this period was in *Erie v. Tompkins* (1938), which limited the authority of federal courts and enhanced the judicial authority of the states. Although Brandeis admired Roosevelt personally, he was opposed to the president’s attempt, in 1937, to “pack” the Supreme Court.

Finally, Brandeis played an extremely important role in the spirited debates raging around the formation of New Deal policy. He did this, in part, by utilizing extensive informal channels of influence—through Felix Frankfurter and Frankfurter’s many disciples, through numerous private conversations with major and minor New Deal officials, and even, occasionally, through direct and indirect contacts with President Roosevelt himself. Soon Brandeis came to be regarded as the symbolic leader of that wing of New Deal thought that believed in imposing limitations on federal authority, avoiding centralization at the expense of local autonomy, and enhancing free market competition rather than relying upon federal measures that assumed and accepted the inevitability of large-scale production. Many historians of this period refer to those in Washington who held these views as *Brandeisians* or *neo-Brandeisians*.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS; SUPREME COURT.

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**BREADLINES**

Breadlines, in which poverty-stricken and hungry Americans queued for free food, were representative of the increasing unemployment and consequent hunger caused by the Depression. Breadlines became common in many cities during the 1930s, and the sheer numbers of homeless and unemployed people often overwhelmed the charities that were giving out food. Rexford G. Tugwell, a New Deal administrator and advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, commented in his diary about the pervasiveness of hunger during the Depression: “Never in modern times . . . has there been so widespread unemployment and such moving distress from cold and hunger.”

With the onset of the Great Depression, companies were forced to cut production and to lay off many of their employees. By 1932 there were some thirteen million Americans out of work, or one-fourth of all workers. Even those who remained employed often found their wages and hours sharply reduced, and providing adequate food for oneself and one’s family became a daily struggle for many Americans. One oft-repeated story tells of a teacher in West Virginia who directed a young girl to go home and eat. The girl replied, “I can’t. This is my sister’s day to eat.” In New York City one out of five children attending school was reported to be suffering from malnutrition. And in other areas, such as the coal-mining regions of Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, thousands of children went hungry.

Breadlines were thus a necessity during the 1930s. They were run by private charities, such as the Red Cross; private individuals—the gangster Al Capone opened a breadline in Chicago; and government agencies. Breadlines became associated with shame and humiliation because many Americans felt responsible for their own downfall. As one
A long line of people wait for free food in February 1932 in New York City. Because government relief programs were inadequate during the early years of the Depression, private organizations and benefactors often provided the food. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
distressed man during the Depression put it: “Shame? You tellin’ me? I would go stand in the relief line [and] bend my head low so nobody would recognize me.”

See Also: CHARITY; SOUP KITCHENS; UNEMPLOYMENT, LEVELS OF.

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BRIDGES, HARRY

One of the most successful and radical labor leaders in the United States, Harry Bridges (July 28, 1901–March 30, 1990) was integral to the formation of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) and a strong voice for the left in American labor throughout the Depression years and after.

Born in Australia to middle-class parents, Bridges became a sailor in his teens, and emigrated to San Francisco in 1920, eventually finding work as a longshoreman. He had already been exposed to the radicalism of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) while working in Australia, and he soon was involved in labor organizing on the San Francisco docks. In 1933, Bridges, along with Communists and other radicals, was at the forefront of efforts to rebuild the faded International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA). He and other labor activists sought to unite all unions in the industry into one federation. They proposed changes from the top-down leadership structure of previous unions, calling for regular union meetings, financial accountability for union officers, and a democratic constitution that would recognize the voices of rank-and-file members.

In 1934, the newly revived ILA sought to negotiate a contract that would organize West Coast docks. Even after the intervention of President Franklin Roosevelt and in the face of opposition from the ILA’s own president, the union voted to strike, shutting down West Coast docks beginning on May 9. Tensions during the strike also led to violent clashes between protesting workers and police, most notably in San Francisco, where a general strike ensued. During the strike, Bridges gained a reputation as a dedicated organizer and successful leader, particularly after employers were forced to arbitrate with the union to end the strike. This notoriety also made him a target for anti-labor forces who claimed Bridges was a Communist agitator, a charge he would deny. Evidence from Soviet archives suggests that Bridges was a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s.

After another large strike in 1936, Bridges was elected president of the Pacific Coast District of the ILA, but the district soon came into conflict with the more conservative union leadership. In 1937, the district’s members voted to join the newly formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and they renamed themselves the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union. With Bridges as president, the ILWU was one of the most radical unions in the country, engaging in hundreds of job actions to improve working conditions and retaining a large faction of Communist members. With the rise of fascism in the late 1930s, Bridges led the ILWU’s boycott of Italian and German ships, and the union later adopted a “no-strike” pledge during World War II in order to support the U.S. war effort.

Bridges’s continued radicalism made him the target of deportation hearings in the late 1930s, yet he remained defiant, even after the ILWU was expelled from the CIO in 1950 for supporting its Communist membership. Bridges continued as president of the ILWU until 1977, remaining politically outspoken and ensuring his legacy as one of America’s most important labor leaders.

See Also: CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION (ILA); SAN FRANCISCO GENERAL STRIKE (1934); STRIKES.
The popular song “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?,” which became an anthem of the Great Depression, was written in 1932 by composer Jay Gorney and lyricist E. Y. “Yip” Harburg as part of a musical score for the satirical revue Americana. The revue took its theme from Roosevelt’s “Forgotten Man” speech that launched his first presidential campaign by reminding Americans of the men who had fought our wars and worked in our factories but now were out of work. “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?” was written for a scene in which men in soldiers’ uniforms form a breadline.

Gorney’s melody starts out in a plaintive minor key—an unusual beginning for a Broadway theater song—and Harburg’s lyric portrays a man who is not a pitiful panhandler, but a strong man bewildered to find himself in a breadline. In the past, he says, he has built a railroad and fought bravely in war, but now he is outraged to find that he must beg for a dime. In the opening verse, he expresses his bitterness, “They used to tell me I was building a dream,” and in the chorus, the main body of the song, he recalls how jauntily he and other men went off to war, only to find themselves later “slogging through hell.”

By the end of the song, as the music soars upward in a crescendo, the singer’s request becomes ominously threatening as he confronts his listener and repeats his request for money, but this time, instead of addressing him as “brother,” he uses the more military (“buddy” is a military term for a fellow-soldier) and militant, “Buddy, can you spare a dime?” The clear implication is that this powerful, embittered man—and “half a million” like him—could easily rise up against the political system that betrayed them with its “Yankee-Doodle-de-dum.”

After Americana opened on Broadway on October 5, 1932, a month before the presidential election, reviewers singled out “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?” for praise, and recordings by Bing Crosby and other singers made it a hit despite the fact that some radio stations downplayed or even banned the song.

See Also: BREADLINES; MUSIC.

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Philip Furia

BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS (BSCP)

Pullman porters worked exclusively on railroad cars called Pullman sleeping cars, the brain-child of George Mortimer Pullman and the major means of transportation used by the wealthy to travel long distances before the era of air travel. George Pullman chose recently freed black men for the position of porter on his sleeping cars in order to evoke the comfort and style slaves had provided for the gentry in the antebellum South. By the 1920s, the Pullman porter was perhaps the most recognized African American in white America, and the Pullman Company employed approximately twelve thousand African Americans, making it the largest private employer of black men in the United States. In 1925 a group of porters, fed up with long hours, low pay, and the servile demeanor demanded by the Pullman Company, formed the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) in New York City, where it enjoyed a measure of success.
The BSCP’s campaign came to a halt when it reached Chicago, headquarters of the powerful, anti-union Pullman Company and home to more than a third of Pullman porters. Through the years Pullman executives had cultivated close relationships with black leaders by pouring money into institutions in black Chicago and promoting the image of Pullman as a friend not just of workers, but the entire community. As a result, the majority of black leaders opposed the BSCP. Utilizing a community-based strategy, the BSCP set out to win the hearts and minds of ministers, the press, and politicians who did not appreciate the role labor unions could play in the larger black freedom struggle. By 1929, as significant numbers of black leaders began supporting the BSCP and its organizing networks, a pro-labor perspective was taking shape in black Chicago. The pro-labor stance increased the union’s credibility in the eyes of the community and increased membership in the union. Shortly thereafter, fallout from the Depression, which included a severe decline in travelers, fewer jobs for porters, fewer tips for working porters, and fear associated with joining a union during hard times, contributed to a decline in BSCP membership. From a high of 7,300 members in 1927, BSCP membership had dropped to 658 by 1933. While some observers decreed that the BSCP had died, union porters dubbed the 1929 to 1933 period as the “dark days.”

The union’s fate changed through its relationship with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the coming of New Deal labor laws. The AFL, which granted federal charters to thirteen BSCP locals in 1929, provided very little financial assistance, but gave the BSCP a platform from which to advance its call for greater economic opportunity for all black workers. Though the BSCP was reduced to a skeleton crew, the Brotherhood carried the gospel of unionism deep into the black community during the dark days by forging cross-class alliances with other groups challenging the racial status quo. Simultaneously, the AFL continued to support racist unions while hundreds of thousands of black workers in steel, meatpacking, and autos were poised for organization.

Questions related to organizing black industrial workers erupted at the 1935 AFL convention when its leadership, refusing to endorse industrial unionism, set the stage for the emergence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Although the BSCP never left the AFL, the strength it had gained within the black community by 1935 pushed the AFL to grant the BSCP an international charter, even as the AFL voted to sustain union color bars against thousands of other black workers.

The BSCP’s destiny was also altered by favorable legislation promoted by the federal government. The Amended Railway Labor Act of 1934 guaranteed railroad workers the legal right of collective bargaining, placing the National Mediation Board at the service of the union during elections. Finally, the Brotherhood gained recognition at the national level as the voice of all black workers when A. Philip Randolph, head of the BSCP, became president of the National Negro Congress in 1936. In 1937, the BSCP signed a historic labor contract with the giant Pullman Company, marking the first time representatives from a major American corporation negotiated a labor contract with a union of black workers. But the larger significance of the BSCP’s community organizing during the Great Depression lay in popularizing unions, thus providing an important foundation for widespread unionization of black workers.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); NATIONAL NEGRO CONGRESS; ORGANIZED LABOR; RANDOLPH, A. PHILIP.

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BROWDER, EARL

Earl Russell Browder (May 20, 1891–June 27, 1973) led the American Communist Party (CPUSA) to its greatest size and influence during the Great Depression and World War II. Meanwhile, he was recruiting and directing, with a degree of autonomy, spies for the Russian secret police and Soviet military intelligence.

Browder, the eighth of ten children, was born to Kansas parents who had lost their homestead to drought, disease, and debt. Earl’s disabled father, William, and his homemaker mother, Margaret, taught populism, socialism, and anticlericalism to their offspring. Poverty forced the boys to leave elementary school. Earl drifted through left-wing movements, most notably the Kansas City bookkeepers and accountants’ union and the Socialist Party. His opposition to World War I caused him to be imprisoned for a time in Leavenworth Penitentiary. There he read about the Russian Revolution, and became a dedicated Marxist-Leninist. He entered the Communist Party at mid-level, organizing an American delegation to the first Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions, held in Moscow in 1921. Known by its Russian abbreviation, Profintern, and subordinate to the Communist International (Comintern), it had its own staff, funds, and networks in foreign countries. In mid-decade, Browder became intimate with Raissa Lukanovskaya, a Profintern attorney and former commissar of justice in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov during the Russian Civil War. She helped him land a position organizing illegal trade unions to resist China’s right-wing government. The post gave Browder undercover experience that served him well. After Soviet leader Joseph Stalin removed CPUSA head Jay Lovestone in 1930, Browder became part of a three-person leadership that also included William Z. Foster and William W. Weinstone. There Browder proved a vicious infighter; after Foster was debilitated by a heart attack in 1932, Browder won firm control of the CPUSA.

Browder soon championed the Popular Front policy, directed by Moscow. Between 1933 and 1939, his CPUSA called for antifascist unity and supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. Browder painted the Communists as heirs to American radical traditions, at the very time when the CPUSA was changing from a sect of immigrants to a party of ethnic and black Americans. It included 82,000 members and influenced many times that number. Browder even achieved a degree of autonomy in domestic politics, with Soviet approval. Yet as early as 1933, he had begun building an espionage network among federal employees.

The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact killed the Popular Front and left the CPUSA morally bankrupt. When Germany invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941, Browder led the charge back to vigorous antifascism. The CPUSA regained members and Browder came to see himself as an independent Communist leader. After Stalin dissolved the Comintern to placate the West, Browder propounded his Tehran Thesis, arguing that the wartime conference of United States, British, and Soviet leaders in Iran signified the acceptance of Communism as a permanent force in the world. At home, big business could play a role in defeating fascism and extending prosperity into the postwar era. He also reconstituted the CPUSA as the Communist Political Association, a nonpartisan leftist lobby. This action constituted a grave heresy because it violated V.I. Lenin’s concept of the vanguard role of the Communist Party set forth in 1903. Once victory in Europe became certain, the Soviets engineered Browder’s removal and took his espionage agents. When he died not one Communist newspaper in the world printed his obituary.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.

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BSCP. See BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS.

BUNCHÉ, RALPH

Ralph Bunche (August 7, 1904–December 9, 1971) was the first black to win the Nobel Peace Prize. He received the honor in 1950 for his efforts on behalf of the United Nations (UN) in negotiating a truce between Egypt and Israel. He eventually became undersecretary-general of the UN. In the late 1960s, radical activists accused Bunche of ignoring domestic civil rights concerns, but in the 1930s Bunche had been a leading intellectual radical who attempted to steer civil rights groups in a new, activist direction that directly addressed black and white working class needs.

Bunche received his B.A. degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. Before he had completed his doctorate, Howard University hired Bunche as an instructor, and he organized and chaired the school’s political science department. In 1934, when Bunche completed his dissertation on colonial governance in Africa, he became the first black American to earn the Ph.D. in political science.

When Bunche started working at Howard University his liberal political views became more radical and pronounced. He called upon the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to abandon its legalistic civil rights reform strategy for one that was dedicated to building an interracial workers’ alliance. He argued that supporting class politics and instituting dramatic economic reform were the keys to solving blacks’ second-class status. He publicly claimed the New Deal was a “raw deal” for blacks, and he openly worked with communists and socialists in organizing the National Negro Congress (NNC). The NNC, established in 1936, sought to build a coalition of organizations dedicated to solving the “Negro problem” through a new class politics. The same year, Bunche published *A World View of Race*, an aggressive critique of the imperialist and capitalist roots of racism.

Bunche’s public political stances began to soften as fascism spread across Europe and as the United States became increasingly involved in the Allied war effort. He broke from the NNC when he concluded that it had become a tool of the Soviet Union. Due to his expertise in African affairs, the federal government hired Bunche as an African and Far East affairs analyst for what would become the Office of Strategic Services. He would later work for the State Department and then the UN.

Before he moved into the government, however, Bunche played a central role in the production of one of the most important social science surveys of black life in the United States: *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy* (1944). This study, directed by Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, became the cornerstone of liberal ideology on race issues for much of the civil rights era. As Myrdal’s assistant, Bunche supervised numerous other researchers and produced several thousand pages (collected in four long “memos”) of analysis of black political development in the South, black betterment organizations, and black leadership. One of these memoranda, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR*, was published posthumously in 1973.

See Also: HOWARD UNIVERSITY; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP); SOCIAL SCIENCE.

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Businessmen reached new levels of unpopularity during the 1930s. Following the prosperity of the 1920s, the stock market crash of 1929 punctuated the end of the “New Era” in dramatic fashion. By 1932, the nation’s gross national product had dropped 33 percent, nearly 25 percent of workers had been thrown out of work, and the prices of most goods were cut in half. Business executives who had been seen as enlightened captains of industry, responsible for much of capitalism’s advances during the years following the end of World War I, were soon perceived as responsible for capitalism’s collapse. Some, such as utility magnate Samuel Insull, fled the country as their corporate empires collapsed around them. In 1933 and 1934, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, led by chief counsel Ferdinand Pecora, questioned leading businessmen and financiers, including J. P. Morgan, Charles Mitchell, Winthrop Aldrich, and Thomas W. Lamont, about their practices. Morgan acknowledged that he had (legally) avoided paying any income tax in 1930, 1931, and 1932, while others, such as Mitchell, eventually faced criminal charges for their actions. The legitimacy of capitalism, itself, was increasingly called into question.

Businessmen reacted to this social, political, and economic crisis, and to subsequent New Deal policy measures, in different ways and in ways that changed over time. To speak of “businessmen” as an unchanging monolith does injustice to the complexity of the historical record. It is, however, possible to make some generalizations. In reacting to the Great Depression and the coming of the New Deal, businessmen drew on the intellectual currents that had been popular during the 1920s and earlier. They at first welcomed the election of President Franklin Roosevelt, and cautiously looked to the federal government to provide stability and legitimize the “associational” activities that antitrust laws had long prevented. By 1935, however, many businessmen were frustrated with the New Deal. Although there were exceptions, businessmen generally opposed New Deal measures designed to increase the bargaining power of organized labor, provide public works projects, create unemployment insurance and old-age insurance, and regulate wages and hours. Businessmen could usually be counted as reliable supporters of a balanced federal budget, and as vociferous opponents of measures designed to increase federal revenues, such as Roosevelt’s call to “soak the rich” with income tax increases. Efforts to regulate the nation’s banks and financial markets, such as the 1933 Glass-Steagall Banking Act and the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, were also greeted with disdain by most businessmen. With the coming of World War II, though, New Dealers and businessmen achieved a rapprochement of sorts.

THE EARLY NEW DEAL AND THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION

During the 1920s, a number of businessmen and politicians, including such figures as George Perkins, Frank Munsey, and Herbert Hoover, championed the idea of business cooperation. Through voluntary organizations, such as trade associations, businesses could attempt to plan production, develop and implement codes of conduct, and avoid competing on price. These anticompetitive practices grew in part out of measures developed in World War I to regulate wartime production, but they also expanded on the popular notion of the “business commonwealth.” Thanks to enlightened planning, supporters of the business commonwealth assumed, business could coordinate the economy and capitalism in such a way as to ensure prosperity and stability for all firms. Greater efficiencies would smooth out the business cycle’s oscillations, minimizing unemployment and delivering a wider selection of goods to consumers.

In developing the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, New Dealers explicitly drew on associational activities in their effort to end the economic depression. Businessmen welcomed Title I of the NIRA, which suspended the nation’s antitrust
laws and called for business to participate in drafting codes of conduct that would govern competitive practices. Organizations such as the American Bar Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported this idea, and even the National Association of Manufacturers offered a lukewarm endorsement of the policy. Bernard Baruch and Hugh Johnson, both of whom had served on the War Industries Board during World War I, backed the NIRA, as did such leading businessmen as Gerard Swope, Henry Dennison, and Charles Abbot. Many of these individuals helped participate in the actual drafting of the legislation, and Hugh Johnson was placed in charge of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which emerged from this work. The NRA not only reflected ideas about efficiency, planning, and competition that dated back to thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen and Frederick W. Taylor, it also found favor with such New Dealers as Rexford Tugwell. Although reluctant to trust businessmen, New Dealers saw in the NRA the possibility for the state to counter business’s power by championing the interests of consumers, farmers, and labor. In practice, however, the codes of competition that were drafted under the NRA reflected the power and interests of larger businesses. In sectors as diverse as cotton textiles, steel, lumber, petroleum, and automobiles, for example, the NRA codes served to put in place government-sanctioned cartels, largely achieving big business’s goals while minimizing the influence of consumers and labor. As time passed, the NRA’s popularity waned. By the time the Supreme Court declared Title I of the NIRA an unconstitutional use of federal power in Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, the NRA had few remaining supporters.

Business and the New Deal, 1935–1939

While businessmen initially looked to the New Deal to provide economic stability, they found most of Roosevelt’s political agenda unpalatable. They were particularly upset by the New Deal’s commitment to organized labor. Section 7(a) of NIRA’s Title I, though, which enshrined the right of organized labor to collectively bargain with employers, was initially met with guarded acceptance by the business community. Businesses located in northern, higher-wage environments generally assumed that it would improve their competitiveness relative to their southern counterparts, or simply accepted its inclusion as a price to be paid for the suspension of antitrust laws. When NIRA’s Title I was struck down in Schechter, stronger protections for workers’ rights to organize were incorporated into the language of the National Labor Relations Act, which became law in 1935 despite vigorous opposition from many business organizations. Business opposition to the Social Security Act of 1935, while noticeable, was somewhat less intense, in part because a number of firms characterized by welfare capitalism saw Social Security as a way to, in effect, transfer these sorts of programs to the federal government.

Measures such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were also passed by Congress despite objections from businessmen and firms concerned about further government encroachment into what they declared was their right to manage labor relations as they saw fit. These issues were particularly salient in the steel, auto, and mining industries, where such businessmen as Myron Taylor of U.S. Steel and Alfred Sloan of General Motors confronted labor leaders like John L. Lewis and Walter Reuther. Such events as the 1936 to 1937 Flint sit-down strike and the 1937 Memorial Day massacre outside of Republic Steel in Chicago graphically demonstrated the high stakes of the conflict between labor and business, driving home to businessmen the importance of trying to shape public policy and public opinion. This effort had taken a number of forms throughout the Great Depression, but one of the most prominent organizations to emerge was the American Liberty League, founded in 1934 with financial backing from the DuPont family. Along with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and a number of other organizations, the American Liberty League led the public relations effort against President Roosevelt and the New Deal. It opposed deficit spending by the federal government, objected to Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, and tried to influence the rewriting of the federal tax code.

Although businessmen had little success in rehabilitating their public image during the 1930s, with the coming of war they found a new chance
to recapture the public’s trust and respect. Many businessmen took a leave of absence from their private-sector employment in order to work for such new government bodies as the War Production Board, becoming “dollar-a-year men” (so named because, while retaining their private salaries, they took only minimal compensation from the government). While working for the government, they drew upon their expertise to advance the war effort. Investment banker Ferdinand Eberstadt, for example, developed and implemented the Controlled Materials Plan, which solved many of America’s wartime production problems by controlling the allocation of copper, aluminum, and steel. After converting automobile production facilities to the building of airplanes, the United States managed to produce nearly 300,000 aircraft during the war, easily trumping the productivity of the other combatant nations. By the time the war ended, businessmen had made some strides in changing public opinion. By 1953, for example, David Lilienthal, a staunch New Dealer, published *Big Business: A New Era*, a glowing account of big business and its place in American society.

See Also: American Liberty League; Banking Panics (1930–1933); Baruch, Bernard; Causes of the Great Depression; Johnson, Hugh; Morgan, J.P., Jr.; National Recovery Administration (NRA).

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**BYRD, HARRY**

Senator Harry Flood Byrd (June 10, 1887–October 20, 1966) led the Democratic Party political machine in Virginia. According to historian James T. Patterson, Byrd was one of the “irreconcilable Democrats,” who voted against the New Deal beginning as early as 1935. He opposed the Franklin Roosevelt administration 65 percent of the time; only Senator Carter Glass, also from Virginia, opposed the New Deal more. Byrd became a significant member of the Republican-Democratic congressional coalition that emerged to oppose the New Deal by 1938.

Born in Martinsburg, West Virginia, and raised in Winchester, Virginia, Byrd was the scion of prominent Virginia families. He traced his lineage to the William Byrds, who had helped to settle colonial Virginia. Harry Byrd, however, downplayed his distinguished ancestry and preferred to think of himself as a “self-made” man. He left school at age fifteen to take over his father’s bankrupt newspaper, the Winchester Evening Star. Byrd also began to invest in apple orchards, eventually becoming one of the largest apple producers in the country.

Both his father, Richard, and his maternal uncle, Henry Flood, were active in state politics, and they encouraged Byrd to run for office. Byrd’s uncle was one of the key architects and leaders of the Democratic Party political machine, known simply as the “Organization.” As his uncle’s protégé, Byrd served in the state legislature from 1916 to 1925, and became chairman of the state Democratic Party upon his uncle’s death. By the mid-1920s, Byrd had risen to lead the Organization. Efficient management and a restricted electorate assured the political success of Byrd and his favored candidates for state offices. Elected governor in 1926, Byrd reorganized the state government in an effort to eliminate waste and inefficiency. A fiscal conservative, Byrd earned a reputation for himself as a progressive. He focused on maintaining a balanced state budget, keeping state taxes low, and providing few social services.

In 1933, Byrd was appointed to the Senate when Claude Swanson joined Roosevelt’s cabinet. Facing reelection in 1934, Byrd supported President Roosevelt and the New Deal programs. Yet, as a fiscal conservative, he voiced his concerns about the rapid expansion and reckless spending of the federal government. A champion of self-help, Byrd as-
asserted that government work relief programs undermined individual character. Moreover, the New Deal, popular with both blacks and whites in Virginia, threatened to disrupt the political and social control of the Byrd machine. By 1935, Byrd openly opposed Roosevelt’s policies, voting against the Wagner Labor Relations Act and Social Security. He secured an amendment to the Social Security Act that allowed states to determine how much aid they would contribute to the program. Through his influence, Virginia was the last state to join the program in 1938. Moreover, in 1936, at Byrd’s urging, the Senate created a Select Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies of the Government and appointed Byrd chair. Throughout his career in the Senate, which lasted until his retirement in 1965, Byrd consistently criticized federal government expansion, large federal expenditures, and deficit spending.

See Also: CONSERVATIVE COALITION; DEMOCRATIC PARTY; GLASS, CARTER; NEW DEAL.

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Born in Charleston, South Carolina, of Irish Catholic parents, James Francis Byrnes (May 2, 1879–April 9, 1972) matured into the most influential southerner in the Depression-era Senate. Raised by his mother, a dress maker, and his maternal grandmother, the young Byrnes received a parochial school education and became a full-time clerk for a Charleston law firm at the age of fourteen. He studied law independently, and was admitted to the South Carolina bar in 1904. In 1910 Byrnes won South Carolina’s second district by fifty-seven votes and entered the U.S. House of Representatives. Dark haired and sharp featured, the young politician possessed an encompassing public persona that shielded a skillful, sly mind and an industrious spirit.

Intent on maintaining white supremacy, South Carolina’s minority of Protestant white males controlled Byrnes’ electoral base, which had suffered since 1876 from corrosive race baiting. Although Byrnes could have appeal to racial prejudices, he preferred to campaign on economic and social improvement platforms. He supported Woodrow Wilson’s World War I administration and the formation of the League of Nations. He met Franklin Roosevelt at the 1912 Democratic convention, and during the Wilson years Byrnes benefited from Roosevelt’s friendship. Byrnes refused to join the Ku Klux Klan and, in 1924, ran unsuccessfully for the Senate against the demagogic Coleman L. “Coley” Blease. Six years later, with the help of a new friend, Bernard Baruch, and the growing economic crisis, Byrnes defeated Blease.

Upon his nomination for president, Franklin Roosevelt drew politically shrewd Byrnes into the “Brains Trust,” and the two men sustained a warm relationship throughout the 1930s. Possessing such confidants as Carter Glass, Joseph Robinson, and Byron “Pat” Harrison, Byrnes emerged as a key legislative leader for much New Deal legislation. Convinced that the Depression’s origins lay at home, Byrnes opted for a planned economy. He participated as a calculating compromiser to help create the Emergency Banking Act, the Farm Credit Act, the Homeowners’ Loan Act, the 1933 Economy Act, and such agencies as the Agriculture Adjustment Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the National Recovery Administration. As a member of the Senate conference committee Byrnes also forged understandings that facilitated the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934.

Byrnes used work relief funds from the Public Works and the Works Progress Administrations (WPA) to alter the face of South Carolina. He sided with veterans to override a presidential veto of a bonus bill. Driven by the race-based politics of his constituency, he fought in 1935 the Wagner-Costigan proposal, a federal anti-lynching bill. Al-
though Byrnes was ill during passage of such 1935 reforms as the National Labor Relations Act, the Eccles Banking Act, the Revenue Act, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, and the Social Security Act, he nonetheless endorsed them on the basis that these new laws would benefit South Carolinians. In 1936 he easily won reelection to the Senate.

In 1937 Byrnes joined Roosevelt’s attempt to reorganize the court system. Despite the alarm of many wealthy South Carolinians, Byrnes understood that the average voter preferred reform. When the reform effort failed, Byrnes bemoaned the political errors that prevented passage. Byrnes’ votes against the Fair Labor Standards and Child Labor Acts also had their roots in the South Carolina electorate and the increasingly urban tilt of the New Deal. Concurrently, his resistance to extension of the WPA was also rooted in the concerns of rural precincts where the agency’s wage scales drew away labor and earned cotton growers’ wrath. Byrnes actions were further shaped by his belief that the Depression was by this time lifting. After telling Roosevelt that he would stand with his friends, he supported conservative senators Walter George, Millard Tydings, Guy Gillette, and Ellison D. Smith when Roosevelt attempted to purge them from the Congress in 1938. Yet, Byrnes also helped reelect such New Dealers as Florida’s Claude Pepper and Alabama’s Lister Hill. While pundits claimed these actions marked a break with Roosevelt, the South Carolinian had refused to sign the
southern Conservative Manifesto authored by Josiah Bailey, who touted a conservative opposition to the course of the New Deal. Byrnes endorsed the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act, composed the 1939 Administrative Reorganization Law, and managed the refunding of the WPA.

After trips to Japan and Germany in the mid-1930s, Byrnes feared future aggression. In 1938 he urged the Roosevelt administration to accept Jewish émigrés from Nazi persecution, and, as chair of the Navy appropriations subcommittee, he supported the expansion and increased preparedness of the U.S. Navy. Byrnes was appointed an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1941, but he resigned that post in 1942 to serve as Roosevelt’s director of the economic stability. He later served as secretary of state from 1945 to 1947 during the Truman administration and as governor of South Carolina from 1951 to 1955.

See Also: BRAIN(S) TRUST; ISOLATIONISM; SOUTH, GREAT DEPRESSION IN THE.

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Henry C. Ferrell, Jr.
CAGNEY, JAMES

Born in New York City, James Cagney (July 17, 1899–March 30, 1986) was the son of an Irish bartender and his Norwegian wife. After graduating from Stuyvesant High School, Jimmy Cagney attended Columbia University. His show business career began in 1918 when he appeared in local vaudeville revues. This work led to his first role in a major Broadway show *Pitter Patter* in 1920. After an unsuccessful visit to Hollywood in 1922, Cagney danced with his wife, Frances Willard “Billie” Vernon, on the vaudeville circuit in New York. Cagney won critical notice for small stage roles and by 1929 he was a star on Broadway.

Cagney’s movie career began with the Warner Brothers musical *Sinner’s Holiday* (1930). The cocky redhead from the Lower East Side and Yorkville neighborhoods quickly became a movie star in the 1930s, often playing a fast-talking Irish-American tough guy. His roles in *Public Enemy* (1931) and *Smart Money* (1931) helped establish the gangster movie genre. Cagney was handsome, athletic, and versatile; his experience as a dancer was evident in his unique body movement and dynamic screen presence. But his ironic wit and comic talent led to a wide variety of roles, including those in *Blonde Crazy* (1931) and *Taxi* (1932).

Discontented with the Hollywood studio system, the independent New Yorker left Los Angeles for six months while renegotiating his contract in 1931. With his salary doubled, Cagney was one of the first Irish-American actors to achieve megastar status playing urban antiheroes. He had leading roles in nineteen films in the next four years. Depression-era audiences were charmed by the feisty big city wise guy in such hit movies as *Winner Take All* (1932), *Hard to Handle* (1933), *Lady Killer* (1933), and *Jimmy the Gent* (1934). His performance in *Footlight Parade* (1933) was among his most memorable. In this movie he played a light-footed Broadway stage director confronting the competition of talking motion pictures. Cagney danced and sang in three Busby Berkeley production numbers and was featured in the film’s tribute to the National Recovery Administration, reminding Depression-weary viewers how much they depended on President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Its lavish budget and strong supporting cast distinguished *Footlight Parade* from most of the Hollywood dream factory movies Cagney made in the 1930s.

Cagney’s performance in *Comes the Navy* (1934) helped that picture earn an Academy Award nomination for best picture, but many of his movies in the 1930s were less memorable. When Cagney teamed with his friend Pat O’Brien in nine movies, however, the Irish-American pair delighted audi-
ences with their wit and energy. The restless Cagney left Warner Brothers in 1935 to work with independent film companies but returned to earn his first nomination as best actor in *Angels with Dirty Faces* (1938). Among the best roles he played in the 1930s was his part as a Prohibition racketeer in *The Roaring Twenties* (1939).

While Cagney was often described as cocky or pugnacious, his movie star qualities were more difficult to define. Perfectly suited for the hard times of the thirties, he possessed a gritty character with clipped speech and restless body language that moviegoers found irresistible. His political consciousness, as a founder of the Screen Actors Guild, his criticism of Jack Warner’s studio system, and his being a subject of a HUAC investigation in the late 1930s and 1940s, also suited the times.

James Cagney made more than ninety movies in his long and productive career, but he is best remembered for his tough guy roles in the fifty movies he made from 1930 to 1940. He retired to Martha’s Vineyard in 1961 and received the American Film Institute Life Achievement Award in 1974. He died on March 30, 1986, at his farm in Stanfordville, New York.

See Also: Berkeley, Busby; Hollywood and the Film Industry.
Holger Cahill (January 13, 1887–July 8, 1960) was national director of the Federal Art Project of the Works Project Administration (WPA) from its inception in 1935 to its termination in 1943. Born Sveinn Kristjan Bjarnarsson, Cahill was the child of parents who immigrated to North Dakota from Iceland. He spent most his adolescence in a variety of manual jobs from Winnipeg to Shanghai before settling in New York City, where his connections with the arts community led him into journalism. He began taking courses at Columbia University and, from 1922, working for the Newark Museum in New Jersey, where he organized major exhibitions of American folk art. In 1932 Cahill became acting director of the New York City’s Museum of Modern Art, for which he arranged an exhibition entitled “American Folk Art: The Art of the Common Man in America, 1750–1900.” A prolific author and a respected authority on art, Cahill rejected conventional distinctions between “fine” and “folk” art, and he idealized the antebellum period when, he believed, the arts and society had been totally integrated through universal practice. Federal service provided Cahill with the opportunity to restore the arts to “the people,” both as producers and consumers.

While the provision of relief for destitute artists was the Federal Art Project’s principal function, Cahill sought to recover the “American culture pattern” in both the scope and diversity of its programs. This involved the promotion and dispersion of art throughout the nation. Art projects were established in thirty-eight states and the Federal Art Project employed some ten thousand artists who produced 128,000 murals, easel paintings, and sculptures and 240,000 prints that decorated schools, libraries, and other public buildings. The sheer scale of the project was complemented by its variety. There were four dimensions to the Federal Art Project’s work involving the promotion of creative art, art education, community service, and research. Almost 50 percent of its personnel were engaged in creative art, and the Federal Art Project assisted painters who would later become internationally renowned, including Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, and Willem de Kooning. Approximately, 25 percent of the Federal Art Project’s workforce was involved in establishing 103 art centers that offered art classes in twenty-three subjects. Travelling exhibits and “Art Weeks” brought art to a wider public.

Cahill also oversaw the recording of an American vernacular tradition. The Index of American Design employed five hundred workers in thirty-five states and compiled 22,000 plates of textiles, furniture, ceramics, and other artifacts. For Cahill, the masses were crucial to the nation’s art resources, and in 1939 he organized the “Contemporary Unknown American Painters” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art. In contrast to his counterpart, Edward Bruce, who headed the Treasury Department’s Section of Fine Arts, Cahill did not discriminate against the avant-garde, and major commissions were given to artists such as Stuart Davis and Arshile Gorky.

The WPA was a complex organization, and much of Cahill’s work as director was consumed by administrative matters, such as liaison with state authorities, negotiations with unions, and political lobbying. Dependent upon annual congressional appropriations, the existence of the Federal Art Project was precarious and liable to the kind of swingeing budget cuts that occurred in 1936 and 1937. Cahill understood that the Federal Art Project was vulnerable because its per capita costs were 70 percent higher than for manual workers in the WPA, and his efforts to maintain the project in the face of widespread criticism required him, at times, to work a nineteen-hour day. When Congress abolished Federal One in 1939 and turned responsibility for the remaining arts projects to states, Cahill remained in a coordinating role, although he became less influential. If his vision for the integration of the arts and society was not fully realized, his efforts...
provided relief for thousands of artists and nurtured those artists who would form the vanguard of abstract expressionism in the postwar era. After the termination of the federal art project in 1943, Cahill returned to New York City to concentrate on writing fiction.

See Also: ART; FEDERAL ART PROJECT (FAP); FEDERAL ONE; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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CALDWELL, ERSKINE

Erskine Preston Caldwell (December 17, 1903–April 11, 1987) was a prolific writer whose novels, stories, and nonfiction about the American South combined burlesque humor, social criticism, brutal violence, and graphic sexuality. He was one of the Depression-era’s most prominent and controversial literary figures.

The son of a reform-minded itinerant minister, Caldwell lived in seven southern states by the time he was twelve. Although he never received a high school diploma, he attended the University of Virginia, which he left without a degree in 1925 to work as a reporter for the Atlanta Journal. Dedicated to becoming a professional fiction writer, Caldwell quit the paper in 1926 and moved to Maine, where he lived in dire poverty and obscurity, gradually gaining notice for stories published in several of the era’s little magazines.

The central theme of Caldwell’s Depression-era writing is the agony of rural impoverishment. His first two novels, Poor Fool (1929) and The Bastard (1930), hard-boiled tales of amoral loners, attracted little critical or popular notice. Caldwell came to literary prominence with the publication of Tobacco Road (1932), the story of a family of destitute Georgia sharecroppers, the Lesters, stubbornly clinging to farmland that has been ruined by soil erosion. Lazy, licentious, and morally depraved, the Lesters’ brutal, often obscene behavior culminates when one of the family’s sons, Dude, backs his automobile over his grandmother, who is left unattended for hours until she is thrown, still alive, into an open grave. God’s Little Acre (1933) narrates the story of the Waldens, another indigent farm family that has been digging futilely for gold on their barren land. The plot, noteworthy for the pornographic rendering of an adulterous sex scene, also includes the proletarian tale of a temporary takeover of a closed mill by the locked-out workers.

The 1933 theatrical adaptation of Tobacco Road, which became the decade’s longest-running Broadway play and toured the country, brought Caldwell fame and financial security. The play’s popularity outside the South, however, stemmed in part from the fact that the story was often played for comedy rather than social critique, and quite likely reinforced stereotypes about the degeneracy of southerners.

In addition to writing two other novels during the thirties, Journeyman (1935) and Trouble in July (1940), Caldwell also published hundreds of short stories, many about poverty, sex, and racism, in magazines and in five collections, including the critically-acclaimed Kneel to the Rising Sun (1935). In later decades, many of Caldwell’s Depression-era novels were released as mass-market paperbacks, with astonishing results. By the early 1960s, he had sold over sixty million books and was being advertised as “the best-selling novelist in the world.”

A committed, if idiosyncratic, leftist, Caldwell also wrote journalism designed to expose the horrors of American poverty. A 1935 series for the New York Post described the dire malnutrition suffered by several Georgia families, claiming that “men are so hungry that they eat snakes and cow dung.” In
1937, Caldwell collaborated with celebrated photojournalist Margaret Bourke-White, whom he would marry in 1939, on the decade’s first major photo-essay book, *You Have Seen Their Faces*, which offered a pointed critique of economic exploitation in the rural South. However, some liberals, including James Agee, contended that Bourke-White’s photographs were manipulative and that the book’s depiction of the poor was sentimental and condescending.

Throughout his work, Caldwell sought to challenge romantic misconceptions of his native South by exposing the human costs of soil erosion and economic exploitation. However, the exceedingly debased nature of his characters often reinforced stereotypes of poor whites, African Americans, and women, and seemed to place blame on the very people Caldwell saw as victims, rather than on larger social structures. Moreover, the pornographic quality of his writing generated virulent protest, including campaigns to have his work banned in several cities.

Caldwell’s work, a volatile blend of social protest, ribald humor, sexual frankness, and shocking violence, defies conventional aesthetic and political categories. He remains one of the Depression era’s most enigmatic authors.

See Also: Bourke-White, Margaret; Literature; South, Great Depression in the.

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Joseph Entin

CANADA, GREAT DEPRESSION EN

Like most of the industrialized world in the 1920s, Canada enjoyed an uneven prosperity during the latter years of that decade. Internal economic growth was based on speculation (in real estate and on the stock market) and a great wave of consumer spending on houses, automobiles, and household appliances, all financed on credit and promoted by a newly-developed advertising industry. When Wall Street led the way in a collapse of stock prices in October 1929, Bay Street in Toronto was only a heartbeat behind. Canadian businessmen did not initially see Black Tuesday as more than a temporary setback, but it was soon associated with a general economic collapse that was more serious and protracted in Canada than in almost any other “advanced” nation of the world.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY
The Great Depression was hardly a uniquely Canadian phenomenon. It was the downward part of a periodic international economic cycle that affected all nations, although the industrialized suffered more. On the other hand, the Depression was arguably more severe in Canada than in almost any other nation except the United States. Officially recorded unemployment reached almost one-fifth of the labor force in Canada in 1933, but such statistics were only the tip of the iceberg. In Montreal, in 1934, almost 30 percent of the population was living on official assistance, and the figure for French-Canadians was almost 40 percent. The relief allocation in Montreal—$21.88 per month—was well below the estimated cost of a “restricted diet for emergency use.”

The government did not count independent farmers as unemployed, although many had negative incomes in the early 1930s. The prairie farm...
community, especially, suffered through drought and bad harvests in these years, which meant that farm families did not always have their own harvests to eat. Omnipresent dust became the symbol for the Depression in western Canada. The government did not count independent fishermen or timberers as unemployed either, and most significantly of all, it did not count women. In the worst years, therefore, fewer than half of those Canadians who wanted a paying job were able to find one.

Two major factors made the Canadian economic situation so serious. One was proximity to and involvement in the American economy because the United States was even more hard-hit by the depression than Canada. The other was the extent of Canadian reliance on the production and sale abroad of raw materials ranging from grain to lumber to minerals. The bottom dropped out of the international market for such goods in 1929, and it did not recover until much later in the 1930s. Canadian manufacturing production also dropped by one-third between 1929 and 1933. But Canada had other problems as well, including political and constitutional arrangements that militated against active policies of social assistance and social insurance to those Canadians who were suffering.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

Canada was a federal state, and sections ninety-one and ninety-two of the British North America Act—the largest part of the Canadian constitution created by act of the British Parliament in 1867—carefully distinguished between the powers of the federal government and the powers of the prov-
inces. Provincial powers included almost all of the powers relevant to social conditions. But the provinces were not given commensurate powers of taxation and revenue-raising, largely because the nineteenth-century Fathers of Confederation had never anticipated vast amounts of expenditure on health, welfare, and unemployment. Moreover, the Canadian constitution made absolutely no mention of cities or municipalities, which bore much of the burden for urban unemployment but had little tax base except real property. The municipalities dispensed much-needed relief on a cheeseparing basis that made no effort to maintain the dignity of the recipients.

During the early 1930s, constant political struggle occurred between the federal government and the provincial governments, but also between the provincial governments and the municipalities. The federal government refused to expend money on relieving unemployment because of “constitutional limitations.” Not until the 1935 election did the government in power pay much attention to the cries of the destitute. As for the provinces, they blamed their failure to act on the “feds.” In the midst of the finger-pointing, a federal Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada because it violated provincial authority.

Ideological constraints were probably as important as constitutional limitations in hamstringing federal action during the Depression. R. B. Bennett, the Canadian prime minister from 1930 to 1935, lacked imagination and a willingness to experiment in active government. A typical Conservative, for
most of his administration he balanced his budget and sought international economic improvement chiefly through a “Canada First” protectionist policy combined with imperial preference. In 1935 he announced a sudden conversion to activism, however, telling a national radio audience, “I am for reform. I nail the flag of progress to the mast. I summon the power of the state to its reform.” Most Canadian voters did not believe that Bennett’s new policy was anything but opportunism though, and voted instead for Mackenzie King’s Liberals, who had promised very little but had the solid backing of the electorate in Quebec. What Bennett’s “conversion” did represent, however, was a growing realization by large segments of the Canadian business and professional community that only a stabilized economy could stave off a major political and social upheaval.

**SOCIAL CONDITIONS**

Given the extent of unemployment, especially in the resource sector of the economy, and the limited forms of social assistance, life was extremely hard for large numbers of Canadians during the Depression. In many regions, particularly those outside Ontario and Quebec, virtually the entire population was on the dole or thrown entirely on their own resources. Conditions were particularly hard on women, upon whose shoulders as housewives and mothers was thrown the burden of maintaining the coherence and integrity of the family in the midst of economic crisis. Perhaps the most publicized wife and mother was Elzire Dionne, who gave birth to identical quintuplets in May of 1934. The Dionnes were classic examples of impoverished farmers, living in a northern Ontario home without plumbing and electricity. The province of
Ontario swiftly removed the photogenic quintlets from the control of their parents, declaring them wards of the Crown, on the grounds that the Dionnes could not possibly bring them up appropriately.

For the half of the population that had employment, life during the thirties was often quite a pleasant experience. Food, housing, and consumer goods were relatively cheap, and servants and services were readily available at bargain rates. In Montreal, laundresses who washed and ironed by hand in their own homes earned $2 per day. Economic conditions certainly improved dramatically in the late part of the decade, especially in the urban areas of Ontario and Quebec.

For Canada’s First Nations, especially the Métis, there was a general sharing in the drought conditions on the Prairies and the overall Depression markets and employment opportunities. At the same time, the Department of Indian Affairs experienced administrative cutbacks leading to much inactivity and confusion, and the 1930s actually saw a considerable growth of organization among aboriginal peoples. The Métis organized l’Association des Métis d’Alberta in 1930, while on the West Coast the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia was founded in 1931, and the Pacific Coast Native Fisherman’s Association in 1936.

One of the major social effects of the Depression was to widen the gap in Canada between the nation’s poor—like the Dionnes—and a well-to-do and well-educated elite. Contrary to predictions, universities maintained or even added to their en-
rollments during the decade, increasing the proportion of females among their student bodies in the process. Despite administrative belt-tightening, for students and faculty alike, life within the ivory tower was good. Canadians who spent the Depression on the wrong side of the economic divide would be understandably extremely eager, after the end of World War II, to ensure that they were allowed to participate in the postwar era of prosperity.

MOVEMENTS OF POLITICAL PROTEST

Organized parties of protest and radical reform abounded in the “Dirty Thirties.” During the early years of the Depression, however, only the Communist Party of Canada offered a national voice for Canadian popular discontent, creating in 1930 a National Unemployed Workers’ Association that within a year had 22,000 members across the country. The Communists could be charged with following the commands of the Communist International, and were quickly repressed by section 98 of the Criminal Code, introduced in 1919 during the earlier “red scare” to outlaw the advocacy of revolutionary agitation. Eight Communist leaders were arrested in August 1931, and although they were subsequently released, the party had lost its momentum and never recovered it. A few Fascists were to be found over the decade, but they were never taken seriously.

The League for Social Reconstruction (LSR), which held its first convention in Toronto in January 1932, sought a “planned and socialized economy.” The LSR was proudly non-Marxist and non-revolutionary, and considered itself merely an elitist educational organization. Not until 1933 did the LSR participate in the formation of a new political party, formed by representatives of farmers’ and labor organizations at Regina, Saskatchewan. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (or CCF,
as it was usually called), emphasized economic planning and a series of universal welfare measures that would be introduced after necessary amendments had been made to the British North America Act. The CCF attracted over 300,000 votes in the 1933 British Columbia provincial election, and won 8.9 percent of the popular vote nationally (seven parliamentary seats). The new MPs were led into the House of Commons by J. S. Woodsworth and T. C. Douglas. But the CCF would subsequently enjoy strong support in only a few provinces (notably British Columbia and Saskatchewan) and would make no inroads east of Ontario.

Other newly-organized movements of protest existed on mainly a provincial or regional basis. Most had populist roots. Perhaps the most influential of the new creations was the Social Credit Party of Alberta, which emerged out of the travails of farmers in that province. Social Credit was developed by a Calgary schoolmaster and radio preacher, William Aberhart (1878–1943), who had broadcast for the Prophetic Bible Institute over the West's most powerful radio station, CFCN, since 1924. In 1932, Aberhart was converted to the economic theories of a Scottish engineer named C. H. Douglas, a monetary theorist who believed that capitalism was incapable of distributing purchasing power to the masses of people. Douglas advocated the distribution of money, in the form of “social credit,” to enable people to buy the goods and services they produced. Aberhart took over these theories, which he did not fully understand, and converted them into a practical platform overlaid with fundamentalist evangelicalism. He emphasized state intervention in the economy and the issuance of a social dividend (eventually set at $25 per month) to all citizens as part of their cultural heritage. The new party swept to victory at the polls in 1935. Over the next few years, much of its economic program would be disallowed by the federal courts as unconstitutional. But the party remained in power in Alberta until 1972. Versions of Social Credit sprang up all over the western provinces, and a British Columbia variant would govern British Columbia for over twenty years beginning in 1952.

In Quebec, a popular leader with tendencies toward demagoguery emerged in 1933 in the person of Maurice Duplessis (1890–1959). Duplessis rode to power in 1935 on the backs of the Catholic social action movement and a Quebec nationalism associated with the Action Libérale Nationale (ALN). These two movements merged to create a powerful force for attacking the capitalist system. Duplessis insisted that Quebec was owned by foreigners. What was needed was “l’achat chez nous” (“buying at home”) and the destruction of the great financial establishments. When in power, Duplessis quickly abandoned the reform program that brought him into office, retaining mainly only a concern for provincial autonomy, a fervent anti-Communism—the “Padlock Act” of 1937 closed any place suspected of disseminating Communist propaganda—and a paternalist program of grants and handouts for the disadvantaged. Like Social Credit, the program of Duplessis’s Union Nationale Party was far different from its campaign promises, but the party remained in power until well after World War II.

Perhaps the most effective movement of Catholic social action occurred in the Maritime region, peopled by farmer-fishers who had no control over marketing and distribution. The Antigonish movement gained its impetus from two Roman Catholic priests at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia—Father James Tompkins and Father Moses Coady—who advocated that small producers regain power over their own production and consumption through economic cooperation in the forms of cooperative banks, stores, and marketing agencies. The Antigonish ideology, like most populist movements of the Depression in Canada, was a curious mixture of radical rhetoric and conservative attitudes, well designed to appeal to small producers.

From a political and constitutional perspective, the most extreme action of the 1930s occurred not in Canada but in its neighboring Dominion of Newfoundland. The economy of Newfoundland was so dependent on fish and other extractive resources that failed to find markets in the early 1930s that the government was not only forced to declare bankruptcy but to place itself under the tutelage of Great Britain, which administered Newfoundland through appointed trustees. The trusteeship remained until, by a series of contorted steps, New-
foundland finally joined the Canadian Confederation in 1949.

PUBLIC VIOLENCE

The thirties in Canada were periodically punctuated by outbreaks of public discontent that often turned to violence. Some of the violence occurred when spontaneous demonstrations were broken up by authorities apprehensive of the threat to social order. This was the case in both a famous riot in Vancouver in 1935 and in a subsequent riot in Regina that occurred when police armed with baseball bats moved to disperse a group of unemployed Canadians travelling to Ottawa to protest their situation. Much of the violence resulted from confrontations between organized labor and the authorities. On the whole, labor unions did not flourish during the hard times of the 1930s, but many workers fought desperately to maintain their position. Police and even the militia were often called upon in strike situations. Some strikes were gestures of desperation, such as that by coal miners in Saskatchewan in 1931, which ended in a riot in Estevan. Later in the decade, when economic conditions were better and workers attempted to organize industrial unions in the factories, both management and governments desperately opposed such actions. A notable strike occurred in 1937 in a General Motors plant in Oshawa, which resulted in a victory by the newly formed Committee of Industrial Organization (CIO, later called the Congress of Industrial Organizations). What is perhaps the outstanding feature of public discontent in Canada was how seldom it led to violence and how little damage was done to life and property.

RISE OF SOCIAL WELFARE

As in most jurisdictions, the length and intensity of the Depression in Canada dramatized the inadequacy of the existing arrangements for social justice, thus giving a substantial boost to debate over schemes of social protection, especially in the public sector. Contrary to much popular mythology, a fair amount of social insurance was in existence in Canada before the Depression and was extended during the 1930s, almost entirely on a provincial basis. Little reform occurred on a national or federal level, however, leading critics to argue that Canada lagged behind other nations in its social welfare provisions, although by the early 1940s, all national political parties were committed to reform.

A general old-age pension scheme had been introduced by the federal government in 1927, jointly financed by both levels of government and administered by the provinces. It paid a maximum of $20 per month to British subjects over the age of seventy. Despite other constitutional limitations, the federal government was clearly responsible for veterans, and various health and pension schemes for those who had fought in World War I took up a substantial proportion of the federal budget in the 1930s. Several provinces attempted to introduce public health-care insurance during the Depression, but were opposed by the medical profession. On the other hand, the doctors in some provinces did introduce their own schemes of health-care insurance, which became the basis of Blue Cross coverage. Compulsory national unemployment insurance was introduced in 1940 following a constitutional amendment. However, most national Canadian social insurance schemes were introduced on a piecemeal basis well after the Depression was over.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Canada had achieved world recognition as an independent nation as a result of World War I, and became a dominion, an autonomous community within the British Empire, as a result of the Westminster Conference of 1930. Throughout the Depression, Canada was an active member of the League of Nations and during the decade developed a small but highly skilled Department of External Affairs, with an extremely limited social view of the world. In 1935 the nation executed a major change of international policy by negotiating a most-favored nation treaty with the United States. This treaty signaled a new emphasis on the Canadian-American relationship, as Canada began to disengage from the British Empire and adopted a continentalist position. Like most of the participants in World War I, Canada was slow to rearm. Indeed, during most of the 1930s it spent less than $1 per capita annually on its military establishment. Canada was for obvious reasons reluctant to come out of
its isolationist shell, although events in Europe and elsewhere around the world gradually forced its engagement. The Canadian government fully supported the British policy of “appeasement” in the later 1930s, and was hardly prepared for World War II.

One of the consequences of events in Europe was the emergence of a large number of refugees from Nazi persecution, most of them Jews. Canadian authorities showed little interest in assisting these people, and in 1938 actually began limiting Jewish immigration, despite desperate pleas from its Jewish community, which offered to finance refugees at no cost to the government. A general Canadian suspicion of Jews was even more virulent in Quebec, and the government of William Lyon Mackenzie King was—like previous Canadian governments—obsessed by the need for assimilable newcomers. Canada continued to drag its feet on refugee policy, and never accepted more than a few thousand Jewish refugees. Since the nation was desperately short of scientific, intellectual, and cultural talent, in even the crassest of non-humanitarian terms its refugee policy was a disaster. In moral terms, the Canadian attitude— summed up by one of its mandarins as “None is too many”—was unconscionable, particularly since the country constantly lectured the world from a high moral pedestal.

CANADIAN CULTURE

Perhaps paradoxically, the period of the Depression was in some ways a very positive one for the development of a distinctive Canadian culture, although most popular culture remained dependent on the United States. Many of the unemployed found solace in their local public libraries, and more than one radical political critic and writer first found his or her voice in the library stacks. The federal government, which was publicly responsible for regulating the airwaves, had received a report from a royal commission in 1929 calling for the nationalization of radio, as in Great Britain, instead of allowing private broadcasters, as in the United States. The government eventually decided on a dual system—both public and commercial—establishing by the Broadcasting Act of 1932 the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission, which in 1936 became the publicly-operated Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, with extensive English and French language networks. Over the years, the CBC has been the principal patron of Canadian cultural content in the nation, and during the late 1930s it served as the Canadian equivalent of the writers’ branch of the Works Progress Administration.

On a less public level, the governor-general of Canada, the Earl of Bessborough, spearheaded the creation of the Dominion Drama Festival in 1932, which served to promote amateur regional theater throughout Canada. The Dominion Drama Festival was able to take advantage of a strong upsurge of interest in the theater during the Depression, which came about partly because so many Canadians had free time on their hands and partly because radical intellectuals found drama, poetry, and art to be ideal mediums for expressing their discontent with the status quo. Much of the most original creative work done in the 1930s in Canada came from the radicals, who were neither part of the university establishment nor of Americanized popular culture.

CONCLUSION

Somehow Canada managed to survive the Depression with its social fabric relatively intact, only to lurch unexpectedly into World War II. Many Canadians were forced to defer their expectations of a better life for nearly an entire generation. They were as a result eager both to participate in the postwar prosperity and to insure through the gradual elaboration of a network of social welfare provisions that the people of Canada would never again experience such privations.

See Also: AFRICA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; ASIA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; MEXICO, GREAT DEPRESSION IN.

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A child of Brooklyn, New York, Alphonse Capone (January 17, 1899–January 25, 1947) found notoriety and wealth in Chicago through organized crime. Capone was born to an Italian immigrant family in 1899. Though a promising student, he left school in the sixth grade, and from then it was a life in the streets. Capone was probably twenty when he killed his first victim. Three years later, he followed Johnny Torrio, his mentor in crime, to Chicago. Together, they built a model criminal organization.

Torrio was a modernizer who did for gambling, prostitution, and the Prohibition-era sale of liquor what John D. Rockefeller had for the oil business. The automobile and telephone—as well as the Thompson submachine gun—were some of the modern tools Torrio employed. When a 1925 assassination attempt left him wounded, Torrio retired and left the business to his protegé.

Like Torrio (and Rockefeller, Sr.), Capone rationalized the marketplace with a pool arrangement, where different gangs were allowed control of different sections of the city. Anyone dissatisfied with their share met a bloody end. The seven victims of the 1929 St. Valentine’s Day Massacre were but one example.

Perhaps Capone’s true genius lay in his crafting a public image. “They call Capone a bootlegger,” he once complained. “Yes. It’s bootleg while it’s on the trucks, but when your host at the club, in the locker room or on the Gold Coast hands it to you on a silver platter, it’s hospitality” (Bergreen, p. 268). Such comments always served Capone well with the public. So did his reputation for generosity: When the Depression struck Chicago with nearly 50 percent unemployment, Capone opened up soup kitchens to feed the needy. The public did not care that Capone “encouraged” others to pay the cost of his project—Big Al lent a helping hand at a time when government did not. “Capone has become almost a mythical being in Chicago,” (Bergreen, p. 402) one critic lamented in 1930. Hollywood gave the story form a year later with Edward G. Robinson as Little Caesar, who was Capone by any other name. The press had already made much of Capone as a kind of street philanthropist.

Capone was grossing some $100 million annually by the late 1920s. This wealth proved his undoing, or at least his failure to report it did—he was convicted of income tax evasion in 1931 and spent eight years in federal prisons, including Alcatraz. By then, Capone had fashioned a myth for the Depression and beyond. He was the gangster as antihero. Capone died from the ravages of syphilis in 1947.

See Also: CRIME; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PROHIBITION.

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CAPRA, FRANK

Frank Capra (May 18, 1897–September 3, 1991) was a motion picture director, producer, and writer who
won three Academy Awards for best director in the 1930s. Born in Bisacquino, Sicily, Capra emigrated at the age of six with his family to Los Angeles, where he grew up. In the early 1920s, after graduating from Throop College of Technology (now Caltech), he wrote gags for movie producers Hal Roach and Matt Sennett. After writing material for screen comic Harry Langdon, Capra directed three films starring Langdon in 1926 and 1927 before the two had a falling-out.

In 1928, Capra was hired by Harry Cohn, head of Columbia Pictures. Between 1928 and 1933, Capra would direct nineteen features for Columbia, including American Madness (1932), a film about the collapse of a bank, which anticipated many of the themes of Capra’s later social films. In 1931, Capra began working with screenwriter Robert Riskin, who would go on to write most of Capra’s major films of the 1930s.

Although Capra had begun to make a name for himself during the early 1930s, his first huge hit came with It Happened One Night (1934). The film concerns an heiress (Claudette Colbert) who is secretly traveling from Miami to New York to escape her father. She is discovered by an out-of-work newsman (Clark Gable), who senses that her tale might make a good scoop. Naturally, the two fall for each other. It Happened One Night helped to create the screwball comedy, one of Hollywood’s most important subgenres during the 1930s. It also established Capra as one of Tinseltown’s most popular and powerful directors. It Happened One Night
swept the Oscars, garnering the awards for best picture, director, writer, actor, and actress.

With the exception of Lost Horizon (1937), a box-office disappointment that led to a bitter rift with Cohn and tensions with Riskin, Capra’s success continued unabated over the next several years. Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936) earned Capra his second best director Oscar. A third arrived with You Can’t Take It with You (1938). Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) and Meet John Doe (1941) capitalized on the success of Mr. Deeds with similar plots about a little man taking on corrupt and powerful interests. The darkly comic Arsenic and Old Lace (produced 1941–1942; released 1944) was just wrapping production when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Shortly thereafter, Capra became an officer in the Army Signal Corps, where he supervised the Why We Fight series of propaganda films during World War II.

After the war, Capra directed two more significant films: It’s A Wonderful Life (1946), which despite later becoming his most watched film never found an audience at the time of its release, and State of the Union (1948). Thereafter, Capra’s career experienced a rapid decline.

Critics and audiences have sometimes seen Capra’s 1930s films, especially the social trilogy of Mr. Deeds, Mr. Smith, and John Doe, as cinematic embodiments of the spirit of the New Deal. On closer inspection they are less clearly liberal. Capra’s own politics were far from Rooseveltian: He was a lifelong conservative Republican. While Capra’s most important screenwriter, Riskin, was a New Deal liberal, another important writer on his pictures, Myles Connolly, was a reactionary anti-Communist. Out of this political stew emerged films that, perhaps unintentionally, illuminate the ambiguities of American populism during the Great Depression. Although Capra’s films centered on tribunes of the little man, often their heroes’ most implacable foe was the people themselves: the panicked crowd trying to withdraw their money from the bank in American Madness; the thousands of letters calling for Senator Smith’s resignation in Mr. Smith; or the angry throng at the stadium in John Doe.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON.

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CARDOZO, BENJAMIN N.

Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (May 24, 1870–July 9, 1938) served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1932 until 1938. Cardozo was born in New York City and earned his law degree at Columbia University. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1891 and gained a reputation for his scholarly approach to law and his belief that the law should be adapted to modern conditions. Cardozo was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals in 1914 and was elevated to its chief judgeship in 1926. He served on this state court until President Herbert Hoover appointed him to replace retiring Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in 1932.

Like Holmes and Louis Brandeis, Cardozo was a legal realist and a pre-New Deal progressive who believed that the Constitution, especially as it affected state governments, should be flexible, and that states should have broad discretion to make laws to solve or alleviate social and economic problems resulting from industrialization and urbanization, such as child labor, unsafe working conditions, and abusive business practices. In such cases as MacPherson v. Buick (1916) and Ultramasres Corporation v. Touche (1931), Cardozo wrote decisions for
New York that respectively expanded the legal responsibilities of businesses in product liability and fraud cases. A series of lectures that Cardozo gave at Yale Law School reflected these ideas and opinions and was published as a book, *The Nature of the Judicial Process*, in 1921.

Cardozo, like other pre-New Deal progressives, was more willing to grant the states, rather than the federal government, broader powers to enact labor, social welfare, and regulatory reforms. Since the early New Deal emphasized economic planning and the regulation of prices, wages, and production through codes made and enforced by the executive branch, Cardozo joined the majority of the Supreme Court in striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act in the *Schechter* decision of 1935. Cardozo dissented, however, in the Supreme Court’s anti-New Deal decisions in the *Butler* and *Carter* cases of 1936. In *Butler*, he and Brandeis joined Harlan Stone’s dissenting opinion. Harlan claimed that the Agricultural Adjustment Act should be upheld since because Congress had the constitutional authority to regulate agricultural production through excise taxes. In *Carter*, Cardozo wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Guffey Coal Act should be upheld since the commerce clause gave Congress the authority to regulate the prices, wages, and trade practices of the interstate coal industry.

By 1937, he belonged to the pro-New Deal majority on the court. After Cardozo’s death in 1938, he was replaced on the Supreme Court by Felix Frankfurter.

**See Also:** *BRANDEIS, LOUIS D.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, JR.; SUPREME COURT.*

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**CARTOONS, POLITICAL**

Political cartoons, or editorial cartoons, serve as a commentary on current events. From the first use of such cartoons in newspapers and periodicals in the early nineteenth century to the Great Depression in the 1930s and thereafter, political cartoons have played a major role in shaping public perceptions and opinions. By using satire rather than mere humor, political cartoons communicate the views of the cartoonist and add depth to an editorial in a newspaper or magazine.

**FAMOUS POLITICAL CARTOONISTS OF THE 1930s**

Several political cartoonists gained fame for their work during the Great Depression, including Clifford Berryman, Herb Block, J. N. “Ding” Darling, Jerry Doyle, Rollin Kirby, and Fred O. Seibel.

**J. N. “Ding” Darling.** Jay Norwood Darling (1876–1962) received the Pulitzer Prize twice for his editorial cartooning (1924 and 1943) and was named the best cartoonist by the nation’s top editors in 1934. From 1906 until his retirement in 1949, Darling chronicled the thoughts, ideas, trends, and politics of the United States primarily for the Des Moines Register, although his cartoons appeared in newspapers throughout the United States. He was particularly noted for his wit and his use of political satire, especially in relation to conservation policy. Darling’s interest in conservation led in 1933 to his being appointed chief of the Bureau of Biological Survey by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although Darling was a strong Republican and not a supporter of Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, he nevertheless was an energetic promoter of conservation projects and his cartoons often emphasized the value of governmental regulations that could benefit the environment. The J. N. “Ding” Darling National Wildlife Refuge on Sanibel Island in Florida is named after him.

**Herb Block.** Another popular Depression-era cartoonist was Herbert L. Block (1909–2001). Block published his first editorial cartoon, titled “This is the forest primeval—”, six months before the 1929 New York Stock Exchange crash that marked the
onset of the Great Depression. Like Darling, Block was interested in protecting nature and the environment, especially the cutting of America’s virgin forests, and he addressed these concerns in his cartoons. Block’s interest in nature later broadened into concern for the economic and international environment that developed in the 1930s.

Block started his career as a cartoonist for the Chicago Daily News in 1929. In 1933, he started working as a syndicated cartoonist under the name HerBlock for the Newspaper Enterprise Association, a feature service headquartered in Cleveland. He joined the Washington Post in 1946, and stayed there for the rest of his career. During the Depression he provided superb commentary about unemployment and poverty in the United States and the rise of fascism in Europe. One cartoon, titled “Well everything helps,” depicts Hoover fishing at Rappidan River with members of Congress and his administration. Block comments on the deepening Depression by showing Hoover reviewing his “economic program” with his fishing line in the water, and later selling his catch of fresh fish on a street in Washington, D.C.
Block’s cartoons addressed many aspects of the Great Depression and his editorial comments were a rallying call for reform. Though Block was supportive of New Deal policies, he nonetheless questioned Roosevelt’s efforts in some areas, notably the president’s unsuccessful attempt in 1937 to pack the U.S. Supreme Court. Block was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for editorial cartooning in 1942, 1954, and 1979, honors that confirmed his reputation as one of the country’s leading political cartoonists.

Jerry Doyle and Fred O. Seibel. Gerald “Jerry” Doyle (1898–1986) and Fred O. Seibel (1886–1968) were two of the more popular political cartoonists of the New Deal era. They were especially noted for their distinctive depictions of Roosevelt. Seibel was an editorial cartoonist from 1926 to 1968 for the Richmond Times-Dispatch, while Doyle spent most of his career at The Philadelphia Record and Philadelphia Daily News. Doyle’s sophisticated drawings generally expressed support for Roosevelt, whom he depicted as tall, imposing, powerful, and larger-than-life. Doyle usually showed Roosevelt smiling, gave him titles such as “skipper” to show that he was in charge, and sometimes depicted him as a quarterback in football games. Seibel, whose drawings were less realistic in style, generally depicted Roosevelt as struggling and lacking control, with a protruding chin and a body like a penguin. Seibel’s cartoons sometimes included an image of a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat, which was meant to indicate that Roosevelt’s policies would only succeed by magic. Neither Doyle nor Seibel, however, would hesitate to reverse his usual depiction of Roosevelt when, in the cartoonist’s opinion, the subject matter warranted it. One of Doyle’s most famous cartoons showed Roosevelt holding a picture of Hitler with Hitler’s arms in a position of surrender and Roosevelt’s elongated arms forming a V for victory.

Drawing Presidents

Hoover and Roosevelt were regular subjects of political cartoons during the 1930s. In the first hundred days of Roosevelt’s administration in 1933, cartoonists tended to show Roosevelt as a confident, strong, and energetic leader whose intentions for the nation were good. These cartoons suggested that Americans sensed that the new president had faith in the future and could lead the nation out of hard times. The February 1934 issue of Vanity Fair, for example, includes a rugged-looking Roosevelt riding a bucking horse in the shape of the United States. By 1935, however, the country had only achieved a modest degree of recovery, and some political cartoonists began to express opposition to Roosevelt and his programs.

See Also: Communications and the Press; Humor.

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William Arthur Atkins

CASTE AND CLASS

The terms caste and class are associated with an interpretation of American race relations that came to prominence in the late 1930s and was widely influential in both social scientific and applied social inquiry. Part of an older, historically-rooted trend toward more social scientific understandings of racial inequality, the caste and class concept offered a powerful, if flawed, analysis of the depths and the consequences of racism in the United States.

The caste and class concept was first laid out in a brief 1936 essay by social anthropologist W. Lloyd...
Warner, and it was more fully developed in a series of community studies conducted in the Depression-era South. Warner, who started his anthropological career studying aboriginal tribes in Australia, was among the leaders of a broader trend towards applying anthropological techniques honed in observing “primitive” cultures to “typical” American communities. It was in this type of study that he and others developed the caste and class concept. Indeed, in important ways the concept emerged out of the contrast between industrial New England and the post-plantation agricultural South. While still engaged in an ambitious study of the substantially ethnic but predominantly white city of Newburyport, Massachusetts, Warner launched a parallel study in Natchez, Mississippi. In Newburyport, as Warner reported in his famous *Yankee City series*, social relations were organized around an elaborate status hierarchy based on class, upheld not only by differences of wealth and income, but even more importantly by class-coded behavior, attitudes, and cultural traits. In Natchez, however, the picture was more complicated. In Natchez, there was not one, but two separate class hierarchies, one black and one white. They in turn existed within a rigid and pervasive caste system—an all-encompassing economic, political, social, and cultural system of racial subordination that was aimed at maintaining white supremacy. While at times caste and class worked in tension with one another, the overwhelming weight of the system was devoted to keeping African Americans—and especially the small black middle- and upper-classes—“in their place.” Conversely, no matter how low they were on the class hierarchy, whites always had the social, cultural, and psychological advantage over African Americans.

Although he was by no means the first to describe black/white relations as a caste system, Warner’s framework proved more widely influential—reflecting his own status as a prominent white social scientist, as well as the landmark empirical studies conducted using the caste and class concept. Studies such as John Dollard’s *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937), Hortense Powdermaker’s *After Freedom* (1939), and *Deep South* (1941) by Warner students Allison Davis, Burleigh Gardner, and Mary Gardner elaborated the interlocking mechanisms of caste and class subordination in empirical detail. A series of studies commissioned by the American Council on Education investigated the impact of caste and class on black adolescent personality development. Important though they were in illuminating the structural and institutional dimensions of southern racism, what these studies shared—again reflecting a broader trend in contemporary social science—was a fascination with the cultural and psychological scars it left. African Americans in the South, or so the deeply flawed portrait that emerged from these studies suggested, had become “accommodated” to racial subordination in what threatened to become a self-perpetuating complex of repressed frustration, self-hatred, and, for the lower classes in particular, cultural “pathology.”

Criticized at the time for its basically static, pessimistic vision of American race relations, the caste and class framework was nevertheless important for drawing attention to the enduring reality of racism as a key factor in the persistence of African-American poverty and economic subordination—during and beyond the depths of the Great Depression. Its central analysis, however, left an ambiguous legacy that also endures: on the one hand, an argument for attacking the roots of white racism; on the other, a distorted cultural and psychological imagery of the African-American lower class.

See Also: CLASS; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS; SOCIAL SCIENCE.

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Alice O’Connor
CAUSES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

Disagreement over the causes of the Great Depression began before the economic collapse that commenced in 1929 had even been given that name, and the disagreement has persisted ever since. Nor does the debate show any signs of imminent resolution in the early twenty-first century. Arguments over what caused the Great Depression are deeply entwined with economic, social, and political philosophy.

A major reason for the controversy is that the Depression seemingly disproved the efficacy of the unregulated free market. Defenders of the faith of classical free market economics are, therefore, obliged to seek elsewhere for the causes of the collapse of the economy following a decade of lowering taxes and lifting restrictions on business by successive Republican administrations. It is an article of dogma to them that an unfettered marketplace is self-correcting. Accordingly, devotees of Adam Smith’s worldview must find fetters—some sort of government interference or regulation—on which to lay the blame.

WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGINS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

Although it was in many ways eclipsed by the second installment of the twentieth century’s world conflict, World War I (or “the Great War” as it was still known at the time of the Depression) was a major source of much of what happened in the world for most of the remainder of the century, including World War II and the Cold War. The role played by the Great War in helping to produce the Great Depression was also significant. Although the death toll from World War I was relatively small for the United States, the war was catastrophic for many European nations.

The war’s economic impact was similarly profound. The war stimulated and distorted the economies not only of the belligerent nations, but those of many nonbelligerents as well. Wartime inflation was followed by postwar deflation in most countries. During the war and for several months after the armistice, demand for American farm products, especially grains, soared, as did prices. Such profitable conditions led American farmers to go deeply into debt to buy additional land and machinery. These happy circumstances for American farmers were, however, an artificial consequence of the war, which severely disrupted European agriculture. When the latter recovered rapidly after the war, the demand for the expanded production of American farms plummeted, helping (along with a sharp contraction in the money supply) to carry the economy into a sharp recession in 1920 and 1921. Agriculture was to remain in depressed conditions throughout the period of more general prosperity from 1923 to 1929.

The war also radically altered international finance. It transformed the United States for the first time from a net debtor nation into the world’s largest creditor. Massive war debts owed by the British and French to American creditors were part of the economic landscape of the 1920s, as were the huge reparation payments the European victors demanded from Germany. The problem of war debts and reparations was a continuing irritant to the international economy in the twenties.

Perhaps more significant in its adverse effects on the world economy was the war’s establishment of the United States in the role previously held by Great Britain as the world’s banker or creditor-in-chief. This position carried with it responsibilities for which the Americans were ill prepared and that they were disinclined to shoulder. In particular, American political leaders of the twenties were committed to maintaining a favorable balance of trade, meaning that they wanted the nation to export more than it imported. This posture was, in the long term, incompatible with America’s assumption of the position of the world’s leading lender, because other countries had to sell more to the United States than they bought from it if they were to have the funds to repay the debts they owed to American creditors.

THE STOCK MARKET CRASH

This much can be stated categorically: Popular perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding, the stock market crash of October 1929 did not cause the Great Depression. Although hardly anyone re-
alized it at the time, the economic contraction that became the Depression had already begun in the summer of 1929, when the economy started to slow considerably.

“You know,” Herbert Hoover once remarked to journalist Mark Sullivan, “the only trouble with capitalism is the capitalists; they’re too damn greedy.” This is a truism that has been proven repeatedly, but it is also true that greed is a highly contagious disease against which few people’s immune systems provide much protection. This is particularly the case when those already infected are actively working to spread the contagion, as many of them were in the 1920s. (Du Pont executive and Democratic National Chairman John J. Raskob, for example, wrote a 1929 article entitled, “Everybody Ought to be Rich.”) The result was an epidemic of greed in the United States in the mid and late 1920s.

The first major outbreak of the disease in the decade occurred in Florida, where it took the form of real estate speculation. It began with the reality of the growing value of beachfront property in a place with warm winters that had been made accessible to well-to-do northeastern and midwestern residents by the development of the automobile and the construction of highways. Quickly, however, Florida real estate became a classic bubble in which prices rose far beyond realistic values, simply because they were rising. That is, speculators were willing to pay ever higher prices for land because they expected someone else to be willing to pay even more for it a week or a month later. The Florida bubble burst, as all bubbles that keep expanding ultimately must, following a severe hurricane in 1926, but the greed virus had already infected a different area: Wall Street (which was, in any case, its natural habitat).

The Great Bull Market of the late twenties was fueled by easy credit in the form of margin buying (buying stock by putting up a small percentage of its cost in cash and borrowing the rest “on margin,” using the stock itself as collateral for the loan). In a rapidly rising market, the “leverage” provided by margin buying made the possibilities for huge profits extraordinary. By the time the Federal Reserve sought to dampen the speculative fever in 1928 and 1929 by raising interest rates, the mania had taken on a life of its own. “Nothing matters as long as stocks keep going up,” the New York World said as 1929 began. “The market is now its own law. The force behind its advance are now irresistible.”

Historian Maury Klein sums up the situation well in his book Rainbow’s End (2001): “Put simply, too many people held too much stock on borrowed money.” When the economy began to slow in the summer of 1929, it sent signals to Wall Street that were disregarded by most investors, but heeded by many of the richest insiders. Among those who quietly got largely out of the market before the bottom fell out were Raskob (who apparently thought that he ought to remain rich while “everybody” lost their shirts), Bernard Baruch, Joseph P. Kennedy, and President Hoover himself.

The crash was a response to an already begun, but as yet invisible to most observers, Depression. It amounted to a spectacular funeral for the “New Era” of eternal prosperity that had been proclaimed a few years earlier. Funerals, it is worth remembering, do not cause death; they recognize the decedent’s passing, which has already occurred. Such was the relationship between the crash and the demise of prosperity.

The crash did, however, accelerate the downward spiral of the economy by wiping out much of the paper wealth of investors and by altering the previously euphoric outlook of so many people into one of pessimism, which led them to be much more cautious in their spending and investment. Both of these consequences of the crash further eroded demand.

**MONETARY POLICY AND THE GOLD STANDARD**

There is no question that the money supply can have profound effects on the economy. In the simplest terms, if the money supply is insufficient, prices must fall, which can lead to the sort of serious deflation that contributed to the Panic of 1893, the worst economic depression in American history prior to the Great Depression. If, on the other hand, the money supply grows faster than the demand for money, prices will rise, causing inflation. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the most notable and recent
example of the potentially catastrophic consequences of runaway price increases was the hyperinflation that had gripped Germany in 1922 and 1923, when the exchange rate between the German and American currencies went in less than two years from 192 marks to the dollar to 4.2 trillion marks to the dollar. Annualized for the two years, this was an inflation rate in excess of a trillion percent a year. By November 1923, German money was essentially worthless.

Germany's horrible experience with hyperinflation contributed to the coming of the Depression in two important ways. First, it wreaked havoc on the German economy and those of several other central European countries, and they never fully recovered from the effects for the remainder of the decade. Second, the German disaster caused other nations to be unduly concerned with avoiding inflation when the more dangerous economic predator lurking in the shadows of late twenties prosperity was actually deflation. In their efforts to defend their nations against inflation, political and economic leaders inadvertently strengthened the building forces of deflation.

In the decades prior to World War I, most major countries had been on the gold standard, meaning that their currencies were convertible to a set amount of gold. This meant that the value of all currencies on the gold standard had a stable exchange rate with other currencies that were tied to gold. The gold standard was abandoned by most of the belligerents during World War I (the United States, a late entrant into the war, remained on the gold standard), but there was a concerted effort to restore it after the war. Because of the major disruptions of the war, exchange rates were allowed to float from 1919 to well into the 1920s. Such floating rates provided some protection against the problems in one or a few countries spreading to other countries, but most nations’ governments were committed to returning to the gold standard with fixed rates of exchange as rapidly as possible. Great Britain did so in 1925 and France followed in 1928. By 1929, forty-five nations were on the gold standard.

By 1929, much of the world’s gold was rapidly flowing into the United States and France. Attempts by various countries to keep their currencies at prewar exchange rates led them into deflationary policies, intended to cheapen the prices of their products on the international market and so bring gold back into their countries to support their currencies. These deflationary actions contributed to a worldwide contraction in economic activity.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEPRESSION

Technology was in three major respects a significant factor in creating the conditions that produced the Great Depression.

First, new technologies provided much of the impetus for the unprecedented prosperity of the 1920s. The development of important new products that large numbers of people can be persuaded to buy is often the driving force in periods of economic boom, as appears to have been the case with personal computers and the Internet in the boom of the 1990s. The development of such new consumer products encourages investment in new plants and equipment and provides employment for large numbers of workers. This was plainly the case with the automobile in the 1920s. The motor car was not new in the twenties; nor was its method of mass production, which had been perfected prior to World War I. What was new in the decade following that war was the enormous expansion of the market for cars and the rapid development of numerous industries that were stimulated by the mass ownership of automobiles. Among these booming industries of the prosperity decade that preceded the Depression were petroleum (exploration, drilling, refining, and retailing); steel production; road and highway construction (which pulled along the cement industry); and motels, diners, and tourist attractions.

Nor was the automobile alone among new technologies that had been developed by the early 1920s in providing fuel for the economy of the decade. Radio, little more than a promising curiosity at the decade’s start, had spread across the nation and into the homes of a majority of Americans by 1929. Along with the automobile and, to a lesser extent, a variety of new household appliances, the swift rise of radio to the status of “necessity” for middle-class life provided an enormous stimulus to the economy.
It should be noted that while the potential market for radios and electrical appliances was huge, it was limited to areas where electricity was available. Although all densely populated parts of the United States were electrified, large expanses of rural America were not, so rural Americans were not part of the potential market for electrical devices. Additionally, while there was no such access barrier to farmers buying automobiles (and many did buy them), the fact that agriculture remained economically depressed throughout the decade also reduced the potential market for automobiles among the nation's farmers.

A rapid economic expansion induced by the products of new technology can be great while it lasts, but it is, almost by definition, limited in its duration. Once most consumers have purchased the new products, demand for them must decline. Businesses involved in the industries can try to lessen the effects of a saturation of the market for their products by trying to expand the potential number of consumers through lower prices and installment purchase plans. They can also use the introduction of new models and planned obsolescence to churn the market with repeat customers. Both of these strategies were employed to considerable effect in the second half of the 1920s. Even so, the trajectory of new sales of a new technology will almost always be downward as the market for the product approaches saturation.

If an economic boom that has been stoked by one or more new technologies is to continue after the market for it or them has been largely supplied, new technologies that can be made to appear to be necessities for consumers must be introduced. The lack of such additional new products in the second half of the 1920s is the second way in which technology played a significant part in causing the Depression. In terms of the development of new or significantly improved products, the ten-year period beginning in 1925 was probably the least productive time in the twentieth century. The only major new product introduced during those years, as the economy moved from extraordinary boom to unprecedented bust, was the electric refrigerator.

If technological innovation failed to introduce much in the way of new products during the late 1920s and early 1930s, that did not mean that there was a hiatus in technological advance. On the contrary, there was great technological advance in the methods for producing the products that had already been developed. During the 1920s, productivity of industrial workers increased by 50 percent or more. And, even while huge numbers of workers were jobless in the 1930s and wages were very low, technological advances in manufacturing processes continued, resulting in another 25 percent increase in productivity in that decade.

The effects of this sort of technological advance on the economy tend to be the opposite of those of the development of new products, and the rapid innovation in productive processes in the 1920s was the third major contribution of technology in laying the groundwork for the Great Depression.

Certainly process innovation requires some new investment, but it is usually on a much smaller scale than that required for manufacturing new products. Furthermore, improvements in the technology of production usually lead to the number of machines and buildings used to make products being decreased. Most important, the whole point of such innovations in process is to increase productivity, so they almost invariably result in fewer workers being employed to manufacture a given quantity of the ultimate consumer product. In the six years from 1923 to 1929, output per person-hour of labor in manufacturing in the United States increased by nearly 32 percent.

To summarize the role of technology in the Depression: Technological advances that introduced new products greatly stimulated the economy of the 1920s, but the lack of new products in the late 1920s placed a drag on the economy when the market for the earlier innovations became largely saturated. Continuing advances in the technology of producing already existing goods contributed to an increase in unemployment and to a lessening of demand, both because of the unemployment itself and because increased productivity without corresponding wage increases reduced the share of national income going to potential consumers (i.e., workers who remained employed).
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND “UNDER-CONSUMPTION”

Both types of technological advance—new products and new processes to make them—contributed to a fundamental shift in the economy. Put simply, mass production necessitates mass consumption. In this new economy, therefore, it was essential that a large portion of the population have both the desire and the means to buy products that were not, by any standards of the past, necessary for them to have. “Now you have taken over the job of creating desire,” Hoover told advertisers in 1925. This meant that such traditional values as frugality and deferred gratification had to be undermined. Advertising served this objective by keeping “the customer dissatisfied,” as a 1929 article by a General Motors executive put it.

The whole idea of the new consumption-driven economy seemed odd to some observers. “It still escapes me why a prosperity founded on forcing people to consume what they do not need, and often do not want,” social critic Stuart Chase wrote in 1929, “is, or can be, a healthy and permanent growth.”

Persuading people that they should buy what they had not even known they wanted was, however, only the first step in achieving the level of mass consumption needed to soak up the products of mass production. Effective demand requires money as well as motivation to buy. For this reason, as an economy becomes more dependent on mass consumption, it should move toward a less concentrated distribution of income. In the 1920s, just the opposite was happening. The slice of the national income pie going to the richest one percent of Americans grew from 12 percent in 1920 to 19 percent in 1929. This increasing maldistribution of income posed a serious threat to prosperity.

If a sufficient number of customers with desire and money to buy what the nation’s industry was producing could not be found at home, a possible solution would be to sell the excess abroad. But several obstacles blocked this route: First, as the world’s principal lender, the United States could not continually export more than it imported; second, tariff barriers constrained international trade; third, other industrial countries were facing similar problems of overproduction and so they, too, sought to export more than they imported.

In the absence of some means of transferring a larger share of income to those who would buy the products coming off assembly lines—through taxation, higher wages, or deficit spending by the government, all of which went against the grain of popular thinking and the dominant political and economic philosophy of the era (indeed, tax cuts on upper income brackets in the Coolidge years helped to increase the maldistribution)—the only way to keep the economy going seemed to be to allow people who did not have enough money to buy products to buy them anyway. Advertising led people to hunger for products; credit let them, however briefly, satisfy that hunger. Selling products on credit became ever more popular as the twenties wore on. This process kept demand within shouting distance of supply for a few years beyond when the imbalance would otherwise have hit. But in postponing the day of reckoning, the rising burden of debt made the eventual fall much harder.

As he left a post-crash meeting of industrialists called by President Hoover on November 21, 1929, Henry Ford succinctly stated a major cause of the Great Depression then underway: “American production has come to equal and even surpass not our people’s power to consume, but their power to purchase.”

TARIFFS AND THE DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Once the Depression had begun, the policies and actions of various governments around the world in reaction to it worsened the situation. Tariff barriers—led by the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in the United States, passed in 1930—were erected to protect domestic markets. These impediments to international trade added to the deflationary forces already at work, and the world economy slipped ever deeper into depression.

CONCLUSION

“One cannot recall when a new year was ushered in with business conditions sounder than they are today,” the Wall Street Journal gushed on January 4, 1929. Exactly two months later, Herbert Hoo-
ver proclaimed in his inaugural address that he had “no fears for the future of our country. It is bright with hope.” Following the stock market crash less than eight months later, President Hoover reassured the nation in the same terms the Journal had used at the year’s outset, saying that the economy was “fundamentally sound.”

The most comprehensive answer to the question of what caused the Great Depression is that conditions by the last year of the 1920s were quite the opposite of these optimistic pronouncements. Had the economy in fact been “fundamentally sound,” the stock market crash would surely have produced some deleterious economic fallout, but the decline would not have been nearly as steep, deep, or prolonged as it turned out to be. The unfortunate truth was that, in a variety of ways outlined in this entry—from international banking, war debts, and reparations, through the effects of the gold standard on money supply, the wild speculation of the decade’s orgy of greed, the lack of major new products combined with rapid increases in productivity, the economy’s new dependence on mass consumption, and widespread consumer debt, to the growing maldistribution of income, the economy was fundamentally unsound in 1929. That many-faced unsoundness caused the Great Depression.

See Also: EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS; LAISSEZ-FAIRE; MONETARY POLICY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; STOCK MARKET CRASH (1929).

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CERMAK, ANTON

Before there was a Roosevelt coalition of reformers, organized labor, and ethnics, there was a Cermak coalition. This one elected a mayor of Chicago and might have accomplished more had Anton Cermak (May 9, 1873–March 6, 1933) not been assassinated while meeting with president-elect Franklin Roosevelt.

Cermak was born in Kladno, Bohemia, now part of the Czech Republic. Cermak came with his family to the United States as an infant, and grew up in Braidwood, a coal-mining community southwest of Chicago. He made his way to Chicago as a teenager with limited education but great ambition.

Like other newcomers, Cermak naturally gravitated to the Democratic Party, but with a difference—this regular politician never saw a need to fear or war on reformers. His tolerance for diverse viewpoints served Cermak in a career that saw his election as alderman, bailiff of the municipal court, president of the Cook County Board, and state representative.

Cermak’s politics combined advocacy for immigrants with opposition to Prohibition. For years before passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, Cermak led the United Societies, an umbrella group that fought to keep legal the sale and consumption of liquor. While his standing as a “wet” on the issue of Prohibition made enemies, it also had advantages: By the mid-1920s, when voters later turned against the Amendment, Cermak was vindicated.
Cermak spent the 1920s courting other ethnic groups so that in 1931 he was ready to run for mayor of Chicago. Opposing him was Republican William Hale “Big Bill” Thompson. The three-term incumbent derided Cermak as “Pushcart Tony,” a reference to Cermak’s first real job in Chicago. Cermak’s reply could have been a motto for Democrats in the Age of Roosevelt: “It’s true I didn’t come over on the Mayflower, but I came over as soon as I could.” Cermak even reached out, in a way, to African Americans. In the 1927 mayor’s race, Democrats circulated the rumor that a Republican win would lead to a black takeover of the city, but Cermak refused to engage in such demagogy. The Chicago electorate picked Cermak by nearly 200,000 votes, and no Republican mayoral candidate has won Chicago since. Unfortunately for the victor, vote totals did not translate into the money necessary to keep government running. The city ran on funds generated mostly by real estate taxes, and with nearly half the working population unemployed, Chicagoans had stopped paying their taxes. Cermak soon was forced to slash budgets and lay off workers. At one point, the city owed its employees some $40 million in back wages. Cermak went to Washington, D.C., requesting assistance from the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation, only to have the Republican-controlled RFC turn him down.

Because Cermak was a committed “wet” who favored the speedy repeal of Prohibition, he favored Al Smith over Franklin Roosevelt as Democratic nominee for president in 1932. It was a decision that ultimately cost Cermak his life. In February 1933 Cermak traveled to Miami to repair his relationship with the president-elect. Aiming at the next president, assassin Joseph Zangara instead shot Chicago’s mayor, who was sitting alongside Roosevelt in an open car. Cermak died of his wounds three weeks later.

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**CHANDLER, RAYMOND**

American writer of hard-boiled detective novels, Raymond Chandler (July 23, 1888–March 26, 1959) helped develop the genre and stretch its limitations. Born in Chicago, Chandler was seven years old when his parents divorced and his mother took him to England to live. He attended Dulwich College, a preparatory school, from 1896 to 1905. In 1907 he became a British subject. After working as a civil servant and a reporter, and after publishing poems, literary essays, and fiction without achieving much success, Chandler returned to the United States in 1912. In World War I he served at the western front with the Canadian army. After the war Chandler worked as a reporter and bookkeeper in California. He married Cissy Pascal, a woman seventeen years his senior, in 1924. In 1932, after ten years with the Dabney Oil Syndicate, he was fired for drinking, absenteeism, and involvement with women who worked for him.

Out of work, he began writing “hard-boiled detective stories,” which were published in *Black Mask* and other detective magazines. His first novel, *The Big Sleep* (1939), introduced Philip Marlowe as Chandler’s detective and narrator. Marlowe’s sardonic wisecracks and idealistic outlook gave *The Big Sleep* and the novels that followed a style and substance that moved them beyond the limitations of the detective novel towards the techniques and concerns of the serious novel, particularly those concerns raised by the Depression. Marlowe, as Chandler’s spokesman in the novels, pointedly comments on class and wealth as corrupting influences on American society. Chandler’s large cast of characters provides a cross section of American life, and his tangled plots and the atmosphere of the urban jungle suggest the complexities of the modern world. Marlowe’s idealism leads him to seek meaning, order, and justice in the increasingly meaningless, chaotic, and corrupt world, and Marlowe’s inevitable failure and disillusionment at the end of the novels make him a particularly modern antihero. Chandler’s most highly regarded novels besides *The Big Sleep* are *Farewell, My Lovely* (1940), *The High Window* (1942), *Lady in the Lake* (1943), *The Little Sister* (1949), and *The Long Goodbye* (1954).
Chandler also was a successful screenwriter, most notably for such movies as *Double Indemnity* (1944), *The Blue Dahlia* (1946), and *Strangers on a Train* (1951). Devastated by his wife’s death in 1954, Chandler attempted suicide and was hospitalized several times for depression and alcohol-related health problems before he died on March 26, 1959.

*See Also:* HARD-BOILED DETECTIVES; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; LITERATURE.

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**AUSTIN WILSON**

**CHAPLIN, CHARLIE**

Charles Spencer (“Charlie”) Chaplin (April 16, 1889–December 25, 1977), motion-picture actor, director, producer, and writer, was born in London, England, to two music-hall singers who separated soon after his birth. Chaplin experienced a difficult and often unstable childhood. A talented mimic, he began acting early, and by 1913 the successful music-hall performer signed a movie contract to work for Keystone’s Mack Sennett. Chaplin quickly developed a comic persona, the Tramp, which launched him to stardom, and began to write and direct his short comedies. By 1919 he had built his own movie studio and cofounded United Artists with Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks, and D. W. Griffith. During the 1920s Chaplin shifted from two-reel shorts to feature-length films, most notably *The Gold Rush* (1925).

During the Depression Chaplin completed one film, *City Lights* (1931), and made two more, *Modern Times* (1936) and *The Great Dictator* (1940). *City Lights* was planned before the stock market crash of 1929 and is best considered Chaplin’s farewell to the 1920s, particularly for its satirical portrayal of an urban millionaire who is generous when drunk but suicidal when sober.

The Depression left its imprint on both *Modern Times* and *The Great Dictator*. In 1931 and 1932 Chaplin took a fifteen-month world tour, which demonstrated his global fame and confronted him with the suffering of the Depression. Responding to calls for socially relevant works, Chaplin began work in 1933 on a project, *The Masses*, that was released in 1936 as *Modern Times*. Although it resembled earlier Chaplin features with its visual comedy, romance, and pathos, *Modern Times* was more topical than his previous films, alluding to the Depression in images of frantic assembly lines, closed factories, and street clashes between protesters and the police. Ideologically progressive, the film sympathized with common people like his Tramp and the gamin, and criticized authority figures like the factory owner or the policeman who kills the gamin’s father. Critics and moviegoers were divided in their response to this new and more socially aware Chaplin.

Chaplin’s next film, *The Great Dictator*, aligned itself with another progressive cause of the later Depression years: antifascism. A pointed satirical attack on fascism, the film starred Chaplin in two roles—a gentle Jewish barber and the dictator of Tomania, Adenoid Hynkel. Chaplin conceived the film in the late 1930s, halted production on it briefly when World War II erupted in 1939, then decided that even during wartime, it was important to use humor to combat what he considered to be cruel totalitarianism. *The Great Dictator* was Chaplin’s biggest box-office success in its initial domestic release. Recognizing its popularity, Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Chaplin to read the film’s final speech at a presidential inaugural ball in 1941. By the end of the Depression, Chaplin was developing the reputation of a politically aware and progressive filmmaker; that reputation would later cause him problems after the Cold War set in, when he faced accusations that he was a Communist.

*See Also:* FASCISM; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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Prior to the Great Depression, private charity played a critical, if supplemental, role in the nation’s patchwork relief system. Although public and private charities grew considerably between 1910 and 1929, private charity constituted barely one quarter of all aid in 1929. But because private agencies administered most relief funds, their values shaped virtually all public programs that emerged before and during the 1930s.

Between 1929 and 1931 most politicians and professionals believed that the expansion of private charity would help the nation overcome its devastating economic problems. Through emergency appeals, private charity quadrupled to $170 million in two years—34 percent of all relief funds. As its primary funders, the community chests remained strong proponents of private charity, as did the Herbert Hoover administration, which extolled its virtues despite clear evidence that private charities lacked adequate resources to cope with rising unemployment.

The economic crisis quickly exhausted even the best efforts of private charities. For example, the...
number of families on relief in Detroit increased from four thousand to forty-five thousand between October 1930 and January 1931. In Cleveland, nearly ten times as many families received charity in mid-1932 than had received it in 1929.

In 1930, the community chests raised $84.8 million in 386 cities. This was only an $8 million increase over the 1929 total and it had to be distributed among 33 more cities. Even a model city such as Philadelphia, which was spending about $1 million each month on private charity, could not cope with the increasing need. Funds were stretched so thin that 57,000 families received between $1.50 and $2 per person per week, plus a little coal, some food, and used clothing. By November 1931, Philadelphia had exhausted its charitable funds.

Although private charities feared that an expanded public welfare system would hurt their ability to raise funds, by late 1931 they recognized that existing networks of relief could not adequately respond to increased demands for assistance, especially in major cities. Conflicts emerged, however, between city officials, who faced growing pressure to act, and business leaders, who argued that such actions would stifle economic recovery.

Private charities also could not raise new resources because their primary donors—working and middle-class people—lacked the income to
contribute. By late 1931 their national organizations reluctantly conceded that federal intervention was imperative. The 1932 Republican platform, however, affirmed the party’s position that relief was primarily a private responsibility.

As relief programs expanded during the Depression, traditional distinctions between the “worthy” and “unworthy” poor persisted. In New York, private charities classified the newly unemployed separately and assigned their cases to unpaid junior staff. Throughout the 1930s, racial discrimination continued to create barriers for the receipt of charity among African Americans, although they were twice as likely as whites to be certified as eligible.

The policies of the Franklin Roosevelt administration continued such practices even as they dramatically expanded public relief. In January 1935 Roosevelt spoke of the differences between the “productive” and “unproductive” poor, and, at the height of the New Deal, the government continued to assume that private charity was best suited to address the needs of the “old poor.” Public relief programs maintained a central feature of private charities—their emphasis on investigation, which persisted long after the Depression.

See Also: BREADLINES; PHILANTHROPY; SOUP KITCHENS.

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CHAVEZ, DENNIS

Dennis Chavez (April 8, 1888–November 18, 1962) was a U.S. Senator from New Mexico. One of only a handful of Mexican Americans ever elected to the Senate, Chavez ardently supported the New Deal to bring jobs and educational opportunities to his constituents.

Born Dionisio Chavez in Los Chaves, New Mexico, the future New Dealer entered school for the first time in 1895 when his family moved to Albuquerque. He quit after the seventh grade to help support his parents and eight siblings. While working full time as a delivery boy, Chavez continued his education by reading extensively. In 1917, he received a Senate clerkship and eventually parlayed this opportunity into admission at Georgetown University Law School in Washington, D.C. At this time, the only requirement to enter law school was satisfactory completion of entrance examinations. Chavez received his degree at the age of thirty-two and returned to Albuquerque to practice law.

Although his father had served as a Republican precinct captain, Republican neglect of his Mexican-American neighborhood led Chavez to register as a Democrat. In 1922, he won his first political seat in the New Mexico House of Representatives. Eight years later, he entered the U.S. House of Representatives, receiving much of his support from the large Hispanic electorate in the state. In 1934, Chavez ran for the U.S. Senate but narrowly lost to incumbent Bronson Cutting and then charged fraud. Cutting’s sudden death ended the dispute, and Chavez received an appointment to the vacant seat. He would remain in the Senate until his death in 1962.

In the 1930s, Chavez firmly backed the New Deal, advocated neutrality, and sought to improve relations with Latin America. Mostly associated with the Works Progress Administration, Chavez pushed the agency to provide jobs to New Mexico’s poor and to use its funds to construct schools to enable others to follow his footsteps out of poverty. He supported the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin Roosevelt that ended U.S. intervention in Latin America and, in 1939, he advocated recognition of Francisco Franco’s Spain as a further means of im-
proving relations with the countries to the south of the U.S. border.

Still, Chavez did not become a national figure until 1944, when he introduced a bill prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. The legislation died, but Chavez claimed a notable place in history by laying the groundwork for subsequent civil rights legislation.

See Also: LATINO AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; MEXICO, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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CARYN E. NEUMANN

CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The 1930s marked a seminal decade in the history of American childhood. The onset of the Great Depression hit children and adolescents hard, but at the same time new policies and changing public attitudes signaled positive changes for America’s youngest citizens. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Americans had been moving toward a new definition of childhood and adolescence. Modern childhood was viewed as a period distinct from adulthood and separate from adult responsibilities. For over one hundred years, longer life expectancy and declining birth rates had lowered children’s proportion of the total U.S. population. In 1830, individuals nineteen years of age and under (the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of children) constituted 56 percent of the country’s population with a national median age of 16.7. In 1930, children’s proportion of the total population had declined to 38 percent, and the nation’s median age rose to 26.4.

The economic Depression of the 1930s led many couples to have even fewer children, and a growing number of young men who were unable to find employment postponed marriage. By 1940, individuals under twenty years of age made up only 36 percent of the nation’s total population, and the country’s median age had risen to 29. Interestingly, as children and adolescents became a smaller proportion of the nation’s total population, they became a more visible part of public policy and American culture. Changes in public policy and culture that took place during the 1930s established a universal definition of American childhood for the balance of the twentieth century.

MODERN CHILDHOOD AND THE ONSET OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

Before the onset of the Great Depression, children’s diminished share of the total population paralleled a general improvement in their lives. An estimated U.S. infant mortality rate of 130 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1900 fell to 85.8 deaths in 1920 and to 64.6 in 1930. By 1930 most states had passed compulsory school attendance laws for those under sixteen, established public high schools (although many were segregated), and placed restrictions on the industrial employment of young people under fourteen years of age. In addition, medical science had made great strides in treating and preventing childhood diseases such as diarrhea, rickets, and diphtheria.

Child welfare experts attending President Herbert Hoover’s 1930 White House Conference on Child Health and Protection pointed to the progress that had been made for American children. In his opening address, Hoover waxed sympathetic about the value of children, but there were few positive results from the 1930 conference. The Hoover administration seemed to turn a blind eye to the worsening economic conditions for youngsters and their families. Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur, a medical doctor, argued in 1932 that the economic Depression could actually be good for children. Families with less money to spend, Wilbur concluded, would be forced to depend upon each other and live a more wholesome home life.

It was obvious to many others that a growing number of American children and their families
were living in miserable conditions during the worsening economic crisis. By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in March 1933 it was clear that children were experiencing some of the Depression’s worst consequences. While the national divorce rate did not rise, desertion became more common. Although infant mortality rates had continued to fall during 1931 and 1932, they were climbing again by 1933 for the first time since such data had been collected in the United States. With unemployment rates at 25 percent, many families that had been middle-class during the 1920s slipped into poverty, contributing to rising incidence of hunger and malnutrition among children and adolescents. Psychological stress on adults resulted in domestic violence and child abuse. School districts ran out of money, classrooms became more crowded, school years were shortened, and many young people dropped out of school to seek work. Cash strapped business owners and parents ignored or intentionally violated existing child labor laws. Franklin Roosevelt noted that one-third of America’s citizens were ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-fed. Of those, the majority were children.

A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN

Child welfare advocates attending the U.S. Children’s Bureau’s Child Health Recovery Conference on October 6, 1933, called for emergency food relief, school lunch programs, funds to pay the salaries of public nurses, and reimbursement plans to pay private physicians to care for needy children. Government officials from the U.S. Children’s Bureau and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) told attendees that more than six million children lived in families on federal and state relief. Responding to conference recommendations, the FERA and Children’s Bureau quickly implemented the Child Health Recovery Program (CHRP). This two-year effort concentrated on providing emergency food and medical care to America’s poorest children, especially those living in rural areas. In the end CHRP did not live up to advocates’ ambitious expectations, but it marked the first New Deal relief program directed at children and the first established at the federal level to help the nation’s youngest citizens.

The 1935 Social Security Act was the New Deal’s next generation of programs and its most ambitious. Besides the better known old-age pension plan, the 1935 Social Security Act included three specific programs for children: Titles IV, V, and VII. Title IV, the Aid to Dependent Children program (ADC, later renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children), replaced the widely varied state-based mothers’ pension systems. As state governments ran out of money for mothers’ pensions, families turned to FERA welfare funds. This circumstance ran contrary to the U.S. Children’s Bureau’s established argument that mothers’ pension recipients were entitled to long-term aid, not simply emergency unemployment relief. Pension advocates wanted to keep mothers at home with their children and out of the wage-labor force. The federal ADC program was founded on this philo-
Like many children during the Great Depression, these sons of unemployed miners at Miller Hill, West Virginia, in 1937 faced poverty when their parents lost their jobs. National Archives and Records Administration

It initially defined those eligible for aid as any child under sixteen who lived with a parent or close relative as caregiver, but had no breadwinner in the home. Amendments to Title IV in 1939 expanded the program to sixteen and seventeen year olds. ADC established the idea that in the absence of parental support, the federal government was ultimately responsible for needy children. States provided additional allotments to match federal ADC funds, but payments were meager and caregivers (mostly single mothers) received no stipend for their own support. This situation left ADC families in perpetual poverty. Furthermore, at the state level many blacks and minorities, as well as youngsters’ whose mothers were judged as “immoral,” found themselves denied aid. Over time the debate concerning who “deserved” ADC made it the most controversial part of the Social Security Act.

Title V of the Social Security Act provided federal money for maternal and child health care for needy women and children. Title V was the only health care program included in the 1935 act, making poor children and pregnant mothers the only recipients of federally subsidized health care until passage of the 1965 Medicare Act.

Title VII focused on young people with “special needs.” The Children’s Bureau estimated that there were approximately 300,000 orphaned, abandoned, or physically and/or mentally handicapped children living in the United States who were dependent on the state for their support. By 1935, only one-fourth
of the states had established county welfare boards to look after the needs of such children. Title VII made the health and well-being of dependent children a joint federal-state responsibility.

The Great Depression also focused attention on adolescents. In 1933, the Children’s Bureau estimated that 23,000 adolescents traveled the country riding the rails and hitchhiking along highways in search of work. While some were females, most adolescent “hobos” were males. Many felt they were a burden on their already strapped families and hit the road to find work. The unemployment rate for American boys sixteen to twenty years of age was twice that of adults. Many people were sympathetic to the plight of unemployed youth, but some also charged that homeless boys were dangerous juvenile delinquents. The infamous Scottsboro Boys’ case, in which nine black youths were accused of raping two white women in Alabama in 1931, and other high-profile criminal trials fueled such fears. In March 1933 Congress established the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). For the next nine years the CCC employed more than 2.5 million males aged seventeen through twenty-three. Enrollees built recreational facilities and engaged in land conservation work. Life in the CCC was regimented and many officials enforced Jim Crow rules within the camps. CCC participants sometimes served as scapegoats for local community problems, but overall, the CCC was one of the New Deal’s most popular relief efforts, ending only after U.S. entrance into World War II.

Like the CCC, the National Youth Administration (NYA, 1935–1943) was also a popular New Deal program directed at American youth. As a division of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the NYA provided part-time work-relief for high school and college-aged students, as well as full-time jobs for unemployed young people no longer in school. The NYA was open to both males and females and had a Division of Negro Affairs headed by Mary McLeod Bethune. Like the CCC, it was a popular program that ended only after the United States entered World War II. Another WPA program, day nursery schools, actually expanded during World War II. Organized to provide jobs for unemployed teachers, these high quality pre-schools opened to children of all races and set the standard for preschool education throughout the United States.

Another side of the New Deal focused on getting young people out of the wage-labor force. The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act successfully wrote child labor restrictions into federal law for the first time. It outlawed the employment of individuals under sixteen in the manufacture of goods shipped across state lines. It also set regulations for the employment of sixteen and seventeen year olds, and prohibited all minors from working in specific industries. The law ignored young people who worked in agriculture or domestic service, but the economic crisis of the 1930s increased pressure on politicians to end child labor. For the first time in history, American children were expected to spend more of their time in school than on the job.

**YOUTH CULTURE AND THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION**

This fact underscores the new status of childhood by the 1930s. Popular radio shows appealed to young consumers, even during dire economic times. Films featuring the “Our Gang” kids, and child stars such as Mickey Rooney, Judy Garland, and Shirley Temple depicted an idealized childhood absent from adult responsibilities. Children’s lives on the big screen were filled with activities experienced with peers, not adults. By the late 1930s a majority of seventeen year olds attended high school for the first time in the nation’s history. The quality of schools varied widely, but communities accepted the notion that education through high school was a public responsibility.

The shift to high schools as a universal experience for American adolescents reinforced the development of a distinct youth culture. Dating moved adolescent boys and girls far from the watchful eyes of parents. Clubs such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Young Men’s Christian Association, Young Women’s Christian Association, Young Men’s Hebrew Association, and the Department of Agriculture’s 4-H Clubs gained new members. Racial and ethnic segregation persisted, but comic books and other “kid” centered aspects of popular culture crossed social divisions. Highlight-
Several New Deal programs offered sports and recreation opportunities to children around the country. This group of boys exercises under the direction of a National Youth Administration counselor at a recreation center in Nampa, Idaho, in 1936. 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

ing the significance of youth culture, a 1941 article in *Popular Science* introduced the word "teenager" into the American print vocabulary. The important matter of growing up became the focus for most children and teens. The economic crisis somewhat hindered the development of a commercialized youth culture dancing to the rhythm of swing music, but the concentration of most young people into high schools strengthened the trend.

The dramatic crisis that engaged Americans during the 1930s clearly shaped the lives of children and youth. Individuals who grew up during the Great Depression were also the first generation to experience a government that recognized a federal responsibility for protecting and shaping the lives of the nation's youngest citizens. Racial, gender, and ethnic discrimination persisted, but the idea that every child should have the right to basic economic security, a childhood separate from adult responsibilities, and a high school education was accepted as an American entitlement.

See Also: AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (ADC); AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS; CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (CCC); EDUCATION; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; HEALTH AND NUTRITION; NATIONAL YOUTH ADMINISTRATION (NYA); SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.

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**CIO. See CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

**CITIES AND SUBURBS**

With brute force, the Great Depression hit America’s metropolitan areas, the centers of economic growth during the 1920s. The Wall Street crash nearly halted construction of skyscrapers and residential housing, then staggered output of durable goods. Pittsburgh steel mills, automobile assembly lines in Detroit and Flint, and tire factories in Cleveland and Toledo were all stilled. Declines in freight shipments laid off thousands from the docks of San Francisco, Memphis, and New Orleans, and slashed output at the American Locomotive Corporation in Schenectady. By 1933, idle blast furnaces at Birmingham’s Tennessee Coal and Iron brought to that city the highest unemployment in the urban South. Only a few cities weathered the storm. Miami and Phoenix filled with sun worshippers, federal spending on Hoover Dam buoyed Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C., became the New Deal’s company town.

**THE RELIEF CRISIS**

Although millions of jobless lived in the cities, few city governments distributed outdoor relief (with the notable exception of Boston). Most relied on voluntary charities and lodging shelters. Across the South, businesses moved whites into jobs held by African Americans, and New Orleans Mayor T. Semmes Walmsley required municipal employees to show poll-tax receipts. Officials in the Southwest deported aliens; Los Angeles alone repatriated over eleven thousand Mexicans, and the city dispatched police to turn away migrants at California’s borders. By the fall of 1933, 59 percent of the Phoenix’s Mexican population was on relief, compared to 11 percent of Anglos. Atlanta’s jobless rate reached 25 percent, but was triple that in black neighborhoods.

Business-led voluntarism tried to stem the disaster. Mayor’s committees in Buffalo and Nashville prevailed on industrial leaders to stagger layoffs, and Buffalo’s Man-a-Block and Household Helper schemes scrounged for part-time jobs. Philadelphia’s (Horatio Gates Lloyd) Committee for Unemployment Relief raised $4 million in private contributions. But when voluntary resources were exhausted in 1931, cities had to look elsewhere. The business-led Allegheny County Emergency Association launched a “Pittsburgh Plan” for quasi-public improvements, while Kansas City boss Tom Pendergast corralled the chamber of commerce behind a $50 million “Ten Year Plan” for boulevards and other public works. New York City’s Welfare Council forced Mayor James J. Walker to create a department of public welfare.

In suburban New Jersey towns, governments slashed public works, chiefly road and sewer repairs, while regional school districts juggled the loss in per-pupil reimbursements. Communities forced salary givebacks from police, firemen, and teachers, the latter stereotyped as single and female. Charities attempted to serve the “invisible” white-collar jobless in the suburbs. Ramsey’s Committee of the Unemployed searched for odd jobs and collected funds from churches and fundraisers like the Young Ladies Community Club’s “prosperity bridge.” Ridgewood disbursed charitable aid via the Social Service Association, then in late 1931 formed the Emergency Relief Bureau to provide direct relief and made-work. By December 1933 the Ridgewood Taxpayers Association obtained a voluntary 5 percent salary cut from teachers, who acknowledged a “clear understanding of civic affairs.”

The relief crisis encouraged labor and liberal activists to challenge business primacy. In Detroit,
Thousands of unemployed urban Americans relied on private charity during the early years of the Depression, before full-scale federal relief efforts were underway. These men lined up outside a soup kitchen in Chicago in 1931. The food was reportedly being supplied by the gangster Al Capone. National Archives and Records Administration

Frank Murphy scored an upset mayoral victory in 1930 over the issue of relief levels. The election in Minneapolis of Farmer-Laborite William A. Anderson touched off demonstrations that ousted the conservative relief administrator. But strong Republican city-manager governments in Cleveland and Cincinnati resisted deficits to finance relief, as did property owners’ leagues in Denver and Houston. Conservative bankers in New York, who held Detroit’s commercial paper, forced slashes in Motor City relief, and Rochester’s banking fraternity threatened a credit strike against the city manager’s budget. In spring 1933, the House of Morgan and Chase National Bank boycotted the underwriting of New York municipal bonds until the city agreed to cut relief and hold down property taxes.

A GUARDED PARTNERSHIP

In May 1932, big-city mayors, led by Murphy of Detroit, pleaded for credit from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and in February 1933 they launched the U.S. Conference of Mayors to demand $5 billion for self-liquidating public works. They nudged President Franklin D. Roosevelt to accept federal emergency relief, and thereafter leveraged much New Deal spending, notably via the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and Works Progress Administration (WPA). Such urban leaders as New York settlement head Mary K. Sim-
khovitch and Cleveland activist Ernest J. Bohn, who spearheaded the nation’s first municipal housing authority, demanded slum clearance and public housing.

Localities responded guardedly, notably Baltimore, Richmond, and Portland, Oregon, where Democrats who favored states’ rights attacked federal intervention. Although Roosevelt was reelected on an urban tide in 1936, his sweep of 104 of the country’s 106 cities with populations greater than 100,000 blanketed pockets of disenchantment. Roosevelt carried 68.3 percent of the vote in Baltimore, including bellwether Polish and Italian wards, but in Philadelphia, he suffered a falloff among Irish and working-class Italians. Chicago’s African Americans were weaned from Republican “race men” less by Roosevelt’s appeal than by Mayor Edward Kelly’s deft politics of recognition. Doubling his support from Chicago blacks, Roosevelt still garnered only 49 percent in 1936.

New Deal welfare spending did not bring a “Last Hurrah” for urban political machines. Relief was politicized in Jersey City, where Frank Hague controlled Public Works Administration (PWA) spending for the Margaret Hague Medical Center; and in Memphis, whose boss, Edward Hull Crump, tithed WPA employees and directed Army Corps of Engineers projects on the Mississippi River. The power of Tammany Hall had declined in New York City before Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia wielded New
Unemployed union members march in Camden, New Jersey, in 1935 to draw attention to their plight. Such parades were held in many cities during the Depression as massive numbers of disgruntled and desperate unemployed men and women demanded jobs and relief. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

Deal patronage to forge his own reform coalition, and Bruce Stave concludes that David Lawrence’s Democratic organization in Pittsburgh “had its roots in the New Deal.”

MODERNIST URBANISM

In the absence of a national urban policy, federal programs rested largely on 1920s social theory and modernist design: assumptions about the “social disorganization” of the slums, the importance of the “neighborhood unit,” and economies of scale that civic centers and hospital complexes provided the sprawling metropolis. Bauhaus architects such as Marcel Breuer, the visionary architect Le Corbusier, famous for his “tower in the park,” and industrial designers like Norman Bel Geddes helped popularize the Art Deco streamlined slab look, which has been dubbed PWA Moderne. Against machine-age efficiencies, proponents of small-scale English “garden cities” made little headway. Clarence Stein and Lewis Mumford of the Regional Planning Association of America envisioned new towns in suburban greenbelts. Although Resettlement Administration head Rexford G. Tugwell sympathized with this program, his agency realized only three such cities.
Many American cities confronted problems of homelessness and substandard housing during the Depression. These shacks on the outskirts of Paterson, New Jersey, in 1935 housed about twenty-five people, most of them unemployed textile workers. National Archives and Records Administration

Federal relief dollars enhanced modern urbanization that was already underway. Nashville and New York finished civic centers with court houses and state office buildings, although the completion of the Federal Triangle on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., proved the most imposing project. The WPA financed the removal of trolley tracks in 224 cities, replacing unsightly rails with green medians and smooth asphalt. Planning departments designed schemes for traffic separation, including beltways around central business districts, a dream of vehicular flow inspired by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads’ Toll Roads and Free Roads (1936) and General Motors’ Futurama exhibit at the 1939 New York World’s Fair. Redevelopers cleared decaying wharves for waterfront parks in Milwaukee and Des Moines and for riverside parkways like Boston’s Storrow Drive.

New York City was transformed under Mayor La Guardia and Park Commissioner Robert Moses, the city’s de facto public works czar. With its own WPA jurisdiction, the city accounted for one-seventh of all WPA appropriations. The agency refurbished scores of parks and playgrounds, over three hundred schools, and miles of parkways, along with North Beach Terminal (renamed La Guardia Field), the largest single WPA project in the country. Federal works also had a significant impact on cities in parts of the South, Southwest, and West that would later be called the Sunbelt, a region starved for such improvements. In New Orleans, the PWA improved sewerage, restored the

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French Quarter, and built the Charity Hospital, then the second largest health-care facility in the country. The WPA overhauled Nashville’s streets, while the PWA built three high schools, including Pearl High for African Americans. The WPA installed the sewerage and water mains of Albuquerque’s Near Heights subdivision and completed Las Vegas’s War Memorial Building, vital to the town’s convention economy. California historian Kevin Starr argues that federal public works—notably the construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam and Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) investment in the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge—made possible California’s future as a sun-drenched, populous, vehicular world.

TRANSFORMATION OF HOUSING

To revive mortgage financing and construction, in June 1933, the Roosevelt administration enacted the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), which over the next two years saved more than one million non-farm residences from foreclosure. Kenneth T. Jackson has pointed out, however, that the HOLC’s standardized appraisals rated neighborhoods A to D (with D indicating neighborhoods of greatest risk, which were usually inhabited by Eastern Europeans, Mexicans, and African Americans) and daubed red on “Residential Security Maps.” Lizabeth Cohen found that 60 percent of HOLC’s Chicago loans went to C and D neighborhoods, but redlining starved home refinance in inner-city Detroit and Philadelphia. Discriminatory practices also affected Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance. Jackson showed that substantial mortgage relief was provided to A and B districts in suburban Essex County in New Jersey, and Ladue, Clayton, and Webster Groves in Missouri, compared to scant aid begrudged C and D streets in central Newark and Saint Louis.

Federal support engaged scores of cities in slum clearance and low-rent public housing. With data from the CWA Real Property Inventory, activists in Cleveland, Indianapolis, and Newark documented the dimensions of the slum problem and won referenda for municipal housing authorities. After the National Industrial Recovery Act authorized grants and loans to municipalities to clear lands and build housing, PWA administrator Harold L. Ickes undertook direct federal construction (until deterred by the U.S. Court of Appeals’ 1935 Louisville Lands decision, which rejected the federal government’s use of eminent domain). By 1937, the PWA had completed 22,600 units at a cost of $130 million, including Atlanta’s Techwood Homes, the 10,800-room Cleveland Homes limited dividend, and Philadelphia’s Carl Mackley Homes, sponsored by the Hosiery Workers Union. Working with more than 150 municipal authorities after 1937, the U.S. Housing Authority sponsored an additional 130,000 units by 1941.

The low-rent program dovetailed with local priorities by stimulating business districts and maintaining segregation. Atlanta’s all-white Techwood cleared blacks from a twelve-block slum near downtown, while the all-black (Joel Chandler) Harris Homes reinforced a racial barrier. The Cleveland Housing Authority built three projects in the heart of the ghetto, while ignoring black applicants for white projects. The PWA constructed the all-white Williamsburg Houses in Brooklyn and the all-black Harlem River Houses, for which the New York City Housing Authority kept separate application offices. The Phoenix Housing Authority built distinct projects for Mexicans and blacks in South Phoenix and for Anglos on the city’s west side.

URBAN STYLE IN GRITTY TIMES

The concentration of the unemployed made cities spawning grounds for radicalism (although Lizabeth Cohen argues that in Chicago, the city’s common consumer culture provided a basis for working-class solidarity). As millions gave up on capitalism, self-help groups, such as Denver’s Unemployed Citizens’ League, canvassed for jobs and bartered work for food. In New York City, production-for-use enthusiasts organized an Emergency Exchange Association, which issued scrip and sparked similar exchanges in other cities. Stirred by African nationalists, eviction protests broke out in Harlem, while Communist Unemployed Councils stormed home relief offices. Communists staged food riots in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Saint Louis, and led the epic Detroit Hunger March on Ford Motor Company on March 7, 1932. Strikes
also occurred among mortgage payers in Radburn, New Jersey, and renters in New York’s Sunnyside, Queens, both garden city experiments of the 1920s. In January 1934, Denver’s unemployed invaded the Colorado state capitol, demanding legislators fund state relief.

In New York, hundreds of writers, artists, and engineers were drawn to the Communist Party’s Cultural Section and its John Reed Clubs. Eviction protests, sit-ins at relief offices, and other grassroots actions mobilized working-class anger behind Toledo’s Auto Lite strike in 1935 and sit-down strikes in Flint and Detroit in 1937. San Francisco’s left-wing tradition, with its boisterous Embarcadero, energized the general strike of July 1934. Cities provided the crucible for the Congress of Industrial Organization’s growth in the mass production industries.

These urban pressures also transformed race relations. Anger at inadequate relief allowances and rage against evictions touched off African-American self-help efforts and store boycotts in Phoenix, in Cleveland’s Woodland ghetto, and in Harlem along 125th street. After the March 19, 1935, Harlem riot, Mayor La Guardia appointed a commission that spotlighted the ghetto’s overcrowding. Outrage also spawned Reverend Adam Clayton Powell’s protest for equal employment, which picketed the 1939 New York World’s Fair.

The Depression-era American city gave a gritty, hard-edge look to design and culture, while artists became determined to document widespread want and protest, producing the CWA’s Public Works of Art Project, the murals of the Treasury Relief Arts Project, the Federal Art Project, the American Scene style of painting, and Ben Shahn’s proletarian realism. The golden age of revelatory photography inspired Berenice Abbott and Arnold (Weegee) Felig in New York and Dorothea Lange in San Francisco, while the docudrama of the WPA “Living Newspaper” reflected what historian William Stott has called the era’s “sublime fidelity to fact.”

THE LEGACY OF THE 1930s

The Depression accentuated regional discrepancies in city development. Urban population growth, which had risen to 27.3 percent in the 1920s, sank to 7.9 percent during the 1930s. Slow-downs in immigration, slumping birthrates, and the end of suburban annexations halted central city growth across the industrial North. Five of the twelve largest cities in the Midwest (Cleveland, Saint Louis, Toledo, Akron, and Youngstown) suffered losses in population during the 1930s. Among cities with a population of 100,000 or more, the only ones that grew by 20 percent or more were Washington, D.C., and Sunbelt wonders, including Miami, San Diego, Houston, and Los Angeles. While nearly all the northern metropolitan areas grew by single-digit percentages, metropolitan Los Angeles jumped by 25 percent, Houston grew 51 percent, and Miami soared 90 percent.

Subsidies from Washington sped expansion and modernization of municipal government. With federal dollars, cities took on more responsibilities, ranging from social work for relief recipients and felons to WPA day nurseries and city planning. City governments streamlined tax assessment and collection and turned functions over to special authorities, including ports, highways, and toll bridges. The tax revolt also hastened the spread of manager cities in Michigan, Virginia, Texas, and Florida. In the suburbs, lean budgets spurred the amalgamation of Jacksonville and Duval counties, consolidated services in Milwaukee County, and spirited the move for “home rule” in Hamilton, Mahoning, Cuyahoga, and Stark counties in Ohio. Most metropolitan counties extended zoning and undertook comprehensive plans for parks, parkways, and subdivision regulations. Modern executive government emerged in Arlington and other northern Virginia counties and in Nassau and Westchester, New York.

Nevertheless, the 1930s left American cities with an uncertain future. While the New Deal spurred an urban-Washington axis, and theoretical statements like the National Resources Committee’s Our Cities (1937) affirmed the role of cities in national recovery, the country lacked an urban policy. Experts predicted that central cities would remain stagnant, with unemployment at permanently high levels. Yet cities were centers of revitalization. A zeal to reclaim blighted districts would galvanize the Pittsburgh Regional Planning
Association’s postwar “renaissance” and fuel Robert Moses’s ambitions for the arterial highways and residential towers of modern New York. They remained the centers of an urban liberalism that would define American politics for the next two generations.

See Also: ARCHITECTURE; FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA); GREENBELT TOWNS; HARLEM RIOT (1935); HOUSING; HUNGER MARCHES; LA GUARDIA, FIORELLO H.; MOSES, ROBERT; MURPHY, FRANK; PLANNING; SAN FRANCISCO GENERAL STRIKE (1934).

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CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (CCC)

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was created in March 1933 during the first frantic “hundred days” of the New Deal. It was the first of a number of agencies created to cope with one of the most desperate and poignant of the social problems caused by the Depression—massive unemployment and economic deprivation amongst the nation’s youth. It is impossible to get accurate figures on the extent of youth joblessness at the nadir of the Depression, but the best estimate would be that at least 50 percent of young people between fifteen and twenty-four years of age who were in the labor market were unemployed. Of these, at least 250,000 were simply drifting about the country; the writer Thomas Minehan labeled them the “boy and girl tramps of America.” Millions more were mired in hopeless poverty and apathy, without the means even to complete their education. Franklin D. Roosevelt had built his election campaign in 1932 around his faith in the future. Clearly he had to do something quickly to alleviate the deprivation and the scarring of the generation who would inherit the future.

There was also an urgent need to confront a scar of a different kind—the havoc that generations of waste and exploitation had wreaked on the American landscape. Large-scale forest destruction and the resultant soil and wind erosion had created a potential environmental catastrophe. Roosevelt had a life-long interest in conservation. More than most he understood the urgency of repairing the ravaged environment, and he was determined to use his office to do so. Thus the CCC was in one
sense a catalyst by which two squandered resources, young men and the land, were brought together in an attempt to save both.

The idea of putting young men to work in the woods was not new. The philosopher William James had long been an enthusiastic advocate of such a program, and various European governments had established conservation camps for their unemployed. Yet, of all the New Deal agencies, the CCC bore the new president’s personal stamp, expressing both his conviction in the superior qualities of rural life and his concern for halting the destruction of America’s natural environment. Roosevelt had outlined his plans during the campaign, and once inaugurated he moved quickly to act on them. The enabling legislation quickly passed through Congress, and on March 31 became law: The CCC was born.

The new agency’s administrative structure was extremely simple. The need for speed was paramount, hence the decision to work through existing federal departments rather than set up a completely new structure. The CCC would be open to young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who were already on the relief rolls. They would be enrolled in camps or companies of two hundred men each, put to work on conservation tasks, and paid $30 monthly, $25 of which went straight home to their families. The men were to be initially enrolled for six months, but enrollment could be renewed for up to two years. The Department of Labor had the responsibility of selecting the enrollees, and the War Department transported them to the camps, which it administered, while the departments of Agriculture and the Interior supervised the actual work projects. Coordinating the whole
endeavor was a director and a small central office staff. Roosevelt’s choice as director was Robert Fechner, a conservative southern-born labor leader, who was appointed, in part, to allay American Federation of Labor (AFL) disquiet at CCC wage scales. Fechner was hardly a typical New Dealer, but he ran the CCC efficiently until his death in 1939. He was succeeded by his deputy James J. McIntee, also of the AFL.

THE CCC BEGINS
Mobilization began quickly, and given the scale of the enterprise, it proceeded with surprising smoothness. By July 1 nearly 300,000 young men were already at work in more than 1,300 CCC camps. Moreover, those eligible for enrollment had already been extended. On April 14 it was decided to enroll fourteen thousand native Americans of all ages, and a month later the president directed that 250,000 World War I veterans should also be enrolled, again regardless of age. Many of the veterans had marched in 1932 with the Bonus Army, which President Herbert Hoover had ordered dispersed at gunpoint; now a new president gave them a chance to work in the woods instead. The contrast was not lost. Finally, the CCC enrolled twenty-five thousand local woodsmen to help with the projects.

Once the CCC had been mobilized, Fechner and his staff began to think about possible policy developments. An early decision was to add an education program under the general direction of the commissioner for education, George F. Zook. A director of CCC education was appointed in December 1933 and given the responsibility of developing a suitable education program for the camps. The program was initially challenging, and the War Department opposed it, yet a prime measure of its success was that within three years thirty-five thousand enrollees had learned to read and write, and one thousand high school diplomas had been awarded, as well as thirty-nine college degrees.
In January 1934, buoyed by both the CCC’s initial success and the extremely favorable public reaction to it, the president decided to expand the program. Enrollment grew steadily, peaking in September 1935 with more than 500,000 enrollees in 2,514 camps. Numbers were slowly reduced thereafter, partly because a second youth agency, the National Youth Administration (NYA), had been created in 1935, but also because of Roosevelt’s increasing desire to cut spending. The efforts to close camps in the interest of economy, however, were often thwarted by local politicians, who were anxious not to lose the $5,000 to $10,000 spent monthly by camps in the local market, and the attendant community goodwill that resulted.

The CCC was the most popular of all the New Deal agencies, enjoying wide bipartisan political support. The corps was supported by those directly connected to it—the communities where the camps were established and the enrollees and their families. But the CCC was also popular with millions of ordinary Americans who received no direct benefits from it, but liked its image; most Americans could easily recognize the value of the work performed, while the idea of young men working with their hands in the wilderness appealed to the romantic and nostalgic imagination of a nation whose president had recently announced the closing of its last frontier. Ironically, the only group dubious about the corps was the liberal left, usually the New

Members of a CCC unit put up fencing in Greene county, Georgia, in 1941. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION
Deal’s most vocal supporters, whose members were disturbed by the military’s dominant presence in the camps.

The CCC was extremely effective. Though associated in the public mind with reforestation, CCC enrollees were actually engaged in a myriad of tasks. They battled forest fires, developed camping grounds and park trails, improved grazing lands, fought soil erosion, protected wildlife (particularly in the nation’s wetlands), constructed dams and irrigation ditches, and preserved and restored historical sites. Still, reforestation was the corps’ most important task, and its contribution to the nation’s environment was crucial, best measured by a single statistic. Of all the trees planted on public lands between 1789 and 1942, more than 75 percent were planted by the CCC.

The CCC conserved human beings along with the landscape. Its enrollees benefited physically from the hard work and healthy living, while also gaining a deeper perspective on their country. Many of them had traveled far from home to go to camp because many of the reforestation projects were located in western states. There they met and worked alongside people from many different ethnic or regional backgrounds.

White enrollees, however, were unlikely to find themselves living and working alongside black youths, and to some of those critical of the corps, this was its most serious shortcoming. The 1933 act that created the CCC contained a clause stating specifically that there should be no discrimination “on account of race, color or creed” in the selection of enrollees. Yet within a few weeks it was obvious that these provisions were being ignored, especially by southern selection agents. Black youths, despite the desperate nature of their poverty, were simply being passed over, and Department of Labor officials had to threaten to stop all selection in the South before local agents, reluctantly, began to comply. In addition, local white communities in many parts of the country were inclined to protest if a black camp was established nearby, in contrast to their enthusiastic welcoming of white corpsmen. This was a national rather than a regional response, although southern communities were generally less hostile to black camps than communities in other regions, especially the Rocky Mountain states. Eventually, Fechner and his staff evolved a policy covering black enrollment. There was to be strict segregation in the CCC; as far as possible, black men would not be sent out of their home states, black camps would not be forced on local communities, and blacks would be selected according to their ratio in the general population (one in ten) and not according to need. Fechner, a conservative southerner, had no intention of engaging in social engineering, and though most black enrollees clearly benefited from their time in the CCC, it never provided them with the opportunities available to white members. They were not allowed the latitude of movement accorded white enrollees, command in black camps was firmly retained in white hands, and unlike its sister agency, the NYA (also directed by a southerner, the liberal Aubrey Williams), Fechner made no attempt to move against prevailing racial attitudes. The CCC did not fail its black enrollees; it simply ignored their particular circumstances and needs.

THE LAST YEARS

In January 1937 Roosevelt, fulfilling a campaign promise and in accordance with his strong personal wish, recommended that the CCC become a permanent agency of government, and legislation to effect this was introduced in March. It was never passed, for though the ensuing debate showed that bipartisan support for the agency remained strong, Congress was reluctant to concede that it should become more than a relief measure. Moreover, after Roosevelt’s court-packing bill poisoned the legislative atmosphere, legislators decided to hand the president a rebuff by refusing to make permanent his pet project. Congress eventually renewed the program for three more years.

Beginning in 1939, the CCC slowly lost its importance as the economy started its long-awaited revival. Enrollee and camp numbers were steadily reduced, particularly as the demand for munitions and war materials absorbed the remaining pockets of unemployment. Fechner’s successor, James McIntee, did what he could to meld the corps’ activities into the nation’s defense needs, but the demand for the abolition of all government spending...
not directly relevant to the winning of the war became too strong to resist. In 1941, Congress created a Joint Committee on Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, charging it with recommending the elimination of all non-essential bodies. In December 1941 it recommended an end to the CCC. The president fought to save the corps, but to no avail. In June 1942 the Senate finally concurred with an earlier House resolution to deny further funding to the agency, and the CCC was abolished.

Although the CCC came to an end, it was certainly not forgotten. Both the California Conservation Corps, established in 1979, and the Wisconsin Conservation Corps, established in 1983, used the New Deal agency as their model, and for good reason. Despite its relatively high cost, the CCC added far more to the national wealth than the sum spent on it, not to mention the benefits to the health and morale of otherwise jobless young men. In its nine-year existence, nearly three million young men had passed through this essentially makeshift agency. Moreover, by the time of the CCC’s abolition the United States was at war, and CCC members had received valuable experience in the military lifestyle, which the Army was able to build upon. More importantly, the members of the CCC made a genuine contribution to the heritage of every American in the billions of trees they planted or protected, the parks and recreation areas they developed, and the millions of acres they saved from soil erosion or flooding.

See Also: BOY AND GIRL TRAMPS OF AMERICA; CONSERVATION MOVEMENT; HUNDRED DAYS; NEW DEAL.

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JOHN A. SALMOND

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The Great Depression is not remembered as a time of major advances in human rights, yet during the 1930s significant steps were taken in both civil rights and civil liberties: The U.S. Supreme Court established important protections for criminal defendants; Congress granted new powers to labor unions; and the civil liberties of unpopular groups were strengthened.

In the case of the “Scottsboro boys,” the most infamous legal controversy of the decade, the Supreme Court demonstrated a newfound concern for the rights of accused criminals and a willingness to challenge judicial racism in the South. This case involved nine African-American males ranging in age from sixteen to twenty who were arrested in March 1931 near Scottsboro, Alabama, and charged with raping two white women. The young men were hastily tried and eight were sentenced to death. Although a lawyer was present at their trial, he was neither competent nor given time to prepare a defense. Activists who investigated the case found that the evidence against the young men was flimsy. The women who were their chief accusers were of dubious character, their testimony was inconsistent, and one later recanted her accusations. International Labor Defense retained Samuel Leibowitz to pursue the Scottsboro boys’ appeals and mounted a worldwide campaign on their behalf.

Leibowitz petitioned the Supreme Court for relief and in Powell v. Alabama (1932) it ordered a new trial because the Scottsboro boys had been denied effective counsel, violating their right to a fair trial. The young men were tried a second time in 1934. Again they were convicted and sentenced to death and again their appeal reached the Supreme Court. In Norris v. Alabama (1935) the justices unanimously overturned their convictions on the grounds that African Americans had been excluded from the jury.

The Court further strengthened the rights of the accused in Brown v. Mississippi (1936). Here the justices rejected murder charges against three black men whose convictions were based solely on coerced confessions. In Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) the
Court ruled that indigent federal defendants were entitled to legal counsel. Twenty-five years later this right was extended to all defendants in *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963).

When it came to voting rights the Supreme Court was less courageous. In *Nixon v. Condon* (1932) the justices invalidated the whites-only Texas Democratic primary election, ruling that states cannot discriminate against voters on the basis of race. But when the state legislature gave political parties complete authority over primaries, the Court approved. In *Grovey v. Townsend* (1935) it ruled that parties were voluntary associations and thus allowed to discriminate. This decision would be reversed nine years later in *Smith v. Allwright* (1944). The Court further demonstrated its reluctance to meddle in political affairs by upholding the constitutionality of poll taxes in *Breedlove v. Suttles* (1937).

During the 1930s the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) focused much of its energy on passage of a federal anti-lynching law. Senators Robert F. Wagner of New York and Edward Costigan of Colorado introduced such a bill in 1934, but maneuvering by southern opponents blocked it from being considered by the full Senate. The NAACP executive secretary, Walter White, sought President Roosevelt’s support for the bill, but Roosevelt was unwilling to antagonize powerful southern legislators: “If I come out for the anti-lynching bill now, they will block every bill I ask Congress to pass to keep America from collapsing. I just can’t take that risk.” In 1937 another anti-lynching bill sponsored by New York Representative Joseph Gavaghan passed in the House 277 to 120. A Gallup poll reported that 70 percent of Americans favored such legislation, but southern senators launched a filibuster and prevented a vote. Although Alabama’s Tuskegee Institute recorded the lynching of twenty-four African Americans in 1933, this number steadily dwindled until only two such atrocities were logged in 1939. The NAACP was responsible for much of this decline.

In education, racial separation was the rule, but during the 1930s a small crack appeared in the wall of segregation. Donald Murray applied for admission to the University of Maryland Law School in 1934. When his application was refused, Thurgood Marshall brought suit arguing that Murray should be admitted since Maryland provided no opportunities for blacks to study law. Baltimore City Court Judge Eugene O’Dunne agreed and Murray entered law school in September 1935.

In 1938 Charles Houston argued a similar case. Lloyd Gaines had applied to the University of Missouri Law School. Missouri also provided no legal education for black students. In *Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada* (1938) the Supreme Court ordered the state to admit Gaines. Although the justices were not yet willing to repudiate “separate but equal,” the Gaines decision was the first step on the road to *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954).

African Americans enjoyed few civil rights during this decade, but they built a foundation for future gains. In the words of Robert S. McElvaine, author of *The Great Depression* (1984), “The rebirth of that dream of true racial equality . . . was the real achievement of the New Deal years in race relations.”

Without question, workers and organized labor enjoyed the greatest expansion of rights during the 1930s. Three major pieces of legislation were responsible for this progress: the Norris-La Guardia Act (1932), the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), and the National Labor Relations Act (1935). Each of these bills, using different language, guaranteed workers the right to organize unions and bargain collectively with employers. Observers wondered whether the Supreme Court would follow its longstanding pro-business bias and strike down these laws. In the case of *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States* (1935), the Court invalidated most provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, including section 7(a), which covered union organizing. However, in five separate 1937 decisions the Court upheld key provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, finding that the ability of workers to organize and engage in collective bargaining was “a fundamental right.”

Subsequent decisions further expanded workers’ rights. In *Senn v. Tile Layers Union* (1937) the Court recognized that picketing was a form of free speech protected by the Constitution. This decision
was broadened in *Thornhill v. Alabama* (1940). African Americans picketing stores as part of a “don’t buy where you can’t work” campaign received similar protection in *New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery* (1938). In *Hague v. Congress of Industrial Organizations* (1939) the Court struck down a Jersey City anti-union ordinance requiring permits to hold public meetings or distribute literature in public places. Labor’s rights were also strengthened by the Senate in 1936 when it established a committee under the chairmanship of Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr., “to make an investigation of violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.”

In several important cases the Supreme Court expanded the rights of free speech and assembly. In *Stromberg v. California* (1931) the Court overturned the conviction of a counselor at a Communist youth camp for displaying a red flag. A few weeks later, in *Near v. Minnesota*, it ruled that the First Amendment free press guarantee protected even the publication of a malicious anti-Semitic scandal sheet. In 1933 New York federal court Judge John Munro Woolsey struck a blow against censorship by ruling that James Joyce’s novel *Ulysses* (1922) was not obscene. In *DeJonge v. Oregon* (1937) the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a speaker at a Communist sponsored rally. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes said that the state could not make “mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion . . . basis for a criminal charge.” The Court relied on a somewhat different logic when it rejected the conviction of Communist Party organizer Angelo Herndon, who was given a twenty-year sentence for violating a Georgia anti-insurrection statute. In *Herndon v. Georgia* (1937) the majority opinion held that speech could not be punished “by reason of its supposed dangerous tendency even in the remote future.”

The Supreme Court also considered religious freedom cases with mixed results. In *Lovell v. City of Griffin* (1938) the Court ruled unconstitutional a local ordinance used to prevent Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing religious tracts on city streets. The Court, however, was not willing to extend this protection to other areas. In *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940) it upheld the expulsion of two Pennsylvania students who refused to join in a compulsory salute to the flag in keeping with their religious beliefs. In the face of surprisingly strong public criticism, the justices admitted they had erred and three years later the Court reversed itself.

Meanwhile, developments in Congress indicated growing intolerance for radical political beliefs. In 1938 the House Select Committee on Un-American Activities, under the leadership of Representative Martin Dies, began a decades-long hunt for subversive influences. Its sensational public hearings became a platform for wild accusations of Communist infiltration in labor unions and New Deal agencies with a chilling effect on free speech.

During the Depression there were important gains, especially for organized labor. But the picture was not uniformly sanguine: the Jim Crow system remained in place in the South; African Americans would have to wait a quarter of a century before gaining full civil rights; and an anti-Communist crusade that would erode civil liberties began. With respect to civil rights, the 1930s were most significant for establishing the basis for advances that would be fully realized in later decades.

*See Also:* Anti-Lynching Legislation; International Labor Defense (ILD); La Follette Civil Liberties Committee; National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); Scottsboro Case; Supreme Court.

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*Paul T. Murray*
The Civil Works Administration (CWA), created in the fall of 1933 and disbanded the following spring, was the first, public employment experiment of the New Deal. At its peak in January of 1934, CWA employed approximately four million workers. The program initiated many projects that later were absorbed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA, 1935 to 1941). Perhaps most importantly, CWA took several million relief recipients off of the federal “dole” and gave them employment and regular wages.

The CWA reflected the values of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his relief administrator Harry Hopkins, both of whom favored employment over direct relief. Both feared that the federal relief program (FERA) would institutionalize a permanent national “dole.” During the summer of 1933, the New Deal had reduced the federal relief caseload significantly and forced some states to finance a larger share of the relief burden. But both the caseload and federal expenditures threatened to rise again during the coming winter. In late October, Hopkins’s assistant Aubrey Williams prevailed on Hopkins to propose a dramatic expansion of public employment. The program would take large num-

*Men employed by the Civil Works Administration clean and paint the dome of the Denver capitol building in 1934. [National Archives and Records Administration]*
bers of “employable” recipients off the relief rolls and also employ several million unemployed workers who were not on relief. The program would be financed by the large unexpended balances of the New Deal’s slow-moving public works program, the PWA. Hopkins presented the plan to Roosevelt on October 29. The president stunned Hopkins by immediately accepting the extraordinary proposal. The CWA was one of the most dramatic policy experiments of the New Deal era. Between November 1, when the program was announced, and December 15, approximately three and a half million workers were placed on hastily constructed federal projects. In mid-November, a large portion of federal resources was devoted entirely to issuing the first CWA paychecks. Although civil works drew on the staff and resources of the federal relief program, state Civil Works administrations hired engineers, efficiency experts, and professionals in the field of labor relations, making the program much more like public employment than work relief. Workers were paid regular wages and were not supervised by social workers.

During its brief lifetime CWA workers built approximately 500,000 miles of roads and worked on thousands of schools, airports, and playgrounds. Reflecting a gendered division of labor, CWA employed women in primitive workshops, sewing garments for the unemployed. Although civil works absorbed many projects from work relief programs established earlier in the Depression, a key goal of CWA was to move beyond traditional “made work” to projects of permanent value. The program’s pioneering “Civil Works Service” program for “white collar” professionals produced surveys of coastlines, harbors, and public buildings. The CWA employed artists, musicians, and actors on projects that were precursors to the more well known WPA arts projects.

The CWA was enormously popular. Hopkins later estimated that approximately ten million workers “walked up to a window and stood in line, many of them all night, asking for a [CWA] job.” The program also generated significant support in Congress for a permanent federal employment program. But the growing political support for CWA alarmed may New Deal officials, who feared that public employment would become an expensive “habit” and create a permanent drain on the federal treasury. Fiscal conservatives within the New Deal, led by Bureau of the Budget Director Lewis Douglas, successfully lobbied Roosevelt to discontinue the program in the early spring of 1934.

The mercurial history of CWA once led historians to view the program as a noble but haphazard experiment, plagued by corruption and inefficiency. Recent research, however, has suggested that projects were relatively well run, free of graft, and represented a significant improvement over traditional “made work.” Perhaps most important, the CWA experiment greatly increased support for public employment, creating pressure both within the New Deal and in Congress for the administration to end the general relief grant program and launch the WPA in 1935.

See Also: HOPKINS, HARRY; NEW DEAL; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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JEFF SINGLETON

CLASS

The Great Depression had a significant impact on class relations in the United States. Although the Depression did not create class divisions, it did help
to magnify the divisions that already existed. The working class, the group most likely to criticize capitalism as immoral, was joined by growing ranks of middle-class Americans who not only sympathized with those in the working class but also began to question the system that had caused so much grief. These class divisions became a battle over values. As historian Robert S. McElvaine explains in his book *The Great Depression* (1984), the working class and middle class valued the ideals embodied in cooperative individualism, calling for more equity, cooperation, ethics, and justice in the economic system, while elite Americans remained wedded to the ideal of acquisitive individualism, which was generally amoral, self-interested, and competitive.

While motion pictures certainly provided an opportunity for people to escape from the economic and emotional hardships of the Depression, many of the films also offered critical windows on to that very world. Many of the most popular gangster films of the era, including *Little Caesar* (1930) and *The Public Enemy* (1931), offered critiques of unbridled acquisitive individualism. Other films, including *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang* (1932) and *Dead End* (1937), offered more explicitly stinging critiques of the amoral marketplace that had ravaged the lives of millions of moviegoers. One sign of the growing influence of the state in society is the fact that films in the post-1933 era increasingly portrayed the federal government as a moral institution capable of addressing real questions of inequity and injustice.

While President Roosevelt proved adept at using class rhetoric to forge his New Deal coalition, he also found himself pushed further to the left by grassroots militancy on the streets and in the voting booths. In 1934, workers in San Francisco and Minneapolis engaged in successful general strikes with a great deal of support from the middle class. The 1934 congressional elections were a victory not only for Democrats but for those who were politically much further to the left than Roosevelt himself. Moreover, the popularity of governors Floyd Olson of Minnesota, who was elected on the Farmer-Labor Party ticket in 1930, and Philip La Follette of Wisconsin, who helped to bring that state’s Socialist and Progressive parties together in 1935, was a clear sign that many working-class and middle-class Americans were willing to consider radical alternatives. And perhaps most important, the phenomenal popularity of Louisiana senator Huey Long and “Radio Priest” Charles Coughlin, both of whom gathered a great deal of support from millions of lower-middle-class Americans tenaciously trying to hold on to their status, was a clear sign that the early New Deal alone could not satiate the appetite of an increasingly discontented, vocal, and class-conscious (albeit not necessarily in the Marxist sense) populace.

The growing influence of working-class Americans who questioned the morality of the market helped to convince Roosevelt that his political future lay with meeting their demands legislatively and not just rhetorically. The fruits of this influence were apparent in the most significant legislation of the second New Deal, including the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which gave workers the legal right to bargain collectively and offered government oversight with the creation of the National Labor Relations Board. Congress also passed the Social Security Act in 1935, which provided unemployment insurance and old-age pensions to workers and their dependents. And finally, in 1938 Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, which established minimum wages, maximum working hours, and child labor laws. All of these acts, although not completely supported by organized labor, insured that questions of equity would become a part of the emerging welfare state. In other words, the state would no longer simply protect property; rather, it would recognize class differences and attempt to broker those differences.

One of the most significant developments regarding class relations during the Great Depression was the creation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (later called the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO) in 1935. While United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis became the organization’s first leader, it is clear that the impetus for industrial unionism arose from below, among the ranks of industrial workers who had been excluded from the craft-oriented American Federation of Labor (AFL). Although the CIO is best remembered for organizing mass production
workers, it is also important to remember that it represented not just an organizational shift, but an ideological one as well. Unlike the AFL, which often excluded racial and ethnic minorities, the CIO unions confronted racism and segregation by inviting African Americans, eastern and southern European immigrants, and other ethnic Americans into their organizations. The CIO also pioneered in the use of new tactics, including sit-down and slowdown strikes, which paved the way for unionization in some of the nation’s most powerful industries, including most famously General Motors. However, the CIO grew increasingly conservative by the end of the decade by helping to contain grassroots militancy within the parameters set up by the state for union organizing and bargaining.

Although the Great Depression exacerbated class differences between the working and elite classes, it also helped to remake the working class itself. As historian Lizabeth Cohen argues in her book *Making a New Deal* (1990), thousands of immigrant and ethnic Americans who had previously identified primarily with their ethnic communities came to see themselves in class terms. Certainly this process had begun before the decade of the Depression, as thousands of immigrants participated in a burgeoning national consumer culture and experienced the homogenizing influences of welfare capitalism during the 1920s. However, during the Depression, thousands of immigrant and ethnic Americans were disappointed by the inability of their own communities—from churches to ethnic banks to mutual aid societies—to meet the needs of their members. Increasingly, ethnic Americans, many of whom had joined CIO unions and had begun voting for the first time, began to look toward their unions and the state to address their needs.

Social scientists, who had largely ignored class as a conceptual tool to explain society before 1929, grew increasingly interested in analyzing American society in class terms during the Great Depression. In their 1929 study *Middletown*, sociologists Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd played a pioneering role in developing the concept of class. Although they relied largely on a notion of class that revolved around income and occupation, they also paid close attention to social behavior, individual expectations, and consumption patterns. In *Muncie*, Indiana, they identified two main classes—a business class and a working class. In a later study, *Middle-town in Transition* (1937), they further refined their definition of class by identifying six main classes. Based on these studies, the Lynds warned that either American democracy would transform the economy or that the economy, as represented by big business, would overwhelm and take over American democracy.

Though less well known than the Lynds, social scientist W. Lloyd Warner also played an important role in creating new conceptions of class to explain American society. After taking part as a consultant in a study of industrial fatigue among workers at the Western Electric Plant in Hawthorn, Illinois, Warner began his own investigation into class relations in Newburyport, Massachusetts. Like the Lynds, Warner identified six classes; however, he focused more on the cultural and social components of class by highlighting the important role that housing, neighborhoods, source of income, social contacts, and voluntary activity played in creating class divisions. While Warner largely accepted the necessity of class divisions because of the complex division of labor in modern industrial society, he nonetheless asserted that opportunity and mobility remained essential to maintaining a democratic nation and ideals.

See Also: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); CASTE AND CLASS; CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); SOCIAL SCIENCE.

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Benjamin Victor Cohen (September 23, 1894–August 15, 1983) was a well-known lawyer, public servant, author, and New Dealer. Born in Muncie, Indiana, to a wealthy family, Cohen received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Chicago in 1914, a doctorate in jurisprudence from the University of Chicago Law School in 1915, and a doctorate in judicial science from the Harvard Law School in 1916. While at Harvard, Cohen met Felix Frankfurter, who became his mentor. Frankfurter, in turn, was the protégé of Louis Brandeis, who was best known for his commitment to the small business ideal. Brandeis’s ideas and Frankfurter’s influence would have a great impact on Cohen’s career.

After graduation from Harvard, Cohen served as Judge Julian Mack’s legal secretary in the federal circuit court system. In 1917, Cohen began working for the U.S. Shipping Board and, between 1919 and 1922, he worked for the American Zionists. By 1922, Cohen had decided to enter private practice while continuing to serve gratis for the National Consumers League and helping Frankfurter prepare a minimum-wage bill for women. By 1933, Cohen had achieved the confidence of his mentor, and Frankfurter recommended him to Franklin D. Roosevelt for service in his New Deal.

Working closely with fellow Frankfurter protégé Thomas Corcoran, Cohen helped to draft a number of important New Deal laws in 1933 and 1934, including the Truth-in-Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Cohen also worked as legal counsel for Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes. Cohen’s importance in New Deal legislation continued to grow, especially after he worked on the 1935 Public Utilities Holding Company Act, which regulated large utility corporations. Again working alongside Corcoran, Cohen contributed his legal expertise to such New Deal laws as the Rural Electrification Act (1935) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938).

Cohen’s political reputation was bruised when he became identified with Roosevelt’s 1937 court-packing plan. Instead of working behind the scenes, Cohen now became a public figure subject to criticism by New Deal opponents. Also, his association with court packing identified him even more with Tommy Corcoran who was already being labeled as one of Roosevelt’s political “hatchet” men.

As World War II erupted, Cohen helped the president implement the Lend-Lease plan, which gave aid to countries fighting the Axis Powers. Cohen also served as legal counsel to America’s wartime ambassador to Great Britain, John G. Winant. As the war drew to a close, Cohen participated in the Dumbarton Oaks conference, which set the stage for the formation of the United Nations. Cohen then served from 1948 to 1952 as a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. general assembly. Thereafter, Cohen retired to private life, although he remained active in Washington affairs. A private, humble man, Benjamin Cohen was a brilliant legal expert who used his talents to advance not only the New Deal, but world peace and disarmament.

See Also: CORCORAN, THOMAS G.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; SECURITIES REGULATION.

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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Collective bargaining, which is considered to be the main purpose of labor unions today, first gained permanent government sanction in the New Deal era. Collective bargaining is defined by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics as the process by which “representatives of employees (unions) and employers determine the conditions of employment through direct negotiation, normally resulting in a written contract setting forth the wages, hours, and other conditions to be observed for a stipulated period.” Since the founding of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1886, unions had sought to bargain collectively. This method worked for unions when they were powerful enough to bargain directly with employers, or in times of national emergency, such as during World War I, when the federal government decided that the best interests of the nation were served by collective bargaining. It was not until the onset of the Great Depression, however, that a permanent government body was created to promote collective bargaining agreements.

Senator Robert Wagner of New York was the leading politician in the promotion of collective bargaining. Wagner advocated expanding the government’s role in planning the economy of the United States. As a part of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which allowed companies within targeted industries to form legal cartels and set prices and production quotas, Wagner insisted upon the insertion of section 7a, which guaranteed employees the right to join unions of their own choosing and to bargain collectively. This was the first time that the government claimed the obligation to play a constructive role in managing industrial relations. The creation of this legislation was spurred by a bill introduced by Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, and drafted by the AFL, which would have created a thirty-hour workweek; although the National Industrial Recovery Act undermined that effort, the AFL enthusiastically endorsed the Act, section 7a in particular.

Soon after enactment of the legislation, the National Labor Board (NLB) was formed to adjudicate labor disputes. The NLB had members drawn from industry, labor, and government. Wagner hoped the NLB would serve as a mediator between labor and management, but neither labor nor management was enthusiastic about this development. William M. Leiserson, who was appointed the NLB’s secretary, warned Wagner that reliance upon mediation as a first step would simply reproduce the conflict within the NLB, which is indeed what happened. Leiserson recommended to Wagner that the NLB become an arbitral body that only considered matters of policy, and that a separate body of mediators be established, which is the direction toward which the NLB slowly evolved. The NLB issued rulings regarding the behavior of the two sides in the course of collective bargaining, but it did not mediate disputes itself. The NLB declared that each side had obligations that it had to meet during the collective bargaining process—management had to meet and bargain with employee representatives and sign written contracts, and unions had to present grievances and demands to the employer before striking. By obliging management to meet with representatives of employees, the NLB began to develop the idea of majority rule within union representation elections, which it began to oversee.

In response to the strike wave of 1934, however, it became apparent to the Roosevelt administration that the NLB was ineffective. After obtaining passage from Congress of public resolution 44, in which Congress gave to the president the power to establish one or more labor boards for a one-year period, Roosevelt created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which had the authority to hold hearings and make findings of fact concerning violations of section 7a. Despite these changes, it became clear that new legislation was needed, and in 1935 the National Labor Relations Act, more popularly known as the Wagner Act, was passed. This act authorized the NLRB to oversee union elections in order to determine majority representation of employees by unions. The act also authorized the NLRB to investigate “unfair labor practices” by both employers and unions, and to seek injunctive relief from the courts while these investigations were ongoing. This induced both employers and unions to seek collective bargaining agreements in signed contracts. Industrial strife was not ended by this legislation; numerous strikes took
place throughout the second half of the New Deal era, including the famous sit-down strike in Flint, Michigan, in early 1937. A structure was put in place, however, which eventually diminished the violence that had characterized strikes in earlier eras.

See Also: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (WAGNER ACT); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB); ORGANIZED LABOR; WAGNER, ROBERT F.

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COLLIER, JOHN

John Collier (May 4, 1884–May 8, 1968) was commissioner of Indian affairs from 1933 to 1945. Collier championed Native American concerns and advocated legislation under the New Deal banner to alleviate their suffering. Serving under Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, Collier, an astute promoter and publicist, held the commissionership of Indian affairs for twelve years, the longest reign in that division’s history. During that time, a new concept of self-government emerged that delineated the federal government’s approach to American Indian policy and forever changed the way Native Americans defined themselves.

A reformer of federal policy toward Native Americans, Collier was born in Atlanta, Georgia. He graduated from Atlanta High School, studied at Columbia University, worked as civic secretary of the People’s Institute in New York City, edited the Civil Journal, which sanctioned progressive urban reform, and established the Home School, a utopian experiment saturated with John Dewey’s theories. After watching Native American dances at Taos, New Mexico, in 1920, Collier recognized the importance of preserving tribal life. He taught sociology at San Francisco State College in the early 1920s and then accepted an appointment as research agent for the Indian Welfare Committee of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs. Opposed to the Bursum Bill, named for U.S. Senator Holm O. Bursum of New Mexico, which would have terminated Pueblo water and land rights without proper remuneration, Collier successfully campaigned for its defeat. In 1923, one year before Congress enacted the Indian Citizenship Act, Collier organized and began serving as executive secretary of the American Indian Defense Association.

A lobbyist in the nation’s capital for a decade, Collier promulgated his views in various ways. He favored the termination of the land allotment system, supported the revamping of the Indian Bureau in an attempt to improve services and avoid mismanagement, and advocated the cognizance and freedom of Native American cultures and the right of self-rule. Collier urged federal credit for reservations, accepted Native religious independence, endorsed the Indian Oil Act of 1927, wrote essays for American Indian Life, and emphasized the necessity for conserving tribal resources.

Collier’s criticisms forced the Interior Department under Secretary Hubert Work and Indian Affairs Commissioner Charles Henry Burke to request an outside organization, the Brookings Institution, to examine the Indian Bureau. A task force led by Lewis Meriam submitted a report, The Problem of Indian Administration, issued in 1928. It concurred with some of Collier’s suggestions, recommended an increase in federal appropriations for Native Americans, and proposed ending land allotment. Touring western reservations to investigate Native American living conditions and criticizing Interior Department officials under Secretary Ray L. Wilbur for not implementing the Meriam Report, Collier
kept himself visible and vocal during President Herbert Hoover’s administration.

In April 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected Collier to serve as commissioner of Indian affairs. With this appointment, Roosevelt offered a New Deal to Native Americans and provided Collier, who had an ally in First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, with the opportunity to put his ideas into practice. Almost immediately changes occurred for Native Americans. Collier approved congressional legislation to compensate Pueblos whose lands had been lost to encroaching white settlers. He encouraged the dissolution of the Board of Indian Commissioners, ended the selling of Native trust land, and by limiting missionary work at Native American schools, he affirmed the right of freedom of religion for native peoples. Active in advancing Native American education and civil liberties, Collier surfaced as a dedicated and competent public official during the Great Depression.

The most important piece of Native American legislation that passed Congress under Collier’s stewardship was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which marked a major turning point in the relationship between Native Americans and the United States government. It signaled a fundamental reversal of federal policy. Instead of forcing Native Americans to forsake their traditions for new lives on farms or cities, the 1934 act, also known as the Wheeler-Howard Bill, conceded their right to exist as a separate culture. Tribes were allowed to form their own governments, and reservations continued to be strongholds of Native identity. The main provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act were to restore to Native Americans management of their assets, prevent further depletion of reservation resources, build a sound economic foundation for the people of the reservations, and return to Native Americans local self-government on a tribal basis. The measure also established federal revolving credit to foster economic development and scholarships to encourage education. Government officials vigorously pursued the objectives of the bill until the outbreak of World War II.

Other reforms in Collier’s New Deal for Native Americans included the creation in 1935 of an Indian Arts and Crafts Board within the Interior Department to market the production and distribution of Native goods. The Johnson-O’Malley Act of 1934 offered general federal assistance to some Native American students to attend public schools and permitted the Indian Office to contract with the states to provide education, health, and welfare services to Natives on reservations within their borders. The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps enlisted Natives in relief programs. Collier also secured funds for Native service activities from the Public Works Administration. In fact, New Deal agencies funded 29 percent of Native service expenditures in 1934.

Despite his lofty aspirations, Collier frequently suffered setbacks. He met with native opposition to certain regulations and proposals and encountered criticism from Congress. Secretary of War Henry Stimson repudiated Collier’s suggestion that the government create separate Native American military units for wartime purposes, preferring an integrated service during World War II. These and other problems enveloped Collier at times during his tenure.

Collier envisioned a time when Native American tribes would have their own governmental institutions to replace the Bureau of Indian Affairs. He believed that consolidation of individual and communal land under a tribal government was the means by which to achieve this independence. Puzzled by the lack of native support for the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier learned that his plans for consolidation offended tribes who had come to value personal ownership of land, some of whom angrily accused the commissioner of communism.

Following his resignation as commissioner of Indian affairs in January 1945, three months prior to the death of President Roosevelt, Collier became president of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs in Washington, D. C. Later he taught sociology and anthropology at the City College of New York, pursued research on Native America, and wrote newspaper columns. In 1964 Collier received a distinguished service award from the Interior Department headed by Stewart L. Udall. Collier died in Taos, New Mexico, having left a significant impression on government relations with Native Americans during the Great Depression.
See Also: INDIAN NEW DEAL; INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1934; NATIVE AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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Leonard Schlup

COMICS

The comics had been a familiar daily distraction for Americans ever since Richard Outcault’s The Yellow Kid debuted in Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World in 1896. But it was during the Depression decade that they truly earned an enduring place in American culture, not only in the newspapers but also in the pulp magazines known as comic books. Still commonly known as “the funnies,” comics of the 1930s actually branched out into genres of adventure, crime, and superhero fantasy. Generally dismissed as escapist entertainment of little social value, comic books in fact exerted a powerful influence on the popular imagination. They confronted the politics, contradictions, and social dislocations of the Great Depression in a way that young readers especially responded to. They presented a means for those readers to purchase entry into uniquely appealing fantasy worlds. And in the process they helped to invent the concept of commercial youth culture.

With a daily audience in the millions, newspaper comics were the property of powerful and mostly conservative syndicates like the Chicago Tribune, United Features, and William Randolph Hearst’s King Features. Popular funnies such as Popeye, Mutt and Jeff, and Joe Palooka dealt in apolitical slapstick humor, sometimes with vague populist undertones. But the Tribune’s serialized adventure strip Little Orphan Annie featured the benevolent corporate billionaire, Daddy Warbucks, and rankled the Roosevelt administration with its attacks on the New Deal. Other comic strips, such as Buck Rogers, Tarzan, Flash Gordon, and The Phantom, offered heroic fantasies set in future times, distant worlds, and remote jungles—places where injustice could be redressed and order restored without challenging the status quo at home.

But there was plenty of domestic disorder elsewhere in the comics page. Based on the FBI’s popularized crusade against organized crime, Chester Gould’s Dick Tracy was an unusually streetwise strip featuring an angular-jawed detective and a wonderfully grotesque rogues gallery. The quintessential Depression-era comic strip, Dick Tracy picked up where the Hollywood gangster films of the early 1930s left off, and it played to the popular taste for urban violence and mayhem.

In 1933 the Eastern Color Printing Company published the pioneering Funnies on Parade. Featuring reprinted newspaper comic strips on pulp paper bound together under a slick cover with a ten-cent price tag, it launched a new publishing trend soon to be called comic books. By 1935 some comic books began to feature original material not owned by the syndicates. None of these made much of a commercial impact until 1938, when National Periodical’s (later known as DC Comics) Action Comics hit the newsstands featuring on its cover a costumed superhero named Superman. The creation of teenagers Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, Superman immediately broadened the popularity of comic books and gave the medium its distinct identity. Within a year, Superman’s comic books were selling close to a million copies per month. His success led very quickly to a proliferation of costumed heroes, including Batman, Captain Marvel, Green Lantern, Wonder Woman, and Captain America.

Unlike their more conservative elders in the newspapers, comic books proved very adaptable to
idealistic, absurdist, and culturally subversive mate-
rial aimed directly at youth sensibilities. Most cre-
ators working in the industry were young urban
sons of immigrants with liberal politics and populist
social values. Based in and around New York City,
the fledgling comic book industry comprised novice
but enthusiastic artists and writers, experienced il-
lustrators down on their luck, and businessmen
who shared an “anything-for-a-buck” philosophy
of publishing. Resulting from this unusual associa-
tion was a comic-book image of Depression-era
America, crude and outrageous, yet oddly sincere
and hopeful as well.

The superheroes symbolized American ideals
filtered through the cynical reality of the 1930s.
Typically cast as “champions of the oppressed,”
colorfully costumed heroes aligned themselves
squarely on the side of common people. Batman
apprehended crooks who eluded the police and the
courts on technicalities. Superman’s enemies in-
cluded greedy stockbrokers, heartless mine-
owners, and wicked munitions manufacturers. The
Green Lantern protected poor citizens from mali-
cious corporate leaders and their crooked lawyers.
By acting as a benevolent outside force to redress
the power imbalance between virtuous common
people and abusive corporate interests, su-
perheroes championed the interventionist and col-
lectivist spirit of the New Deal. Comic books im-
plicitly, and sometimes explicitly, endorsed
President Roosevelt’s leadership and identified the
enemies of the New Deal as the enemies of the na-
ton.

Garish and direct, the entry of comic books into
American discourse was the cultural equivalent to
a sock on the jaw. Whereas adults generally read
and adored the newspaper funnies—some of which
were already being hailed as national treasures—
comic books had a polarizing effect on the public.
Even as they won legions of young fans, comic
books sometimes left their parents bewildered and
concerned. Critics accused them of inducing eye-
strain, degrading cultural sensibilities, and desensi-
tizing children towards violence. Comic books thus
pointed toward a new era of “generation gaps” di-
vided along lines of cultural preference. Initially re-
garded as a fad for young people in need of Depres-
sion-era escapism, few would have predicted that
these comics would still be a vital part of American
culture into the twenty-first century.

See Also: CARTOONS, POLITICAL; HUMOR;
SUPERMAN.

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The boost in the farm economy in mid-1933 occasioned by early New Deal efforts in monetary reform and commodity reduction was threatened by a bearish fall slump unless significant amounts of cash could be quickly infused into farmers’ pockets. Demands for inflated currency and above-market government loans reflected panic from both the Congress and the farm belt, especially the cash-deprived cotton South.

The Roosevelt administration showed no panic but acceded to a suggestion apparently made by Oscar G. Johnston, a big-time cotton planter from Mississippi and finance director of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), that the government make ten-cent-per-pound non-recourse loans to cotton farmers who agreed to participate in the New Deal’s 1934 cotton reduction program. Such a loan would be slightly less than actual or spot market prices. The controversial non-recourse feature, which Jerome Frank, head of the AAA’s Legal Division, thought was outrageous and a dangerous precedent, freed the borrower from any liability if prices fell. In such a case, the government would possess title to the cotton, but nothing more. When President Franklin Roosevelt told Jesse Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to provide for the loans, a new agency, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), was created to make them. With Congress out of session the CCC was authorized by Executive Order 6340 and chartered under the laws of Delaware on October 17, 1933. The quasi-public CCC was incorporated by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, and Oscar Johnston from the AAA. The new agency represented a creative legal and fiscal response to a very serious economic threat to the cotton economy in the fall of 1933. Millions of loan dollars soon flowed into the cotton belt covering approximately two-and-a-half million new bales, thus permitting orderly marketing by producers. In fact, by early 1934, prices rose above the loans, vindicating the early process.

Developed to dispense funds to producers and support normal lending institutions, the CCC soon helped rescue commodities other than cotton. According to Commodity Credit’s own internal study, its loans throughout the Depression (October 1933 to June 1940) pumped nearly $900 million into the cotton economy, more than $470 million into corn, nearly $167 million into wheat, more than $46 million into tobacco, and smaller amounts into figs, pecans, raisins, peanuts, and other crops. The result was an increase in commodity prices—nearly doubling cotton and tobacco prices, even more for corn, and dramatic increases for other commodities. The balance sheet registered a mere $26 million loss during that time. Negatively, in some years, the CCC made loans excessively above market levels which led to the amassing of huge carry-over commodities; only World War II relieved the pressure and avoided a potential disaster. Positively, by employing a pragmatic mixture of government intervention and market forces, the CCC promoted price stability and orderly commodity marketing. In doing so, it quietly became an excellent antidote to poverty in the Great Depression and one of the most effective institutions to emerge from the New Deal.

See Also: Farm Policy; Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation; Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).

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COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934

The congressional architects of federal policy regulating communications were determined to not make the mistakes Congress had made in the development of the railroads. In that case Congress had invited corruption by distributing lands to the owners of the railroads, and aided in what became a continuing problematic relationship between private ownership of railroads and the industry’s public service function.

The Communications Act of 1927 was an announcement by progressives that the federal government would own and administer the airwaves. The 1927 legislation established an experimental commission to oversee communications; the Communications Act of 1934 made that body, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), permanent. The Communications Act of 1927 was built upon the belief that the new technology of radio would serve the public by facilitating national education and the dissemination of valuable information collected by the federal government, such as weather reports to aid agriculture. The act also addressed the potential use of radio in transportation, and anticipated that seagoing vessels, for example, would come to rely on radio communication in that same way the railroads had relied on the telegraph.

The Communications Act of 1934—a forty-page document that was compiled after a single day of hearings—reaffirmed the FCC’s authority and the federal government’s control, but it also addressed the relationship between local radio stations and new national networks, a relationship that would produce confusion and political conflict for years to come. Later additions to the 1934 act extended the government’s responsibility for public education and the dissemination of news, and provided for licensing with controls and limits that were politically useful. These and later amendments to the Communications Act of 1934 have continued to wrestle with the evolving relationship between the communications industry and the federal government. Try as they might, the progressives who had shaped the Communications Act of 1927 reached the same point their predecessors had reached in their effort to require national control over the railroads. By providing for local ownership of radio stations, the authors of the Communications Act of 1934 continued the debate between local independence and national control that had tormented the railroads.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; RADIO.

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BARRY DEAN KARL

COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS

Modern communications had congealed during the 1920s. Fashion and design, news, film, radio, promotion, and popular culture became intertwined and profitable as corporate entities. They projected public excitement about modern consumer culture, often from New York and Los Angeles, while slighting regional and ethnic variety. The conden-
sation of news, seen in the newly established Reader’s Digest, *Time Magazine*, the tabloid press, and the fast paced newsreels, exuded a gauzy glorification of the modern that often mocked traditional values while ostensibly speaking for the “democratic market.”

With the Great Depression, the political stakes related to the corporate definitions of news and
prevailing cultural values took on sharper relief and more urgency. The sliding economy devastated the communications industry, while business slipped in public esteem. Movie attendance was off by a quarter and many of the major studios declared bankruptcy. Newspaper circulation was down; advertising revenue was off 45 percent. In this context, however, the consequences of bringing sound and sight together for the first time in feature films and newsreels were far reaching but subtle. Half of American homes had a radio by the mid 1930s. Warren Susman has written that “sound helped mold uniform national responses; it helped create or reinforce uniform national values and beliefs in
a way that no previous medium had ever before been able to do. Roosevelt was able to create a new kind of Presidency and a new kind of political and social power through his brilliant use of the medium."

Franklin Roosevelt’s ability to make news was reinforced by his adept use of press conferences (he held 337 in his first term alone) and fireside chats. Photographers collaborated by not featuring him as a man without the use of his legs. Rivals such as Senator Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin competed with Roosevelt for attention through commercial radio, and all of them received thousands of letters from listeners each week.

The National Industrial Recovery Act, through its codes of fair competition, put the stamp of approval on media oligopolies in 1933. The next year Roosevelt signed the momentous Communications Act, which updated the 1927 Radio Act and created the Federal Communications Commission. Corporate media gained a largely compliant commission and what was lost in the legislative rush was any significant place for noncommercial or educational broadcasting. As Robert McChesney has shown, NBC and a gaggle of lawyers and lobbyists re-framed questions about the value of noncommercial stations so that network control of broadcast frequencies was made to look patriotic. Educational radio was effectively limited, and commercial broadcasters were given free use of the public airwaves with little financial return to the public or control by regulators. That structure has dominated American cultural life and the communications industry with few challenges ever since.

Modern propaganda was being developed in Germany during the same years that New Dealers experimented with forms of mass persuasion. America’s limited efforts resulted in controversy, such as the response to Pare Lorentz’s pathbreaking Resettlement Administration documentary The Plow That Broke the Plains (1936), which highlighted the plight of those in the Dust Bowl and implicitly called for greater federal assistance. Republicans decried its message as overly partisan in an election year.

Reporting on social issues took on new urgency, as writers traveled about the land as never before. They developed a passion for documenting concrete facts and facing authentic misery by observing conditions firsthand, then translating their concerns into powerful writing, seen notably in the work of Edmund Wilson, Lorena Hickok, and James Agee, and in magazines such as Survey Graphic and Life. The documentary form expanded through the widespread use of photojournalism, under both government auspices and commercial syndicates. Dorothea Lange, Margaret Bourke-White, Walker Evans, and Paul Strand all galvanized public attention through the sensitivity and intimacy of their photographs. The picture of poverty described in John Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath (1939) was so powerful that it was spun off as a feature film, although director John Ford gave the story a more conservative slant.
Newspaper chains, largely controlled by ideologically conservative owners, featured editorials that bristled with anti-Roosevelt invective, while their news columns often dishied out the New Deal press releases. The larger chains included those controlled by William Randolph Hearst, Roy Howard, and Colonel Robert McCormick. New magazines created during the Depression years, including Life, Look and Fortune, all featured compelling photo essays.

Interpretive reporting, columnists, and specialized experts became more widely read in the 1930s as well. Louis Stark of the New York Times became the preeminent expert on labor relations. Prominent political columnists included Walter Lippman and David Lawrence. Dorothy Thompson wrote on international affairs for the Herald Tribune. Drew Pearson initiated his popular political gossip column. Americans could read the right-wing vitriol of Westbrook Pegler or the more gentle counsel of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s column “My Day.”

Censorship of news stories, feature films, and literature included such examples as the banning of Henry Miller’s book Tropic of Cancer (1934). The Catholic Legion of Decency pressured Hollywood to adopt the Production Code in 1934. Yet in 1931, a landmark Supreme Court decision, Near v. Minnesota, had overturned state gag laws as unconstitutional forms of prior restraint, thus strengthening First Amendment guarantees.

Depression-era promotional strategies, the measurement of the public taste, and altered designs for consumer goods were masterfully explored in two books by Roland Marchand. He notes how advertising appeals often reinforced consumers’ guilt over their economic failure as personal rather than systemic while championing products to make them more successful or attractive job applicants. Public relations efforts sought to identify corporations as patriotic community builders rather than union busters. Opinion surveys were becoming institutionalized, most often identified through the work of George Gallup or Elmo Roper and their organizations.

The prevailing view of communications has long told a story of growing homogenization of the public through the mass media. Propaganda studies that began emanating from universities in larger numbers by the 1930s reinforced such a view. Yet in recent years, scholars have focused on resistance to mainstream media by workers, ethnic groups, and diverse regional affinities. The continuing attraction of “race movies” and the black press, the regional theaters promoted by the Federal Theatre Project, and the work of regional muralists, such as Thomas Hart Benton, all helped promote diverse local contexts, ideas, and images. Spanish-language radio had its first female host in 1932 when Maria Latigo Hernandez became host of a show called La Voz de las Americas, a daily afternoon program on KABC in San Antonio. Hernandez used the show as a platform for civil rights and other local issues. That same year the Japanese American Citizens League, organized in 1929 in California, first published Pacific Citizen, aimed at combating anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States.

Labor unions initiated their own newspapers, journals, and documentary film units during the 1930s. The Film and Photo League was created in the early 1930s by radical documentary filmmakers, some of whom were associated with the Communist International. The League covered strikes, hunger marches, racism, and other issues of social inequity that were often ignored by the mainstream media. Upton Sinclair, the famous writer and critic, ran for the governorship of California in 1934 and lost, but he aroused a strong constituency and the powerful wrath of the conservative movie moguls, who used newsreels and a major media campaign to bury his candidacy. In Lords of the Press (1938), journalist George Seldes attacked William Randolph Hearst and groups like the National Association of Manufacturers for assisting Spain’s Francisco Franco, Germany’s Adolf Hitler, and Italy’s Benito Mussolini.

Americans were soon drawn to the crackling urgency of Edward R. Murrow’s broadcasts describing the London bombings. Yet fundamental questions addressing the democratization of information and the oligarchic power of commercial media raised by Seldes and others had largely been finessed during the previous decade, and the new wartime climate would obfuscate them even more.
See Also: ADVERTISING IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION; COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934; FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC); HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; RADIO.

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COMMUNIST PARTY

The Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) dominated the Left during the 1930s and was in the forefront of struggles for social change. From the beginning of the Great Depression to the onset of World War II, the party enjoyed unprecedented influence and attained its highest membership totals. With added contingents of fellow travelers and numerous sympathizers, the Communist Party had considerable impact on reform and protest movements of the time.

Central to the Communist Party’s growth and stature was its quick and ready response to the immediate needs and concerns of the masses of people to conditions stemming from the country’s economic crisis. During the period, the party either initiated or substantially contributed to several highly visible grassroots struggles, among them the agitation on behalf of the unemployed, the fight for black rights, the antifascist campaign, and the unionization of workers.

A number of factors coalesced to place the party in a favorable position to assume a leading role in Depression-era struggles. Internally, the factional fighting that had occupied the party for much of the 1920s was settled with the expulsion of party leader Jay Lovestone and the ascension of a three-man secretariat consisting of William Z. Foster, William Weinstone, and Earl Browder. The leadership was further stabilized in 1934 with the election of Browder as general secretary; Browder led the party for the remainder of the 1930s and through the war years, directing policies and activities with a minimum of dissension. Moreover, the party had a functional base from which to launch its campaigns, and a skilled and disciplined cadre of experienced workers. Through the Trade Union Educational League and its successor, the Trade Union Unity League, party members had worked diligently to organize workers and gained credibility as determined and forthright fighters. The party had other established wings with solid reputations, including the International Labor Defense (ILD) and the Young Communist League, and quickly formed others to appeal to specific groups.
Additionally, the party's critique of capitalism meant that it was ideologically armed to deal with the economic cataclysm. “Third period” analysis (first articulated at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International [Comintern] anticipated a crisis in Western capitalism and predicted economic collapse followed by a revolutionary upswing. Accordingly, Communists expected to seize the time, aggressively assume leadership, and lead the disgruntled masses in a radical working-class movement. By virtue of its political stance, the party offered explanations and alternatives and was poised for its anticipated vanguard role.

Despite the opportune circumstances, the party's sectarianism hindered its effectiveness. In accordance with third period analysis, the Communist Party saw itself as the leading light of the movement and thus disdained alliances and coalitions with groups with similar interests and concerns. Party rhetoric was vociferous in attacks on reformists and other radicals, whom it wildly labeled as enemies of the working class and “social fascists.” Hence, Communist stridency precluded any cooperation with likeminded progressives and for the first half of the decade kept the party isolated from the mainstream of American liberalism.

Despite its sectarian stance, the party’s accomplishments were substantial. In March of 1930, Communists launched an unemployment campaign with nationwide demonstrations. Nearly half a million people in over thirty cities answered the call, with an estimated 100,000 participating in New York alone. The party followed up with the organization of unemployed councils and the staging of local and national demonstrations. The party’s program included demands for emergency relief, unemployment insurance, no evictions, and a seven-hour workday and five-day workweek. Through the councils, communist organizers called attention to the plight of the unemployed, obtained some concrete benefits for them, and gave political voice to suffering masses.

In addition to its activities with the unemployed, the party expanded its outreach to African Americans. In keeping with the mandates of the Sixth World Congress, which defined blacks as an oppressed nation within a nation requiring special attention, the CPUSA was intent on representing itself as the party of black Americans. In 1932 (and again in 1936 and 1940) an African American, James W. Ford, was the vice-presidential nominee on the Communist Party ticket. Beyond symbolic gestures, Communists aggressively recruited blacks and courageously entered the hostile South, where they attempted to organize blacks and whites together in defiance of law and etiquette. Facing considerable peril, in 1931 they helped form a sharecrows union in Alabama that sought better conditions and fairer treatment for agricultural workers.

The party probably made its greatest inroads with blacks through the ILD’s vigorous defense of black prisoners. The group’s long-running campaign surrounding the “Scottsboro Boys,” nine black youths convicted of raping two white women in Alabama in 1931, attracted worldwide attention and contributed greatly to the party’s image as a militant opponent of racism and discrimination.

By the end of 1934, the party had begun moderating its tone and moving closer to cooperation with other groups. The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern affirmed the shift in mid-1935 with its call for a united front of democratic forces to combat the growing threat of fascism. Attacks on liberals and socialists ceased as the CPUSA sought alliances with groups that it had formerly assailed. This new policy, the People’s or Popular Front (later rechristened the Democratic Front), was reflected in support for President Franklin D. Roosevelt and New Deal policies, the abandonment of dual unionism, and generally a less doctrinaire and sectarian posture. In the wake of this changed attitude, the CPUSA took the lead in uniting its National Student League with the Socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy in 1935 to form the American Student Union (ASU). The ASU combined activism on college campuses with involvement in labor, antifascist, and civil rights issues. In the South, the ASU had its close counterpart in the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC), a federation of black youth groups brought together by young African-American Communists in 1937. With a base originally in Richmond, Virginia, the SNYC spread to several southern states, where it spearheaded labor and civil rights initiatives.
The Popular Front’s most enduring success was in the area of labor. John L. Lewis, head of the Committee for (later Congress of) Industrial Organizations (CIO), relied heavily on experienced and skilled Communist organizers when he undertook the task of unionizing the mass productions industries. Communists and others strongly linked to the party could be found at nearly every level of the early CIO and came to dominate a number of CIO unions.

The CPUSA’s successful foray into mainstream progressive movements came to an abrupt halt with the 1939 Nazi-Soviet nonaggression treaty. Although membership was largely unaffected, Democratic Front alliances dissolved because the party’s shift from collective security to neutrality seemed a betrayal of its previously principled stand against fascism. The party sought to resurrect its former alliances during the 1940s, but its credibility had been undermined and its image badly tarnished.

See Also: ALABAMA SHARECROPPER’S UNION; AMERICAN STUDENT UNION; BROWDER, EARL; FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.; INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE (ILD); POPULAR FRONT; SCOTTSBORO CASE; SOUTHERN NEGRO YOUTH CONGRESS (SNYC).

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CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO)

Dismal working conditions for millions of American industrial laborers inspired the creation of the CIO. Originally called the Committee for Industrial Organization, the CIO began in November 1935 as a reformist movement within the American Federation of Labor (AFL), which had traditionally focused on organizing skilled workers, such as electricians and carpenters, into their own trade unions. The AFL had made only halfhearted efforts to organize the millions of workers in such basic industries as steel, automobiles, rubber, and meatpacking. These industrial workers had almost universal complaints about the general climate of job insecurity during the Great Depression, the lack of any meaningful input concerning their working conditions, and the arbitrary power of their foremen to hire, fire, and transfer. For most workers, having so little control over their lives proved to be humiliating and degrading. Anyone who was fortunate enough to work at an industrial job during the Depression had to accept long hours and the increasingly fast pace of the machinery. The combination proved to be exhausting, and often dangerous. If workers spoke up or complained, they risked losing their jobs, with no recourse.

ORIGINS

The CIO sought to change the balance of power in American factories. Three presidents of existing AFL unions—John L. Lewis of the United Mine-workers (UMW), David Dubinsky of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers—pushed hardest for the creation of the CIO and offered resources from their union treasuries to support the cause. Lewis’s UMW had a direct interest in organizing the steel industry, because large steel companies owned a significant percentage of the nation’s coal mines. Dubinsky and Hillman saw potential in linking the fortunes of industrial workers, through the CIO, with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. All early CIO leaders feared that unrest among American workers, if not harnessed in positive ways, could be channeled into potential Communist or fascist movements.

Industrial workers had made their discontent obvious after the passage in 1933 of Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act, which was designed primarily to allow businesses to regulate
themselves out of the Great Depression, but which also contained a clause (section 7a) that guaranteed American workers the right to organize into unions without interference from their employers. Throughout 1934, hundreds of thousands of laborers, across industries and across regions, went on strike to claim their legal right to join unions, many of which were affiliates of the AFL. In most cases, however, employers ignored the law and fought hard, often violently, against their employees. Many leading union supporters lost their jobs, while the federal government did nothing to prevent or punish these blatant violations of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The prospects for widespread gains for organized labor fizzled with the 1934 organizing defeats. But what would become of the unrest that prompted the uprisings? Lewis, Dubinsky, and Hillman hoped that it could be funneled into effective industrial unions within the AFL, making organized labor a significant national political force. The AFL’s leadership, however, did not share this vision, and very shortly after its creation the CIO began to operate, for all practical purposes, as an independent labor organization.

**AMBIGUOUS BREAKTHROUGHS**

Two months after the Supreme Court declared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in May 1935, President Roosevelt signed the
National Labor Relations Act—also known as the Wagner Act, after its chief sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner from New York—which once again guaranteed American workers the right to join unions without employer opposition. Workers were understandably wary. Likewise, while CIO officials appreciated the symbolic importance of the bill, they had no illusions that business owners would obey it. CIO leaders also faced the difficult task of convincing workers that the CIO was serious about supporting them, and that it had the power to stand up to intransigent managements.

In February 1936, rubber workers at Goodyear Tire in Akron, Ohio, forced these dynamics into the open with their fight for long-simmering demands: a measure of control over both their hours and their method of payment, and protection for union activists, who were being fired in violation of the Wagner Act. The struggle was far more complex than simply workers versus management. The CIO competed for the workers’ allegiance with an AFL union and with Goodyear’s company union, which was not an independent bargaining agent and which should have been outlawed under the Wagner Act. Rubber workers set the pace in this conflict, largely rejecting the AFL, but not entirely content with their alternatives. The CIO hoped to harness the workers’ anger and use it to establish a permanent union with a collective bargaining agreement with Goodyear, but the company was still far stronger than any union. In late March, Goodyear offered minor changes in working hours, but refused to sign a formal contract. This was an ambiguous result, like many of the CIO’s experiences in the 1930s. The rubber workers were not crushed, which was a major triumph when compared with earlier years, but by no means did the CIO create a solid institutional base in Akron, and rubber workers were without either a collective bargaining agreement or any other means to resolve their grievances.

The CIO also sought to organize steelworkers, who shared common complaints about the arbitrary power of foremen, but who also had experienced numerous routs at the hands of management, most recently in 1934. Steel was the heart of American industrial might, however, and there were half a million potential steelworker union members. Girding for battle, the CIO created the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee (SWOC) in June 1936. Funded primarily by Lewis’s UMW, SWOC ignored any AFL claims to jurisdiction over skilled steelworkers and began mass organizing.

While still technically part of the AFL, the CIO now operated independently and faced strong opposition from its parent organization. The CIO also acted on its own by supporting President Roosevelt in his successful bid for reelection in 1936. Whether or not they were influenced by the CIO’s endorsement, most working-class Americans voted for Roosevelt, and CIO leaders hoped that this display of political power would help protect the fledgling industrial union movement.

The CIO’s fortunes rose with the success in early 1937 of the famous Flint, Michigan, sit-down strike against General Motors (GM). Although it appears that most autoworkers in Flint desired greater control over their working lives, only a few were willing to risk their livelihoods by openly associating with a unionization drive sponsored by the upstart United Auto Workers (UAW). By organizing workers to stay inside factories rather than to picket outside them, UAW activists neutralized much of the power that GM (or any other intransigent employer) traditionally wielded in such conflicts. A police assault on the sit-down strikers would damage company property, and it was impossible to operate machines with strikebreakers while strikers occupied the plant. Although the Supreme Court would later declare the sit-down tactic to be an unconstitutional violation of a company’s property rights, for a brief period, refusing to leave factories tipped the balance of power in labor conflicts. The CIO was not involved in the day-to-day conduct of the Flint strike. Lewis, however, personally negotiated with GM and government officials to broker the final settlement. As a result, the CIO gained much favorable publicity and the UAW became one of its largest and most important affiliates. The UAW’s first agreement, however, proved to be more important for its symbolism than its substance. GM pledged to recognize the UAW as its labor force’s sole bargaining agent for six months, but much remained unclear about what
concrete differences that would bring in labor-management relations.

With an eye toward GM’s loss of market share during the Flint sit-down strike—the economy was experiencing a minor upswing in the midst of the Depression—U.S. Steel president Myron Taylor unexpectedly settled with SWOC in early March 1937. Once again, the agreement was an ambiguous triumph. U.S. Steel employees won a wage increase and a forty-hour workweek, but SWOC did not extract the right to be the sole bargaining agent for the company’s workers. Nevertheless, the CIO benefited from having won any concessions at all from the nation’s largest steelmaker, which had rebuffed all previous organizing campaigns. The following month, Chrysler Corporation signed a labor agreement with the UAW-CIO, and the Supreme Court declared the Wagner Act constitutional. Hundreds of thousands of workers across the country, from a staggering variety of jobs, soon joined CIO-affiliated unions. There was certainly reason to be hopeful about the future of the CIO’s industrial union project.

DAUNTING CHALLENGES

However, there were also ominous developments. Ford Motor Company violently resisted UAW organizing efforts, and the Roosevelt administration failed to enforce the Wagner Act. Likewise, smaller steel companies fought successfully, sometimes lethally, against SWOC’s efforts to complete organization in steel. These campaigns drained resources from the CIO, which, despite increasing its institutional presence around the country, was often unable to offer adequate support to the masses of hopeful workers in other industries who had recently joined unions. The CIO also relied heavily on organizers, and top leaders in a few affiliated unions, who were members of the Communist Party. Communist union activists, perhaps a quarter of the CIO organizing staff, were essential to the industrial union mission and appear almost without exception to have placed their commitment to workers above their party allegiances. Yet the presence of Communists in the CIO made the organization vulnerable to red-baiting politicians and industrialists. During the Depression years, however, top CIO officials shrugged off such attacks and utilized the Communists’ talents.

The biggest threat to the CIO proved to be the deep recession that began in late 1937. Industrial employment plummeted, severely reducing union membership and dues payments. When it officially split from the AFL in November 1938—changing its name to the Congress of Industrial Organizations—the CIO was far weaker than it had been a year earlier. The recession further emboldened anti-union employers like Ford and Republic Steel to flaunt the Wagner Act, the AFL continued its counterattack against what it considered to be the CIO’s renegade operations, and John L. Lewis assumed increasing, often erratic, control of the CIO while still leading the UMW. It is unclear how many workers still belonged to CIO unions in late 1938, but it seems certain that the numbers were far lower than those released by CIO officials.

As the defense buildup for World War II brought the nation out of the Great Depression, the CIO’s prospects for survival increased dramatically. The war years, indeed, would bring relative institutional stability, but with many constraints on union behavior. The central question continued to be whether or not industrial unionism, through the CIO, could maintain a lasting presence and improve the lives of millions of American workers. The jury remained out as the Depression ended. The alternative, however, seemed to be the grim, arbitrary autocracy that had prompted unionization. Adding to the complexity, while the CIO sought better lives for masses of Americans, the working class itself was not united. Improving opportunities for all workers would require serious challenges to racial and gender discrimination, hierarchies that were dear to many members of CIO unions. The CIO, indeed, faced daunting challenges.

See Also: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; DUBINSKY, DAVID; HILLMAN, SIDNEY; LEWIS, JOHN L.; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (WAGNER ACT); SIT-DOWN STRIKES; STEEL WORKERS’ ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (SWOC); UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS (UAW); UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).
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CONSERVATION MOVEMENT

Popular wisdom has it that in times of scarcity or economic contraction the relative luxury of land or resource conservation loses its viability and appeal. Yet, during the Great Depression, the conservation movement, which had reached an apogee during the Progressive era, continued within a core of organizations and especially within the federal government to evolve as the New Deal linked conservation projects with its relief programs.

The Depression in agriculture that accompanied the end of World War I had drawn the attention of economists and agricultural planners to the challenges of inefficient agriculture and overproduction. Agricultural economists and politicians had spent the 1920s casting about for a solution to deflated commodity prices, and most had been attracted to the idea of parity price controls and government intervention in the marketing of agricultural surpluses. Yet, with the onset of nationwide Depression in 1929, and especially by 1931, many of the most progressive of the nation’s planners and agricultural economists had begun to discuss land utilization and overproduction as the most pressing concerns facing American agriculture. The leading thinkers of this latter group, M. L. Wilson, Rexford G. Tugwell, Henry A. Wallace, and L. C. Gray, entered the upper ranks of the agricultural establishment after the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and they were pivotal in determining federal conservation policy during the Depression. The principal accomplishments of the conservation movement during the 1930s took place mostly within the programs of federal government through the coordination of forward-thinking policymakers.

FEDERAL CONSERVATION PROJECTS

Tugwell suggested in 1934 that the moment for action on conservation measures had arrived, not only because of the national emergency and its economic causes, but also because of the new leadership in which the American people had placed their trust. Roosevelt was a natural leader for conservationist thinking in government because of his concern for the conservation of resources and the efficiency of agriculture and forestry, which he had demonstrated during his career as a farmer and politician in New York state. In a speech in Montgomery, Alabama, in January 1933 the incoming president encompassed many of his ideas about conservation and planning: “We have an opportunity of setting an example of planning not just for ourselves but for the generations to come, tying in industry and agriculture and forestry and flood prevention, tying them all into a unified whole . . . so that we can afford better opportunities and better places for living for millions of yet unborn, in the days to come.”

The continuation of the conservation movement during the Great Depression was most evi-
Conservation workers plant trees in 1937 to promote reforestation in support of the Withlacoochee Land Use Project in Florida.

Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

dent in federal land use planning, and the conservation projects of the New Deal were deeply rooted in progressive ideas about efficient land use that had characterized the early twentieth century. Significant among these was the identification and retirement of so-called submarginal land (agricultural land unsuited for the purposes for which it was being used), a project that began in divisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). Retiring surplus, unprofitable farmland from production had been an element of New York’s land use planning programs under Governor Roosevelt during the 1920s, but not until the New Deal did federal agencies embrace the idea of promoting similar reforms in land use. In 1935, the Tugwell’s Resettlement Administration took over the land utilization and land retirement work of the AAA and FERA, and attempted, in spite of widespread opposition, to conserve human and natural resources through the reorganization of the agricultural landscape.

Another corrective conservation measure, the Shelterbelt Project, was in part a response to the dust storms of the mid-1930s. The Shelterbelt was designed to include the planting of over two hundred million trees along the country’s 100th meridian as a means of moderating drought and reducing dust storms, thus protecting crops and livestock.

Soil conservation was no less important to the prevention of dust storms and agricultural ineffi-
ciency, and shortly after $5 million was allotted to erosion control in 1933, Ickes created the Soil Erosion Service (SES) in the Department of Interior, where it developed into an agency committed to spreading the use of such techniques as contour plowing and strip farming. With a 1934 study the SES drew attention to the plague of erosion, reporting that within the United States only 578 million of over two billion acres were unaffected by soil loss. In March 1935 the SES was transferred to the Department of Agriculture and renamed the Soil Conservation Service. In 1936, in response to the growing awareness of the destructive powers of erosion, Congress passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which offered inducements to farmers for replacing soil-draining commercial crops like cotton, wheat, or corn with grasses and legumes that returned nutrients to the soil and remained rooted in the soil yearlong. This legislative descendent of the AAA linked conservation to the earlier aims of reducing production, and it gave soil protection a permanent place in government.

Regional planning was no less important a part of the federal agenda during the New Deal, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) embodied regional planning through the development of dams that provided flood control and generated electricity, the construction of new highways, and agricultural reforms that combined to transform the economic life of the region. Though no other regions received as much reorganization as the Tennessee Valley, this model of intensive regional planning informed national policies elsewhere.

The nation’s forests were another subject of widespread interest among government officials, and the Forest Service’s 1933 National Plan for American Forestry recommended that the federal government begin purchasing cutover and tax-delinquent land. As a consequence, between 1933 and 1936 the federal government doubled the size of the national forest system.

Work in the national forests was performed in large part by one of Roosevelt’s, and the nation’s, favorite New Deal programs, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which was designed as a refuge for the millions of unemployed young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Corps enrollees worked on both private and public land, constructing trails, reforesting national parks and forests, working to prevent erosion, and fighting forest fires, among dozens of other pursuits. The CCC’s work offered tangible proof of the federal government’s interest in the conservation of both human and natural resources, and as it offered new opportunities to the nation’s young men it furthered the conservation agenda dramatically in the years preceding World War II.

With the national appeal of programs like the CCC and the growing attention in government to conservation issues, the historic conflict between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior over programs and power continued. During the 1930s Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes battled for control over the New Deal conservation projects. Both administrators saw the logic of combining the conservation functions of government in one department, but both also sought control over the programs. Ickes sought to change the name of the Department of the Interior to the Department of Conservation and Works, with an associated swapping of bureaus with Agriculture, but Wallace refused, arguing that the functions of forestry and soil conservation belonged with other agricultural pursuits in his department. Ultimately, in 1935 and 1936, both President Roosevelt and Congress refused to consolidate the government’s conservation programs into one department, and the distribution of conservation bureaus through the several departments remains to the present.

BEYOND GOVERNMENT

Outside government, such advocacy groups as the Sierra Club similarly worked during the Depression to forward their agenda of expanding and preserving national parks, forests, and monuments, like Death Valley, Kings Canyon, and Olympic National Park. A newcomer to the conservation movement during the Depression was the Wilderness Society, founded by a small group of wilderness advocates who rejected the growing automobility of recreation and devoted themselves to the preservation of wilderness. One of the founding members,
Benton MacKaye, who worked for the TVA during the early 1930s, had been a primary advocate for the creation of the Appalachian Trail. MacKaye was concerned that the natural areas for which conservation activists had worked during the 1920s were being threatened by unprecedented government intrusion into conservation and recreational development. The Wilderness Society campaigned against the government’s make-work programs, such as the Shenandoah National Park’s Skyline Drive, which brought tourists—and their cars—to the wildest parts of the nation’s parks and forests.

By the end of the 1930s, hundreds of millions of acres of land had come under federal management and been improved by the labor of relief workers. The subsidies and supervision provided to agriculture and public lands through the various federal agencies meant that the landscapes of production and recreation had changed, with conservation being a new and fundamental aspect of agricultural and land-management policy within the federal government.

See Also: CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (CCC); RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION (RA); SHELTERBELT PROJECT; SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE (SCS); TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (TVA).

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CONSERVATIVE COALITION

The roots of a conservative coalition opposing the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt can be traced back to shifts in the major parties that predated the 1930s. As early as 1920, the Republican Party had jettisoned much of its progressive wing and defined itself as a more ideologically homogenous, conservative organization anchored in New England, the Midwest, and the West. The Democrats of the 1920s, for their part, were not a unified liberal party, but an ideological muddle of rural southerners and urban northerners, anti-alcohol drys and anti-Prohibition wets, nativists and immigrants, and Protestants and non-Protestants. Hungry to regain national power they had lost since the Wilson years, the Democrats’ gratitude for Franklin Roosevelt’s victory in 1932 encouraged short-term unity within the president’s party in Congress during the first hundred days. But as early as 1934, the emergence of the American Liberty League, with its support from not only Republicans but also past Democratic leaders such as 1928 presidential nominee Al Smith, showed the potential for a bipartisan coalition of conservatives unified in support of states’ rights, anticommunism, opposition to federal taxation and spending, and resistance to organized labor and civil rights.

As Roosevelt’s programs increasingly redefined the national Democrats in the 1935–1936 period as a party championing the interests of the urban, in-
dustrial working class, some veteran Democratic lawmakers from the South openly resisted the shift. Conservatives from both parties fought vainly against the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations) and Social Security Acts, and Senator Carter Glass of Virginia led successful efforts to water down the president’s “soak-the-rich” Wealth Tax Act of 1935. Roosevelt’s 1936 landslide re-election appeared to foretell a pending rout of his remaining conservative adversaries in Congress, but the unpopularity of the president’s “court-packing” bill in 1937 and the onset of a major economic recession reinvigorated conservative critics in both parties. During the 1937 session, an ever-more-formal partnership between southern Democrats and congressional Republicans, both often representing traditionalist white, rural constituencies, began to flex its legislative muscle.

In the “Conservative Manifesto” of December 1937, written mainly by North Carolina Democrat Josiah Bailey, anti-New Deal legislators from both parties attacked the sit-down strikes launched by organized labor, demanded lower taxes and a balanced federal budget, endorsed states’ rights and private property rights, and attacked relief programs for fostering permanent dependency. With the exceptions of a watered-down Wagner-Steagall National Housing Act in 1937 and the Fair Labor Standards Act the following year, most Roosevelt domestic initiatives floundered. When the president tried to reverse his political fortunes by working to defeat his conservative Democrat nemeses in party primaries, the voters repudiated him, returning anti-New Deal senators Ellison Durant, “Cotton Ed” Smith of South Carolina, Walter George of Georgia, and Millard Tydings of Maryland to Washington, and giving Republicans their greatest gains since 1928.

For all intents and purposes, the New Deal era had ended by 1938. Texas congressman Martin Dies led the House Un-American Activities Committee in headline-grabbing hearings alleging Communist influence in New Deal programs and the labor movement. Conservatives killed anti-lyching legislation, and pushed through passage of the Hatch Act, prohibiting federal employees, including relief workers, from participation in political campaigns. As the danger of world war deepened by the late 1930s, the conservative coalition’s asking price for its cooperation with the executive branch on foreign policy was the winding down of the New Deal—a price the Roosevelt administration increasingly paid. During World War II and for several decades after, as Cold War fears of communism at home and abroad mushroomed and civil rights emerged as an even more central and divisive national issue, bipartisan coalitions of conservative lawmakers would continue to act as a powerful brake on liberal presidential initiatives.

See Also: AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE; ELECTION OF 1938; NEW DEAL; RECESSION OF 1937; SUPREME COURT “PACKING” CONTROVERSY

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ROBERT F. BURK

CONSUMERISM

In the 1920s, America became a modern consumer society. The number of automobiles, radios, refrigerators, and other new appliances exploded as factories introduced mass production techniques and advertisers developed new ways of selling these goods. But reformers feared that modern consumers found themselves powerless in the face of manipulative advertising, mass technology, and a maldistribution of income. Consumers could no longer judge the quality of packaged, technically complex items simply by taste, touch, or smell, nor could they bargain over prices. Those concerns gave rise to a consumer movement in the 1920s. The movement began with the publication of Stuart Chase and F. J. Schlink’s Your Money’s Worth
(1927), a best-selling book that exposed false advertising and adulteration of nationally advertised brand-name goods. In response to this book’s success, Chase and Schlink established Consumers’ Research, the country’s first product-testing agency. Although the organization had only several thousand members, the idea that consumers needed help in reforming modern capitalism gained widespread acceptance during the Great Depression.

The Depression led to the creation of new governmental agencies dedicated to protecting consumers. Facing economic devastation and dire need, consumers wanted more for their money. Though the economy experienced massive deflation, not all prices declined as fast as wages, especially as large corporations sought to maintain prices and cut production as an attempt to stabilize profits. In addition, many manufacturers resorted to cheapening the quality of products as a way to cut costs. But the biggest problem that consumers faced during the Great Depression was lack of income. Indeed, many New Dealers believed that underconsumption resulting from a lack of mass purchasing power caused the Depression. Though capital spending fell far more than consumption, the idea of underconsumption as the country’s main economic problem had widespread popular appeal.

When President Franklin Roosevelt introduced the New Deal, he adopted a purchasing power rationale and promised an expansion of governmental authority to end underconsumption and increase purchasing power: “The aim of this whole effort is to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity.” But the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act were necessarily inflationary. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) suspended antitrust provisions to allow businesses to stabilize production and prices. As a result, the NRA codes worsened the problem of what New Dealer Gardiner Means called “administered prices.” Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act was intended to increase wages, but industry noncompliance rendered collective bargaining ineffective. The efforts of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) to increase the purchasing power of farmers by raising commodity prices was also inflationary. The initiatives of both the NRA and the AAA led to higher prices without substantially increasing national income, and higher prices threatened to undermine public support for the New Deal. As a result, Congress created new bodies to look out for the interests of consumers and to contain consumer protest.

The creation of the NRA’s Consumer Advisory Board signaled the incorporation of a progressive attitude into the New Deal and the official recognition of the importance of consumers to economic recovery. The board’s first chairman was Mary Rumsey. Born in New York in 1881 to E. H. Harriman, a railroad financier, Rumsey grew up in elite circles, but she maintained a lifelong interest in social welfare. During World War I, Rumsey helped organize community councils under the Council of National Defense. Those councils played an important role in monitoring wartime prices and served as the basis of cooperatives after the war. During the 1920s, Rumsey developed close ties to the female reform community, and she received her appointment to the Consumer Advisory Board at the behest of her close friend and roommate Frances Perkins. Rumsey, who also had the ear of Eleanor Roosevelt, appointed to the board representatives from women’s groups that were sympathetic to consumer issues, including the American Home Economics Association, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the National Consumers’ League, the Women’s Trade Union League, the League of Women Voters, and the American Association of University Women. Rumsey also appointed social scientists, such as Gardiner Means, Robert Lynd, and Paul Douglas.

In the AAA, Secretary Henry Wallace created the Consumers’ Counsel to protect consumer interests, and he appointed Frederic Howe as its first head. Howe was a leading municipal reformer who had long advocated the need for public markets. World War I was a formative experience for Howe, as it had been for Rumsey. While serving as commissioner of immigration at Ellis Island in New York Harbor, Howe wrote The High Cost of Living (1917), in which he argued that food monopolies paid farmers too little for their products and...
charged urban consumers too much. As head of the Consumers' Counsel, Howe argued that processors raised prices more than was necessary to make up the value of the processing tax, and thus gouged the American public. Howe’s theories about monopolistic pricing in the food industry, as well as in other important industrial sectors, received support from Gardiner Means, who served as Wallace’s economic adviser. In addition, liberals within the AAA, such as Moderncai Ezekiel, Louis Bean, and Jerome Frank, along with Undersecretary of Agriculture Rexford Tugwell, supported the Consumers’ Counsel’s attack on high prices, low wages, and degraded quality, which they believed to be impediments to economic recovery.

Although the NRA Consumer Advisory Board and the AAA Consumers’ Counsel were established to diffuse consumer protests, they legitimized and fueled growing activism. At the policy level, they had little impact, but at a popular level, they gave administrative endorsement to the idea of high prices as profiteering and low wages as economically unsound. In the fall of 1933, the formation of the Emergency Conference of Consumer Organizations, which represented fifty consumer groups, signaled a growing unrest, as did the hundreds of thousands of letters that citizens sent to Washington with details of economic difficulty. Especially telling were the thousands of bread wrappers that consumers sent to demonstrate what they believed to be, and what Secretary Wallace had told them were, unjustified prices. In response to increasing agitation, Eleanor Roosevelt invited the Emergency Conference of Consumer Organizations to the White House for a high profile meeting on consumer problems. One of the most vocal representatives, Leon Henderson, condemned the Consumer Advisory Board as ineffective. As the director of the remedial loan division for the Russell Sage Foundation, Henderson saw first-hand how economic necessity drove low-income wage earners into the grips of loan sharks. After the White House meeting, NRA administrator Hugh Johnson hired Henderson as an advisor on consumer problems. He was soon promoted to the post of chief of the NRA research and planning division, a position he used to continue his attack on high prices and low wages.

New Deal consumer advocates pushed for three programs. First, they sought to organize county consumer councils to create a consumer movement. In response, the NRA created the Bureau of Consumer Economic Education under the direction of economist Paul Douglas and underconsumption theorist William Trufant Foster. The bureau established councils in two hundred counties; each council included home economists and county agents, as well as housewives, wage earners, and farmers of modest means. These councils, along with women’s clubs, churches, labor unions, and other organized groups, received new government publications on consumer issues. The Consumers’ Counsel, for example, sent out tens of thousands of copies of Consumers Guide, which listed average prices for basic goods like meat, milk, and bread, and urged consumers not to pay more. Second, in addition to grassroots organizing, consumer advocates pushed for an end to price fixing in NRA codes. Finally, consumer advocates called for a government system of quality standards to provide consumers with essential product information. The Consumer Advisory Board hired well-known sociologist Robert Lynd and consumer advocate Caroline Ware to investigate the possibility of government-imposed grade labeling on the theory that even if consumers were not well organized, they could benefit from knowing more about the goods they purchased. Demands for better standards culminated in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 that required better product labeling and extended the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation to the cosmetic industry.

New Deal rhetoric aroused consumers who felt entitled to fair prices and good quality, especially during a time of serious economic need. In the spring of 1935, when record-breaking droughts caused a shortage of cattle, consumers protested rising meat prices. In cities across the country, housewives formed High Cost of Living Committees to demand price cuts on meat, milk, and bread. Regardless of the real causes for price increases, these angry consumers blamed food monopolies and demanded justice in the marketplace. Some of this movement’s leaders came from the country’s most politically radical groups, including the Communist Party, but many of the movement’s follow-
ers were ordinary housewives having a hard time making ends meet. The League of Women Shoppers, for example, was a Popular Front organization that gained a middle-class following during the meat crisis by mobilizing housewives against price increases. In Detroit, Mary Zuk, another radical activist, led housewives on a meat boycott while also helping to form the United Auto Workers.

By the late 1930s, business was forced to acknowledge the presence of a growing consumer movement as testified by the popularity of Consumers’ Research and the spread of consumer boycotts. Business Week argued that the business community should support the demands of consumer groups for a Department of the Consumer as a way to keep track of this burgeoning threat. The mobilization for World War II bolstered the consumer movement. Both New Deal consumer advocates and grassroots organizations staffed the newly created Office of Price Administration (OPA), which was set up to curb wartime inflation. Its first administrator was Leon Henderson, who implemented a national system of price controls, rationing for fair distribution, and government grade labeling. To enforce compliance, the OPA set up “little OPAs” in every community. These boards were the heirs of the NRA county councils. Though not the Department of the Consumer that advocates had desired, the OPA pushed for many of the programs that had been at the heart of the consumer movement during the Depression.

See Also: ADVERTISING IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION; HENDERSON, LEON; NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (NRA); SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

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M E G J A C O B S

COOLIDGE, CALVIN

Calvin Coolidge (July 4, 1872–January 5, 1933) was vice president of the United States in the administration of President Warren G. Harding and became president upon Harding’s death on August 2, 1923. Elected in his own right the next year, Coolidge served a full term, until March 4, 1929.

Coolidge was born and raised in Plymouth Notch, Vermont, a tiny locality, and after graduation from Amherst College in Massachusetts he moved to nearby Northampton, where he read for the law in a local law office. Passing the bar at the age of twenty-five he soon turned to Republican politics and thereafter occupied a series of local offices, eventually ascending to the houses of the state legislature, the mayoralty of Northampton, and lieutenant governor and governor of Massachusetts.

In the politics of Massachusetts Coolidge was by no means a conservative and took interest in issues of workers’ rights, voting for them during the Progressive era. He came to believe, however, that social and economic legislation had advanced too rapidly and he withdrew his support of it. As governor of Massachusetts he chose to reorganize the state’s bureaucracy, abolishing dozens of departments in the name of efficiency.

It was the Boston police strike of 1919 that catapulted Coolidge into national prominence. His statement that “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time” caught the attention of the nation.

As vice president Coolidge was almost invisible, so much so that when he became president the
nation’s reporters at first were at a loss to define his personality, not to mention his economic ideas, and took refuge in descriptions of “Silent Cal.” They predicted a tight-fisted chief executive of pure Vermont lineage. To be sure, Coolidge’s economic ideas were largely the truisms and prejudices of the time. He was against government spending to stimulate the economy. He appears to have agreed with Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon that taxation, institutional and personal, should be held at a minimum, not to stimulate spending but to encourage investment, especially by wealthy Americans. He and Mellon agreed that the wealthy needed to take chances in investment while low-income citizens should invest cautiously, in only the most conservative ways.

During Coolidge’s years in the presidency the expenditures of the federal government hovered around $3.3 billion. In 1923 the top five percent of the population received 22.89 percent of the national income and in 1929 it received 26.09 percent. Married couples with incomes below $3,500, a very comfortable income for the time, paid no taxes (leaving only 2.5 million taxpayers).

The above arrangements were no prescription for the debacle of the stock market in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression. The best that can be said for President Coolidge’s leadership was that he followed the nation’s leaders, business and financial, who beheld ever higher plateaus of prosperity. The president did not give much attention to the Federal Reserve System, presuming that everything
was all right, and when the system moved timidly against the speculation already visible in 1927, he did nothing. Against the rising numbers of holding companies and investment trusts he said little beyond telling a press conference in January, 1926, that he had spoken with William Z. Ripley of Harvard University, who was complaining about holding company excesses. The president advocated installment buying, saying it was better than allowing credit at his father’s Vermont store. He offered no criticism of the rise of brokers’ loans, relating that they were not too large, a remark that lifted stock prices the next day.

Not long before Coolidge died, he told a reporter friend that he had lived beyond his time—the Great Depression was then reaching its lowest point—which was true enough.

See Also: CAUSES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; MONETARY POLICY; REPUBLICAN PARTY; TAXATION.

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ROBERT H. FERRELL

CORCORAN, THOMAS G.

Thomas Gardiner Corcoran (December 29, 1900–December 6, 1981) was an ebullient New Deal legislative draftsman and presidential confidant. Born in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, Corcoran overcame anti-Irish prejudices to graduate at the head of his class at Brown University and the Harvard Law School, and to clerk for Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. At the Wall Street law firm of Cotton & Franklin, Corcoran handled securities issues and aimed at making his own fortune in the stocks, but he lost badly when the market crashed in 1929. In 1932 Corcoran went to Washington as a counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).

At the start of the Roosevelt administration, Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter recruited Corcoran, James M. Landis, and Benjamin V. Cohen to draft the federal Securities Act of 1933. Corcoran spent most of his time keeping peace between his brilliant but high-strung collaborators. Winning acclaim for their work, the young lawyers were dubbed the “Happy Hotdogs” for their patron. Afterwards, Landis was appointed to the Federal Trade Commission to help enforce the Securities Act, while Corcoran joined Cohen to work on other legislation. Together they drafted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. As a team, Cohen was the more innovative thinker, while Corcoran was the energetic lobbyist for their ideas. Both bachelors at the time, Corcoran and Cohen rented a large house in Georgetown and made it a social as well as political center for other liberal New Dealers.

Corcoran drew the personal attention of President Roosevelt, who nicknamed him “Tommy the Cork.” At social gatherings, Corcoran entertained the president by playing the accordion and singing Irish ballads. Roosevelt also appreciated his talents as a writer. Corcoran drafted Roosevelt’s speech accepting renomination in 1936, with its memorable imagery of a “rendezvous with destiny.” On Frankfurter’s advice, however, Roosevelt kept Corcoran and Cohen in their lower-level positions to do utility work on a range of New Deal projects rather than appoint them to the higher offices they expected. Although he worked temporarily in the Treasury and Justice departments and frequently at the White House, Corcoran spent most of his government service on the RFC’s payroll. He loyally supported Roosevelt’s efforts to enlarge the Supreme Court in 1937 and was suspected of being an instigator of the president’s efforts to purge conservative Democrats from the party in 1938.

Corcoran married his secretary, Margaret (Peggy) Dowd, in 1940, and had five children. To provide for his family he returned to private practice, anticipating that Roosevelt would name him solicitor general during this third term. But Corcoran had become too controversial and the threat of a divisive confirmation fight dissuaded Roosevelt from nominating him. Corcoran shifted from New Dealer to wheeler-dealer, growing wealthy as a Washington lobbyist who represented corporate interests on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies. Although he never held another government post, he remained close to such prominent politicians as Lyndon Johnson. Corcoran’s K street office conspicuously displayed photographs of himself and Johnson to confirm his status as an insider, along with copies of the conservative magazine National Review to reassure his clients.

See Also: COHEN, BENJAMIN V.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; SECURITIES REGULATION.

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DONALD A. RITCHIE

COSTIGAN, EDWARD

Edward Prentiss Costigan (July 1, 1874–January 17, 1939) was a U.S. senator from Colorado from 1930 to 1936. Born in Virginia, Costigan moved to Colorado when he was three years old. He became politically active as a young adult, campaigning for William McKinley in the 1896 and 1900 presidential elections. After finishing his Harvard degree and entering the bar in 1897, Costigan returned to Denver dedicated to political activism for the underprivileged and opposed to the self-interested political machines that dominated Colorado politics.

Frustrated by Republican Party conservatism, Costigan helped found the Progressive Republican
Club of Denver in 1910, which joined the new National Progressive Republican League the following year, setting the stage for Theodore Roosevelt’s third party campaign for the presidency in 1912. Costigan took a leading role in that campaign, running for governor of Colorado on the Progressive ticket and coming in a solid second.

Costigan’s political activism found full expression after the Ludlow coal strike in 1914, when he successfully acted as defense counsel to the strike leaders accused of inciting violence against the mine-employed militia. The issue served to crystallize Costigan’s developing views on the need for the fair treatment of industrial workers in the new age of industrial capitalism. With the decline of the progressive movement, Costigan felt he had no choice in 1916 but to endorse Democratic President Woodrow Wilson for re-election. Costigan was rewarded with a place on Wilson’s new Tariff Commission, on which he served until his resignation in 1928.

The onset of the Great Depression provided Costigan with a campaign issue with which to return to active political life. Fighting on the issue of Republican paralysis in the face of unprecedented nationwide poverty and economic collapse, he won a convincing victory as a Democrat in the 1930 Senate race in Colorado.

Costigan was at the forefront of legislative efforts to create a federal welfare safety net to combat the Depression in 1931 and 1932; he participated in a conference of progressive legislators in March 1931 and drew up plans for a joint federal-state program of grants-in-aid to the destitute the following November. The Costigan-La Follette bill failed in the Senate, but a less ambitious version passed in early 1932. In September 1932 Costigan became vice-chairman of a National Progressive League, which worked for the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency.

One of the most significant acts of the First Hundred Days of the Roosevelt administration in 1933 was the signing of the Federal Emergency Relief Act, which was based on the Costigan-La Follette proposals. The first allocation of aid under this act went to Colorado in recognition of Costigan’s role in passing the bill. Costigan also drew up plans for six billion dollars of federal public works, supplemented by loans and grants to states for further local construction. He was also co-sponsor of an unsuccessful anti-lynching bill, and of successful efforts to strengthen emergency banking legislation by forcing the government to guarantee bank deposits. The strain of his intensive legislative duties took its toll: Costigan suffered a stroke in 1934 that was to lead to his decision not to seek renomination to his Senate seat in 1936.

See Also: ANTI-LYNCHING LEGISLATION; FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA); HUNDRED DAYS.

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JONATHAN W. BELL

COUGHLIN, CHARLES

Charles Coughlin (October 25, 1891–October 27, 1979) was a Roman Catholic priest and a radio pioneer who used the new medium to broadcast popular but anti-Semitic and isolationist views during the Depression. Coughlin was born in Hamilton, Ontario, to Thomas and Amelia Mahoney Coughlin, pious Catholics who immersed their son in the Church. Charles attended Saint Michael’s College in Toronto, where he established himself as a strong student and a talented public speaker. The school was run by the Basilian Fathers, an order that stressed social action and justice. After graduating in 1911, Coughlin entered Saint Basil’s Seminary in Toronto. He became an ordained priest in 1916.
After seven years teaching at Assumption College outside of Windsor, Ontario, Coughlin was assigned as a parish priest to the Archdiocese of Detroit, Michigan. He served as an assistant pastor in both Kalamazoo and Detroit before securing his own parish in North Branch, Michigan. Here, in 1926, Coughlin arranged for a loan of $79,000 and oversaw the building of a new church that would seat six hundred congregants. To bolster his new church, which was known as the Shrine of the Little Flower, Coughlin purchased radio time and began broadcasting, at times right from his pulpit. By 1928, Coughlin’s popular shows had attracted numerous new congregants and pulled in enough money to fund the construction of a larger church with an 111-foot granite tower.

Detroit was one of the first cities to feel the effects of the Great Depression because the automobile industry, which was the city’s main source of employment, was hit hard by the economic downturn. Coughlin’s Sunday radio show, which by 1929 was broadcast by stations in Chicago and Cincinnati as well as Detroit, eased the pain of the Depression for many listeners. In 1930, Coughlin signed a deal with CBS to broadcast his Golden Hour of the Little Flower to a potential audience of up to forty million listeners. When Coughlin’s increasingly controversial views caused CBS to refuse to renew his contract in 1931, he established contracts with individual radio stations and continued to reach millions of listeners. Coughlin’s magazine, Social Justice, which was launched in 1936 and published until 1942, also claimed six hundred thousand subscribers.

Coughlin’s early broadcasts were delivered in a mainstream rhetorical style. By 1930, however, Coughlin’s style had changed, and he exhibited a growing obsession with the international banking industry, which he blamed for many of the nation’s problems and which he considered the bastion of Jews. He initially supported President Franklin D. Roosevelt and considered himself, erroneously, to be one of Roosevelt’s key advisors. But despite the efforts of Joseph Kennedy to bring the men together, the relationship was rocky at best. In 1934, Coughlin spearheaded the National Union for Social Justice, which was built around support of an annual living wage for workers, greater profit for farmers, and central control of the monetary system. Coughlin insisted the group was a lobbying organization only and not a third party. Yet in 1936, Coughlin, along with Dr. Francis E. Townsend and Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith, founded the Union Party. The party was based on similar principles as the NUSJ and supported the presidential bid of William Lemke of North Dakota. The party pulled in only 2 percent of the national vote, greatly hurting Coughlin’s credibility. By 1938, Coughlin’s radio broadcasts had become blatantly isolationist and anti-Semitic in tone and content, and he expressed sympathy for Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Although he continued to attract millions of listeners, Coughlin bowed to church pressure and stopped broadcasting in 1940. Under the order of his bishop, Coughlin ceased all political activity by 1942, although he was allowed to continue serving as a parish priest until 1966. He died in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, in 1979.

*See Also:* Anti-Semitism; Dictatorship, Fear of in the United States; Isolationism; Radio; Religion.

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Lisa Krissoff Boehm

**COWLEY, MALCOLM**

Malcolm Cowley (August 24, 1898–March 28, 1989) was a critic, editor, and literary historian, and the preeminent chronicler of the 1920s literary genera-
tion. Born in western Pennsylvania, Cowley grew up in Pittsburgh with a number of future literary figures, including his lifelong friend, the critic Kenneth Burke. In 1915 Cowley matriculated in Harvard, where he associated with a literary circle that included Conrad Aiken and e. e. cummings. Despite being ranked second in his class, Cowley withdrew from Harvard to drive a munitions truck for the American Field Service in France and later served in the U.S. Army. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1920.

Cowley studied French literature at the University of Montpelier from 1921 to 1922. While there, he became friends with, among others, Tristan Tzara, Louis Aragon, Ernest Hemingway, Gertrude Stein, and John Dos Passos. These were the key years described in his classic memoir *Exile’s Return* (1934). Back in the United States, Cowley did various literary jobs and wrote for the little magazines of the day.

In 1929 Cowley became literary editor of the *New Republic*, the most powerful position of its type. As Cowley became more involved with editorial responsibilities and political activities, he became a leader in the political movement leftward of American writers. In 1935 he helped organize the League of American Writers and became its vice president. Cowley was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin, but conspicuously never joined the American Communist Party. He justified the show trials, but quickly cut all Communist connections after the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. After joining the Office of Facts and Figures in 1940, Cowley was attacked for his earlier radical positions and forced to resign.

Cowley made some of the great literary discoveries of his day, most notably John Cheever, Jack Kerouac, Ken Kesey, and Larry McMurtry, and his championing of William Faulkner led to Faulkner’s rediscovery.

After World War II, Cowley became an editor at Viking where he made some of the great literary discoveries of his day, most notably Jack Kerouac, John Cheever, and Ken Kesey, and successfully championed the republication of such neglected figures as William Faulkner, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Walt Whitman. In his own work, Cowley continued to mine the veins begun in *Exile’s Return* in such autobiographical works as *The Dream of the Golden Mountain: Remembering the 1930s* (1980) and *And I Worked at the Writer’s Trade*, and such critical works as *After the Genteel Tradition* (1964) and *A Many-Windowed House* (1970).

See Also: LITERATURE.

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Mark C. Smith

**CRADLE WILL ROCK, THE**

*The Cradle Will Rock*, a modernist labor opera produced by the Federal Theatre Project, opened on June 16, 1937, and immediately made headlines. It told the story of the struggle between steel unionism and Mister Mister in Steeltown, USA, and of the middle-class members of the Liberty Committee who had prostituted themselves to Mister Mister. Composer Marc Blitzstein’s opera effectively combined vernacular speech and diverse musical styles to tell a compelling story of the pressures on professionals, artists, small business people, and union leaders to sell out, but also of the ultimate triumph of a powerful working-class movement.

Opening night came just two weeks after the Memorial Day massacre by Chicago police of supporters of the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee. Conservative opposition to the New Deal was rising in the wake of the sit-down strikes and President Roosevelt’s 1937 court-packing proposal. Works Progress Administration (WPA) arts project workers in New York conducted a one-day work stoppage on May 27, 1937, and some theater people and audiences sat down to protest threatened cuts. Responding to conservative pressures, however, the WPA announced a 30 percent staffing cut in the New York project, and, in a move aimed at *The Crad-
dle Will Rock, a suspension in the opening of any new play, musical performance, or art gallery before July 1, 1937.

Determined to see the play performed, Blitzstein, director Orson Welles, and producer John Houseman planned a performance at the Venice Theatre, twenty-one blocks north of the Maxine Elliot Theatre where they had rehearsed and expected to open in a benefit performance for the left-wing Downtown Music School. Performers Will Geer and Howard da Silva led a march uptown. Officials of the Musicians Union and Actors Equity had told their members that they could not perform, and nonprofessional relief workers feared being cut off relief if they participated. Houseman suggested that Equity members could play their roles from the audience without violating union instructions against appearing on stage. As the curtain went up in the packed house, Blitzstein was on stage alone, prepared to perform the entire opera himself. As he began to sing the lead female role of Moll, however, Olive Stanton, a relief worker, joined in and sang her part from her place in the audience. Most other cast members followed in turn to play their parts from the audience. The play was a hit and ran for another two weeks, with the actors continuing to perform from the audience with the approval of Equity. Welles and Houseman staged the play again at their new Mercury Theatre, as did amateur theater groups throughout the country. The success of The Cradle Will Rock owed much to the growth of a new left-wing working-class audience.

The Federal Theatre Project provided the opportunity for the creators of The Cradle Will Rock to develop their vision, but it did not share in its triumph due to the WPA suspension. At its height, the Federal Theatre Project staged hundreds of classical and contemporary plays, successfully implementing project director Hallie Flanagan’s vision of a “relevant theatre.”

See Also: FEDERAL THEATRE PROJECT (FTP); FLANNAGAN, HALLIE; WELLES, ORSON.

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MARTIN HALPERN

CRIME

In the popular imagination, the Great Depression is not seen as an era of violence or of criminality. Viewed through the lens of nostalgia, it is thought to be a simpler, calmer time. But nothing could be further from the truth. The early Depression saw a stunning increase in the homicide rate, and was one of the most violent periods to that point in American history. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, criminals also played an important role in American culture, with many Americans following their actions closely—and, one imagines, identifying with them on some level, despite the fear many people had of violence or of being a target of crime.

It is difficult to come by meaningful crime statistics for the period before the 1930s. The federal government only began to count crime statistics in 1930, and experts believe that crime was systematically underreported early in the century, so it is hard to make valid comparisons for property crimes, burglaries, robberies, rapes, and other criminal activity between the Great Depression and earlier periods. The significant exception is the murder rate. During the early part of the twentieth century the murder rate in the United States rose from 1.2 homicides per 100,000 people in 1900 to 6.8 in 1920. Between 1920 and 1930, it climbed again, reaching 8.8 in 1930—a higher murder rate than in the 1970s. In the early 1930s it reached a high point for the entire century, peaking at 9.7 homicides per 100,000 people in 1933, and declining afterwards for the rest of the decade.

THE CRIMINAL AS BUSINESSMAN

Why was American society so violent in the 1920s and early 1930s? The most generally accepted...
The FBI’s most wanted criminals in 1934 included (clockwise from top left) John Dillinger, Arthur Barker, Charles Arthur “Pretty Boy” Floyd, Homer Van Meter, Alvin Korpis, and Baby Face Nelson. Bettmann/CORBIS

The explanation is that rampant violence was one of the unexpected consequences of prohibition, the ban on producing, distributing, or selling intoxicating beverages that began with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1919 and the Volstead Act the next year. Bound by the fiscal conservatism of the times, the federal government quickly found that it was all but impossible to enforce prohibition. Alcohol intended for any variety of commercial or industrial purposes was re-distilled and sold as drinking liquor, produced in shops that employed sweated labor. People smuggling alcohol from other countries did a brisk business. In 1925 alone, prohibition agents shut down 172,000 illegal alcohol shops.

Most important, however, was the rise of a $2 billion illegal industry of producing and selling alcohol, run by organized crime. Paralleling the rise of the corporation, organized crime became big business during the prohibition years. Contracts
between producers, distributors and salesmen could not be enforced through any courts, and the market was highly competitive. So the bootleggers sought to make their agreements stick and eliminate their competitors through shootings, beatings, threats, and other kinds of violence. Often, Italian and Irish immigrants ran these criminal organizations, and for many they represented one of the few chances working-class ethnics had to make phenomenal amounts of money and join the American elite. Despite the extreme violence of the gangs, for many working-class Americans—especially those who resented prohibition—the wealth and notoriety of the ethnic mobs became a point of identification and pride.

The Torrio-Capone gang in Chicago was the model for this new kind of organized crime. A few months after the passage of the Volstead Act, Frankie Yale of Brooklyn, New York, executed one of Chicago’s preeminent mobsters, James “Big Jim” Colosimo. Legend has it that Johnny Torrio, one of Colosimo’s henchmen, hired Yale to commit the murder so that Torrio could diversify the gang from brothels and illegal gaming into the purchase and sale of liquor. Torrio brought in a group of hired guns from Brooklyn, one of whom was Alphonse “Al” Capone. Capone was one of the most colorful characters in Chicago’s underworld. A young man who listed his occupation on his business cards as “secondhand furniture dealer,” he ran the Chicago gang’s business to the tune of two hundred gang-related murders a year in Chicago in the mid-1920s. He was very open with reporters and the press—who covered him enthusiastically—about his role in murders, such as that of Dion O’Banion, a nemesis of the Torrio-Capone gang, in 1924. The rivalry between the Torrio-Capone gang and the O’Banions reached its peak with the St. Valentine’s Day massacre of 1929, when members of the Capone gang dressed as police officers slaughtered seven unarmed O’Banions. When Capone finally was brought down for income tax evasion, federal investigators estimated that his organization’s annual income from liquor, prostitution, loan-sharking, extortion, slot machines, and gambling was $70 million. He was truly the big businessman of the crime world, and his power seemed to mirror that of corporations during the 1920s.

With the stock market crash of 1929 came revelations of corporate malfeasance often not captured in crime statistics. The great crash may have made it appear to ordinary Americans that some kind of massive criminal operation was afoot—how else could all that money simply vanish? But while ordinary speculation and irresponsible lending decisions were primarily responsible for driving stock prices sky-high during the bubble, there were speculative “bull pools” and insider trading operations. There were also white-collar criminals like Ivar Kreuger, a Swedish mogul who ran the International Match Company, which sold $150 million worth of stock before being revealed as little more than Ponzi scheme in the crash.

THE CRIMINAL AS FOLK HERO

The early 1930s saw a dramatic acceleration of violent crime—murders, robberies, and kidnappings alike. The late days of prohibition may have been one cause, and the social dislocation of the Depression another. The baby of aviation celebrity Charles A. Lindbergh was kidnapped and murdered. Businessmen were kidnapped and held for ransom. The Barker-Karpis Gang stole $240,000 from the Cloud County Bank at Condordia, Kansas.

But the imagination of the American public was especially captivated in the early 1930s by a pair of robbers who drove the back roads of Texas, holding up banks and stores: Clyde Barrow and Bonnie Parker. The young duo met in 1930, as the Depression swept across the country. Parker, born to a poor family in West Dallas, had waited tables as a teenager in the late 1920s. Barrow had grown up in a desperately poor family outside of Dallas, and was involved in car theft and robbery as a teen in the late 1920s. They met, fell in love, and—though separated for two years by imprisonment—embarked in 1932 on a series of bank robberies and hold-ups at stores such as the Piggly Wiggly, which would lead to the deaths of twelve people and the wounding of several more.

Bonnie and Clyde were on the run for a year and a half, driving aimlessly through Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas (Barrow wrote a letter to Henry Ford, telling him that the Ford was the best car ever made), committing robberies and killing...
police officers and paying occasional visits to family members, to whom they were deeply attached. In May 1934, they were ambushed and shot in Louisiana. Bonnie was twenty-three years old at the time of her death, and Clyde was twenty-five. Quickly, they became legends. Before being killed, Bonnie had already started to contribute to the story of their nihilistic romance, writing “The Ballad of Bonnie and Clyde” and other poems in the country-ballad tradition celebrating her hopeless life on the road. After their deaths, crowds gathered around the ambush site to seek bits of the bullets that had killed them, and their funerals were mass public events.

Bonnie and Clyde were not the only violent criminals to gain a public following. There were other bank robbers and criminals who became almost like folk heroes in the early 1930s. Charles Arthur “Pretty Boy” Floyd was the son of a tenant farmer, born in Georgia and raised in Arkansas. He stole from banks and acquired the status of a Robin Hood figure, with the desperation of a small farmer in the Great Depression. George “Machine Gun” Kelly gained his notoriety by kidnapping Charles F. Urschel, an Oklahoma City oil millionaire. John Dillinger, scion of a strict Indianapolis grocer, became a juvenile delinquent at an early age, leading a child gang known as the Dirty Dozen. The Dillinger Gang was one of the best known bank-robbing gangs of the early 1930s. It flaunted authority and mocked the F.B.I. and the police, and the gang members claimed legitimacy by presenting themselves as the people’s thieves. As Henry Pierpont, one member of the gang, said, “I stole from the banks who stole from the people.” F.B.I. agents shot Dillinger down in front of Chicago’s Biograph Theater in the summer of 1934. He had had plastic surgery while on the run, however, and as befits a larger than life legend, there were many people who doubted that he had really died.

Although it is difficult to know why certain figures attract so much more cultural attention than others, it does seem that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, each historical era had the criminals best suited to it. For people in the business-crazed world of the late 1920s, there was little to separate legitimate business from crime. Figures like Al Capone dramatized the violent competition of the free market and represented the anarchic dimensions of market hysteria. In the early years of the Depression, the evaporation of possibility, the dire poverty of unemployment, and the absence of direction exemplified by the wandering rage of Bonnie and Clyde struck a deep chord in people across the country, for whom the young, desperate, and doomed pair seemed less violent murderers than star-crossed lovers, outmatched by the law. The violence of the early Depression began to decline later in the decade, as liquor became legal once again, mob activity declined, and political activism began to replace the fear and uncertainty of the early 1930s. But the spike in violence of the early 1930s should make people who rhapsodize about the calm and social cohesion of the past think twice, for the chaos and criminality of the era—both its famous criminals and its less well-known high crime rate—easily match the crime waves of the more recent past.

See Also: “BALLAD OF PRETTY BOY FLOYD”; BONNIE AND CLYDE (BONNIE PARKER AND CLYDE BARROW); CAPONE, AL; HEROES; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PROHIBITION.

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Kim Phillips-Fein
CROSBY, BING. See MUSIC; RADIO.

CULTURE AND THE CRISIS

Culture and the Crisis: An Open Letter to the Writers, Artists, Teachers, Physicians, Engineers, Scientists, and Other Professional Workers of America was an influential pamphlet-manifesto issued in 1932 by the League of Professional Groups. Its immediate goal was to boost support among American professionals for the Communist Party’s 1932 presidential ticket of William Z. Foster and James W. Ford. The pamphlet maintained that the Communist candidates alone acknowledged the collapse of capitalism behind the suffering of the Great Depression. The pamphlet struck a more distinctive note in arguing that only a Communist America would allow professionals freedom in the studio, classroom, or lab. Professionals composed a social class in their own right, one distinct from the class of “muscle workers” and that of the “irresponsible businessmen.” The economic crisis presented this class of professional “brain workers” with the historic opportunity to join with their “true comrades,” the muscle workers, and to liberate themselves from “false money-standards.”

Historians justly remember Culture and the Crisis for signaling the radical turn of American literature in the early 1930s. Sherwood Anderson, Malcolm Cowley, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, Waldo Frank, Langston Hughes, and Edmund Wilson were among the fifty-two signatories willing to declare their intent to vote Communist. No less significant, however, is the pamphlet’s trailblazing effort to theorize the rise of a technical-intellectual “New Class” in modern society, a central concern of social theory beginning in the 1970s. Culture and the Crisis is also notable for predicting the focus on the political economy of culture that would characterize the Popular Front years of 1935 to 1939, and for announcing what Michael Denning calls the “cultural front” of mid-century America, “the terrain where the Popular Front social movement met the cultural apparatus during the age of the CIO” (Congress of Industrial Organizations).

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.; LITERATURE; POPULAR FRONT; SOCIALIST PARTY.

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WILLIAM J. MAXWELL

CUMMINGS, HOMER

Homer Stille Cummings (April 30, 1870–September 10, 1956) was the attorney general of the United States from March 4, 1933, to January 2, 1939. Born in Chicago, he took his undergraduate and law degrees from Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. He developed a successful trial practice in Stamford, Connecticut, founding the firm of Cummings and Lockwood in 1909. Always active in Democratic politics, Cummings was a floor leader in support of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, and was rewarded with the attorney generalship.

While in office Cummings sponsored a number of reforms, which included establishing uniform rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts and expanding the functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He secured legislation beefing up federal authority over firearms and such interstate crimes as kidnapping and bank robbery, and his penal reforms included the establishment of the penitentiary at Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay. Yet while he successfully defended the administration’s monetary policy in the “gold clause” cases, his department was unable to replicate the feat in cases challenging such central New Deal programs as the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. These frustrations prompted President Roosevelt to instruct Cummings to draft the ill-fated Court-packing bill, which was introduced in 1937.

History’s judgment of Cummings’s tenure has not been altogether favorable. Many prominent
New Dealers criticized the quality of legal work produced by Cummings’s staff. The department, they complained, was staffed with too many political appointees and too few able lawyers. Nor did Cummings enjoy the confidence of the justices of the Supreme Court. Associate justices Louis Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone each expressed to Roosevelt concern over the department’s competence. At the height of the Court-packing fight, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes privately complained to New Deal Senator Burton Wheeler that under Cummings’s supervision New Deal statutes had been poorly drafted and the briefs and arguments offered in their defense badly drawn and poorly presented. Had the office been occupied by a different attorney general, Hughes suggested, the troubled history of New Deal legislation might have been quite different.

Cummings resigned in January of 1939. He remained in Washington, where he practiced law until his death.

See Also: LAW ENFORCEMENT; SUPREME COURT “PACKING” CONTROVERSY.

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BARRY CUSHMAN

CURRIE, LAUCHLIN

Lauchlin Currie (October 8, 1902–December 23, 1993) was born in a small fishing village in Nova Scotia, Canada, where his father owned a fleet of vessels. When his father died in 1906 his family moved to the town of Bridgewater, but Currie’s early schooling also included short periods in Massachusetts and California. After two years at St. Francis Xavier’s University, Nova Scotia (1920–1922), Currie studied at the London School of Economics (1922–1925) where his teachers included Edwin Cannan, Hugh Dalton, A. L. Bowley, and Harold Laski. In 1925 Currie joined Harvard’s graduate program, where his chief inspiration was Allyn Abbott Young. His Ph.D. was on banking theory, and he remained at Harvard until 1934 as assistant to, successively, Ralph Hawtrey, John H. Williams, and Joseph Schumpeter. In 1934 he became a U.S. citizen and joined Jacob Viner’s famous “freshman brain trust” at the U.S. Treasury. There he outlined an “ideal” monetary system for the United States (including a 100 percent reserve banking plan) and teamed up with Marriner Eccles shortly before the latter became governor of the Federal Reserve Board (November 1934). Eccles recruited Currie as his personal assistant.

At the Fed Currie drafted what became the 1935 Banking Act, which created a true central bank for the United States with increased control over money. At Harvard he had bitterly attacked Fed policy, blaming its “commercial loan theory” of banking (or real bills doctrine) for monetary tightening at a time when the economy was already declining (mid-1929), and then for its passivity in the face of mass liquidations and bank failures from 1929 to 1933. In a January 1932 Harvard memorandum on anti-Depression policy, Currie and two fellow instructors, Harry Dexter White and Paul T. Ellsworth, urged large fiscal deficits, open-market operations to expand bank reserves, the removal of tariffs, and the relief of inter-allied debts. White, another “freshman brain trust” recruit in 1934, became top adviser (and later the assistant secretary) to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. White and Currie worked closely in their respective roles at the Treasury and Fed, from 1934 to 1939, and also after 1939 when President Roosevelt appointed Currie as his White House adviser on economic affairs.

At the Fed Currie constructed an important “net federal income-creating expenditure series” to show the influence of fiscal policy in acute Depression. When, after four years of recovery, the economy declined sharply in 1937, he was able to explain to President Roosevelt, in an unprecedented four-hour interview, how damaging was the declared
aim of balancing the budget “to restore business confidence.” This dialogue was part of the “struggle for the soul of FDR” between Secretary Morgenthau and Governor Eccles. At first the president sided with Morgenthau and disaster followed. Not until April 1938, after the worst period of his long tenure in the White House, did Roosevelt at last ask Congress for more than $3 billion of spending on relief and public works. In May 1939 Currie joined Harvard’s Alvin Hansen in testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) to explain the additions and offsets to the circular flow of income and expenditure and the role of government in stabilizing this flow at full employment.

As the White House economist from July 1939, Currie advised on budgetary policy, social security, and peacetime and wartime production plans. In March 1940, at the President’s request, he prepared a lengthy Memorandum on Full Employment Policy that attempted to allay the President’s fears that the large expenditures being planned for defense, housing and social security were economically unsound. Currie wrote: “I have come to suspect that you are somewhat bothered by the apparent conflict between the humanitarian and social aims of the New Deal and the dictates of ‘sound economics.’ I feel convinced that in place of conflict there is really complete harmony and for that reason only the New Deal can solve the economic problem.”

After a mission to China in January 1941 Currie advised that China be added to the lend-lease program, which he then administered. In 1943 and 1944 he ran the Foreign Economic Administration, and in early 1945 he headed a mission to Switzerland to secure the freezing of Nazi assets. After the war Currie was one of those blamed for “losing” China. It was also alleged that he had participated in wartime Soviet espionage. No charges were laid and in 1949 and 1950 he headed an important World Bank mission to Colombia. He stayed on to advise on the implementation of his report. He assumed Colombian citizenship in 1958 and was the country’s leading economic adviser until his death in 1993. Currie’s extensive collected papers are archived at Duke University’s Special Collections.

See Also: BRAIN(S) TRUST; ECCLES, MARRINER; FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; MONETARY POLICY.

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DAVIS, CHESTER

Born in rural Iowa, Chester C. Davis (November 17, 1887–September 25, 1975) graduated from Grinnell College in 1911 and became a journalist in South Dakota and Montana. While editor of the Bozeman Weekly Courier, Davis became seriously interested in farm issues and his career in journalism yielded to agricultural advocacy instead. He became editor of the Montana Farmer in 1917, involved himself in various agricultural groups, and won gubernatorial appointment as Montana’s commissioner of agriculture and labor in 1921.

Sharply analytical, full of reformist ideas, and demonstrating patience and executive skill, Davis earned the confidence of farmers. In the 1920s, he joined farm advocate George N. Peek in the campaign for national farm parity, a formula designed to improve farmers’ purchasing power, and worked for passage of the doomed McNary-Haagen bills, which would have authorized federal acquisition of farm commodities. Success proved elusive until the onetime Republican joined the farmer-friendly New Deal administration of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933.

When George Peek became head of the new Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), he turned to Davis to run the AAA’s Production Division. They were joined by others who saw the AAA’s task as primarily to raise prices for farm commodities, a view not shared by socially conscious liberals in the AAA’s Legal Division and Consumers Counsel who wanted justice for farm tenants. When internecine conflict in the AAA forced Peek out by the end of 1933, he was replaced by Davis, whose personality seemed better suited to mitigate differences within the agency. However, more than a year later—in early 1935—when the Legal Division tried to reinterpret a controversial section of the AAA’s cotton contract for 1934 and 1935 in favor of retention of the same tenants on plantations despite acreage reduction, an angry Davis, with the pragmatic support of Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, fired a number of liberals in both the Legal Division and Consumers Counsel. Both Wallace and Davis knew that the agency could not alienate the conservative landlord establishment in or out of government. Davis even believed that Wallace would be forced out of the cabinet if the firings were not sustained.

Davis left the AAA in 1936 but continued to hold a series of federal positions, including membership on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, War Food Administrator (briefly) during World War II, and advisor to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Active in postwar famine relief and European reconstruction, he also
served as associate director of the Ford Foundation, working with programs in India and Pakistan. Davis retired in the 1950s and died in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in 1975.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); WALLACE, HENRY A.

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DEFICIT SPENDING

The Great Depression marked a turning point in America’s fiscal history. Prior to the 1930s, balanced federal budgets in which tax receipts exceeded expenditure were the norm, but thereafter they have been rare. The unbroken sequence of unbalanced budgets that operated from fiscal year 1931 to fiscal year 1947 heralded the predominance of deficit budgets in the second half of the twentieth century. In contrast to the post-World War II period, however, Depression-era fiscal policy was only belatedly influenced by the new Keynesian economic theories.

The budget moved from a $734 million surplus in fiscal year 1929 to a $2.7 billion deficit in fiscal year 1932. President Herbert Hoover initially regarded deficits as a short-term necessity while the economy underwent correction. Under his lead, Congress cut taxes, increased public-works spending, and established loan programs to assist state and local public works and state unemployment relief. These measures were utterly insufficient to boost recovery, but Hoover held back from large-scale deficit spending for fear of engendering big government. Moreover, the tax-increasing Revenue Act of 1932 vainly attempted to restore balanced-budget orthodoxy so that government borrowing would not crowd out business from tight credit markets. Its reduction of purchasing power only aggravated economic decline with the consequence that the deficit remained stubbornly high.

Hoover came under attack most often not for the inadequacy of his deficit spending but for its excess. Business leaders feared that unbalanced budgets would have severe inflationary consequences if government expanded the money supply to ease its borrowing requirements. To the mass public, deficits were evidence of government extravagance and mismanagement. In the 1932 presidential election, therefore, economic and political considerations induced Democratic candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt to promise that his administration would balance the budget.

The core ideas of what became known as Keynesianism—that consumption rather than investment drove economic growth and that public spending could stimulate mass purchasing power when the private economy was in recession—had few adherents. In the 1890s, University of Pennsylvania economist Simon Patten had pioneered the idea that increased consumption was the foundation for economic well-being, a view later promoted by his students, Wesley Mitchell and Rexford Tugwell, and journalist Stuart Chase in the 1920s and 1930s. Meanwhile, lay analysts William Trufant Foster and Waddill Catchings turned the conventional economic belief that consumption was the result of production on its head in a number of popular tracts, such as Plenty (1925), Business without a Buyer (1927), and The Road to Plenty (1928). They further contended that government spending was the best means to counteract recession when many people lacked private income to spend. British economist John Maynard Keynes promoted similar views in works like The Means to Prosperity (1933). “Too good to be true—You can’t get something for nothing,” Roosevelt had commented in the margin of his copy of The Road to Plenty. He was
Similarly unimpressed with Keynes, whom he dubbed “a mathematician rather than a political economist” after their 1934 meeting.

Nevertheless, Roosevelt had no more success than Hoover in balancing the budget. New Deal emergency spending on public works, relief, and rural programs drove up federal outlays to $6.6 billion in fiscal year 1934 and $8.2 billion in fiscal year 1936, well above Hoover’s largest budget of $4.7 billion in fiscal year 1932. Tax revenues could not cover this expansion in a depressed economy, so the deficit grew to $4.3 billion in fiscal year 1936 compared with $2.6 billion in Hoover’s fiscal year 1933 budget. Ever mindful of his campaign pledge, Roosevelt viewed the New Deal deficits as an embarrassment rather than an instrument for recovery. Accordingly, he repeatedly raised taxes—both direct and indirect—and was a reluctant spender. Significantly, congressional enactment over the presidential veto of a $2.2 billion appropriation for immediate payment of the World War I veterans’ bonus helped make the fiscal year 1936 deficit the largest operated by the New Deal. The true measure of New Deal fiscal activism was not the actual deficit but the full-employment deficit that would have accrued had the economy been operating to its full potential. This hypothetical index differentiates between intentional policy and the effect of depressed economic activity on the tax base. It reveals that only four New Deal budgets—fiscal years 1934, 1936, 1939, and 1940—operated expansionary deficits, while the others provided no greater stimulus than Hoover’s budgets of fiscal years 1930 to 1932. Moreover, in contrast to Hoover, Roosevelt could have operated larger deficits without fear of driving up interest rates because the early New Deal had liberated monetary and credit policy from Federal Reserve control.

In 1937 Roosevelt’s fiscal orthodoxy prompted his decision to balance the fiscal year 1938 budget as an anti-inflation precaution in advance of full recovery. The reduction of federal spending coincided with the first collection of the social security taxes, which sucked purchasing power from the economy, and the tightening of monetary policy. The combined effect of these three actions tipped the recovering economy into deep recession. Roosevelt now faced a stark choice of adhering to orthodoxy or spending his way out of recession. Conservative advisers led by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau insisted that a balanced budget was vital to restore business confidence. Conversely, Federal Reserve chairman Marriner Eccles, a longtime advocate of counter-cyclical policy, warned that only deficit spending would restore purchasing power in the economy. The effort to speed recovery by placating business, he told Roosevelt, had “borne no fruits in either dollar terms or goodwill.” Once a lone voice, Eccles now found himself at the center of a group of liberal New Dealers whom the recession had converted to the same cause. These included such cabinet members as Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and Henry Wallace, as well as younger officials spread throughout the federal bureaucracy, such as Laughlan Currie, Mordecai Ezekiel, Leon Henderson, and Aubrey Williams. They found theoretical justification in Keynes’s recently published master work, *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936), which contended that in advanced industrial economies permanent deficits were needed to boost consumption and full employment.

The battle for the president’s ear ended in victory for the spenders. Though unconvinced about permanent deficits, Roosevelt adopted Keynesian remedies against the recession and justified these with Keynesian rhetoric. In April 1938 he recommended that Congress appropriate $3 billion for emergency spending and credit programs without corollary tax increases to boost “the purchasing power of the Nation.” Federal spending consequently rose beyond $9 billion in both fiscal years 1939 and 1940, and the deficit grew from $0.1 billion in fiscal year 1938 to $2.8 billion in fiscal year 1939.

In marked contrast to the early New Deal, the later New Deal adopted deficit spending as its principal weapon against recession. Presidential statements that routinely justified deficits as necessary to compensate for underconsumption helped to break down the public’s antipathy to unbalanced budgets. By 1940 important socioeconomic groups, including farmers and organized labor, had come to regard fiscal activism as essential. Deficit spending
also acquired intellectual legitimacy with the growing acceptance of Keynesian doctrine among professional economists. However the triumph of the new thinking was far from complete. Lacking a strategy to determine the requisite level of compensatory finance, the New Deal deficits of fiscal years 1939 and 1940 were too small to generate full recovery, which had to await the expansion of defense expenditure in 1941. Moreover, a congressional coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats had been emboldened by liberal reverses in the recession-affected 1938 midterm elections to enact reductions in New Deal appropriations in 1939. For this group, deficits had become a political evil as the embodiment of big government.

America’s experience in World War II finally institutionalized deficit spending as national economic policy. Driven by military needs, the federal deficit skyrocketed from $6.2 billion in fiscal year 1941 to $57.4 billion in fiscal year 1943. The conjunction of massive deficits and dramatic growth of the economy by 56 percent between 1941 and 1945 seemingly provided justification of Keynesian theory, even in the eyes of business leaders. This was the foundation for enactment of the Employment Act of 1946, which consolidated Roosevelt’s economic legacy. Like New Deal fiscal policy, the legislation was imprecise and limited, most notably in its failure to guarantee full employment. Nevertheless it formally mandated the federal government’s obligation to combat recession and rising unemployment and established the president as the manager of prosperity. In essence, the priority of fiscal policy had changed from protecting capital markets in 1932 to protecting and creating jobs by 1946, and deficit spending had become the essential instrument to achieve this new purpose.

See Also: ECONOMY, AMERICAN; KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD; KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS.

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DEMOCRATIC PARTY

As the oldest existing political party in the world, the Democratic Party of the United States experienced its most significant expansion in voter registration and party organization, consistent electoral success in national elections, and fundamental changes in its coalition, policy agenda, and ideology during the Great Depression. Despite Democratic presidential nominee Alfred E. Smith’s resounding defeat in the 1928 election, there was evidence of the potential for a future political realignment favoring the Democratic Party. Smith was the first Democratic presidential nominee in many years to win pluralities in the twelve largest American cities. He also carried the two most Catholic, urban states: Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The presidential election of 1928 also stimulated a sharp increase in voter registration and turnout among foreign-born citizens and the voting-age children of immigrants, especially women, who voted overwhelmingly for Smith.

After being nominated for president, Smith had designated John J. Raskob, a wealthy, Catholic, anti-prohibition or “wet,” former Republican and General Motors executive, as chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Through his vigorous fund-raising among his business contacts, Raskob succeeded in liquidating the DNC’s $1.5 million campaign debt. He also created and financed a full-time publicity division for the DNC. Its director, Charles Michelson, researched and publicized the policy behavior and statements of Republican president Herbert Hoover, the RNC chairman, and Republicans in Congress so that Raskob and other Democrats could regularly and publicly criticize and oppose Republican policies, especially after the Great Depression began in late 1929.

Nonetheless, Raskob wanted to continue to focus the efforts of the Democratic Party in general
and the DNC’s apparatus in particular on repealing the national prohibition of alcohol. By concentrating on the prohibition issue, Raskob hoped that the Democratic Party would nominate Smith for president in 1932 and adopt a platform as conservative and pro-big business as the Republican platform on economic issues. Like other conservative Democrats, Raskob blamed the worsening economic conditions on excessive spending, bureaucratic bloat, and an unbalanced federal budget by the Hoover administration.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The major obstacle to Raskob’s strategy for the 1932 presidential election was Democratic governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York. Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the navy during the Woodrow Wilson administration and as the Democratic vice presidential nominee of 1920. He had also made nominating speeches for Al Smith at the 1924 and 1928 Democratic national conventions, earning Roosevelt the respect of many Catholic Democrats. Reluctantly accepting Smith’s request that he run for governor in 1928, Roosevelt won by a narrow margin as Smith decisively lost his home state to Hoover.

Frustrated by his failed efforts throughout the 1920s to change the national Democratic Party’s organization, decision-making processes, ideology, and future economic platform, Roosevelt used his governorship and titular leadership of the New York Democratic Party as a role model for his future national party leadership as president. In order to attract the support of traditionally Republican, rural upstate New Yorkers, Roosevelt’s policy agenda included property tax relief for farmers, the construction of farm-to-market roads, and the development of state-sponsored hydroelectric power for rural areas. With James A. Farley serving as secretary and later chairman of the New York Democratic state committee, Roosevelt directed Farley and Secretary of State Edward J. Flynn to secure the removal of local Democratic chairmen in heavily Republican areas who had been collaborating with Republican politicians in exchange for patronage. The governor also encouraged Farley and Flynn to recruit Democratic candidates for state and local offices in order to provide contested elections in Republican-dominated areas and increase Democratic representation in the Republican-controlled state legislature. Shrewdly attuned to the power of publicity through modern technology, Roosevelt had Farley arrange and finance monthly radio broadcasts and later, for his 1930 reelection campaign, talking movies.

Reelected governor in 1930 with 62 percent of the votes and a winning margin of more than 167,000 votes in upstate counties, Roosevelt used his second term to develop a successful campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination of 1932. He distinguished himself as the first governor to advocate unemployment insurance and old age pensions. Roosevelt also educated himself on policy issues that were of greater concern in the South and West, such as cotton prices, railroad rates, soil and forest conservation, flood control, and rural electrification. Meanwhile, James A. Farley and Roosevelt’s aide Louis Howe traveled throughout the United States, but especially in the South and West, to lobby for delegate support for Roosevelt at the 1932 Democratic national convention. Roosevelt, Farley, and Howe assumed that most northern delegates controlled by Catholic Democratic politicians would probably vote for Smith at the convention. Consequently, their strategy was to gradually develop a consensus-building yet ideologically diverse coalition of southern conservatives and western progressives whose delegates would eventually provide Roosevelt with at least the two-thirds majority needed for the presidential nomination. But this strategy also required the pro-Roosevelt Democrats to discourage and minimize the number of favorite son and other minor presidential candidates at the convention. After they persuaded Speaker of the House John N. Garner of Texas to end his presidential candidacy in exchange for the vice-presidential nomination, Roosevelt was nominated for president on the fourth ballot.

With approximately one third of the voters identified as Democrats in 1932, Roosevelt recognized the need to attract the votes of disaffected Republicans, independents, and minor party members so that he could win a decisive victory that would provide a mandate for major policy changes and for
transforming the Democratic Party into the new majority party in the two-party system. Therefore, Roosevelt rarely used the word Republican in his post-convention campaign speeches. His policy proposals and the Democratic national platform were a dichotomous, contradictory mixture of promises to balance the federal budget, reduce bureaucratic centralization, and protect states’ rights, but also to provide vigorous presidential leadership and more federal intervention to reduce unemployment, raise farm prices, and protect Americans against the economic abuses and mistakes of banks and big business.

Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Republican president Herbert Hoover with 59 percent of the popular votes and carried forty-two states in the electoral college. Although about 65 percent of black voters supported Hoover, Roosevelt’s electoral support from white Republicans and independents was broadly distributed among income levels and various ethnic groups and between urban and rural areas. Only 25 percent of Roosevelt’s plurality in 1932 was derived from the nation’s twelve largest cities.

From 1932 until 1940, James A. Farley served as DNC chairman. Roosevelt agreed with Farley that the DNC apparatus and activities should be used to promote intra-party harmony at such events as Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners and through fund-raising efforts. For example, the Colored Division, a special division of the DNC that concentrated on black voters, cultivated the realignment of non-southern blacks from the Republican to the Democratic Party, but ignored controversial racial issues like segregation and the disfranchisement of southern blacks. Other DNC special divisions, such as those for labor, agriculture, and foreign-language ethnic groups, were used to promote the expansion and diversification of the Democratic coalition during this era.

By far, though, the most innovative, effective, and regularly active special division of the DNC from 1932 to 1940 was the Women’s Division. Mary “Molly” Dewson, director of and later adviser to this division, shrewdly realized that Democratic women could increase their status and influence in the party organization and the Roosevelt administration if they impressed the president, DNC chairman, and other male Democratic politicians with their ability to raise funds, distribute publicity, mobilize voters, and win elections. For example, in the 1936 election, the DNC Women’s Division produced and distributed about 80 percent of all Democratic campaign literature. It also published the Democratic Digest, a monthly newsletter, and increased the number of female Democratic campaign workers from approximately 73,000 in 1936 to 109,000 in 1940. Dewson used these impressive campaign accomplishments and her long-time friendships with Eleanor Roosevelt and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins to lobby and persuade the president and Farley to increase DNC funding of the Women’s Division, the representation of women on party committees and at national conventions, and the number and status of federal jobs given to women. By the time of the 1940 election, however, Edward J. Flynn replaced the disgruntled Farley as DNC chairman, Dewson had left the Women’s Division, and the DNC’s apparatus played a smaller role in campaign finances and services.

NEW DEAL

Roosevelt hoped that the New Deal’s economic policies would not only unite and satisfy the voting blocs and interest groups that elected him in 1932 but would eventually persuade enough disaffected Republican and independent voters to become loyal Democrats so that the Democratic Party would become the new majority party in the two-party system for a long time. However, after the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and similar New Deal policies that emphasized economic cooperation and planning, Roosevelt moved New Deal liberalism and the national Democratic Party in a more controversial, leftist, divisive programmatic and ideological direction that favored labor and northern urban policy interests and was more antagonistic toward big business and upper-income Americans. Roosevelt wanted this more liberal, social welfare character of his administration and party to co-opt growing grassroots support for various economic protest movements, such as those led by Huey Long and Francis Townsend, before the 1936 election. Enact-
ment of the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Wealth Tax Act of 1935 served to satisfy much of this demand for a broader redistribution of income by the federal government.

**WAGNER ACT OF 1935**

Likewise, Roosevelt’s support of the National Labor Relations (or Wagner) Act of 1935 helped to prevent the possibility of labor unions creating their own party for the 1936 election and to attract the endorsement of John L. Lewis, a Republican and the most powerful labor leader in the nation. Despite growing complaints from southern Democrats in Congress that Roosevelt’s policies and party leadership pandered to blacks, Roosevelt cultivated black voters by appointing a so-called black cabinet. This was an informal group of black federal officials who tried to reduce racial discrimination in the distribution of federal relief benefits and public works jobs. For the first time ever, a black minister delivered the opening prayer at a Democratic national convention in 1936.

No matter how controversial the New Deal and the Democratic Party under Roosevelt had become among conservatives and business interests, Roosevelt’s landslide reelection in 1936 confirmed that a political realignment had occurred. Roosevelt defeated Alfred Landon, the Republican presidential nominee, with more than 60 percent of the popular votes and carried all but two states in the electoral college. Approximately 65 percent of black voters supported Hoover in 1932, but 76 percent of them voted for Roosevelt in 1936. In addition, 80 percent of Catholics, 90 percent of Jews, and 60 percent of low-income, non-southern white Protestants voted for Roosevelt in 1936.

**REALIGNMENT**

The fact that these voting statistics signaled a partisan realignment, rather than merely a personal following for Roosevelt, is evident in the increasing number and proportion of non-southern Democratic seats in Congress as a consequence of the 1930 to 1936 congressional elections. In 1920, 82 percent of the Democratic representatives and 70 percent of the Democratic senators were southerners. By 1936, only 35 percent of the Democrats in Congress were southerners, and only 23 percent of Roosevelt’s electoral college votes in that election came from the South. Even more ominous for the decline of southern influence in the Democratic Party, the Democratic national convention of 1936 repealed the two-thirds rule. This requirement of at least a two-thirds majority of delegate votes for presidential nominations had, in effect, given the South as a region the power to reject any presidential candidate objectionable to it, especially on racial issues.

Determined to solidify the policy accomplishments of the New Deal and to further develop the national Democratic Party as a liberal party, Roosevelt became embroiled with southern Democrats in Congress on two especially divisive issues: the court reform bill of 1937 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Most southern Democrats in Congress opposed Roosevelt on both bills, claiming that his apparent attempt to “pack” the Supreme Court with liberal justices violated the spirit of the Constitution and that the minimum wage legislation would unfairly punish the South for its lower labor costs and threaten race relations by requiring southern employers to pay blacks and whites the same wages. Frustrated with the increasing intra-party opposition in Congress from southern Democrats, Roosevelt decided to dramatically enforce party discipline by attempting to “purge” several conservative southern Democratic senators by opposing their renomination in their states’ 1938 Democratic primaries. Roosevelt and his preferred Democratic candidates failed to defeat any of these senators, and the Republicans made substantial gains in the 1938 congressional elections.

After the 1938 elections, southern Democrats and Republicans in Congress cooperated with each other more openly and regularly, especially within the committee system, by forming a bipartisan conservative coalition that could prevent, defeat, or weaken any new liberal legislation. But the ever growing intra-party influence of blacks, labor unions, big city mayors, and liberal activists on Roosevelt’s presidency and the party leadership was evident in his creation of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) by an executive order in 1940. The FEPC was authorized to investigate
and prohibit racial discrimination in hiring by defense contractors.

Despite the regional and ideological diversity of Democratic support in Congress for Roosevelt’s pre-Pearl Harbor foreign and defense policies, the Democratic national convention of 1940 proved to be unusually restless and rancorous because of the controversy over the anticipation of Roosevelt’s nomination for an unprecedented third term. Former DNC chairman James A. Farley and Vice President John N. Garner both ran against Roosevelt for the presidential nomination. But Roosevelt was easily and overwhelmingly renominated on the first ballot after Chicago machine politicians organized a rousing pro-Roosevelt demonstration. By contrast, Roosevelt’s new running mate, Henry A. Wallace, was nominated by a narrow margin because of his reputation among delegates as a politically inept former Republican who was outspoken in his liberalism on race and other matters.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was reelected president in 1940 with 55 percent of the popular votes and he carried thirty-eight states in the electoral college. American entry into and participation in World War II finally ended the lingering economic effects of the Great Depression and slowed the rising southern white rebellion against the increasingly liberal, northern-dominated national Democratic Party, especially on racial issues. Nonetheless, the immediate political and economic effects of the Great Depression stimulated a realignment that enabled the Democratic Party under Franklin D. Roosevelt to transform itself into the new majority party with a broad, diverse coalition, a new ideology based on New Deal liberalism, and a policy agenda that appealed to a wide range of voting blocs and interest groups that dominated the presidency, Congress, policy making, and even the internal politics of the Republican Party until the 1970s.

See Also: DEWSON, MARY (MOLLY); ELECTION OF 1928; ELECTION OF 1930; ELECTION OF 1932; ELECTION OF 1934; ELECTION OF 1936; ELECTION OF 1938; ELECTION OF 1940; FARLEY, JAMES A.; POLITICAL REALIGNMENT; RASKOB, JOHN J.; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.; SMITH, ALFRED E.

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On April 15, 1929, Oscar Stanton De Priest (March 9, 1871–May 12, 1951) took the oath of office as representative for the First District in Illinois, becoming the first African American elected to the U.S. Congress from the North. Born in the Reconstruction South in the heyday of enfranchisement, De Priest helped to reestablish black citizenship by serving Chicago’s Loop, Gold Coast, and black South Side districts. Soon after De Priest’s historic victory, the black historian Carter G. Woodson organized a $1.50-a-plate banquet for “living congressmen” that featured three Reconstruction-era congressmen and Rep. De Priest.

Born in 1871, the light-skinned son of former slaves from Alabama, De Priest migrated with his family to Kansas when he was a child. He ran away to Ohio with a white friend at the age of seventeen and later began working as a teamster in Chicago. De Priest cut his political teeth on the Chicago Republican Party machine, winning favors from congressmen, election to the post of Cook County Commissioner, and, after building a decorating business, a seat on the city council to become Chicago’s first black alderman. When the incumbent representative in the district died, De Priest was widely assumed to be the frontrunner. The election, however, was close, in part because of an untimely fraud and vice investigation that ensnared De Priest.
in controversy. The investigation was dropped due to insufficient evidence. De Priest won the 1928 election by four thousand black votes, but lost virtually every white vote.

De Priest won instant recognition as a black congressman; he also won notoriety. Before moving to Washington, he applied to occupy offices in the House of Representatives building, but a senior congressman challenged De Priest’s assignment. Although De Priest graciously conceded, his next assignment was also challenged when a southern congressman threatened to vacate his offices rather than neighbor a black man. Liberals from the Republican Party came to De Priest’s aid. An economic conservative in the mold of Booker T. Washington, De Priest served his party in a non-ideological fashion, although he did address racial issues. He lobbied for appropriations for Howard University and pensions for ex-slaves. He also lectured at various black functions, and accepted invitations to speak on black politics to state legislatures. During his term, De Priest’s most controversial activities concerned desegregation of a congressional dining room. Although De Priest was permitted to dine, neither his black staff nor black visitors could enter, while all whites were welcomed. De Priest introduced a measure to the floor to integrate the dining room but lost in committee by a two (Republicans) to three (Democrats) vote. He blasted the decision as a betrayal of equal protection.

De Priest faced a tough reelection in 1934, primarily because of black disaffection from the Republican Party. He was opposed by Arthur Wergs Mitchell, a well-educated and astute New Deal Democrat who employed cartoons and able oratory against the De Priest campaign. At one point De Priest lost his characteristic calm demeanor and sharply criticized the black religious community, particularly local Baptists, for bolting to the Democrats with their promises of relief. Then, given Republican Party disarray in Chicago, his strategists could not regain control of the local machine, signaling voter disaffection. As part and parcel of the realignment of black voters from the Republican Party of Frederick Douglass to the New Deal coalition, Mitchell outpolled De Priest by three thousand votes in 1934. Bitter with disappointment, De Priest conducted several recounts of the ballots, but in the end graciously conceded defeat. That year he was named Man of the Year by the Chicago Defender in recognition of the esteem he received from African Americans. De Priest continued to serve in a public capacity until his death in 1951.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAUSET, CRYSTAL BIRD; MITCHELL, ARTHUR, W.

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DEWEY, THOMAS E.

Thomas Edmund Dewey (March 24, 1902–March 16, 1971) was a spectacularly successful prosecutor of racketeers, a three-term governor of New York state, and a twice unsuccessful Republican presidential candidate. Born in Owosso, Michigan, the son of a local newspaper editor, Dewey graduated from the University of Michigan and earned his law degree at Columbia University in 1925. Admitted to the bar the following year, he was an associate in the law firms of Larkin, Rathbone, and Perry (from 1925 to 1927), and MacNamara and Seymour (from 1927 to 1931). While pursuing vocal training, he met fellow vocalist Frances Ellen Hutt, whom he married in 1928. They had two sons.

Dewey entered public service in 1931 as chief assistant to United States attorney for the southern
district of New York. Establishing efficient control over that office’s administrative duties, he soon entered the courtroom, where he delivered dramatic performances anchored in tenacious examination of details gleaned from bank and telephone records, handwriting analyses, wiretaps, and interviews with hundreds of witnesses. Briefly serving as U.S. attorney in 1933, he successfully prosecuted bootlegger Waxey Gordon (Irving Wexler) for tax evasion. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt named a Democrat to the post at the end of the year, Dewey established a promising private practice.

Recalled to public service in 1935 by New York Governor Herbert Lehman, Dewey was named a special prosecutor to investigate organized crime. Over the next two and a half years, he earned fame as a “rackets buster,” winning seventy-two convictions out of seventy-three cases. Dewey and his staff were especially interested in industrial racketeering, where payoffs and bribes added as much as 20 percent to the cost of living in New York. Since 1933, Dewey had pursued Dutch Schultz (Arthur Flegenheimer), a bootlegger who had moved into the “policy” or “numbers” racket, as well as loan-sharking. Dewey’s staff was gathering evidence to prosecute Schultz when the mobster was fatally shot only two days before the date Schultz had set for Dewey’s own assassination.

While investigating racketeers’ involvement with prostitution, the special prosecutor’s staff developed a compelling case against Lucky Luciano (Salvatore Lucania, also known as Charley Lucky), the capo di tutti capi (boss of all bosses), whose major interests involved narcotics and gambling. Using his established technique of engaging minor miscreants to impugn their superiors, Dewey again captured headlines with his successful prosecution of Luciano and his co-defendants in 1936. Dewey’s account of his racket-busting years, part of an incomplete autobiography, was published a few years after his death as Twenty against the Underworld.

Dewey entered electoral politics in 1937, winning the race for district attorney for New York County, a post he held until 1943. After a widely publicized mistrial, he eventually won the conviction of Tammany boss Jimmy Hines. Defeated in the 1938 New York gubernatorial contest, Dewey failed to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1940. But in 1942, he was elected governor of New York and was reelected in 1946 and 1950. His tenure was marked by moderate progressivism, fiscal conservatism, efficient administration, and careful attention to patronage. Under his leadership, New York became the first state to legislate against racial or religious discrimination in employment. He also promoted the development of the New York State Thruway.

In 1944, the Republicans nominated Dewey for president of the United States, but incumbent Franklin D. Roosevelt won a fourth term. In 1948, Dewey again headed the Republican ticket and seemed the likely victor. However, Harry S. Truman’s attacks on the record of the Republican-dominated eightieth Congress and his now-legendary “whistle-stop” campaign out-paced Dewey’s overconfident middle-of-the-road canvass.

At the end of his third term as governor, Dewey returned to private law practice as a member of the Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer, and Wood firm in New York City. In the 1950s and 1960s, Dewey became both elder statesman and kingmaker in the Republican Party, where he was a prominent member of the eastern internationalist wing. He was instrumental in Dwight Eisenhower’s defeat of Robert Taft for the 1952 nomination, and he also fostered the political career of Richard M. Nixon. A collection of lectures Dewey delivered at Princeton University in 1950 was published in 1966 as Thomas E. Dewey and the Two-Party System. It presaged a redefined Republican Party in the wake of the Goldwater debacle in 1964.

The same meticulous attention to facts and rational analysis that brought him fame as a rackets buster and wealth in private law practice may well account for Thomas E. Dewey’s lack of success in presidential politics, where the game had come to be played in very different terms.

See Also: CRIME; LAW ENFORCEMENT; REPUBLICAN PARTY.
DEWSON, MARY (MOLLY)

Mary Williams “Molly” Dewson (February 18, 1874–October 21, 1962) was one of the most influential women in the Democratic Party in the 1930s and in Roosevelt’s New Deal administration. She held numerous posts, including serving as an advisor to the National Recovery Administration. Dewson’s service culminated with a position on the Social Security Board.

Dewson graduated from Wellesley College in Massachusetts in 1897 with a degree in social work. She was first employed by the Domestic Reform Committee of the Women’s Educational and Industrial Union, where she provided assistance to domestic workers and taught at a housekeeping school. In 1900, she took a job with the Massachusetts State Industrial School for Girls, where she worked until 1912. This work and several publications brought her to the attention of state officials, who asked her to help lead an inquiry into minimum wages for workers in Massachusetts. This project led to the nation’s first minimum wage law in 1912.

During World War I, Dewson volunteered for the American Red Cross, worked with war refugees in France, and led the Red Cross Mediterranean operations by 1918. During the 1920s, Dewson became involved with political issues in New York, as well as at the national level. She worked with Florence Kelley to push New York to adopt a minimum wage for women and children, and she lobbied successfully to limit the workweek for women to forty-eight hours. These efforts brought her to the attention of Eleanor Roosevelt. At Mrs. Roosevelt’s request, Dewson became the organizer of women for the Democratic Party, assisting in the campaigns of Al Smith in 1928 and Franklin Roosevelt in 1930 and 1932.

Due to her success in mobilizing female voters, the Democratic National Committee asked Dewson to head their Women’s Division, a full-time position she used to secure jobs for women throughout the government, including Francis Perkins’s appointment as secretary of labor. Dewson’s work in this regard stressed the importance of women playing more prominent roles in the day-to-day work of the government and the party. To this end, she organized a “Reporter” program, which educated women on New Deal issues and had a significant impact on the tremendous electoral victory of 1936.

Due to ill health, Dewson withdrew from politics in 1938 and retired to Castine, Maine, with her longtime partner, Polly Porter. Dewson was America’s first female political boss, a reformer who expanded employment opportunities for women and pushed for their equal protection under the law.

See Also: BETHUNE, MARY MCLEOD; DEMOCRATIC PARTY; NATIONAL WOMEN’S PARTY; ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR.

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LAURA J. HILTON
DICTATORSHIP

The response to the problems posed by the Great Depression in countries such as Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, and elsewhere, was the rise or tightening of dictatorial regimes to the point that dictatorship was considered by many people to be a feasible alternative to liberal democracy during the 1930s. Certain features characterized these dictatorships: the concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, a one-party system with mass membership, a secret police prepared to use terror as a tool of policy, and a control of the popular media to promote the regime’s doctrine. These features were certainly all present to varying degrees under the Nazi regime in Germany, Communism in the Soviet Union, and Fascism in Italy.

In Germany, against a backdrop of economic chaos caused by the Great Depression, Adolf Hitler, without ever winning a national election or having a popular majority, was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933, just four weeks before Franklin Roosevelt took office. Once in office Hitler employed the attributes of a dictatorship to remove domestic opposition and established the preeminence of the Nazi Party. He sought to increase industrial production, especially through rearmament and public works schemes, and so provide work for millions of unemployed Germans. Considerable scholarly debate exists over how far Hitler intended to follow the foreign policy espoused in Mein Kampf (1925) or whether he was merely pragmatic in pursuing an expansionist foreign policy during the late 1930s. In remilitarizing the Rhineland in March 1936, completing the Anschluss (unification) of Austria and Germany in February 1938, and then securing the Sudetenland in September 1938, Hitler seemed to be rectifying the perceived deficiencies of the Treaty of Versailles. This was widely popular within Germany and received tacit support abroad. Even after Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939, the quick successes of Nazi Germany in 1940 made many consider that Hitler’s dictatorship provided the way ahead.

Joseph Stalin had become leader of the Soviet Union following V. I. Lenin’s death in 1924. By 1929 Stalin had consolidated his leadership, totally overcoming opponents within the Communist Party and eliminating all organized opposition outside the party. In 1928 Stalin embarked the Soviet Union upon the first Five-Year Plan. This plan for economic growth through mass industrialization and collectivization of agriculture came under the banner of “Socialism in One Country” and saw notable achievements, such as the establishment of the city of Magnitogorsk in the Urals dedicated to steel production. This success and others seemed to show that despite Western scepticism, with Stalin as dictator Communism could avoid the problems of the Great Depression. However, the price for economic progress in the Soviet Union was extremely high. Stalin deported over ten million people to Siberia, and purged the Soviet officer corps with disastrous effect during World War II.

In Italy, Benito Mussolini, prime minister since 1922, tightened the grip of his dictatorship in the face of the Great Depression. The policy of the “Corporate State,” combined employer-employee syndicates established during the 1920s, seemed to prevent Italy from suffering the worst effects of the economic downturn. However, the regime failed to wholly implement an integrated economic program, as state investment did not begin until the 1930s and then only sporadically. Mussolini also sought to promote Italian national prestige in foreign affairs, most notably through the invasion and subsequent occupation of Abyssinia in 1935. Italy was criticized by the League of Nations and this encouraged closer collaboration with Nazi Germany. An Axis with Berlin encouraged Mussolini to claim that Italy was ready for war, despite Italian industry and military being underprepared. Indeed, when Mussolini joined the war in June 1940, Italy proved a drain on German resources.

While these three regimes would be devastated in different ways during World War II, the era of the Great Depression saw the rise of other dictatorships. The Francisco Franco regime in Spain began in 1936 and overcame the republicans in the Spanish civil war by 1939 with the support of Germany and Italy. Franco modeled his regime on Mussolini’s corporate state under a single party (the Falange), and remained in office until his death in 1975. Other dictatorships were also established
during this era in South America. The influence of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, although receiving tacit approval from the United States, became increasingly dictatorial during the period, as did the regime of President Getúlio Vargas, who had assumed power in Brazil in 1930.

Whatever the fate of the dictatorships of the 1930s their most remarkable feature was their physical and intellectual control over their own populations, which in the case of Stalin and Hitler allowed for the mass slaughter of millions of people.

See Also: DICTATORSHIP, FEAR OF IN THE UNITED STATES; EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; HITLER, ADOLF; MUSSOLINI, BENITO; STALIN, JOSEF.

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J. SIMON ROFE

DICTATORSHIP, FEAR OF IN THE UNITED STATES

Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidential administration reinvented the federal government in the United States during the Great Depression and World War II. From being a minimal state with scant taxing power, which played little role in the economy and made no effort to guarantee material or social wellbeing, the New Deal created and defined public responsibility for ensuring a minimal level of economic well-being for the American people.

The rise of the federal government was a great transformation in American life. It elicited a prolonged reaction from conservatives and from businessmen whose power it seemed to limit, while traditional liberal intellectuals were alarmed by what they perceived as the rise of a newly powerful federal government. During the New Deal years, the idea that the Roosevelt administration might become a dictatorship circulated throughout nervous conservative and liberal circles alike. The rise of fascism in Germany and Italy accentuated the fear that the National Recovery Administration and other early New Deal planning efforts might be harbingers of fascism in the United States. Especially after Roosevelt introduced his plan to expand the number of judges on the Supreme Court in 1937, conservatives sought to paint him as a politician who wished to eliminate the checks and balances provided in the Constitution. In addition, the rise of populist leaders like Huey Long of Louisiana and Father Charles Coughlin of Detroit frightened liberals and conservatives who thought that these firebrands could be fascist dictators in the making.

In reality, there was never any danger that the Roosevelt administration would become a dictatorship, nor of it sliding into fascism. In fact, the cries of dictatorship accelerated later in the New Deal, when Roosevelt undertook the kind of controversial legislation permitting the self-organization of workers—such as the Wagner Act—that Europe’s fascist governments had sought to destroy as soon as they came into power. Still, even during World War II, conservatives compared the New Deal to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. For example, David Sarnoff, the president of RCA, said in a 1943 speech criticizing wartime social legislation, “If we have learned anything from the history of the past ten years, we have learned how empty were the claims of those demagogues who wheedled away the freedoms of their people with the mirage of an all-powerful state that would provide security at the expense of liberty.”

In the early 1940s, fears about dictatorship and fascism changed into anxieties about Communism.
Ex-Trotskyist James Burnham’s *The Managerial Revolution* (1941) and Austrian exile Friedrich Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) both marked the rising level of anxiety about centralized government power. This intellectual shift transformed the anti-fascism of World War II, with its egalitarian dimensions and support of social democracy, shifting it to a more conservative politics after the war was over. Often, the measures denounced as evidence of totalitarianism were simply those that sought greater welfare state protections or an expansion of social democracy. By targeting these as dictatorial or totalitarian politics, conservatives were able to use the language of World War II to support their own aim of rolling back social democracy in the postwar period.

The new paranoia about totalitarianism afflicted liberals as well. Anxious and frustrated by the limitations and failures of the New Deal and horrified by Stalinist Russia, some liberal intellectuals in the United States began during the late Depression days to fear the rise of a brutal central state as much as the power of corporations or the plight of the poor. They became afraid that their efforts to create a welfare state would have the unintentional effect of moving the country towards dictatorship. This fear prompted many to draw back from the radical politics they had espoused in an earlier era, and to seek ways to regulate capitalism without excessively strengthening the state. This new liberal timidity and radical self-doubt was the real victory of the rising conservative reaction at the end of the New Deal. Unfounded fears of totalitarianism—which never threatened the United States—would constrain postwar liberalism, especially when it came to domestic social and economic policy.

*See Also:* AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE; CONSERVATIVE COALITION; DICTATORSHIP.

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**DILLINGER, JOHN. See CRIME.**

**DISNEY, WALT**

Walter Elias Disney (December 5, 1901–December 15, 1966) was a motion picture and television producer and entrepreneur. After a childhood and youth in the Midwest, Walt Disney entered the field of animated cartoon films in the 1920s and ultimately achieved world fame with the creation of Mickey Mouse. He went on to a long and successful career producing cartoons, feature-length films, and wildlife documentaries, then branched out into television during the 1950s and broke new ground in that medium as well. He also pioneered the concept of theme parks with Disneyland in Anaheim, California, and Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida, the latter in progress at the time of his death.

Although Disney achieved recognition in a variety of fields during his life, his lasting reputation as an artist rests on his work in animated cartoons. The Disney studio introduced technological innovations and a new level of artistic brilliance into animation, transforming a relatively crude medium into a dazzling and sophisticated form. The years of this transformation, and Walt Disney’s peak years as an artist, were the 1930s and early 1940s—a period corresponding almost exactly to the Great Depression—during which Disney produced a series of one-reel Mickey Mouse and Silly Symphony cartoons, then ambitiously tackled the making of feature-length animated films. *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs* (1937), Disney’s first full-length animated film, was a commercial success that captivated audiences and demonstrated the viability of the genre. By the early 1940s, in films like *The Old Mill* (1937), *Snow White*, and *Fantasia* (1940), the studio had established a standard of artistic excellence in animation that has never since been equaled.

The Depression years lent more than a backdrop to this creative phenomenon; they had a direct...
bearing on the process. In the early 1930s, when Disney’s explosive growth was beginning, numerous artists were drawn to his studio out of simple necessity. Veterans of the period have testified that, in those bleak economic times, jobs for artists were exceedingly scarce. Cartoonists, fine draftsmen, skilled painters, and other artists flocked to the Disney studio, grateful for a chance at steady employment. Disney, in turn, displayed an uncanny knack for assessing the varied gifts of these artists, and encouraged them to use their distinctive abilities to elevate the quality of the films.

In addition, the films themselves reflected the spirit of their time. Mickey Mouse, created in 1928, gradually achieved nationwide recognition during 1929, and thus the rise of his popularity coincided with the onset of the Depression. Mickey, with his humble barnyard origins, made an ideal mascot for an America faced with hard times; his unflagging good cheer and plucky resourcefulness seemed to symbolize the indomitable spirit of the country. In his very first film, Plane Crazy, he improvises an airplane out of an old jalopy and other found objects, and in many succeeding films he similarly makes do with whatever unlikely items may be at hand.

An even more striking morale builder was the 1933 Silly Symphony Three Little Pigs. In this immensely popular cartoon, a nation facing a figuative “wolf at the door” saw the title characters defeat their Big Bad Wolf through a combination of optimism and hard work. The Pigs and their taunting theme song, “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?” sparked a nationwide craze in 1933, and observers have often seen the film as an antidote to the Depression. Other Silly Symphonies like Grasshopper and the Ants and The Wise Little Hen (both 1934) entertainingly stressed the benefits of diligence and industry.

The happy antics of Mickey, the Pigs, and other Disney creations made life a little more bearable for millions of Americans during the 1930s. Small wonder that those same Americans continued to reward Disney with their loyal support in succeeding decades.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS.

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J. B. KAUFMAN
DOCUMENTARY FILM

The American people spent more time at the movies during the Depression years than in any other decade, and they wanted their money’s worth. Before each feature they expected to see a cartoon, a short comedy, and a newsreel.

Newsreels were the documentaries of the 1930s, and the newsreel archives are an important source of visual evidence of the period. All five major studios produced their own twice-weekly editions. Five items were generally packaged together, and few items ran for more than two minutes. The studios, ever conscious of their vulnerability to government censorship and the disapproval of powerful religious and special interest groups, favored lighthearted fare. Beauty pageants, animal acts, and novelties were staples. Many items were faked by stringers, the freelance cameramen who got paid only when their coverage appeared on the screen. So it is astounding to see the degree to which the true life of the times actually got recorded, in spite of all the obstacles.

In many newsreels, it was the voiceover narration that provided both the comedy and the political bias. Stripped of this sound, as most footage is in today’s archives, modern filmmakers use this haphazard documentation to say something more than the original filmmakers intended. It is important to keep in mind that a great deal of the most revealing material recorded at the time was never projected in theaters. Considered too gloomy and depressing to please audiences who had come to escape their own dark times, the unused footage went directly into the vaults, considered hardly worth the storage costs involved.

By 1967, when the last of the newsreel makers went out of business, the owners of these archives gave them to universities and the U.S. government in exchange for generous tax write-offs. Given the highly biased origins of the newsreels, today’s filmmakers and their audiences need to view their legacy with caution, if not outright skepticism. Yet when guided by historians and witnesses with hindsight, the material the 1930s cameramen left us can help bring the period to life in a way that printed evidence alone seldom can. This is best seen, perhaps, in the seven-part series The Great Depression, made for the Public Broadcasting Service by Blackside in 1993.

The March of Time, a newsreel-like affiliate of Time magazine that appeared in 1935, was produced by filmmakers with more serious intent. Chapters were issued monthly, ran as long as twenty minutes, and were devoted to a single topic. In 1937 the series showed the bombing of Manchuria by the Japanese. The next year a chapter called “Inside Nazi Germany” showed American audiences vivid pictures of the racial policies of a rapidly rearming future enemy. In 1939, The March of Time included film of sharecroppers in Mississippi in a pathetically unequal struggle with plantation owners. The series often resorted to dramatized recreations when reality footage could not be obtained, a practice much criticized at the time by professional observers and now considered unethical. Though the series received an Academy Award in 1937, its producers lacked the bargaining power of the studio-sponsored newsreels, and many theater managers found their audiences did not clamor for The March of Time’s tendency to present unpleasant news. The series ceased production in 1951, a decade and a half before television brought all newsreels to an end.

The early days of the Depression were also recorded by a small group of politically radical members of the New York Film and Photo League, an organization that for a short time had corresponding chapters in half a dozen other cities. Thanks to the Film and Photo League, the major protest movements of the 1930 to 1934 period can still be brought to life, though the bulk of their footage was not saved. The Museum of Modern Art in New York circulates brief compilations, silent with titles (as they were originally shown), that are powerful reminders of the days when tens of thousands of people were thronging the streets carrying banners for such “socialist” programs as unemployment insurance and subsidized public housing.

The most notable documentary filmmaker of the period was Pare Lorentz, a film critic turned producer, who persuaded the Roosevelt administration to present the need for its reform programs in films of such power and quality that they could,
and did, win widespread theatrical distribution in spite of strong film industry opposition. Lorentz’s first film, *The Plow that Broke the Plains* (1936), dramatized the disasters caused by unwise land use, a condition made all too evident by massive dust storms that swept across middle America that spring. His next film, *The River* (1937), was an equally powerful lesson about flood control, again made vividly current by news of recurring disastrous floods along the Mississippi. Building on his critical success, Lorentz and his New Deal supporters established the U.S. Film Service, which they hoped would nurture the production of still more “films of merit.” However, both of Lorentz’s films, although popular with critics and the public, were greeted by howls of protest from local and state government officials, who resented their cities and states being depicted as problem areas. Only three other films were finished and released by the U.S. Film Service, with increasingly less success.

Many contemporary viewers find both *The Plow* and *The River* flawed by the features that won them widespread critical and public acceptance at the time of their release: namely, narrations composed in Whitmanesque poetics and delivered with overwhelming stridency. But it would be a mistake to ignore the message underlying the persuasive visuals; Lorentz, in these two films of less than one half hour each, managed to state the essential philosophy of the New Deal, both its willingness to accept responsibility for correcting the sins of the past and its certainty that its methods of alleviation, its “social engineering,” would triumph over all adversity. Many contemporary environmentalists and social scientists, however, question the “solutions” presented in Lorentz’s films.

Toward the end of the 1930s, a small but growing group of filmmakers was beginning to produce documentaries that were more in line with contemporary documentary film. Film was an expensive medium, so the filmmakers were dependent on foundations or corporations for sponsorship, with the inevitable artistic and political compromises this type of partnership implies. Yet some veterans of the Film and Photo League and some who had gained experience under Lorentz managed to make a few films that are clear-eyed about the hard truths the nation faced as it reluctantly prepared for war.

Ralph Steiner and Willard Van Dyke’s *The City* (1939) remains a sharp, poignant, and even witty comment on urban society and its discontents, though its utopian solutions now seem unconvincing. Van Dyke’s *Valley Town* (1940) probes the dilemmas of automation, unemployment resulting from new technology, and social upheavals that are as baffling now as then. These films put us inside the heads and hearts of those who lived in the 1930s in a way rarely achieved in any other medium.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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GEORGE C. STONEY

DOMESTIC SERVICE

Although the Great Depression adversely affected a broad spectrum of Americans between 1929 and
1941, the economic calamity was particularly devastating for the millions of workers employed in the domestic and personal service labor force. New Deal programs did little to remedy the financial difficulties of this group. Before the 1929 stock market crash, domestic and personal service employees, such as maids, cooks, washerwomen, and laundresses, comprised 8 percent of the American workforce. The crash, along with falling manufacturing sales, increased debt, the shrinking money supply, bank failures, small business closings, tariff policies, the boll weevil epidemic, and the overproduction of agricultural goods, increased the size of the domestic and personal service sector slightly to 10 percent of the labor force by 1930.

The domestic labor force in the early twentieth century was comprised mostly of immigrants from Ireland, Eastern Europe, Mexico, Japan, and China, as well as many native-born, single white females and married and single African-American women, whose fathers, husbands, and sons faced routine periods of underemployment and unemployment. Between 1900 and 1920, native whites and immigrants from northern and western Europe made up the majority of domestics. However, a gradual racial and ethnic shift occurred during and after World War I. In the northern United States, Eastern European immigrants and African Americans began to replace German, Scandinavian, Irish, and native-born single white women as household help. As
native-born and foreign-born white females found better-paying jobs outside the domestic labor sector, the numbers of black servants increased substantially. African-American females comprised 40 percent of all female household workers in 1920, 36 percent in 1930, and 47 percent the following decade. Not surprisingly, they led in the numbers of domestics in the Jim Crow South. In the southwestern United States, Mexican and Mexican-American women comprised a large percentage of household workers. Like African-American women, they increasingly dominated the domestic and personal service sector after their white counterparts found employment opportunities elsewhere. In 1930, Latina household workers comprised 45 percent of all Mexican females employed outside the home. In major southwestern cities such as El Paso, Denver, and Albuquerque, young unmarried female domestics constituted two-thirds of all Mexican women employed outside the home.

Although women overwhelmingly dominated the domestic service sector, men also worked as household help, mainly as butlers, chauffeurs, gardeners, and cooks. Only in California and Washington state, where high numbers of Chinese male immigrants lived, did men lead in the domestic service area. For the duration of the Depression, men made up 10 percent of all household servants in the nation.

White women remained the largest segment of the female domestic service category—54 percent in 1930 and 53 percent in 1940. Still, some of them had other options. Those with skills increasingly found work in the growing female-oriented service sector economy, where they worked in nursing, education, newly created government agencies, social services, and sales, as well as in business as clerical staff. Although they dominated the domestic sector, those working as servants made up only 10 percent of the overall white female labor force.

Black women, of whom 60 percent labored as domestics, had a different experience, and found themselves at the bottom rung of the labor sector. Like their white counterparts, black wives, mothers, and sisters, attempted to supplement the meager earnings of their husbands, fathers, or brothers. During the Depression, however, they faced competition from both whites and other black women for their domestic jobs. Although the white female labor force increased by 17 percent, the black female labor force declined by 5 percent during the Depression. Given a choice, many employers preferred white domestics over black domestics. Furthermore, unemployed African-American high school and college graduates—displaced teachers, secretaries, sales consultants, and social workers—sought domestic work in growing numbers after losing their jobs. Faced with this uncertainty, African-American domestics sought alternatives.

A newly elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, with the help of advisers, unleashed a number of programs that attempted to increase industrial profits, improve consumer spending, alleviate unemployment, and relieve destitution: These programs included the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Legislation with similar aims included the National Industrial Recovery Act, which improved working conditions and wages and guaranteed employees the right to unionize; the Fair Labor Standards Act, which created maximum working hours and minimum wages; and the Social Security Act, which established unemployment compensation and retirement pensions for the unemployed. Unfortunately, this legislation excluded domestics and farm laborers because many New Dealers, especially southerners, argued that the provisions would have put undue financial strain on the employers of household help and agricultural workers. Domestics, thus, continued to experience economic contraction and widespread discrimination. Many household workers went on temporary relief, provided by such agencies as FERA and the WPA. Other disillusioned household workers abandoned domestic work altogether. Only with the entry of the United States into World War II in December 1941 did the Depression end for domestic workers.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; UNEMPLOYMENT, LEVELS OF.
DON'T BUY WHERE YOU CAN'T WORK MOVEMENT

The “Don't Buy Where You Can't Work” movement, also known as the “Buy Where You Can Work” movement, emerged in major northern U.S. cities during the Great Depression to protest black unemployment rates that often were double or triple the national average. In 1929 the Chicago newspaper the Whip, under editor Joseph Bibb, sponsored a campaign to boycott Chicago stores that refused to hire blacks. Supported by the Reverend J. C. Austin of the Pilgrim Baptist Church, the program resulted in the hiring of more than two thousand blacks, mostly as clerks in Chicago department stores.

The movement spread rapidly to other cities, drawing support from the major civil rights organizations. In 1931 black ministers, politicians, and businessmen published appeals in Harlem newspapers to follow Chicago’s example. Calls for boycotts came from the Harlem Business Men’s Club and from supporters of the black nationalist Marcus Garvey. Harlem Reverend John H. Johnson of Saint Martin’s Protestant Episcopal Church formed the Citizens League for Fair Play and used Harlem newspapers to promote its picketing efforts. In 1933 in Washington, D.C., the New Negro Alliance, Inc., created the motto “Buy Where You Work—Buy Where You Clerk.” Responding to layoffs of black workers at a Washington hamburger grill, the alliance targeted such black district stores as Kaufman department stores, the A. & P., and the High Ice Cream Company stores. Overall, the alliance developed a comprehensive agenda advocating increased black employment, opportunities for black advancement and promotion, combined African Americans’ purchasing power, and the creation of larger black businesses.

The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement had several legacies. In some cities such as New York, it helped to create hiring programs that were among the first affirmative action programs in U.S. history. The movement also provided a model for 1960s direct-action civil rights protests, such as lunch counter sit-ins, and led the way for later federal efforts to address structural unemployment and equal purchasing and earning power in black communities.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; UNEMPLOYMENT, LEVELS OF.

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BILL V. MULLEN

DOS PASSOS, JOHN

John Roderigo Dos Passos (January 14, 1896–September 28, 1970) was a prominent leftist and one of
the great writers of the Depression era. The illegitimate son of a Portuguese immigrant, Dos Passos graduated from Harvard University in 1916 and volunteered as an ambulance driver in France and Italy during World War I. In the 1920s, Dos Passos established himself as a writer of some talent with works such as Manhattan Transfer (1925). Yet he is best known for his epic 1930s trilogy, U.S.A., widely hailed by contemporaries as the great American novel. The trilogy consists of The 42nd Parallel (1930), 1919 (1932), and The Big Money (1936). An ambitious 1,200-page attempt to depict “the slice of a continent” and “the speech of the people,” U.S.A. blends the experimental modernism of the 1920s with the social novel of the 1930s. The novel consists of four different types of writing: biographical portraits of important Americans, “newsreels” quoting the headlines and popular culture of the time, “camera eye” sections of free-form prose poetry (often autobiographical in nature), and a series of interlocking narratives of a dozen fictional characters who appear rootless and directionless while trying to make their way through modern America. When combined, these sections form an elegy on the decline of American democracy in the first decades of the twentieth century and offer a sharply critical view of the dominance of “big money” in the contemporary United States.

U.S.A. won the respect of literary critics, and it also achieved political significance in the 1930s as the Popular Front coalition of Communists and liberals adopted it as essential reading. Dos Passos, however, had professed left-wing ideas prior to the Great Depression; in fact, it was the execution of Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in 1927 that radicalized him. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Dos Passos was close to the Communist Party. He helped found the Communist literary magazine New Masses, and he famously denounced the Socialist Party as “near beer.” In 1931, along with a number of other writers, Dos Passos traveled to Harlan County in Kentucky to publicize the unjust working conditions of striking miners. Dos Passos also helped organize American support for the antifascist side in the Spanish civil war. He traveled to Spain in 1937, where he learned of the brutality of Stalinist Communists who secretly used ruthless tactics against their antifascist al-

lies. After hearing of the murder of a friend by Spanish Communists, Dos Passos drifted away from the left in the late 1930s.

After Dos Passos publicly criticized the Communists, the New Masses suddenly declared Ernest Hemingway a better writer than Dos Passos. After the 1930s, Dos Passos turned toward conservative politics, associating himself with the National Review and writing a right-wing counter-trilogy to U.S.A. Dos Passos’s literary reputation suffered as his right-wing turn discredited his work among liberals and his new conservative friends had little liking for his earlier leftist work. Thus, after the 1930s, too many forgot that Dos Passos’s U.S.A. is one of a select number of works worthy of the title “great American novel.”

See Also: LITERATURE; SPANISH CIVIL WAR.

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William Orville Douglas (1898–1980), Supreme Court justice, was born in Maine, Minnesota, the second of the three children of Julia Fisk and William Douglas, a Presbyterian minister. At age three, Douglas moved west with his parents, first to Estrella, California, then to Cleveland, Washington. When his father died in 1904, his mother settled with her children near relatives in Yakima, Washington.

Douglas had been crippled with polio before his family moved west, and life in Yakima was hard for his practically penniless mother and her children. Eventually, however, Douglas not only regained the use of his legs but became an inveterate mountain hiker, developing the love of nature and
solitude that later characterized his lifestyle and personality. He, his sister, and his younger brother helped their mother financially with odd jobs and work in area orchards. He excelled academically, becoming valedictorian of his high school class in 1916 and a 1920 Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Whitman College in Walla Walla. After teaching English and Latin for two years at Yakima’s high school, and reportedly with only $75 in his pocket, Douglas took a train east, herding a carload of sheep to pay his fare, and enrolled at Columbia Law School. Although obliged to devote much of his time to tutoring and odd jobs, he graduated second in his class.

Douglas had hoped to clerk for Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone after law school. But when the clerkship went to another Columbia graduate, he reluctantly joined a prominent Wall Street firm. After two unsatisfying years there, he left private practice to teach law, first at Columbia, then at Yale, where he specialized in corporate law, became one of the school’s youngest endowed chair professors, and enthusiastically embraced the legal realist movement then flourishing at Yale, including its conception of judges as social engineers.

When the Depression returned the Democrats to power in Washington and gave birth to the New Deal, Douglas, like many other prominent scholars, went to work in the Roosevelt administration. In 1936, he became a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the next year its chair. He also developed close ties with members of the Roosevelt inner circle, often joining the weekly poker games at the White House.

Ultimately, such connections paid off handsomely. Roosevelt had no opportunities to fill Supreme Court vacancies during his first term, but beginning with his appointment of Hugo Black in 1937, the president eventually was able to completely remake the Court. Black and Roosevelt’s second appointee, Stanley Reed, were southerners, Felix Frankfurter, his third selection, was an easterner, and Roosevelt promised to appoint a westerner to the next vacancy on the Court.

Justice Louis Brandeis’s retirement in 1939 gave the president another appointment. Although Douglas had spent his youth on the west coast, Roosevelt considered the SEC chairman an easterner from Yale. The depth of Douglas’s commitment to the New Deal and rigorous regulation of the stock market was questionable as well. But a Douglas speech applauding New Deal programs and attacking financial interests helped to calm such concerns, and in late March, the president submitted Douglas’s name to the Senate. In early April, the Senate confirmed the nomination 62–4; those voting no, all Republicans, complained, ironically, that Douglas was a tool of Wall Street.

As a member of the Court, Douglas enthusiastically joined the justices in completing the dismantling of the pre-1937 Court’s laissez-faire economic precedents. Indeed, his opinion for the Court in Olsen v. Nebraska (1941) remains a classic Roosevelt Court repudiation of the Old Court’s assumption of superlegislative powers in regulatory cases. Albeit with a number of lapses, most notably his stance in Korematsu v. United States (1944) and in other World War II cases involving sanctions against Japanese Americans, Douglas was also a leader in the modern Court’s increasing scrutiny of laws restricting First Amendment freedoms, the rights of suspects and defendants in criminal cases, and racial equality.

Unlike his frequent ally Justice Black, however, Douglas did not rest his jurisprudence on a positivist framework, championing only those individual liberties and other restrictions on governmental authority that are rooted in constitutional language or evidence of the framers’ intent. Instead, he ultimately rejected the laissez-faire Court’s decisions as simply inconsistent with society’s needs, while readily embracing the modern Court’s use of due process and equal protection in recognizing sexual privacy, abortion, and related rights that have no basis in the Constitution’s text or records of historical intent.

Justice Douglas’s expansive reading of civil liberties infuriated conservative politicians. His unorthodox personal life attracted controversy as well. In the early 1950s, he divorced his wife of nearly thirty years. He later remarried three times, on the last occasion to a twenty-six-year-old when he was sixty-six. A 1970 impeachment effort—ostensibly directed at ethical improprieties but more likely at Douglas’s judicial record—failed. A severe stroke in
1975 forced his retirement, but not before he had served thirty-six and a half years on the high bench, the record to date for Supreme Court service. Before his death in 1980, Congress recognized the veteran justice’s love of hiking and nature by designating parkland along a favorite Washington walking trail as the William O. Douglas National Park.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, JR.; HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS; SECURITIES REGULATION; SUPREME COURT.

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TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH

DUBINSKY, DAVID

The life of the labor leader and political activist David Dubinsky (February 22, 1892–September 17, 1982) was governed by three great passions: trade unionism, social reform, and anticommunism. Raised as the youngest son of a Jewish baker in Lodz in Russian Poland, Dubinsky started his labor activism early. After a rudimentary secular Zionist education, he went to work for his father at the age of eleven and led his first strike at fifteen. Dubinsky also joined the Jewish Bund, a socialist organization banned by czarist authorities. Imprisoned and later exiled to Siberia at eighteen, he escaped. Recognizing that he was a hunted man, Dubinsky left Poland, arriving in New York on New Year’s Day, 1911.

Dubinsky became a U.S. citizen and joined the Socialist Party and garment cutters’ Local 10 of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU). He embraced the cutters’ craft culture, moderate socialism, and practical trade unionism. Elected president of his local in 1921, he played a vital role in the bitter “civil war” between Communists and Socialists that decimated New York’s garment unions during the 1920s. Several factors led to the ILGWU’s demise, but Dubinsky blamed an ill-fated 1926 strike and supported the expulsion of the Communists. ILGWU membership fell from a high of 120,000 in the early 1920s to only 40,000 in early 1933 shortly after Dubinsky’s ascent to the presidency. His tenure became closely entwined with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. Taking advantage of the National Recovery Administration’s nominal recognition of collective bargaining rights, Dubinsky launched organizing drives in sixty cities, as well as a series of successful strikes. By May 1934 membership in the ILGWU had jumped to more than 400,000, and Dubinsky emerged as a major figure in New Deal labor circles. Placing its new strength behind the NRA code authority, the ILGWU established a thirty-five hour work week, substantially raised wages, and transformed conditions in its industry. In the process, it provided a model for the industrial union explosion of the late 1930s.

Convinced that the labor movement’s future lay in the development of giant industrial unions, in late 1935 Dubinsky formed the Committee for Industrial Organization with Sidney Hillman, John L. Lewis, and other American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders to push the AFL into organizing basic industry. Although he supported organizing drives throughout 1936 and 1937 and recognized the need to revitalize the labor movement, Dubinsky opposed the formation of the CIO as a separate labor federation in November 1938, fearing dual unionism and Communist Party influence in the new group. He led his union back into the AFL in 1940 and rejoined the Federation’s executive board in 1945. Dubinsky retired from the ILGWU presidency in 1966.
Dubinsky’s political life was shaped both by his strong commitment to social justice and his staunch anti-Communism. He helped to form the American Labor Party in 1936 but eventually renounced it, alleging Communist influence. He cofounded the New York Liberal Party, Americans for Democratic Action, and the International Confederation of Trade Unions, all bastions of Cold War liberal anti-Communism. Throughout, he remained an avid supporter of Roosevelt and later Democratic presidents.

See Also: AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS (ACW); AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); ANTICOMMUNISM; CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); ORGANIZED LABOR.

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JAMES R. BARRETT

DU BOIS, W. E. B.

William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (February 23, 1868–August 27, 1963), who was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in the year of Andrew Johnson’s impeachment and died ninety-five years later in the year of Lyndon Johnson’s installation, cut an amazing swath through four continents. He was a Lenin Peace Prize laureate and his birthday was officially celebrated in China. He wrote fourteen pioneering books of sociology, history, and politics, and in his eighties a second autobiography and three historical novels, complementing the two large works of fiction he wrote in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The premier architect of the civil rights movement in the United States, Du Bois was among the first American intellectuals to grasp the international implications of the struggle for racial justice, memorably proclaiming at the dawn of the century that the problem of the twentieth century would be the problem of the color line. The Souls of Black Folk, his 1903 collection of fourteen essays, transformed race relations in the United States and, by redefining the terms of the three-hundred-year-old interaction between blacks and whites, reshaped the cultural and political psychology of peoples of African descent not only throughout the western hemisphere but on the African continent as well.

By 1910, the problem of the color line in America had become so acute that Du Bois gave up his Atlanta University professorship for the editor’s desk at the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in New York. Du Bois’s magazine, The Crisis, was entirely the editor’s creature, its policies virtually independent of the NAACP’s board of directors, and its extraordinary monthly circulation of more than 100,000 by 1920 due almost entirely to Du Bois’s pen. For fourteen years, Du Bois spoke through The Crisis to demand full civil rights and complete racial integration as the NAACP grew from a small operation into a corporate body increasingly staffed by lawyers, lobbyists, and accountants. Du Bois grew increasingly impatient with the legalistic tack of the NAACP after the onset of the Great Depression.

Having failed to reform the NAACP, Du Bois devoted the years after 1934 to reading Karl Marx and supervising graduate students. Du Bois’s period of Talented Tenth Marxism (1935 to 1948) was distinguished by a deepening economic radicalism, but also by a renewal of his social science meliorism. He wrote with increasing enthusiasm for communism in Russia and with mounting condemnation for European imperialism in Africa and Asia. His 1935 book, Black Reconstruction in America, was ultimately to transform the historiography of a period, although initially it appalled most professional historians by positing a general strike by the slaves during the Civil War and a proletarian bid for power in the South after the war. Flaws it certainly had, but Du Bois’s sprawling monograph would return the African American to the Reconstruction drama as a significant agent. Historians Howard K. Beale
and C. Vann Woodward wrote the author of their admiration for the work and of its influence upon them.

Pressured by several members of the NAACP board, secretary Walter White invited the septuagenarian back. As consulting delegate with White and Mary McLeod Bethune to the founding of the United Nations in May 1945, Du Bois began what would become ever harsher public attacks upon the policies of an international body whose charter was ambiguous about the rights of colonial peoples. His 1947 United Nations petition, “An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America,” was a bold initiative for the NAACP. Although the NAACP board had unanimously endorsed the document the previous August, by June 1948 new board member and UN delegate Eleanor Roosevelt made it plain that international circulation of the petition and repeated attempts at General Assembly presentation “embarrassed” her and the nation. By then, Du Bois had virtually endorsed Henry Wallace’s Progressive Party candidacy, denounced the Marshall Plan and NATO as building blocks in the aggressive American containment of the Soviet Union, and roiled the NAACP directorate by distributing a detailed memorandum for restructuring the national headquarters. Already shaken in 1947 by historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s charges in Life magazine of Communist infiltration, the NAACP chose Mrs. Roosevelt and fired Du Bois in September 1948.

During the 1950s Du Bois aligned himself increasingly with the communist-dominated peace movement. Tried and acquitted in 1951 as an agent of a foreign power, he was barred from travel abroad until the return of his passport in 1958. After several years of extensive travel in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe, Du Bois joined the American Communist Party in 1961 and departed for Accra, Ghana. He died there in 1963 on the eve of the March on Washington.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; RANDOLPH, A. PHILIP; ROBESON, PAUL.

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DUST BOWL

The Dust Bowl refers to a ninety-seven-million-acre area in the southern Great Plains where drought and wind erosion were the most severe during the 1930s. Extending approximately four hundred miles from north to south and three hundred miles from east to west, the Dust Bowl encompassed southeastern Colorado, northeastern New Mexico, western Kansas, and the panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma. The region of the southern Great Plains that became known as the Dust Bowl received its name after a gigantic dust storm, known as a black blizzard, struck the area on April 14, 1935. Robert E. Geiger, a reporter for the Associated Press who was traveling in the area, sent a series of articles from the region to the Washington, D.C. Evening Star. Geiger referred to the southern Great Plains as a “dust bowl.” The public and the Soil Conservation Service quickly adopted the term, and it became the sobriquet for this windblown, drought-stricken area.

CAUSES

Sandy loess soil, drought, lack of soil-holding vegetation, and wind have caused the dust to blow on the southern Great Plains since the prehistoric period. During the nineteenth century, drought and prairie fires sometimes destroyed the grass and exposed the soil to wind erosion. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the settlement of the region and drought contributed to dust...
This farmer in Cimarron Country, Oklahoma, put up fencing in 1936 to protect his farm from drifting sand. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

Storms as farmers plowed the grassland for crops. Similarly, between 1900 and 1930, farmers on the southern plains broke even more native sod for wheat. Steam traction engines, gasoline-powered tractors, and one-way disc plows helped farmers plow the sod and expose the soil to the nearly constant wind. High agricultural prices stimulated by World War I and adequate precipitation encouraged agricultural expansion on the southern plains, and few farmers gave much thought to soil conservation. Many factors, then, contributed to the creation of the Dust Bowl—soils subject to wind erosion, drought that killed the soil-holding vegetation (including wheat), the incessant wind, and technological improvements that facilitated the rapid breaking of the native sod.
This massive cloud of dust hit Rolla, Kansas, in April 1935. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

THE STORMS

In 1931, drought struck the southern Great Plains. By late January 1932, dust storms began to sweep across the Texas Panhandle, and wind erosion became a common problem for the region during the spring. During the worst storms of the decade, the dust drifted like snow, halted road and railway travel, and made breathing difficult. Work crews shoveled the railway tracks clear of drifted dust so the trains could pass. Railroad engineers sometimes missed their stations. During the worst dust storms, residents sealed windows with tape or putty and hung wet sheets in front of windows to filter the air. Others spread sheets over their upholstered furniture, wedged rags under doors, and covered keyholes to keep the dirt out of their homes. Mealtime during a storm meant that plates, cups, and glasses were often covered with a thin coat of dust, and the dust made the food and one’s teeth gritty. Electric lights dimmed to a faint glow along streets during the middle of the day. Travel on highways was hazardous during a dust storm because of poor visibility and dust drifts across highways. Static electricity accompanied the storms and caused automobile ignition systems to fail and cars to stall during the storms. Motorists attached drag wires and chains to their automobiles and trucks to ground this static electricity and prevent their vehicles from stalling. Even windmills, pump handles, and cooking pans became so highly charged that a mere touch caused a good shock. Residents often wore masks when they went outside during a storm, because the dust contained silica that irritated the mucus membranes of the respiratory system and made people feel ill. Many residents died from “dust pneumonia.” Surgeons and dentists confronted the problems of sterilization. Between 1932 and 1939, dust storms made life miserable and sometimes dangerous for residents of the Dust Bowl.

Throughout the 1930s, continued drought and crop failure caused the soil to blow. The number of dust storms increased across the region from 1934 to 1938. The acreage subject to wind erosion also expanded during the period, despite the increased efforts of farmers and government officials to bring
Many families abandoned their farms during the Dust Bowl and traveled west in search of work. Dorothea Lange photographed this family group from Texas at an overnight roadside camp near Calipatria, California, in 1937. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

Many families abandoned their farms during the Dust Bowl and traveled west in search of work. Dorothea Lange photographed this family group from Texas at an overnight roadside camp near Calipatria, California, in 1937. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

fields under control by various soil and water conservation methods. The dust storms that began in 1932 and peaked in 1935 continued intermittently, primarily during the spring “blow months” of February, March, and April, when the wind velocity is the highest in the region. By spring 1936, the coarse, granular structure of the soil particles had broken down due to drought and the constant blowing and shifting of the soil. Much of the topsoil had become a fine powder that even low-velocity winds could easily lift into the air and carry for hundreds of miles. During the winter the alternate freezing and thawing of the ground pulverized the soil still further, making it even more susceptible to wind erosion. The dust storms remained severe into 1937, and the prevailing winds carried the soil to the Middle Atlantic and Gulf Coast states. During the worst storms, sand and soil lacerated the wheat and cotton crops, and covered pastures and killed the grass used for grazing and hay.
This dust-covered farm, photographed in 1938 near Dalhart, Texas, remained occupied, but many in the area were abandoned during the Dust Bowl years.

**SOIL CONSERVATION**

By 1933 the wind erosion conditions in the southern Great Plains became so serious that farmers looked to the federal government for technical and financial support to help them bring the blowing lands under control. In March the Forest Service became the first federal agency to try to stop the dust storms in the region after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt asked the agency to investigate whether a major tree-planting program could substantially reduce wind erosion on the Great Plains. Working with nearly record speed, in August the Forest Service reported that it could. This plan, known as the Shelterbelt Project, advocated the creation of a zone a hundred miles wide that would stretch from Canada to northern Texas, with the western edge running along a line from Bismarck North Dakota, to Amarillo, Texas. Within that area, shelterbelts, that is, rows of trees, would be planted across the entire zone to slow the prevailing winds. With the wind controlled, the dust storms would end or become less severe, and the land could be restored to normal agricultural productivity when the drought ended.

In 1935, after nearly two years of studying the climate, soils, native vegetation, and earlier tree plantings on the Great Plains, the Forest Service reaffirmed the practicality of the project but recommended that the western edge of the zone be moved eastward to follow a line from Devil’s Lake, North Dakota, to Amarillo, Texas.
North Dakota, to Mangum, Oklahoma; this new border area received twenty-two inches of precipitation annually, compared to sixteen inches in the border area originally proposed. The Forest Service then began the Prairie States Forestry Project, as it became known in 1937, planting shelterbelts on selected lands leased from farmers. As the trees grew, the shelterbelts shielded wheat fields from the wind and slowed the blowing soil. By the time the project terminated in 1942, the Forest Service had planted nearly 18,600 miles of shelterbelts that had nearly a 60 percent survival rate. Although the return of normal precipitation enabled nature to heal the wounds to the soil from drought and wind, the shelterbelts helped check soil erosion and protected farmsteads, livestock, and fields.

The Soil Conservation Service also established demonstration projects to persuade farmers to adopt proper conservation techniques. By the late 1930s, the work of the Soil Conservation Service (along with federal dollars and the return of near normal precipitation) helped farmers bring their blowing lands under control. Most farmers who followed the technical advice and procedures of the SCS adopted proper tillage and cropping practices, such as contour plowing, terracing, strip cropping, and planting drought-resistant crops such as grain sorghum. In order to halt dust storms completely, though, the grazing lands had to be restored. Accordingly, the SCS advised farmers to rotate, rest, and reseed pastures and to use contour furrowing and ridging techniques on their grasslands to derive the maximum benefit from precipitation and prevent runoff. The soil conservation practices promoted by the SCS were designed to restore the land to predrought, pre-Dust Bowl conditions.

The soil conservation projects depended on persuasion and voluntary agreements between the farmers and the agency. Officials in the SCS did not believe the agency had the constitutional authority to impose mandatory land-use regulations. Consequently, the SCS encouraged the state governments to require farmers to practice the best soil conservation techniques. On May 13, 1936, the SCS drafted a model state law, titled *A Standard Soil Conservation District Law*, which provided for the creation of state conservation districts by local petition and referendum. After a district organized under the direction of the state soil conservation authority, committee, or agency, the farmers in the district worked in a common effort to halt soil erosion, particularly from the wind, and to follow the best soil conservation practices. District supervisors provided technical information and financial aid to help farmers conduct various conservation practices and purchase gasoline, oil, and horse feed to meet basic soil conservation expenses. Dust Bowl farmers adopted SCS programs because they were geared to practicality and low cost, and the SCS and other agencies provided funds to help them initiate the recommended soil conservation practices. By 1940, most farmers who participated in SCS conservation programs credited the agency with improving their farm practices, increasing their land values, and boosting their incomes. Most Dust Bowl farmers planned to continue their newly learned soil conservation practices.

The most optimistic attempt to help farmers in the Dust Bowl end the wind erosion menace involved the land-use program of the Resettlement Administration (RA) and Farm Security Administration (FSA). The Resettlement and Farm Security administrations, like the SCS, contended that if severely eroded lands could be removed from cultivation and restored to grass, and the blowing range lands reseeded, then the soil could be stabilized, the dust storms ended, and the land returned to a grazing economy similar to that of the Great Plains before the sod was broken for crops. Accordingly, in
1935 the Resettlement Administration, and later the Farm Security Administration (which assumed this responsibility in 1937), began a land-purchase program to acquire the most severely wind-eroded lands on the Great Plains in order to restore them with grass and the best soil conservation techniques, and to move the farmers from the lands that it acquired to better federally owned lands. By the time the SCS assumed responsibility for this work in 1938, the land-purchase program had become an unprecedented experiment in environmental and social planning. The SCS continued to restore the wind-eroded lands in the purchase areas after normal precipitation returned. Since 1960, many of these land-utilization projects have been known as national grasslands, such as the Cimarron National Grassland in Kansas, the Comanche National Grassland in Colorado, the Rita Blanca National Grassland in Oklahoma, and the Kiowa National Grassland in New Mexico.

**FEDERAL RELIEF**

As the wheat and cotton crops withered under the sun on the southern Great Plains, farmers looked to the federal government for aid beyond soil conservation. Although the federal government provided many programs for economic relief from drought and depression, the aid from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) became the most significant. Without the financial aid of the AAA, many farmers in the Dust Bowl would have suffered bankruptcy and lost their lands. The AAA paid farmers nationwide to reduce production by withdrawing a specific acreage from production. In the Dust Bowl, the AAA paid them to reduce production of wheat and cotton, mostly. With fewer acres planted in these crops, agency officials believed that the surplus of these commodities nationwide would disappear and agricultural prices would rise, thereby increasing farm income. Economic necessity compelled nearly all Dust Bowl farmers to participate in the AAA program, but the drought, not the AAA, played a greater role in reducing production than did the allotment or acreage reduction program. Until World War II rapidly increased agricultural prices, AAA checks provided the most important income for many of them.

Dust Bowl farmers also received financial aid from the Resettlement Administration. Only those farmers who could not qualify for loans at banks or other lending institutions could apply for RA rehabilitative loans. These loans allowed farmers to purchase necessities such as food, clothing, feed, seed, and fertilizer in order to remain on their land and ultimately return to self-sufficiency when the drought ended. Before making a loan, the RA prepared a farm management plan that budgeted the farmer’s income for daily home and operating needs as well as loan and mortgage obligations. Resettlement Administration loans in the Dust Bowl averaged about $700 per family. In 1937, the Farm Security Administration continued this loan program for the most destitute farmers, on the conditions that the farmers’ operations could become profitable and they had adequate credit to obtain equipment, seed, and livestock. The FSA also encouraged Dust Bowl farmers to diversify by raising more cattle and less wheat.

Despite aid from the AAA, RA, FSA, and other federal agencies and programs, Dust Bowl residents often did not have enough income to meet their financial obligations. In some areas drought, dust, and economic depression caused property values to decline as much as 90 percent. As farm valuations shrank, tax revenues decreased and some local governments responded by imposing higher property taxes. As income from wheat and cotton fell and as property tax rates rose, tenancy and nonresident ownership increased more than 40 percent in some areas, and tax delinquencies and bankruptcies increased.

**MIGRATION**

Although wheat and cotton prices fell because of overproduction and although drought and dust storms ruined crops and caused additional economic hardship, farmers did not emigrate in great numbers from the Dust Bowl. The migrant characters in John Steinbeck’s *The Grapes of Wrath* were not from the Dust Bowl, but from the cotton region east of the most drought-stricken areas. Migrants from this area had been tenant farmers or sharecroppers whom landowners evicted in order to keep the total amount of the AAA allotment checks
for reducing cotton production (farmers were required to share the aid with any tenants, but they ignored this provision of its AAA program). These thousands of displaced cotton farmers and field workers were the Okies who headed west to California. Still, between 1930 and 1940, the counties in the Oklahoma Panhandle lost 8,762 people, but they did not create a great Dust Bowl migration. Many Dust Bowl farmers moved to the nearest town, where they sought employment or relief from government agencies such as the Civil Works Administration or Works Progress Administration. Some areas rich in natural gas and oil gained population as the petroleum industry expanded and created job opportunities. Similarly, in the Texas Panhandle twenty-three counties lost fewer than fifteen thousand inhabitants between 1930 and 1940.

In southwestern Kansas, the number of farmers actually increased in a twenty-seven county area between 1930 and 1935 as the children of resident farmers and townspeople returned home from cities, often in other states, seeking refuge from the economic hard times of the Great Depression. Between 1935 and 1940, however, the population of southwestern Kansas dropped dramatically, with losses ranging from 18 percent to 53 percent in many Dust Bowl counties. As the farm population decreased, the number of farms declined and farm sizes increased by 24 percent due to the consolidation of farms. Most residents who left the Kansas portion of the Dust Bowl were single men and women or young married couples who perceived better opportunities elsewhere in the region or beyond. Tenant farmers often left the Dust Bowl but landowners usually stayed because they were unwilling to lose their investments in the land, and the agricultural and work-relief programs of the federal government kept most farmers on the land and the majority of the nonfarm population in the towns. Certainly, a large number of people moved within the Dust Bowl area and from the Great Plains states during the 1930s, but most were not people displaced by drought and wind erosion.

NORMALCY

During the spring of 1938 precipitation increased and the wheat, grass, and cotton grew and helped hold the soil against the wind. As a result, the black blizzards ended and even the lesser dust storms diminished in number and intensity. By the spring of 1939 only 9.5 million acres were still subject to severe wind erosion, compared to fifty million acres in 1935. Only a few dust storms occurred throughout the year. By December 1939, the Dust Bowl encompassed only southwestern Kansas and southeastern Colorado. During the early 1940s, the return of near-normal amounts of precipitation ended the drought, and weeds, grass, and crops covered much of the land, preventing the wind from lifting and blowing the soil.

A combination of factors, then, created the Dust Bowl in the southern Great Plains—the plowing of too much marginal land for wheat and cotton, the failure to practice soil conservation, the drought, and the relentless wind. The dust storms of the 1930s forced farmers and the federal government to utilize all of the technical expertise and financial resources they could command to bring the wind erosion problem under control. When drought and dust storms returned to the region during the 1950s, the technology and conservation practices that Dust Bowl farmers had been using for twenty years prevented the region from reverting to the severe conditions of the 1930s.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT (AAA); GRAPES OF WRATH, THE; LAND USE PLANNING; MIGRATION; WEST, GREAT DEPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN.

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R. DOUGLAS HURT
Amelia Earhart (July 24, 1897–July 1937) was an aviator and feminist who symbolized the excitement of early aviation and new roles for women to Depression-era Americans. Always a restless and independent spirit, Earhart (photograph overlap) took her first plane ride in 1921 and earned her license soon after. While working at a Boston settlement house in 1928, she jumped at the chance to be a passenger on a flight from Newfoundland to Wales, thus earning the distinction of being the first woman to cross the Atlantic Ocean by plane. Instantly compared to Charles Lindbergh (to whom she bore an uncanny resemblance), Earhart found herself lionized as a popular heroine even though she had done none of the actual flying.

On May 20, 1932, Earhart claimed her place in aviation history by soloing the Atlantic in her bright red single-engine Lockheed Vega. She was the first woman and only the second person to do so since Lindbergh’s 1927 flight. Once again she was front-page news nationwide, enabling her to promote her belief in the viability of commercial aviation and her equally fervid conviction that women could do anything they set their minds to. In 1937 she announced plans for a round-the-world flight in her new Lockheed Electra, accompanied only by navigator Fred Noonan. The first east-to-west attempt ended prematurely when she damaged her plane in Hawaii. On June 1 she set off in a west-to-east direction. On the hardest leg of the flight, from New Guinea to tiny Howland Island in the mid-Pacific, the plane disappeared. For weeks the country followed the story, but an extensive search turned up no evidence of the aviators’ fate and they were presumed lost at sea. Amelia Earhart’s last flight remains one of the twentieth century’s greatest unsolved mysteries, but it should not deflect attention from her significance as a record-breaking aviator and a compelling symbol of women’s emancipation.

See Also: GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; LINDBERGH, CHARLES.

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SUSAN WARE
Marriner Eccles (September 9, 1890–December 18, 1977) was born in Logan Utah. He was a high school graduate of Brigham Young College in 1909 and shortly afterwards left for Scotland, where he worked for just over two years as a Mormon missionary. The Eccles family had extensive business interests and Eccles became fully engaged in them on his return from Scotland. His family responsibilities increased after the death of his father in 1912, but he thrived on challenges and effectively managed the family enterprises through the Eccles Investment Company. In 1913 he married Mary Campbell Young, whom he had met while in Scotland.

During the 1920s Eccles built up a formidable reputation as a banker and achieved considerable personal wealth. During the period from 1930 to 1933 U.S. banks in general, and Utah banks in particular, exhibited high failure rates. During this time, Eccles presided over a number of banks which demonstrated such resilience in the face of adversity that he was invited to testify before the Senate Finance Committee in February 1933.

The shock of the Depression had a profound influence upon Eccles’s political philosophy. He believed that the economic crisis had been caused by underconsumption and that this trend should be corrected by a variety of government funded initiatives. Because Eccles’s views were unorthodox by bankers’ standards, and because he was willing, especially after the recession of 1937 and 1938, to contemplate budget deficits, he has been described as a Keynesian. In fact Eccles developed his views independently and they were the product of commonsense observation not high-level economic theory. Perhaps his lack of formal education enabled Eccles to free himself from old ideas when it was clear that they were not working.

Eccles chose to work in Washington, initially as special assistant on monetary and credit issues to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who recommended him to Roosevelt as someone who would make a very effective head of the Federal Reserve Board. Eccles agreed to accept this post on condition that legislative changes would move power over money and credit matters away from the Federal Reserve Banks towards a newly constituted Board. Eccles was to the fore in drafting and lobbying for the Banking Act of 1935, which centralized monetary policy and gave formidable powers to the Board. The fact that

**Amelia Earhart, 1930s. Archive Photos**
he was not a Wall Street banker endeared him to many New Dealers. Although Eccles was a strong supporter of government intervention to ameliorate the effects of depression, the restrictive monetary policies pursued by the Fed played a significant role in causing the serious economic contraction of 1937–1938.

Eccles served as chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System until 1948 and remained a board member until 1951. He died on December 18, 1977.

See Also: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; MONETARY POLICY.

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PETER FEARON

ECONOMISTS

The Great Depression presented formidable challenges to mainstream economists of the day. The slump following the stock market crash in the autumn of 1929 was not itself that perplexing. Orthodox doctrine then held that downturns in economic activity were part of the business cycle’s natural rhythm. The real problem was to account for the economy’s failure to right itself. In a well-functioning market system, it was expected that downward adjustments in wages and prices would generate the correctives needed to restore conditions of high production and employment. By late 1931, it was clear that the expectations of the orthodox did not mesh with the observable reality. This observation did not mean that mainstream economists were ready to reject their original “model.” For most of them, confidence in its rightness could still be salvaged with the argument that the state of the economy—not the state of economic theory—was out of joint. It could thus be argued that the many impediments to wage-price flexibility—some generated by the market power of businesses and trade unions, some generated by governments—had kept the normal adjustment mechanisms from functioning properly. This intellectual maneuver may have stiffened the morale of economists in the mainstream, but it did nothing to improve their public image.

In the popular estimation, some critics of mainstream economics were also discredited by the flow of events. In the 1920s, two strands of argument were developed that purported to demonstrate that there was nothing inevitable about “so-called” business cycles and that appropriate policy interventions could effectively stabilize aggregate economic activity at a high level. One variant of this approach maintained that expenditures on public works should be timed to compensate for fluctuations in private spending. This strategy formed an important part of the “new era” economics associated with studies inspired by Herbert C. Hoover as Secretary of Commerce. It is important to note that Hoover expected that the overwhelming bulk of expenditures on public works would be undertaken by state and local governments and that the Federal government’s primary role was to signal when to open or close the spending tap. (This strategy was indeed deployed in 1930—but without the anticipated results—when Hoover was in the White House.) A second variant insisted that the alleged “laws” of the business cycle could be repealed through the appropriate conduct of monetary policy. The leading spokesman for this position—Irving Fisher of Yale—maintained that variations in the general price level were at the root of fluctuations in production and employment. Hence, it seemed to follow that stabilizing the general price level—a task that could be performed by the Federal Reserve—would stabilize the economy. These vestiges of “new era” thinking did not fare well in face of the events of 1929 through 1931.

Events did, however, enhance the credibility of economists associated with the heterodox school of institutional economics. Those of this persuasion had long been skeptical of the claims of the mainstream regarding the beneficent properties of unregulated markets. In their view, economists sympathizing with a regime of laissez-faire were
hopelessly out of touch with the modern economy. The notion that markets were effectively competitive might have had some validity in an earlier, simpler, and less concentrated economic order. The central truth about the current economy was totally otherwise: It was characterized by a fundamental asymmetry inherent in the economy’s structure. In one sector—in which large manufacturing firms were predominant—producers had the capacity to administer prices. It was often in their interest as profit-maximizers to raise prices by restricting outputs, which meant that production and employment were inevitably held below their potential. By contrast, the myriad producers in the agricultural sector were inevitably price-takers, not price-makers, and the prices they faced tended to be notoriously unstable. Depression conditions lent some plausibility to the institutionalist position. (These conditions might also have been read as compatible with a Marxist claim that the Depression foreshadowed the imminent collapse of the capitalist system. This interpretation was indeed articulated, but its impact was never more than marginal in the United States.)

Advocates of the institutionalist heterodoxy got a public hearing in the early 1930s, but they also got more. A number of their most prominent spokespersons were invited to walk in the corridors of power in the early days of the Roosevelt administration. Rexford Guy Tugwell, for example, was a member of Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust” during the presidential campaign of 1932 and remained a key adviser in the shaping of policy in the First New Deal. Tugwell was amply on record in holding that laissez-faire amounted to “competition and conflict” and that it should be displaced by a regime of “coordination and control”—that is, central planning. This intellectual posture underpinned the supply-restriction programs administered by the newly formed Agricultural Adjustment Administration as well as the “codes of fair competition” that industrial trade associations were expected to prepare (and to submit for governmental approval) in the National Recovery Administration. Tugwell’s influence was also noteworthy in the recruitment of economists to staff these emergency agencies, which in turn gave economists a greater presence in the Washington bureaucracy than they had ever before enjoyed.

While most American economists tended to view the world through familiar analytic lenses, there were some notable instances in which economists fundamentally rethought their original positions. Irving Fisher is a case in point. In the 1920s, he had pronounced that the United States was approaching an era of permanent prosperity—a forecast that was to be disastrous, both professionally and personally. By 1932, he had produced an innovative reformulation to explain what had gone wrong. The root of the difficulties, as he then saw matters, could be traced to two diseases: the “debt disease” and the “dollar disease.” The American economy of 1929 was fragile because of overindebtedness (a vulnerability that had gone largely unnoticed at the time). But once the dimensions of this problem had been recognized, alarm spread among some creditors and debtors, sparking an initial round of liquidations. A chain reaction followed, involving distress selling, the contraction of bank deposits as loans were paid off or called in, and a consequent collapse in the general price level. The “dollar disease” had exacerbated this situation: That is to say, as prices fell, the real burden of debts increased. Deflation thus became cumulative. Price reductions in response to shrinking demand should thus no longer be seen as part of a normal readjustment leading to recovery. Instead deflation simply generated more deflation, with no end in sight short of universal bankruptcy. The remedy was implicit in the diagnosis: reflating the price level back to its pre-Depression norm and then stabilizing it at that level. Debt burdens would thereby be relieved and liquidations halted. Debtors, with more discretionary income available for spending on goods and services, would spur resurgence in purchasing power that would reinvigorate production and employment.

Economists in the Washington bureaucracy also displayed some analytic originality, particularly in evidence as they groped to understand a sharp downturn in economic activity in the late summer of 1937 which was, in fact, more precipitous than the drop in production in the months immediately following the crash of 1929. The recession of 1937
and 1938 was especially puzzling because it occurred when the economy was still experiencing excess productive capacity and high levels of unemployment. In the post-mortem on this episode, governmental insiders—most importantly, Lauchlin Currie (then on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board)—detected a significant turnaround in “government contribution to spending” between 1936 and 1937. In 1936, the fiscal impact of government had been decidedly stimulative owing to the payout of a bonus to veterans of World War I, a once-and-for-all transaction for which there would be no counterpart in 1937. Governmental fiscal operations in 1937 turned contractionary when payroll taxes to finance the newly created Social Security system were introduced. It had long been understood that governmental budgetary outcomes were influenced by the state of economy, with revenues rising or falling in response to fluctuations in economic activity. It now appeared that changes in taxing and spending by government could influence the level of economic activity. This basic insight is explored in John Maynard Keynes’s *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, published in 1936. American experience in the recession of 1937 and 1938 appeared to provide empirical validation of that finding.

Analysis of this episode was also a watershed in the thinking of the economist who was to become the leading interpreter of the Keynesian message in the United States. Harvard’s Alvin H. Hansen had reviewed Keynes’s *General Theory* unsympathetically when it first appeared. By late 1937, however, Hansen had undergone a conversion experience. His reading of the course of economic events then meshed with Currie’s: He was convinced by the Keynesian argument that identified deficiency in aggregate demand as the cause of excess capacity and underemployment. He was further persuaded that—in American conditions—full recovery could not be achieved unless the government mounted an aggressive deficit spending program to compensate for inadequacies in private demand.

Hansen and Currie became the point men in delivering the Keynesian message, and they used the platform provided by hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1939 to present it at some length. In mid-1939, Currie was elevated to the White House staff as the “economic adviser to the president,” a title he was the first to hold. By that time, his commitment to the Keynesian conceptual system was complete. He drew the argumentative threads together in a lengthy memorandum on full employment, which he placed before Roosevelt in March 1940. Though its structure was inspired by the Keynesian framework, the primary remedy he then offered for a deficiency in aggregate demand was not the one that Keynes had emphasized. Unlike Keynes, Currie downplayed deficit spending on public works: Further increases in the national debt were politically sensitive in the American context and should be constrained. The main weight of policy should instead be assigned to government programs in order to shift consumption upward. This objective could be reached, he maintained, by combining a “truly progressive” tax system with redistributive transfer payments and enlarged public outlays for health, education, and welfare. Thus, the “humanitarian and social aims of the New Deal” could be reconciled with “sound economics.”

Pearl Harbor precluded the implementation of this policy strategy, but it did not slow the spread of an Americanized version of a Keynesian-style of thinking in the highest echelons in official Washington. Indeed, within the bureaucracy, it approached the status of an orthodoxy. But this thinking was a long distance removed both from the mainstream orthodoxies of the 1920s and from the heterodoxies that had guided the Roosevelt administration’s initial approaches to Depression-fighting.

See Also: CURRIE, LAUCHLIN; ECONOMY, AMERICAN; HANSEN, ALVIN; KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD; KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS; TUGWELL, REXFORD G.

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The popular description of the U.S. economy during the 1920s, “Prosperity Decade,” was no mere slogan; it was reality. From the depths of the very severe post-war Depression of 1920 and 1921, the economy embarked upon a rapid and sustained recovery. Between 1922 and 1929, real gross national product (GNP) grew by 22 percent, with the most rapid rate of expansion evident during the opening and closing years of the decade. This economic growth was not exceptional by the standards that had been set before 1914, but it was at the least highly satisfactory.

THE PROSPEROUS TWENTIES

During the twenties, high levels of investment and productivity growth, which delivered stable prices and full employment, characterized the economy. The output of durable consumer goods, which include automobiles, radios, electric cookers, and refrigerators, grew at about 6 percent per year. Non-durables, examples of which include clothing, shoes, and foodstuffs, expanded at a more modest 3 percent annually. In fact 80 percent of the growth in GNP was in the flow of consumer goods of which the most important was the automobile.

Factory sales of all autos rose from 1.9 million in 1919 to 4.4 million in 1929, during which period U.S. manufacturers built approximately 85 percent of the world’s passenger vehicles. Even more remarkable is the fact that just two companies, Ford and General Motors, accounted for 65 percent of all U.S. sales. An insignificant industry before 1914, motor vehicle production, together with the manufacture of bodies and parts, employed some 447,000 wage earners in 1929. The nation’s largest manufacturing grouping, foundry and machine shop products, had 454,000 wage earners.

Although domestic sales were impressive, the instability that is the hallmark of the durable goods sector was evident. In 1921, in 1924, and in 1927 automobile output actually declined. However, 1928 and the first half of 1929 saw a boom of such magnitude that automotive products accounted for nearly 17 percent of the total value of fully and semi-manufactured goods. This growth was so vigorous that it is difficult to see how it could have been sustained. Although the auto producers were confident, the sector was highly vulnerable to adverse changes in demand at home and abroad.

The contribution of different parts of the economy to National Income is revealing. In 1929 the largest was manufacturing (25.2%), followed by trade (15.5%), finance (14.7%), services (10.1%), and agriculture (9.7%). Although manufacturing represented the largest part, it is clear that other areas of the economy made a great contribution to national wealth. This distribution was also reflected in employment patterns. In 1929 the nation’s factories employed 10.7 million workers but large numbers found work outside manufacturing. The wholesale and retail trade employed 6.1 million, transport and public utilities 3.9 million, services 3.4 million, finance 1.5 million, and construction 1.5 million.

In 1929 manufacturing reached a new peak, producing a 38 percent larger physical output than in 1919 even though in 1929 factory employment was 1.8 percent less. The increase in output was the result of a large rise in productivity, which had been achieved by judicious investment in, especially, electric power and specialised machinery funded mainly by high company profits. Within manufacturing some businesses shed labor while others recruited. Employment expanded in the production of electrical machinery (including radios), bakery products, furniture, petroleum refining, and motor vehicle parts. Contraction occurred in railroad repair shops, in leather goods, in chemicals, and in
cotton textile factories located in the northeast region. During the pre-Depression decade, twenty-two states experienced growth in their factory populations. The most vigorous expansion took place in South Carolina followed by Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, and Arizona. A variety of industries were responsible for the industrial success of these states and among them were cotton goods, knitwear including rayon, lumber, furniture, and cigarette manufacture. In contrast, manufacturing employment declined in the Mid-Atlantic, New England and West North Central regions. For example, traditional manufacturing states, such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, lost jobs. However, growth was not entirely confined to the less industrialized states; Indiana and Michigan also experienced gains. Nor had the absolute dominance of the traditional states been broken. In 1929 there were more manufacturing wage earners in either New York or Pennsylvania than in the entire South Atlantic region, though the fastest rates of factory job creation were evident in states where the industrial base was relatively undeveloped.

Between 1920 and 1929 an additional four million jobs were created outside agriculture. Since manufacturing as a whole did not generate any additional positions, where did the expanding labor force find work? The biggest increase in employment was in the wholesale and retail trade (2.1 million additional jobs) followed by finance, insurance, and real estate (0.6 million additional jobs). Vigorous construction activity also created many new employment opportunities. From a low point of 0.85 million in 1920, the construction industry expanded to an employment peak of 1.7 million during 1927 and 1928 before declining to 1.5 million in the following year.

The construction industry played a significant role in the twenties expansion. A residential building boom reached its peak in 1926 but was already in decline by 1929. However, aggregate construction activity was still buoyant in 1929 as public construction and non-residential building expanded to fill the slack created by the reduction in home building. Residential building was strongly influenced by national prosperity and by the demands of a highly mobile population. Migration from rural to urban areas, especially to the major metropolises, combined with the flexibility of location made possible by the automobile helped create a vigorous housing market. Auto owners’ demands for new or improved roads encouraged higher levels of public construction. As has been noted, the construction industry was a major employer; it was also notoriously prone to booms and slumps. A sharp fall in general economic activity would inevitably dent private and corporate confidence with serious consequences for the industry.

Major changes had been taking place in the socio-economic composition of the labor force since the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the most significant was an increase in both male and, especially, female clerical workers, a trend that continued into the twenties. This trend reflects a general movement of the native born white workforce away from heavy, unpleasant, and unskilled tasks towards the more professionally rewarding and secure white-collar work.

In 1929, 25.2 percent of the U.S. population lived on 6.5 million farms. The farm sector was the source of 40 percent of U.S. exports, measured by value, and also responsible for the provision of a vast range of foodstuffs, feedstuffs, and raw materials for the domestic market. However, over 2.4 million farms were less than 50 acres, over 700,000 farmers worked for more than one hundred days away from farms that could not support their families, and about half the nation’s farms produced no appreciable surplus for market. Over 2.6 million tenants farmed only rented land and tenancy was on the increase. Although some small enterprises were profitable, the vast majority were hopelessly uneconomic, and the families living on them were mired in debt, poverty, poor health, and low levels of education. There was a marked difference between the major commercial operators, who invested in the most up-to-date farm machinery and who belonged to effective farm pressure groups and inefficient operators trying to eke out a miserable existence on infertile soil. Indeed, in 1929 about one million farm families had a net annual income of between $100 and $300, far below the sum required to avoid poverty.
Given the sharp disparity that existed between rural and urban incomes it is not surprising that so many Americans migrated to cities. During the twenties there was a net movement of approximately six million people from the countryside to urban centers, in particular to New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit where building activity was stimulated. The states that lost most residents were Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Kentucky. Many African Americans left the racially oppressive, low-income South and headed for Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington D.C., and Baltimore. The migration of so many Americans during the twenties was beneficial to the economy, which could no longer depend on a substantial flow of European immigrants as permanent controls on entry were introduced in 1924.

1929–1933: THE GREAT SLUMP

The Depression, which began in the middle of 1929, hit a booming economy with savage intensity. By the time a trough was reached in March 1933, manufacturing output had fallen by almost half, unemployment, estimated at just over 3 percent in 1929, had risen to over 25 percent, business profits were negative, and investment had fallen to a historic low. At the same time wholesale prices fell by 38 percent, bank crises paralysed the financial system and farm income plummeted. This Depression embraced industrial and rural America.

By 1933, some 3.4 million manufacturing jobs disappeared, as had 1.4 million in the wholesale and retail trades, 688,000 in construction, 567,000 in services, and 214,000 in finance insurance and real estate. Within manufacturing, the durable goods sector was most seriously affected and output declined by 70 to 80 percent and employment by 55 percent. Among the industries most seriously hit were machinery manufacture, cement, automobiles, bricks, and locomotives. On the other hand, the manufacture of shoes, tobacco, foodstuffs, textiles, and other non-durables fell by a more modest 10 to 20 percent and employment by 30 percent. Industrial structure accounts for the significant regional variations in unemployment. Factory employment was most Depression resistant in the South Atlantic states where, unfortunately, there were few wage earners. However, the East North Central region, which includes the highly industrialized states of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, was very badly affected.

The problems facing the consumer durable sector can be illustrated by an examination of automobile manufacture, which had produced a record output of 4.5 million passenger vehicles in 1929. In 1932, production had collapsed to a mere 1.1 million. Employment had fallen by approximately 45 percent, but pay cuts and short time working had decreased the sector’s wage bill by 75 percent. With consumer confidence low and the stock of vehicles both high and relatively new, further consolidation took place in the industry. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler were better able to produce cheap cars than small independent producers, many of which failed. Of the big three, General Motors was by far the most successful, controlling 41 percent of the market by 1933 compared to Chrysler’s 25 percent and the ailing Ford Motor Company, 21 percent. Even General Motors suffered a loss in 1932; Ford losses were substantial. The decline in auto production had adverse repercussions on a range of industries including steel, safety glass, nickel, tin, upholstery, and wrought iron. However, the manufacture and sale of petroleum products held up well; Americans bought few new autos, but they continued to drive.

Together with automobile production, construction had been a mainstay of the twenties economy, but the industry now experienced a staggering decline. In 1929 there were 509,000 housing starts; in 1933 there were 93,000. Low company profits and surplus office accommodation led to a contraction in commercial construction. Cutbacks in state and local spending reduced the road building and maintenance program. The collapse in the construction industry had dire consequences for structural steel, plate glass, brick making, and the furniture industry. Railroads responded to the lack of freight business by cutting orders for locomotives and cars and, of course, by firing employees.

When farm prices fell even more steeply than those in manufacturing, farm income collapsed. The average net farm income fell from $945 in 1929
to a mere $304 in 1932. In spite of growing farm misery, however, the migratory flow from the countryside to the town was reversed. With jobs scarce, fewer rural people left for the city and at the same time many urban unemployed took part in a “back to the land” movement. Returning to family farms, or even occupying abandoned farms in order to practice subsistence agriculture, was a preferable option for many. Some politicians mistakenly saw the farm as a sensible solution to mounting unemployment. However, the lack of urban job opportunities and a growing rural population ensured that underemployment was a persistent feature of life in the countryside throughout the thirties.

When Franklin Roosevelt delivered his inaugural address in March 1933 the American economy was in deep crisis. Unemployment and farm misery were widespread, the financial system was in a state of paralysis, and business confidence was at an all time low.

1933–1937: THE RECOVERY

From March 1933 to July 1937 real GNP grew at an impressive 8 percent per annum. At the peak of recovery the economy had struggled back to levels of output and employment that had prevailed in 1929. However, this expansion was halted and put into reverse temporarily by a sharp recession in 1937 and 1938, after which GNP resumed its upward trajectory.

During the recovery phase the expansion of non-durable goods was much greater than that of durables. Indeed, by 1937 textiles and cigarettes, the latter an exceptionally Depression-proof industry, had improved upon their pre-Depression output figures. However, the durable sector lagged, sometimes very badly. The output of machinery and of iron and steel had only just failed to reach 1929 levels when the recession struck. The automobile sector had just exceeded its pre-Depression peak in 1937 only to fall spectacularly from it over the next year. Meanwhile, construction and related industries such as lumber, bricks and furniture continued to languish, with late 1920s levels of output a distant dream.

Even by 1937 the manufacturing labor force had not recovered to its pre-Depression position in New England and in the Mid-Atlantic states. Outside these regions, Illinois and Indiana registered modest gains while Michigan recorded a massive rise of 27 percent, which the recession of 1937 and 1938 totally erased. Indeed, the recession had an adverse effect on employment everywhere, except in the South Atlantic and East South Central regions, which remained surprisingly buoyant.

Between 1929 and 1937 the number of manufacturing wage earners expanded by 17.9 percent in the South Atlantic region; the figure for the East South Central region was 8.4 percent. On average, in Virginia and the Carolinas manufacturing wage earners grew more numerous by just less than 25 percent. North Carolina, with cigarette manufacture and low cost textiles, was the most Depression proof state in the nation. Unfortunately the industries that displayed the fastest rate of output growth during the recovery, that is, after 1933, were not major employers. New jobs were created producing refrigerators, rayon, glass bottles and jars, tin cans, canned fruit, washing machines, and radios, but these were industries in which technical progress often acted as a barrier to maximizing employment. They could not fully compensate for jobs lost since 1929 in transport and public utilities (550,000), construction (385,000), and finance real estate and insurance (100,000). The industries most seriously affected by the economic collapse were among the nation’s most dominant employers. By contrast, in 1937 there were 470,000 more jobs in the retail and wholesale trade than in 1929, and an additional 300,000 people worked for the federal government.

Agricultural income revived from its desperately low position during the worst years of the Depression but not to the levels that had prevailed during the late twenties. The problem of small inefficient farms, rural poverty, and a surplus population remained. Migration to urban centers resumed as the “back to the land” movement petered out, but only on a relatively small scale as the job opportunities in cities were so limited. In 1940 virtually the same number of people (30.2 million) lived on farms as in 1929. Agriculture remained a troubled sector.

It is important to remember that many of the structural changes that have been identified as part
of the Depression were evident before 1929. Manufacturing employment as a proportion of national employment had been declining since 1920. The same can be said for mining and agriculture. More people took jobs outside the factory and the farm. Clerical work and employment in the retail and wholesale trades became increasingly attractive. Note too the rise of manufacturing in the South. We can detect in the 1920s the roots of the structural revolution, which led, after 1945, to the rise of the Sun Belt.

However, unemployment remained a persistent problem. Even in 1937 unemployment stood at 14.3 percent of the labor force, significantly above the 1929 level of 3.2 percent. The plight of the jobless was made more acute by a change in the age structure of the population, which in turn led to a substantial increase in the numbers available for work. There was also a rise in the numbers of females who wanted to work. In 1937 there were as many people employed as there had been in 1929, but in the meantime an additional six million Americans had been added to the labor force. The recovery had not created sufficient additional jobs to employ all those who wanted to work. It was not until 1942 that full employment returned.

See Also: AGRICULTURE; CAUSES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; STOCK MARKET CRASH (1929); UNEMPLOYMENT, LEVELS OF.

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ECONOMY ACT OF 1933

The Economy Act was enacted on March 20, 1933, during the so-called First Hundred Days of anti-Depression activism by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s new Democratic administration. It cut $400 million from federal payments to veterans and $100 million from the payroll of federal employees. The measure reflected the fiscal conservatism of the early New Deal and Roosevelt’s antipathy to deficit spending.

The legislation was drafted by budget director Lewis Douglas, who shared Roosevelt’s determination to deliver on his 1932 campaign pledge that a Democratic administration would balance the budget. The president was much impressed by Douglas, whom he described as “the real head of the Roosevelt cabinet.” Both found themselves at odds with those Democratic congressmen who worried that the bill would alienate the veterans’ lobby and that federal retrenchment would worsen the Depression. To overcome their opposition, Roosevelt delivered a special message to Congress on March 10 that blamed the Hoover administration’s deficit budgets for continued economic stagnation and for the banking collapse of early 1933. “For three long years,” he warned, “the federal government has been on the road toward bankruptcy.”

Although ninety Democrats broke ranks, the measure gained speedy approval in the House on March 11 under the skilled parliamentary leadership of John McDuffie of Alabama. The power of the president during this time of unprecedented economic crisis was convincingly demonstrated. As Representative John Young Brown, a Kentucky Democrat, avowed, “I had as soon start a mutiny in the face of a foreign foe as start a mutiny today against the program of the President of the United States.” Routine approval later followed in the upper house. Nevertheless, the measure was instrumental in prompting the share-the-wealth
campaign launched in 1934 by Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, who saw the Economy Act as evidence of Roosevelt’s capture by big business and banking interests.

The Economy Act did not prevent the growth of the budget deficit during the early New Deal, but it diminished the expansionary effects of new spending programs. The $500 million in savings that it yielded was precisely the sum that was appropriated for federal unemployment relief in May 1933. The legislation was signal proof of the absence of influence of the new economics soon to be known as Keynesianism on the early New Deal and it reflected Roosevelt’s initial belief that deficit spending was harmful to economic recovery because it impaired the restoration of business confidence.

See Also: DEFICIT SPENDING; HUNDRED DAYS.

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Iwan Morgan

EDUCATION

In the first years of the 1930s, educators failed to recognize the severity of the Great Depression. By 1932, however, it had become apparent to them that the Great Depression was a crisis that would have a dramatic impact on the nation’s educational system.

One of the most striking ways the Depression affected schools was by altering enrollment patterns. Elementary school enrollment declined as financial necessity forced people to postpone marriage and children, causing the birth rate to decline. By 1940 there were 2.3 million fewer children in the nation’s primary schools than in 1930. Conversely, high school enrollment skyrocketed, jumping from 4.8 million students in 1930 to 7.1 million by the end of the decade. Many young people extended their school careers because they could not find jobs. Additionally, more stringent child labor and mandatory school attendance laws were enacted, keeping youths off the job market and inside the classroom.

Although the Great Depression brought children to school, there was less money spent on education. As tax revenues declined, government and business leaders argued that schools were too extravagant and deep cuts were made in education. By 1934 the nation’s school spending had declined by 34 percent from pre-Depression levels. Administrators stopped school construction, discontinued classes, eliminated teaching positions, and reduced salaries. Some of the worst cuts took place in rural districts, particularly in the South, which spent the least money on education. Arkansas, for example, spent only $33.56 per student annually, while New York invested $137.55 on each of its pupils. In many rural districts the shortage of money led to school closures. By 1934 an estimated twenty thousand rural schools were forced to close. Other districts had to shorten the school year. In the 1933 to 1934 period, ten rural states reported school years of less than three months.

These cuts hit African-American students particularly hard. During the 1930s in the South and in most of the rest of the nation, schools were segregated by race. Schools for black children received less money and resources than those attended by white children. A survey of educational conditions in the South, where most black children lived, showed per capita spending on African-American students was only $12 per child annually. This was a full $32 less than was spent on southern white children and $75 less than the national average. Many schools for black children were merely run-down shacks that did not even have desks. The Urban League reported that 230 counties in fifteen states had no high school for black students to attend.

As school budgets shrunk, educators fought back. Teachers worked to preserve both their jobs and the quality of education. The National Education Association created the Joint Committee on the Emergency in Education to raise public aware-
ness of the problem and to lobby public officials for solutions. Other state and local organizations followed, and by the mid-1930s, thirty-two states had increased aid to education. New cost-saving reforms were also enacted. Schools emphasized guidance programs and grouped students with similar abilities so they could be taught more efficiently. Additionally, pupils were automatically promoted to the next grade level to prevent the added cost of having them repeat courses or entire grades.

Although school leaders remained committed to complete local control of schools, they called on the federal government to provide aid. They wanted federal dollars, but not federal intervention. President Franklin Roosevelt obliged them. His New Deal programs provided aid without taking control by granting assistance directly to students and providing money for capital improvements. The National Youth Administration provided poor high school and college students with part-time...
The young children of unemployed miners attend a Works Progress Administration nursery school near Scott’s Run, West Virginia, in 1937. National Archives and Records Administration

In addition, Roosevelt created federal programs that provided alternatives to schools. These programs were primarily designed to provide work for the unemployed, but also had educational components. The Civilian Conservation Corps, for example, provided unemployed youths with conservation jobs. Participants lived in military style camps, where education programs occupied their free time and helped them develop work skills. The New Deal, moreover, provided education to people that schools ignored. Over forty thousand preschool children were educated in 1,500 federally operated nursery schools. Adult education courses in everything from vocational training to parenting skills were also available through New Deal programs.

While the New Deal aided schools, it did not offset the dramatic impact the Great Depression had on student life. Pupils had to adjust to packed classrooms, less attention from instructors, crowded extracurricular activities, and reduced course offerings. In some places pupils became so discouraged with the situation that they took action. In Chicago and New York students joined their parents in marches to protest cuts in education. Stu-
Posters like this one publicized the WPA adult education program, which encouraged adults to return to school by offering free classes in many subjects. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, WPA Poster Collection.

Students also went on strike when popular teachers or administrators were laid off.

For poor students the school experience created anxiety. They felt left out by the materialism of school culture. High school students, in particular, felt the need to dress in stylish clothes, buy the school newspaper, and attend dances, proms, and graduations. Poor students felt ashamed when they could not afford these things and sometimes responded by becoming critical of the elitism and snobbery of their classmates.

School, however, also served as a refuge for poor children. They attended classes to get a show-er and a hot meal and to warm up in the cold winter months. Teachers donated money to provide clothes, meals, and glasses to their needy pupils. Poor students were also aided by their classmates. In Milwaukee, for example, textbook drives were held to provide books to students who could not afford them, and the Washington High School Girls club provided no-interest loans to needy members so they could buy school supplies. These efforts, along with the New Deal programs, helped schools and their students endure one of the most difficult periods of the twentieth century.

See Also: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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DARYL WEBB

ELDERLY, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON THE

The perception that the elderly constitute a unique group with special needs is a relatively recent his-
torical phenomenon. Widespread concern for the well-being of the elderly became prevalent by the late nineteenth century, as social reformers began to warn that industrialization and urbanization had negatively affected the status and welfare of many older Americans. Although the elderly were, in fact, overrepresented among the population of the era’s almshouses and poorhouses, these fears were generally exaggerated. Rather, most older Americans at this time managed to accumulate sufficient resources, often supplemented by the assistance of supportive kin networks, to live their final years relatively comfortably. This was, however, far more the case for white, higher income people than for minorities and the poor. Nor is this to suggest that the elderly as a group were affluent, but that there is little evidence to suggest that their standard of living was deteriorating. The historical record also discloses that despite continued lobbying efforts by reformers and social workers, few programs designed to help the elderly poor were enacted during the early decades of the twentieth century.

This situation changed dramatically during the 1930s. Although the Great Depression had a profound impact on all segments of society, the economic downturn and subsequent social upheaval presented unique problems for elderly Americans. As the economic crisis worsened, many employers were reluctant to rehire or keep on older workers. Widespread bank failures often wiped out savings accumulated over a lifetime of labor. At a time when home ownership was a long and arduous process for working-class families, poor employment prospects and the loss of savings brought the threat of foreclosure. Given the inability of private and public aid organizations to provide adequate relief, those in need were forced to rely on the assistance of friends and relatives. Even those older Americans who managed to avoid the immediate impact of the Depression often had less fortunate kin, resulting in the day-to-day stress of providing economic assistance or sharing living space.

The magnitude of the crisis eventually induced a governmental response. In addition, a huge movement calling for generous old-age pensions arose around an idea put forth by Dr. Francis Townsend. By 1934 a majority of state governments had enacted old-age assistance programs based on economic need. Eventually all states provided for elderly relief, which was subsidized by the federal government under the Social Security Act of 1935. This groundbreaking legislation also established Social Security Old Age Insurance, which provided retirement benefits (based on employee and employer contributions) to eligible workers when they reached the age of sixty-five. Unfortunately, there were no provisions for workers retiring before 1935, and the original program covered less than half of the American labor force, such predominantly minority occupations as farm and domestic work having been excluded in order to secure the backing of southern Democrats. In addition, significant bene-
Many elderly Americans traveled with their families in search of work during the Dust Bowl years. This grandmother was living in California’s Kerns County migrant camp in 1936. She cared for her two grandsons while their parents worked in the fields. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection.

fits would only accrue over a lifetime of work; thus older workers still in the labor force during the 1930s would ultimately receive reduced benefits. Despite these limitations, the Social Security Act of 1935 would have important consequences for subsequent generations of America’s elderly.

Retirement was not uncommon prior to Social Security, but it was most prevalent among white-collar workers covered by private pension plans. For the American working class, industrialization generally brought higher standards of living, but retirement funds were largely dependent on personal savings (a significant exception would be Union Army veterans covered by Civil War pensions). Because of concerns about the stability of private savings institutions, many older workers attempted to supplement these funds with income derived from part-time work as they passed what would today be considered retirement age. This practice became less common after World War II, and retirement

became a well-defined life stage characterized by leisure activities. Some researchers argue that the impact of Social Security has been relatively minor, since employee contributions that finance Old Age Insurance would have had a comparable effect if invested in personal savings or private pension plans. Nonetheless, the mandatory aspects of Social Security—compulsory participation with inducements to retire at a specified age—have contributed to the normalization of retirement.

Old Age Insurance benefits also helped bring about significant changes in the living arrangements of older Americans. Prior to the twentieth century, relatively few formerly married elderly maintained independent households—the more common pattern was to live with adult children. Although the trend away from co-residency with adult children was underway before the Great Depression, it was most common among middle- and upper-class elderly, since establishing and maintaining a separate residence is typically more expensive than sharing living space with kin. The establishment in 1939 of survivor’s benefits under Social Security had a significant effect on the ability of widows to maintain independent households after the death of their spouses. A luxury at the beginning of the twentieth century, residential autonomy increasingly became the cultural norm in the decades following World War II.

Although the Social Security Act of 1935 did not provide health care insurance for the elderly, it did set a precedent for the establishment of services designed to care for the elderly, which was consistent with the eventual establishment of Medicare in 1965. Universal health insurance for the elderly, in combination with Old Age Insurance and the extension of survivor’s benefits, reinforced the long-term trends in retirement and residential autonomy. These social programs also had the secondary effect of fostering an increased political awareness and influence among older Americans. This is partially the result of growing numbers—approximately 13 percent of the American population was over the age of sixty-five in 1990, compared to 4 percent a century earlier—resulting from increased longevity and the post-baby boom fertility decline. But as the magnitude of society’s finan-
cial commitment to the elderly has grown, older Americans have come to understand that maintaining these benefits requires an active participation in the political process.

The federal government’s commitment to provide significant social services represents an important transformation. During the latter half of the twentieth century, issues related to the elderly have moved from the private to the public sphere as government has replaced the family as the institution most responsible for the well-being of older Americans. Today, most of the elderly maintain emotional intimacy with their kin, but these relationships generally lack a significant financial or day-to-day care component. Although some commentators feel that this has contributed to an increasingly segmented society based on age, the attempt to provide for the welfare of the elderly has been successful as old age in the United States has become characterized by residential autonomy and financial independence.

See Also: Family and Home, Impact of the Great Depression on; Old-Age Insurance; Social Security Act; Townsend Plan.

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ELECTION OF 1928

The election of 1928 was the last of a Republican era extending back to the 1860s. The realignment that broke the Republican Party’s hold on the electorate began only after the advent of the Great Depression and was not rooted in the old politics of the 1920s. America’s Depression thus established the most significant discontinuity in American political history since the Civil War.

America’s two major parties nominated their leading public officials in 1928. President Calvin Coolidge’s withdrawal from the presidential contest led to the nomination of Herbert Hoover, who, as secretary of commerce, had become the driving force of domestic policy in the 1920s. The Democrats nominated Al Smith, the four-term governor of New York, who had earned a national reputation as a progressive devoted to social welfare and efficiency in government.

Al Smith’s Catholicism and other social issues overshadowed the record and policies of the presidential candidates. Anti-Catholics launched a campaign against Smith’s candidacy that ranged from fulminations against papal control of the country to scholarly debates on the relationship between church and state in Catholic theology. Protestant and Catholic voters split decisively in 1928 as Smith benefited from a pro-Catholic and Hoover from an anti-Catholic vote. Al Smith’s opposition to prohibition won him support from “wet” voters, while “dry” voters united behind Hoover. Religion also became tied to race in 1928 as the Republicans cracked the solidly Democratic south by exploiting Smith’s Catholicism, his stand on prohibition, and his alleged sympathy for racial equality.

The combination of economic prosperity, tranquility at home, and stability abroad guaranteed Republican success in 1928. Hoover garnered 58 percent of the popular vote, and his party, with victories in both houses of Congress, controlled the national government for a third consecutive term. The bright spot for Democrats was the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as governor of New York. Roosevelt had tried to avoid running in what looked to be a bleak year for Democrats, insisting on more time for rehabilitation from polio. He succumbed, however, to a personal plea from Al Smith, who thought Roosevelt would help him win votes in upstate New York.

In the aftermath of the Republican landslide, one of Roosevelt’s correspondents wrote that no Democrat could again be elected president without a protracted campaign to educate the public in favor of progressive reform. Beginning in 1929, however, the Great Depression reeducated the public far more quickly than Roosevelt would have dreamed possible from the perspective of 1928. Roosevelt, who reluctantly attempted a political comeback that he had thought was premature, ironically found himself ideally situated as governor of New York to exploit Hoover’s failed response to the challenges of the Great Depression.

See Also: HOOVER, HERBERT; REPUBLICAN PARTY; SMITH, ALFRED E.

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This advertisement ran in newspapers in October 1928 during Hoover’s campaign for president. Four years later, during his 1932 campaign for reelection, Hoover’s opponents tried to discredit him by recalling his alleged promise of “a chicken for every pot.”

HERBERT HOOVER LIBRARY
The midterm election of 1930 was the first in a four-election cycle (1930, 1932, 1934, and 1936) following the 1929 stock market crash that ended an era of Republican Party domination, forged the New Deal coalition, and established the Democrats as the dominant party in the United States. The election was also pivotal to the careers of such important Depression-era politicians as Floyd B. Olson, elected Farmer-Labor governor of Minnesota; Huey Long, elected democratic Senator from Louisiana while still serving as governor; and Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose election to a second term as governor of New York made him the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination of 1932.

On the eve of the elections of 1930, the editors of Business Week warned that the economy was “sliding further into the final stages of depression, under the weight of still unbroken financial fatalism, business inertia, and popular fear.” Predictably, voters punished the party in power. Republicans lost a net of more than fifty House seats, eight Senate seats, six governor’s mansions, and at least one chamber of the legislatures in five states. With stunning ideological precision, voters rebuked the conservative economic consensus of the 1920s by dismissing dozens of conservatives, but not a single progressive Republican from Senate and House seats. Although it appeared after the election that Republicans would narrowly hold both chambers of Congress, special elections gave Democrats a narrow majority in the new House, while Republicans clung to a single vote margin in the Senate.

The 1930 elections marked a new era in American politics as a revived Democratic Party launched the permanent campaign that continued for the four years between presidential elections, with no deference paid to the incumbent president. The Democratic National Committee set up the first enduring national party publicity bureau. Under the direction of journalist Charles Michelson, it laid down a barrage of anti-Hoover propaganda that staggered an administration unprepared for incessant political war. Still, the Republican Party suffered relatively modest losses for the party holding the White House in a slumping economy. And Republicans still led Democrats by large margins in the party affiliations of registered voters. The most optimistic of Republicans believed that both the Depression and their political fortunes had reached rock bottom and would turn upwards during the next two years. But history was not to vindicate their belief that by 1932 a revived economy would return Americans to their senses and restore the nation’s normal Republican majority.

See Also: Democratic Party; Hoover, Herbert; Long, Huey P.; Olson, Floyd B.; Republican Party; Roosevelt, Franklin D.

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ELECTION OF 1932

The presidential election of 1932 marked a turning point in United States political and economic history. The Democratic Party, reduced to minority status following the Civil War and particularly after the financial panic of 1893, emerged as the nation’s majority party with the ushering in of the New Deal. The transition from the Herbert Hoover administration to the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration also witnessed the appearance of a peacetime activist central government in response to the crisis brought on by the Great Depression.

HOOVER’S VULNERABILITIES
A successful mining engineer, Herbert Hoover had made his reputation as a humanitarian when
he served as head of Belgian relief during World War I, and later as food administrator for President Woodrow Wilson after the United States entered the war. At war’s end, both major parties considered him a presidential prospect. Hoover identified himself as a Republican and served as secretary of commerce from 1921 to 1929 during the Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge administrations. Hoover turned the Department of Commerce into a force for rationalizing the nation’s economy through standardization and the elimination of waste, as well as by the promotion of cooperative activity among corporations, farmers, and trade associations.

Hoover’s success as an administrator won him the Republican presidential nomination and victory over Alfred E. Smith in 1928 in a decade that valued business acumen; yet, Hoover’s earlier accomplishments condemned him to criticism as president in light of his inability to counter the economic collapse. By the winter of 1932 to 1933, at least 25 percent of the nation’s workforce was unemployed. The causes of the Depression were complex. Trade was stifled by a high tariff system and other protectionist mechanisms designed by European powers in order to hoard gold and hard currencies and to foster domestic employment. The Hawley-Smoot tariff, signed by Hoover in 1930, further curbed in-
ternational trade. On the domestic front, expressed in later (Keynesian) terms, the economy was crippled by demand deficiency, indicating the inability of consumers’ income to absorb the output of industry. Once the Depression struck, a misguided effort by the Hoover administration and the Federal Reserve System to maintain the dollar based on its gold value led to the final and most devastating stage of the economic collapse—a massive deflation that weakened a fragile banking system.

Revisionist historians and economists since the 1960s have attempted to credit Hoover with paving the way for the interventionist state, but such a view is debatable. Hoover’s response to the domestic Depression was circumscribed by his limited view of the presidency, his opposition to intrusion by the federal government in the economy, and his insistence on community responsibility for the relief of distress. As an example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), legislated early in 1932, limited its activities to loans made for self-liquidating public works; designed to pump liquidity into the banking system, RFC lending absorbed the soundest assets of banks, weakening their capital structures. When public revenues fell and deficits grew during the 1931 to 1932 period, Hoover and his treasury secretary, Ogden L. Mills, sought cuts in expenditures and secured passage of the 1932 Revenue Act, which increased tax levels virtually to wartime rates, a move that had a negative impact on both consumption and investment.

THE NOMINATION OF ROOSEVELT

Reelection to a second term as governor of New York in 1930 put Franklin D. Roosevelt in the position of front-runner for the Democratic Party nomination. He had established himself as a progressive, and there was “magic” in the Roosevelt name. In his quest for the nomination, Roosevelt put together a political team made up of Louis M. Howe, a one-time journalist who devoted much of his life to securing the White House for Roosevelt, and James A. Farley, an affable Catholic who could appeal to the party’s Smith faction. Farley’s principal task was recruiting delegates for the nomination, especially in the western states, and managing the Roosevelt fortunes at the Chicago nominating convention.

But there were obstacles en route to the nomination. Roosevelt had been crippled by polio, and rumors circulated regarding his physical and mental capacities. Party conservatives, led by the financier Bernard Baruch, viewed Roosevelt as a lightweight, susceptible to control by radicals, a view widely circulated by the newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann. A Roosevelt nomination was opposed as well by the Du Pont family of Delaware, anti-statists who funded and controlled the party machinery through the national chairman, John J. Raskob, and its executive director, Jouett Shouse, and feared federal intrusion into their business empire.

In the early stages of the Chicago convention, dark-horse hopefuls banded together in a stop-Roosevelt coalition managed by Baruch. The Du Pont group looked to Al Smith, who believed he was entitled to a second chance at the White House, and to Newton D. Baker, Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of war. In addition, William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson’s son-in-law and wartime administrator of the railroads, enjoyed considerable support in the Bible belt. The coalition’s hopes depended on the two-thirds rule, which required that a candidate receive a two-thirds proportion of delegates to secure the nomination; the anti-Roosevelt coalition believed that a stalemate would produce a compromise (conservative) candidate, likely Baker. These aspirations were dashed when McAdoo abandoned the coalition, and John Nance Garner of Texas, speaker of the House of Representatives, relinquished his favorite son status and shifted that state’s delegation to Roosevelt. Garner was determined to avoid repetition of the 1924 convention deadlock that nearly destroyed the party. Roosevelt was nominated on the fourth ballot and chose Garner as his running mate.

In his acceptance speech, Roosevelt pledged “a new deal for the American people.” The term initially signified a shift away from the party’s domination by big businessmen in the 1920s and towards farmers, labor, and small entrepreneurs. The expression, popularized in the press, came to encompass Roosevelt’s domestic program.
THE CAMPAIGN

In the spring of 1932, Roosevelt had been persuaded by a long-time political adviser, Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, that his experience as governor had not prepared him or the Albany team for meeting the Depression crisis. The result was recruitment of the Brains Trust, headed by Raymond Moley, a Columbia University political scientist. Gifted at speech drafting, Moley proved capable as well of assimilating memoranda on economic and social issues. During the primary campaign, Roosevelt and Moley collaborated in key addresses beginning with the “forgotten man” speech, in which they pointed to massive urban unemployment and the impoverishment of rural Americans and claimed that no nation could endure half boom, half broke. In Saint Paul, Minnesota, they challenged party conservatives by affirming a “concert of interests,” or the interdependence of society’s components.

Catch-phrases and generalizations, while politically appealing, were no substitute for a substantive program designed to tackle the Depression’s causes and consequences. Thus, the Moley memorandum of May 15, 1932, delineated a program requiring expanded federal functions. Excess corporate profits, a result of improved machinery, management, and labor productivity, needed to be taxed and diverted to labor. A proposed public-works relief package of $2.6 billion went well beyond Hoover’s estimate of some $1.1 billion. Public works would be funded in part by an emergency budget, which Roosevelt later used as a fig leaf to claim budget balance for ordinary expenditures. Provision of unemployment and old-age insurance would cushion the economy and individuals against future downturns. Furthermore, the collapse of security values, market manipulation by pools, and the issuance of worthless paper required the divorce of commercial banking from investment banking and the regulation of securities issues and exchanges.

Given the range of expertise involved in these and other problems, Moley recruited two colleagues, Rexford Guy Tugwell and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., to form the original Brains Trust. Tugwell, an expert in agrarian issues, entered the picture on the basis of Roosevelt’s conviction that the farm depression of the 1920s left farmers unable to meet their debts and thus unable to consume the output of industry. Roosevelt was also aware that a permanent Democratic Party majority required that the depressed Midwest be persuaded to detach itself from its traditional Republican Party moorings. Tugwell urged the candidate to consider acreage controls or the tailoring of farm output to meet market demand. Once farmers voted for acreage allotment, subvention would be provided by a tax levied on processors, superseded later by direct government payments. Berle, author of the classic Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), suggested use of the credit of the United States to salvage farm and urban mortgages, a principle soon applied to the banking system. His main thesis, that of business accountability, found expression in the Commonwealth Club Speech, delivered by Roosevelt in San Francisco during the campaign.

On September 12, 1932, one of history’s most formidable political campaigners boarded the Roosevelt Special for a rail tour of the Midwest and Pacific Coast states. Roosevelt’s love of the hustings and approbation of the crowds aside, the Democratic candidate wanted to demonstrate his physical capacity for the nation’s highest office. In the process, he planned to enunciate a broad outline of his plans for meeting the Depression and to offer hope for the future. At a small Missouri town, a tiny elderly woman wearing a faded black dress, a bouquet of flowers in hand, pressed towards Roosevelt: “Pound Hoover,” she shouted as she presented her gift, “Pound him hard!”

At Topeka, Kansas, based on the input of Tugwell and Milburn L. Wilson, an agrarian economist, Roosevelt proclaimed the need for a better economic balance between rural and industrial incomes, which would require federal planning for control of the farm surplus. At Portland, Oregon, Roosevelt expressed approval of the development of the public power potential of the nation’s great river valleys, a program favored by Republican progressives who had sought federal development of Muscle Shoals, Alabama, a scheme Hoover had rejected because of his opposition to public ownership of generating facilities and the sale of electrici-
ty in competition with private utilities. Roosevelt also proposed the use of Muscle Shoals as a yardstick for measuring rates levied by holding companies, which he regarded as too high, and the regulation of capital issues and interstate rates by the Federal Power Commission. In time, he hoped, the Tennessee Valley model would be applied to the Columbia River Valley and other watershed areas.

Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club Address in San Francisco constituted his most important statement on business-government relations. Just as the Declaration of Independence called for restraint on the excesses of government, Roosevelt argued that the time had arrived to impose similar restraints on business. Private economic power, he asserted, had become a public trust. This development necessitated a new constitutional order consisting of a better economic balance, better distribution of purchasing power, restored wages, and the end of unemployment. He hoped that business would put its house in order; otherwise government would intervene to attain these ends.

On October 19th in Pittsburgh, Ohio, Roosevelt pledged, on the insistence of party conservatives led by Baruch, to restore a balanced federal budget. Fiscal prudence was widely regarded as necessary to sustain business confidence in the pre-Keynesian era. In reality, the Roosevelt peacetime budgets were never balanced as a result of declining revenues and the demands of relief and public works.

The Hoover campaign proved ineffective; the incumbent was unpopular, overworked, and a poor public speaker. The president believed he was engaged in a nonpartisan effort to salvage the American system, which, in his view, was embodied in limited government, voluntarism, and freedom from federal economic interference in the marketplace. In his August 11 speech accepting the nomination in Washington, D.C., Hoover expressed his view that the Depression originated in Europe and was beyond his control. He did not gloss over his fundamental conviction that the powers of the federal government should be limited even during times of Depression. He opposed “haphazard experimentation” or reliance on a state-directed social and economic system, which he equated with tyranny.

At New York’s Madison Square Garden on October 31, with defeat at the polls imminent, Hoover claimed that his opponent’s program would undermine the nation’s basic institutions because it proposed the enlargement of the federal bureaucracy, which would extend its reach into every corner of American society. Roosevelt, he believed, promised a radical departure from the nation’s foundations, threatening suffocation of free speech and free enterprise. Short-term, Hoover underestimated the depth and persistence of the Depression; long-term, he warned of the potential excesses of a bureaucratic welfare state.

THE ELECTION

Voters had a clear choice between two approaches for resolving the economic crisis. Hoover preferred reliance on individual effort, buttressed by private charities and local and state government. Roosevelt pledged that the federal government would assume responsibility for recovery and social sustenance. On election day, November 8, 1932, voters chose the latter option, expressing their acceptance of the interventionist state. Roosevelt won 472 electoral votes (42 states); Hoover won 59 electoral votes (6 states). The popular vote for Roosevelt was 22,809,638 (57.4%), for Hoover 15,758,901 (39.7%).

Roosevelt’s sizable victory represented a sea change in American politics, for Hoover had won 60.4 percent of the popular vote only four years earlier. While Democratic candidates for the presidency could usually rely on the South, Alfred E. Smith’s unsuccessful effort in 1928 nevertheless brought first-time immigrant, Catholic, and urban workers into the fold. As a result, Roosevelt bested Hoover in all but one of the nation’s major urban centers, establishing the basis for a long-term New Deal majority. The farm depression cut into traditional Republican majorities in the western states. Roosevelt’s buoyant personality also determined the final outcome. Hoover’s voting strength was concentrated in the New England states, a Republican bastion, where he won 48.4 percent of the vote, and in the middle Atlantic region, where he won 45.4 percent of the vote. The Democratic Party won 310 seats in the House of Representatives, as opposed to 117 for
the Republicans and 5 for minority parties. The Senate vote gave the Democrats a clear majority—sixty Democratic seats to thirty-five Republican and one Farmer-Laborite.

Third party hopefuls offered no effective challenge to the major party candidates, winning only 1,163,181 votes, or 3 percent of the total cast. The largest proportion by far, 872,840 ballots, went to Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party candidate. Thomas was a minister and one-time settlement house worker who exemplified the party’s departure from its radical working-class origins. By 1932, the Socialists depended for their support on intellectuals, reform-minded ministers, well-educated middle-class liberals, the Jewish leadership of the major garment workers’ unions, and a sprinkling of auto workers. While vague on the issue of public ownership of basic industries, Thomas ran on a platform of massive federal funding for relief and public works, old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, government aid to farmers and homeowners, and minimum wage legislation, a program that was soon subsumed by the New Deal.

The Communist Party candidate, William Z. Foster, secured only 103,000 votes, hardly more than the Prohibition Party candidate. Riven by factionalism, unwilling to compromise with “social fascists” (meaning democratic socialists and those who held that capitalism was susceptible of reform), the Communist Party’s chief support came from foreign-born workers in New York City and Chicago and exploited southern textile workers seeking unionization of the mills. Foster’s campaign, based on the overthrow of capitalism as an exploitative system, pictured Hoover and Roosevelt as Tweedledum and Tweedledee. A centrist society opted for capitalism’s reform.

See Also: BRAIN(S) TRUST; GARNER, JOHN NANCE; HOOVER, HERBERT; NEW DEAL; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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**ELECTION OF 1934**

The election of 1934 took place during the early stages of the electoral realignment of the 1930s. This basic change in national voting behavior brought about the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 for the first of four times, Democratic control of the United States Congress, and the creation of a Democratic majority or plurality in the electorate. The “Roosevelt Revolution,” to use Samuel Lubell’s term, ended a Republican-dominated era that dated back to the 1890s.

The realignment process probably began in the mid-term election of 1930, when the impact of the Great Depression first began to influence the political process. In that election Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives for the first time since the election of 1916. In the Senate, where only one-third of the membership was up for election, Republicans maintained the thinnest of margins for one more Congress despite the election of eight new Democrats. It was the first of a series of
Democratic victories that established Democratic control of both houses of the United States Congress with only a few exceptions until the final decades of the twentieth century. In his first election, in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated the incumbent President Herbert Hoover with 57.4 percent of the popular vote, and the Democrats won substantial majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Probably any one of the leading Democratic candidates for the nomination in 1932 could have defeated Hoover, given the severity of the economic collapse, so it is not clear that a Democratic realignment had in fact occurred at that point. As the authors of *The American Voter* have suggested, if Roosevelt and the New Deal program had failed to win the support of a substantial portion of the electorate by the mid-1930s, voter behavior could have reverted to the voting patterns of the 1920s (Campbell et al. 1960). In other words, a permanent realignment of the electorate depended upon the success of Roosevelt’s administration and a series of Democratic victories to persuade voters to repeatedly vote Democratic and begin to think of themselves as Democrats.

Much depended, then, upon the success of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Beginning immediately upon his inauguration, Roosevelt led the Congress in the enactment of an unprecedented flood of legislation to deal with the Depression. This list included the Emergency Banking Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps Reforestation Act, the act that created the Tennessee Valley Authority, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Federal Emergency Relief Act. At its close, precisely one hundred days after it first met, the first Roosevelt Congress had enacted more important legislation in a shorter time period than any Congress in U. S. history.

The election of 1934 was the first national election held after the passage of the legislation of the hundred days. It was and still is a rule of U. S. politics that the party that won the previous presidential election should expect to lose congressional seats in the following mid-term election, but in 1934 the Democratic Party substantially increased its majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the Congress elected in 1934, Democrats added to their already overwhelming majority in the Senate with a net increase of nine seats. Republicans actually lost ten seats—nine to the Democrats and one to Wisconsin Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., who, along with his brother Philip LaFollette, broke with the Republican organization to form the Progressive Party. Thus the party distribution in the Senate when the 75th Congress met in 1935 was sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-five Republicans and one Progressive.

Democratic victories in the Senate were focused in the Northeast (Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island), the Midwest (Indiana and Ohio) and the border states (Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia). Many of the new Senate Democrats elected in 1934 were northern liberals eager to add their support to Roosevelt and the New Deal, including Joseph F. Guffey, the first Democrat from Pennsylvania to serve in the Senate since 1881. Guffey would become a loyal New Dealer and the cosponsor of the Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, one of several New Deal laws struck down by the Supreme Court in 1936. The group also included Missouri Senator Harry S. Truman, who would become vice president in 1944 and president upon the death of Roosevelt in 1945.

Results of the election of 1934 in the House of Representatives were similar. In the 75th House, Democrats had a majority of 319 seats. The Republicans controlled 103 seats, and there were three members of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and seven Wisconsin Progressives. This total represented a net Democratic increase of eight seats. The primary source of new seats was Pennsylvania, where the number of Democratic seats increased by twelve. Excluding changes resulting from vacant seats, Democrats also gained two seats in California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts, and one in Wyoming. Again excluding vacancies, Republicans picked up five seats in Michigan and one seat in Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oregon. The Republicans also won two seats in 1934 from the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota, but in Wisconsin the Progressive Party captured House seats from both major parties—five from the Republicans and two from the Democrats.
With a few exceptions, Democratic gains in 1934 were concentrated in the states with large urban populations, and most losses (except those in Michigan) were in more rural, less populated states.

In the gubernatorial elections Democratic candidates won elections from Republicans in four states (Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania), but lost three states to the Republicans (Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey). In Wisconsin the Democratic incumbent lost to Philip LaFollette, who, having lost a bid for re-election in the 1932 Republican primary, won on the Progressive ticket. The only other successful third-party candidate for governor in 1934 was incumbent governor Floyd B. Olson, the Farmer-Labor candidate, who was re-elected in Minnesota. In California, Upton Sinclair, the author of The Jungle and a lifelong socialist, also attracted much attention by winning the 1934 Democratic gubernatorial primary on a program he called End Poverty in California. Sinclair’s views were far to the left of those of both President Roosevelt and the California Democratic organization; failing to get their support, Sinclair lost decisively to a Republican. Even though the gubernatorial election returns in 1934 could be described as a draw, after the election Democratic governors controlled the state houses of thirty-eight of the forty-eight states and the Republicans controlled only eight.

Many New Deal Democrats concluded from the election results that the voting public had resoundingly endorsed the leadership of President Roosevelt and the legislation of early New Deal. Harry Hopkins, one of the leading figures in the Roosevelt administration, summed up the reaction of many New Dealers with his often quoted observation: “Boys—this is our hour. We’ve got to get everything we want—a works program, social security, wages and hours, everything—now or never” (Leuchtenburg 1963, p. 117). Most of Hopkins’s expectations were realized as the 75th Congress in 1935 enacted some of the New Deal’s most significant laws, including the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act.

The election of 1934 was a milestone in the voter realignment of the 1930s. Those who voted Democratic in 1934 and in the other elections of the decade were predominantly new voters concentrated in urban, industrial areas. These new Democrats were largely working-class, low-income voters—many of them first- or second-generation immigrants, in many cases Catholics and Jews from southern and eastern Europe. They were among those who suffered most from the unemployment of the 1930s, and they constituted a major source of support that made the Roosevelt Revolution possible.

See Also: DEMOCRATIC PARTY; END POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA (EPIC); LA FOLLETTE, PHILIP; LA FOLLETTE, ROBERT M., JR.; MINNESOTA FARMER-LABOR PARTY; OLSON, FLOYD B.; REPUBLICAN PARTY; SINCLAIR, UPTON; WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVE PARTY.

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HOWARD W. ALLEN

ELECTION OF 1936

The crushing defeat by Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt of his Republican challenger...
Alfred M. Landon in the presidential election of 1936 was a watershed in American politics. In political terms, it brought together northern wageworkers and southern racial conservatives in an uneasy coalition that was to provide a relatively stable electoral base for the Democratic Party until the 1960s, when disagreements over civil rights, social welfare, and the control of organized labor could no longer be kept off the national agenda. In ideological terms, the election amounted to a referendum on whether the new interventionist welfare state should replace the laissez-faire state that had dominated politics since the early twentieth century. In class terms, the Democratic and Republican parties were more sharply divided on economic and social issues than ever before (with the possible exception of 1896) and the struggle between the parties was often couched in the rhetoric of class conflict, a struggle between the wealthier classes and those seeking a more just and equitable share of American economic wealth and power.

ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL COALITION

By November 1936, the New Deal had reached its high point. Important reform measures had been enacted into law, including such landmark legislation as the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933), the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the Banking Act (1935), the Social Security Act (1935), and the National Labor Relations Act (1935). While economic recovery would prove elusive until the early 1940s, by the fall of 1936 Roosevelt could point to the fact that nearly six million jobs had been created, industrial output had doubled, corporate profitability had risen from a $2 billion deficit in 1933 to a $5 billion surplus in 1936, and New Deal agencies were well
on the way to providing relief and assistance to the forty-five million people (35 percent of the population) they were to aid by the end of the decade.

While scholarly debate has raged about the purposes and achievements of the New Deal, the American people perceived it as having alleviated the worst effects of the Depression. Roosevelt’s popularity soared and people saw him as a strong and compassionate leader, one who genuinely cared about their welfare and one who had attempted to democratize government by employing racial, ethnic, and religious minorities in unprecedented numbers. Most importantly, Roosevelt was seen as the defender of the common person against the selfish and atavistic business community that seemed intent on destroying the New Deal’s attempts to help the poor and marginalized.

Though Roosevelt had come to power in March 1933 with broad popular support and had attempted to forge an alliance that transcended class boundaries, by mid-1936 the administration had abandoned its conciliatory approach to business and adopted a more anti-business, pro-labor orientation intended to redistribute wealth and power to those outside the mainstream of the American power structure. The disaffection of business leaders with the president began with unease over their lack of power within the National Recovery Administration (NRA) early in Roosevelt’s first term, and it continued to escalate as Roosevelt rhetorically pushed “soak-the-rich” taxation, public utilities reform, and social security legislation. The split between Roosevelt and business became an unbridgeable chasm after the labor unrest of 1935 and the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (also known as the Wagner Act). The Wagner Act was particularly odious to business because it provided workers with the means of compelling employers to recognize unions that had won representative elections and it outlawed company unions and a number of other unfair labor practices.

By the 1936 election, therefore, most business leaders were firmly committed to a Republican victory and provided up to 80 percent of the $8.8 million that Republicans spent on the campaign. Prominent business people also supported a variety of anti-New Deal organizations, with the du Pont, Pitcairn, Morgan, Rockefeller, and Hutton groups providing 90 percent of their funding. The du Pont family alone provided 25 percent of the funding for the most prominent anti-Roosevelt organization, the American Liberty League. Business also funded the attempts of dissident conservative Democrats, who formed the National Jefferson Democrats in August 1936, to unseat Roosevelt.

Roosevelt wished to take full electoral advantage of these class antagonisms, and his campaign staff was directed to focus attention on symbols of corporate wealth and privilege rather than the Republican Party itself. Roosevelt mentioned the Democratic Party by name no more than three times throughout the campaign, and he supported progressive candidates such as Senator George Norris of Nebraska even when it meant supporting Republicans over Democrats. In campaign speeches across the nation, Roosevelt trumpeted the achievements of the New Deal and denounced the shortsighted and self-seeking “economic royalists” in big business, banking, and Republican-owned newspapers, who had changed the American economy into “privileged enterprise not free enterprise.” Roosevelt’s rhetoric indicated that he was willing to use the power of the federal government to protect ordinary Americans against the “economic tyranny” of wealthy business leaders.

As part of his winning electoral strategy, Roosevelt institutionalized the “New Deal coalition” that had begun to emerge as early as 1928. By the presidential election of 1936, the Democratic Party’s electoral base rested largely upon the support of the “Solid” South, northern cities, immigrants, African Americans, ethnic and non-Protestant religious groups, women, working people, and organized labor. The shift in African-American allegiance from the Republicans to the Democrats was particularly significant because their migration from the South had increased their political power in northern cities. The move of organized labor into the Democratic camp was also momentous. Previously constrained by a hostile state and conservative craft leadership, the dynamic and militant leaders of the new industrial unions had presided over dramatic increases in union membership. They were eager to protect their hard
won gains (particularly the Wagner Act) and thus became a crucial source of votes, campaign workers, and finance. Given the hostility of business, union campaign contributions were decisive and it has been estimated that organized labor provided more than $800,000 to Roosevelt’s reelection, nearly 16 percent of total Democratic campaign expenditures. Indeed, in 1936 the Democrats received most of their campaign contributions from the same place as their votes, namely, the emerging New Deal coalition.

ALF LANDON AND THE REPUBLICAN CHALLENGE

The man given the unenviable task of trying to unseat President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 was Alfred Mossman Landon, the forty-eight year old Republican governor of Kansas. Having narrowly won the gubernatorial election in 1932, he was the only Republican governor in the nation to win reelection in 1934, a fact that immediately propelled him into the race for the Republican nomination for the presidency. With the newspapers of publisher William Randolph Hearst giving him national exposure, Landon had little difficulty in securing the nomination at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, in June 1936, and he immediately named conservative Chicago publisher Frank Knox as his running mate.

Landon’s political and economic views were less conservative than the majority in his own party. As governor, he had attempted to maintain balanced budgets while also recognizing the importance to his state of the federal money pouring in through various New Deal programs, and he had spoken in favorable terms about the general purposes of the New Deal. But Landon’s strategic dilemma was how to avoid alienating supporters of the New Deal while also projecting a sharply focused identity that distinguished him from Roosevelt in the eyes of the electorate. Republicans thought he would win votes in the farm states of the Midwest and hoped that his unpretentious down-home style would appeal to voters disillusioned with the urbane sophistication of Roosevelt.

At the outset of the campaign, Landon emphasized his more liberal qualities despite the ferocious attack launched by the Republican right on the New Deal. But as the campaign progressed, Landon showed that there were limits to his liberalism. His campaign speeches raised the terrifying specter of government intrusion into private life and attacked the “communistic” drift of the Roosevelt administration. By October 1936, as opinion polls showed Roosevelt gaining a significant lead (with the exception of the infamous Literary Digest poll that predicted a Landon landslide), Landon’s attacks on the New Deal became increasingly extreme. However, by then it had become clear that Landon’s only hope of victory was if third parties could attract votes away from the president.

POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES TO ROOSEVELT ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT

The success of the New Deal in ameliorating the worst effects of the capitalist system without destroying it had undermined support for parties of the left and right who might have expected a political windfall given the economic and social crisis generated by the Depression. The Communist Party, whose membership grew from seven thousand in 1930 to nearly 100,000 in 1939, developed strong grassroots support during its principled struggles for southern textile workers, Appalachian mineworkers, and civil rights, as well as through the party’s involvement in union organizing. But its electoral impact was minimal due to internal doctrinal disputes, high membership turnover, and the Popular Front strategy adopted in 1936, which urged support for liberal and social democratic parties against the menace of fascism. The Socialist Party fared even worse, with membership collapsing to only 6,500 in 1937 from a high of around twenty thousand in 1931, and the party’s appeal was muted by ideological disputes, lack of a working-class base, and its electoral opposition to Roosevelt. Both parties found that leftist political convictions merged easily with the policies and programs of the New Deal, and radicals discovered by 1936 that some of their ideological commitments could be represented in the new Democratic Party coalition.

Opposition from new domestic demagogues was a far more potent electoral force than were the traditional parties of the left in 1936, and the Roose-
velt campaign was deeply concerned about the populist appeal of demagogues, such as radio priest Father Charles Coughlin, pension movement leader Francis Townsend, and “Share the Wealth” leader Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith, who had assumed leadership of the organization following the assassination of Senator Huey Long of Louisiana in September 1935. In June 1936, these forces came together to form the Union Party, which nominated Representative William E. Lemke of North Dakota for the presidency. Despite the Union Party’s ostensibly progressive and populist leanings, liberals sensed its conservative proclivities and many voters were repelled by the party’s growing anti-Semitism and its vitriolic personal attacks on Roosevelt. Ultimately, the demagogues were unable to counteract the enormous loyalty Roosevelt engendered among ordinary voters who had benefited from the New Deal.

ELECTION RESULTS

Roosevelt’s campaign manager Jim Farley had predicted that Roosevelt would win every state on November 3 except for Maine and Vermont. What initially appeared a wildly optimistic prediction turned out to be uncannily accurate. Turnout was high as 83 percent of eligible voters (around forty-six million Americans) cast a ballot, with Roosevelt receiving 27,751,841 votes compared to Landon’s 16,679,491. Roosevelt received 60.8 percent of the popular vote and the plurality (11,072,350) was the largest in presidential election history. This gave Roosevelt the largest victory in the electoral college (523 to 8) since James Monroe’s unopposed reelection in 1820. The results were equally convincing in the congressional elections, where Democrats won large majorities in the Senate (75–16) and the House of Representatives (331–88). The third-party threat failed to materialize as Union Party candidate William Lemke received only 892,763 votes (2 percent of the vote), Socialist candidate Norman Thomas won 187,342 votes (0.4 percent of the vote, down from the 2.2 percent he received in 1932), and Communist Party candidate Earl Browder won only 80,000 votes.

Furthermore, Roosevelt won 76 percent of lower income voters (but only 42 percent of upper income voters), 81 percent of unskilled laborers, 80 percent of union members, 84 percent of relief recipients, 76 percent of northern African Americans, between 70 and 81 percent of Catholics, and 86 percent of the Jewish vote. Roosevelt ran well in the South and West, but for the first time the northern cities emerged as the real power brokers in the Democratic Party. Roosevelt won 104 of America’s cities with populations of 100,000 or more; Landon won two. The results have been heralded as one of the most striking examples of critical realignment in the twentieth century, a seismic shift in voting patterns that redefined the basis of political loyalties for a generation. Debate has raged, however, about whether the results signify that the Democrats were able to convert large numbers of voters from the Republican Party or rather that the Democrats were able to mobilize many first-time voters, particularly in immigrant communities. Whatever the outcome of such debates, there can be little doubt that the 1936 presidential election was a pivotal moment in American political history, marking one of the few occasions when a coalition of minorities normally outside the American power structure was able to exert a significant influence on the political process.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; GARNER, JOHN NANCE; LANDON, ALFRED M.; NEW DEAL; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.; SOCIALIST PARTY; UNION PARTY.

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ELECTION OF 1938

In the 1938 congressional primaries, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought party realignment along ideological lines by advocating the defeat of selected conservative Democratic senators and representatives. His efforts largely failed, as conservatives gained strength in Congress in the 1938 election.

In 1936 President Roosevelt had won a second presidential term by a landslide and had helped the Democrats widen their overwhelming congressional majorities. He interpreted the outcome as a mandate to complete his New Deal reform package. In his January 1937 inaugural address, he had urged Congress to adopt more comprehensive New Deal programs for “ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished” Americans.

The Roosevelt administration entered the 1938 election campaign on the defensive. During the 75th Congress, conservative Democrats had aligned with Republicans to prevent Roosevelt from attaining his New Deal reform programs. The conservative coalition, which protested the expansion of federal power and especially executive authority, had rejected Roosevelt’s U. S. Supreme Court and executive reorganization plans and had stalled other New Deal reform measures. The economic recession of 1937 and 1938 had weakened Roosevelt’s position further and made his New Deal programs more vulnerable to attack. Democrats were expected to lose congressional seats as presidential parties had done in every off-year election since the Civil War except 1902 and 1934.

ROOSEVELT ANNOUNCES PARTY REALIGNMENT PLANS

President Roosevelt denounced the conservative coalition tactics as undemocratic and intolerable. He considered the 1938 primaries an opportunity time to remove anti-New Deal Democrats from the party and bring conservatives in line with the party’s national platform. In a June 1938 fireside chat, Roosevelt publicly announced his intentions to campaign for liberals in selected Democratic congressional primaries and inform Americans about which candidates supported his New Deal programs. He backed twenty-one of the thirty-one Democratic senators seeking reelection. The president, who complained that the 75th Congress had not fulfilled his party’s “uncompromisingly liberal” 1936 platform, pictured the primaries and elections as ideological contests between New Deal liberals and anti-New Deal conservatives. As Democratic party leader, he declared, “I feel that I have every right to speak in those few instances where there may be a clear issue between candidates for a Democratic nomination involving those principles, or involving a clear misuse of my name.” Roosevelt’s realignment strategy encountered several problems. Besides belatedly launching his party realignment effort, Roosevelt did not define what he meant by a conservative or indicate what specific strategy he would utilize. White House assistants Tom Corcoran, Harold Ickes, and Harry Hopkins supported the president’s tactics, but other advisors dissented. Newspapers accused Roosevelt of attempting to purge conservative Democrats. The president did not organize his strategy well, adopting various tactics as he zigzagged across the nation by train.
Roosevelt targeted for defeat ten conservative Democratic senators: Alva Adams of Colorado, George Berry of Tennessee, Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, Walter George of Georgia, Guy Gillette of Iowa, Augustus Lonergan of Connecticut, Pat McCarran of Nevada, Ellison Smith of South Carolina, Millard Tydings of Maryland, and Frederick Van Nuys of Indiana. Political leaders quickly convinced Roosevelt that four of the targeted candidates could not be removed. The president did not, therefore, intervene in the primaries involving Adams, Clark, Lonergan, or McCarran, all of whom won party renomination. Several New Deal Democrats endorsed by President Roosevelt triumphed in primaries. Congressman Lister Hill defeated segregationist J. Thomas Heflin in Alabama, while Senator Claude Pepper withstood conservative challenger J. Mark Wilcox in Florida. Senate majority leader Alben Barkley outpolled conservative governor Happy Chandler in Kentucky. Senators Hattie Caraway of Arkansas, Robert Bulkley of Ohio, and Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma and Representative Lyndon Johnson of Texas also won their primaries. The president campaigned against New York representative John O’Connor, helping James Fay oust the conservative House Rules Committee chairman.

THE 1938 PRIMARIES AND ELECTION

Roosevelt’s party realignment efforts, however, suffered setbacks in key midwestern and western Senate primaries. The Roosevelt administration campaigned in Iowa for liberal congressman Otha Wearin against incumbent Guy Gillette, who had opposed the president’s court plan. Gillette, solidly backed by the state party organization, easily withstood Wearin’s challenge. The Indiana Democratic party organization could not find a New Dealer to unseat the moderate Van Nuys. Conservative congressman D. Worth Clark benefited from Republican crossover votes to upset Senator James Pope in the Idaho primary.

The most critical setbacks for Roosevelt came in southern Senate primaries, where Roosevelt had intervened most directly, speaking on behalf of lesser known liberal Democrats against conservative incumbents George of Georgia, Smith of South Carolina, and Tydings of Maryland. At a Democratic meeting in Barnesville, Georgia, Roosevelt backed youthful attorney Lawrence Camp against George. George, however, nearly doubled Camp’s vote total in a three-way primary. In Greenville, South Carolina, the president endorsed Governor Olin Johnston against agriculture committee chairman Smith. Smith, a states’ rights segregationist and senator since 1909, won his primary, in part because of reaction against Roosevelt’s intervention. Roosevelt stumped Maryland for two days in support of Representative David Lewis, who was running against Tydings. Tydings, nonetheless, easily prevailed in the primary. In the House, liberal Maury Maverick of Texas was unseated and House rules committee conservative Howard Smith of Virginia handily won renomination.

Roosevelt launched his party realignment strategy too late for it to be effective and he damaged his prestige with his impulsive effort. Ten of the twenty-five Democratic Senate candidates with prior voting records on national legislation were conservatives, showing Roosevelt’s vulnerability. The president did not plan his strategy well, varied his tactics too much from state to state, and relied too heavily on often divided state party organizations. The American electorate disapproved of interference by federal officials in state politics and prevented the personally popular Roosevelt from realigning the political parties ideologically. The primaries stiffened conservative resistance and intensified the liberal-conservative split within his party. Roosevelt did not attempt again to develop a strong liberal party.

That November the Democrats retained sixty-nine seats and controlled over two-thirds of the Senate. Lonergan was the lone conservative Democrat to lose. The Republicans kept all their Senate incumbents and gained eight Senate seats, six of them replacing New Deal Democrats. Robert Taft unseated Bulkley in Ohio and quickly emerged as a Republican leader. The president thus faced a Senate that included twenty-three Republicans and twenty to thirty anti-New Deal Democrats. Although the Democrats maintained a comfortable majority in the House, holding 260 seats, the New Deal coalition was crippled, as public opinion shift-
ed in a more conservative direction. The seventy
defeated House Democrats were mostly liberals
from industrial northeastern and midwestern
states. Most anti-New Deal Democrats won reelection. Around eighty Democrats held at least strong
reservations about New Deal reform programs. The
Republicans gained eighty House seats, nearly dou-
bling their strength from eighty-nine to 169, with
thirteen governorships. Liberal governors Philip
LaFollette of Wisconsin, Frank Murphy of Michi-
gan, Elmer Benson of Minnesota, and George Earle
of Pennsylvania lost reelection bids, while Republi-
cans John Bricker of Ohio, Leverett Saltonstall of
Massachusetts, and Harold Stassen of Minnesota
won governorships. In Roosevelt’s home state of
New York, Thomas Dewey attracted national atten-
nation by nearly defeating incumbent Governor Her-
bert Lehman.

**THE DRIVE FOR POLITICAL REFORM**

Irregularities in three 1938 senatorial cam-
paigns provoked the Hatch Act of 1939, regulating
the political involvement of federal employees in
primaries and elections. Several New Deal liberals
who were either seeking renomination or attempt-
ing to unseat conservative incumbents were ac-
cused of manipulating the Works Progress Admin-
istration (WPA) to enhance their electoral
prospects. In the Kentucky primary, WPA authori-
ties had solicited $24,000 in contributions from
WPA employees to help Barkley defeat Chandler.
Party officials had raised these funds directly, with
WPA personnel being canvassed to ascertain their
political affiliations. In neighboring Tennessee,
WPA administrators had requested numerous do-
nations from WPA workers to help insure the tri-
umph of New Dealer Thomas Stewart over Berry in
the primary. Democratic senatorial aspirants had
benefited from political malpractices in the Novem-
ber election against Republican candidates. The
Pennsylvania WPA director had manipulated WPA
finances in an unsuccessful attempt to help Gover-
nor Earle unseat incumbent James Davis. Besides
selling tickets to WPA workers at party gatherings,
WPA administrators had ordered many Republican
employees to change their registration to Demo-
cratic.

Disclosures from the Senate campaign expendi-
titures committee in January 1939 intensified the
drive for reform. The committee, led by Democrat
Morris Sheppard of Texas, upheld accusations that
WPA officials diverted relief funds for political pur-
poses in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania.
They spiked similar allegations concerning con-
gressional races in Indiana, Maryland, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. The Committee
recommended legislation prohibiting government
officials from either soliciting or receiving contribu-
tions from WPA workers and other federal employ-
ees. The Hatch Act of 1939 banned the assessment
or solicitation of funds from WPA employees or re-
moval of any personnel because of refusal to
change political affiliation. Federal officials and
workers were prevented from using their positions
to interfere in presidential or congressional prima-
ries or elections.

Following the 1938 election, the conservative
coalition controlled both the Senate and the House.
Conservative Democrats aligned with Republicans
to stymie any Roosevelt initiatives and to search for
ways to reduce New Deal programs. In 1939, Con-
gress slashed WPA appropriations, authorized an
investigation of the National Labor Relations
Board, and rejected self-liquidating projects and
housing bills. The failure of party realignment di-
minished Roosevelt’s personal power because he
was serving the final two years of what most Amer-
icans expected to be his last presidential term. Roo-
sevelt denied that the election was a rejection of his
domestic reform program, but the New Deal re-
mained on the defensive in Congress.

See Also: CONSERVATIVE COALITION; FIRESIDE
CHATS; PEPPER, CLAUDE; ROOSEVELT,
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In the election of 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Republican nominee Wendell L. Willkie to win an unprecedented third term in the White House. Carrying 54.8 percent of the popular vote to Willkie’s 44.8 percent (27.3 million votes to 22.3 million), Roosevelt won thirty-eight of the forty-eight states and 449 of the 531 votes in the Electoral College. Democrats retained substantial majorities in both houses of Congress.

The election of 1940 came at the juncture of the Great Depression and World War II. Unemployment remained at 17 percent in the United States early in 1940, but after Europe went to war in September 1939, and especially after the Nazi blitzkrieg overran Western Europe in the spring of 1940, the American defense program began to galvanize the economy. At the same time, national attention turned increasingly to defense and foreign policy. The election thus provided the first major test of the new Democratic majority, forged in the much different context of the hard times and domestic concerns of the Depression decade.

The war affected American politics throughout 1940, perhaps most importantly in determining the presidential nominees. Early in the year, Roosevelt seemed uncertain about his intentions, but the international situation evidently convinced him to run again and made the public willing to support a third term. Among Republican candidates, the war in Europe made Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft seem too isolationist and New York district attorney Thomas E. Dewey too young; utilities magnate Willkie, a dynamic dark-horse candidate, won the nomination. Democrats nominated Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace for vice president, while Republicans chose Oregon Senator Charles McNary.

Willkie and the Republicans tried without much success to capitalize on the third term issue, and they had little more success with charges that Roosevelt’s anti-Axis policies were leading the United States to war. Responding to Republican accusations that he intended to enter the war, Roosevelt memorably declared that “I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” For his part, Roosevelt stressed the improving economic situation and the New Deal’s emphasis on employment, economic security, and rising living standards—issues that opinion surveys indicated remained central to public concerns and voting decisions.

The outcome of the election reflected not only the impact of the war but also powerful continuities from the politics of the Depression decade. Roosevelt’s margin fell below that of 1936 when he had won 60.8 percent of the vote, partly because of diminished support among isolationists, especially in the Midwest, and among Irish Americans, German Americans, and Italian Americans unhappy about
American foreign policy. The president also lost ground among wealthy voters opposed to the New Deal. Roosevelt gained some strength among supporters of his internationalist, anti-Axis policies, and his experience as president was reassuring given the global situation, but his victory came above all from the millions of working-class and lower-middle-class voters who continued to see him as the architect of the New Deal and the guarantor of security. Voting patterns, like party images, thus remained substantially like those of the 1930s, and the New Deal coalition of urban, working-class, lower-middle-class, ethnic, black, and white southern voters remained mostly intact; indeed it was solidified by the politics of 1940.

See Also: Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Wallace, Henry A.; Willkie, Wendell; World War II and the Ending of the Depression.

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ELLIPTICAL. DUKE

Bandleader and composer Edward Kennedy Ellington (April 29, 1899–May 24, 1974) was born in Washington, D.C., of middle-class parents. Young Ellington’s dignified bearing earned him the nickname “Duke.” Drawn in his teens to ragtime piano, he began to play for money and to compose. At nineteen, married with an infant son, Ellington organized a band that included the drummer Sonny Greer, saxophonist Toby Hardwick, and trumpeter Arthur Whetsol. In 1923 they moved to New York City and worked in Harlem nightclubs. Assuming leadership, Ellington added the trumpeter Bubber Miley and studied with the veteran composers Will Vodery and Will Marion Cook. He also gained an able white manager, Irving Mills. The orchestra made its first recordings in 1926, and the following year began its residence at Harlem’s exclusive Cotton Club.

Ellington continued to build his band, hiring the clarinetist Barney Bigard, trombonist Sam Nanton, and saxophonist Johnny Hodges. Their work in the Cotton Club’s famed “jungle revues” helped to publicize Ellington’s increasingly innovative recorded compositions. These numbers cannily exploited his soloists’ distinctive sounds and blended them in harmonically striking ensemble passages. Hodges, Greer, Nanton, and some later recruits remained with Ellington for decades, allowing him to mold his band into a unique “instrument.” The orchestra was a Harlem institution, performing at fundraisers for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and at other community functions, and Ellington became Harlem’s self-styled musical chronicler and spokesman. His band soon gained a national radio audience, and in 1931 he joined an African-American delegation that met with President Herbert Hoover.

Ellington left the Cotton Club that year. After classical musicians compared his compositions favorably to those of the French Impressionists, he began to create extended concert works, including Creole Rhapsody and Reminiscing in Tempo. Wildly successful European tours also stimulated this work, but his success continued to lie with popular dance numbers and ballads. Some of them, such as “Concerto for Cootie” (written for the trumpeter Cootie Williams), showcased his soloists, while others (such as “Take the A Train”) were written by Billy Strayhorn, a young arranger who quickly became indispensable to Ellington. Despite Ellington’s popularity as a leader, composer, and pianist, he had to contend with society’s racism and with discrimination in the music business. He valued Mills’s assistance, but the latter also demanded a share of writing credit and royalties from Elling-
ton’s songs, and in 1939 the two parted ways. At great expense Ellington used a private railroad car for his constant touring (to avoid segregated accommodations) and established his own music publishing company. He was outspoken in interviews and occasional written pieces about the burdens of prejudice, and he remained dedicated to celebrating the black experience in music.

The saxophonist Ben Webster and the bassist Jimmy Blanton augmented the great band of the late 1930s, resulting in what are generally regarded as its finest recordings (1939–1941). Ellington’s personnel choices and extraordinary compositions of the 1930s were the foundation for the rest of his career, which, despite uneven commercial fortunes, produced an astonishing body of concert and popular works and achieved worldwide fame and respect.

See Also: ANDERSON, MARIAN; BIG BAND MUSIC; HOLIDAY, BILLIE; JAZZ; MUSIC.

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**EMERGENCY RELIEF AND CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1932**

The Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERCA) of 1932, signed by President Hoover on July 27, 1932, appropriated funds for federal relief loans to the states and new public works construction. While the public works provisions of the law proved to be a disappointment, the $300 million relief appropriation financed the first large-scale federal public welfare program in American history.

Two forces combined to produce the congressional majorities that approved the law: mounting political pressure for new public works construction and the collapse of state and local relief programs then assisting the unemployed. Numerous congressional proposals for expanded public works spending had surfaced in 1930 and 1931. Even Hoover’s own relief officials had initially supported a large public employment program. At the same time, supporters of direct federal relief to the unemployed through local welfare agencies garnered considerable support for a measure that would have provided $375 million in relief grants to the states (the so-called LaFollette-Costigan Bill introduced in Congress in December 1931). Hoover and moderates in Congress had opposed both these measures, instead advocating voluntarist alternatives such as the private fund drive organized by the President’s Organization for Unemployment Relief.

By the spring of 1932, however, it was clear that the large emergency relief organizations in cities
such as Chicago and Philadelphia would collapse without federal aid. On May 12, Hoover announced that he would enlarge the coffers of the newly created Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to provide funds for public works and relief loans to the states. There followed a politically charged debate over the scope of the public works program and the policies of the RFC, but there now existed a consensus about the need for direct relief aid. In late July, with relief having been discontinued in Philadelphia and on the verge of collapse in Chicago, Hoover signed the ERCA.

The ERCA allocated $322 million for federal public works and authorized the RFC to provide funds for “self-liquidating” state, local, and private public works. The law also allocated $300 million in direct relief loans to local welfare agencies through states. These loans were to be repaid through deductions from future federal highway funds. The implementation of the public works provisions of the law proved to be a disappointment to the public works lobby. States and municipalities hesitated to apply for the funds, which would place them further in debt, and the administration was also slow to allocate the $322 million for federal public works.

The impact of the provisions for direct relief, however, was significant. Federal aid financed the bulk of relief during the winter of 1932–1933. RFC aid not only bailed out large urban relief organizations on the verge of collapse, it also financed a significant expansion of relief in smaller industrial communities and rural regions that had supplied relatively little relief prior to 1932. The RFC was forced to play a more active role in policymaking and administration than had been intended when the law was passed. Federal funds helped finance new state-level relief organizations and federal officials played key roles in lobbying for new state welfare appropriations.

By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated, the federal government was financing over 60 percent of all relief nationally. In the end, the $300 million in relief loans to the states was never repaid, and the federal government had permanently entered the field of public assistance.

See Also: HOOVER, HERBERT; RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION (RFC).

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EMERGENCY RELIEF APPROPRIATION ACT OF 1935

The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 was the New Deal’s effort to end the “dole” and replace it with public employment. The act appropriated approximately $4.8 billion to finance the last months of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and initiate what became the Works Progress Administration (WPA).

The administration’s decision to replace relief with the WPA reflected the values of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his relief administrator, Harry Hopkins. Both believed that relief demoralized the unemployed and produced a condition of dependency. Furthermore, most unemployed workers preferred work relief to the direct “dole.” The end of the Civil Works Administration (CWA) in the spring of 1934 had produced a mass protest movement that demanded work instead of a return to direct relief, and protest organizations proliferated under the “work program” of the FERA, which replaced the CWA. But work relief was enormously expensive and was opposed by influential New Dealers who feared that it would unbalance the federal budget. Roosevelt, despite his clear preference for public employment, shared this concern and terminated the CWA. The end of civil works produced a debate within the administration between “spenders,” who favored public employment, and fiscal conservatives who opposed it.

In the end, Roosevelt came to support public employment because he feared that the high feder-
al relief caseload, which by the end of 1934 approached five million, would create a permanent federal “dole.” In October he began meeting with key advisers to plan a new work program to replace relief. By the end of December the administration had determined to ask Congress for $4.8 billion, approximately two-thirds of which to finance work relief and the rest to draw down the FERA. The program would not be administratively linked to the Social Security Act, the administration’s proposed “permanent program” to deal with “economic insecurity.” Public employment would be a temporary policy to deal with the Depression crisis, not a permanent public employment program.

The administration’s proposal to Congress at first appeared to be adequately funded and have broad-based political support. Eight hundred million dollars would be sufficient to phase out the relief program during the summer of 1935, leaving $4 billion to employ approximately 3.5 million former relief recipients (70 percent of the FERA caseload). The remaining relief recipients, termed “unemployables,” would be returned to the states, which would receive some federal relief aid under the Social Security Act.

But the transition from relief to public employment in 1935 encountered political and administrative obstacles that seriously undermined the policy. First, the appropriation bill was delayed in Congress by demands from organized labor that the program pay prevailing wage rates. Then congressional leaders insisted on allocating the portions of the appropriation to specific employment categories and federal agencies, making it much more difficult to implement a smooth transition from the existing relief program. When the bill finally passed in the late spring, a battle erupted between the FERA’s Harry Hopkins and Harold Ickes, the interior secretary and director of the PWA, over control of the program. The conflict between Hopkins and Ickes was not only a power struggle; it was a debate over whether the new program should resemble public works, with capital intensive projects employing relatively little relief labor, or work relief, which employed more recipients but often seemed to be “made work.”

By September 1935 the administration’s new program appeared on the verge of collapse. Less than one-quarter of the projected 3.5 million workers had been employed and barely $1 billion of the original appropriation remained unallocated. To meet the crisis, Roosevelt handed the remaining funds to Harry Hopkins, who quickly began to transfer work relief projects to the program that came to be known as the WPA. By the end of December, nearly three million workers were on the WPA payrolls and the administration declared its program “99 7/8% successful.” But the smaller than expected WPA employment levels left a large relief burden for the states, generating an on-going crisis in the emerging state public welfare system of the late 1930s. The WPA, by contrast, proved enormously popular and contributed to Roosevelt’s resounding victory in the 1936 election.

See Also: FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA); HOPKINS, HARRY; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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END POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA (EPIC)

End Poverty in California (EPIC) was a series of proposals defining the platform upon which Upton Sinclair hoped to win the governorship of California in 1934. A prominent socialist and writer, Sinclair won acclaim early in the century with The Jun-
gle (1906), an exposé of the putrid conditions of meatpacking facilities and the exploitation of workers in American industry. In 1914 Sinclair left New Jersey and took up residence in California, where he threw his energies into politics, campaigning on the Socialist Party ticket. By 1933, however, with California mired in the throes of depression and possessed of an anemic Democratic Party, Sinclair realized the immediacy of the problem facing the unemployed as well as an opportunity to implement his ideas. Switching to the Democratic Party, Sinclair announced his candidacy in a sixty-page book, *I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty*. Declaring that there was “no excuse for poverty in a state as rich as California,” Sinclair proposed a program to end unemployment and poverty based upon the principle of production-for-use. Such a principle was believed conducive to a possibility of full employment, something that capitalism with its profit motive could not accomplish. The centerpieces of the EPIC plan were a full employment program that would turn over idle land and factories to the unemployed and a pension plan that would provide those sixty years and older with fifty dollars a month, financed by higher income and inheritance taxes. Sinclair overwhelmed his rivals in the Democratic primary and, with support from hundreds of EPIC clubs—citizens groups that had sprung up to advocate the cooperative principles of his program—appeared to be the favorite in the general election against Republican incumbent Frank Merriam. Alarmed that Sinclair would prevail, powerful economic interests in southern California organized the first modern electoral campaign in U.S. history. Financed and directed by the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer film studio, the Southern California Citrus Growers (Sunkist), and the *Los Angeles Times*, the anti-Sinclair forces used misleading cartoons and editorials to inflame voters with allegations that Sinclair was anti-marriage, anti-religion, pro-Soviet, and a free-love radical. The most controversial component of the attack on EPIC was a series of ostensibly factual newsreels screened to moviegoers that portrayed pro-Sinclair voters as poorly informed and lazy, while Merriam supporters appeared articulate and industrious. Particularly notorious were the newsreels that presented as fact an incipient flood of hoboies and unemployed transients preparing to come to California should Sinclair be elected.

The outcome of the election hinged on the level of support provided by Democratic regulars, many of whom remained deeply suspicious of Sinclair’s ideas, especially his call for the use of scrip as a medium of exchange among producers. Scrip was to be used as a token between producers and cooperatives in addition to money. Hoping to palliate the regulars and lead a united party, Sinclair dropped the more controversial of his proposals while appealing to Democratic leaders for full support. The linchpin of EPIC’s fate would be an endorsement from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Early in the campaign, Sinclair traveled east and conversed at length with Roosevelt. In the end, however, Roosevelt refused his support, and the party leadership attempted to persuade Sinclair to step down in favor of a candidate deemed more favorable by the national leadership. When Sinclair refused, the Democratic leadership negotiated an agreement with the Merriam camp to support the Republican in exchange for a bipartisan administration that would support the middle road of New Deal reform. Democratic support proved crucial to Republican victory on election day.

The legacy of the EPIC challenge was its role in pulling the New Deal leftward as Roosevelt, responding to Sinclair (among others), embraced a broader series of social and economic reforms after 1934. The response of the Democratic leadership, however, illuminated the ideological fissures within its brokerage politics, and firmly indicated that it would not support a social democratic insurgency at the grassroots level that managed to nominate candidates unsuitable to the party elite.

See Also: ELECTION OF 1934; SINCLAIR, UPTON.

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EPIC. See END POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA.

ETHIOPIAN WAR

The Italian government of Benito Mussolini invaded the African nation of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935, in order to provide Italy with additional colonial territory, to stimulate Italy’s economic growth and lower unemployment, and to create an outlet for Italy’s excess population. Historians have speculated that with the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Mussolini was also driven by a desire to maintain equal standing with Europe’s other fascist dictator, and he saw the conquest as a means to do so. Ethiopia, which had been one of the last independent African countries, was conquered by Mussolini’s forces by May 1936. The Ethiopian monarch, Haile Selassie I, and his family were driven into exile in Great Britain.

The brutality of the Italian military, particularly its use of low-flying bombing raids and poison gas against both civilians and soldiers, brought it condemnation from the international community. The League of Nations issued economic sanctions against Italy, but the sanctions were applied haphazardly because France and Great Britain wanted to avoid harming their long-standing alliance with Italy. The sanctions also allowed the continued shipment of oil to Italy and did not restrict Italy’s use of the Suez Canal. Once victory was assured, the League lifted the minor sanctions against Italy in July 1936, almost indicating that they endorsed the action.

The general response of the United States government to the war was disinterest. The United States maintained its isolationist stance and concentrated its energies on the Great Depression. It had no colonies in Africa and so did not fear Italian encroachment into its overseas holdings. Economically, the area represented a tiny fraction of the nation’s overseas trade, and few Americans had investments in the region that needed to be protected. Lastly, 1936 was an election year, and neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Alfred Landon wanted to make U.S. involvement in the war a central political concern.

Although the war engendered little interest among the white population of the United States, many African Americans followed the conflict closely and lobbied their government to take a stronger stand. They were motivated by several factors, including the historical importance that Africa’s longest-lasting black nation represented to the continued struggle of African Americans for equality. The civil rights activism of the 1930s increasingly emphasized social and economic equality as African Americans struggled to cope with the Great Depression. They clearly empathized with Ethiopia’s attempt to remain free and equal among the world’s nations.

Major urban areas, such as New York and Cleveland, became centers of political agitation, prayer meetings, and demonstrations. Organizations such as the Ethiopian Research Council, founded in Washington, D.C., in 1934, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People kept news of the conflict prominent in African-American communities. The interest of African Americans in this conflict was matched by people of African ancestry across the globe, and the war provoked anti-Italian protests in Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad, as well as inquiries regarding the possibility of volunteer soldiers from southern Africa, the United States, and Great Britain.

In contrast, the Italian-American community and its organizations repeatedly urged the U.S. government not to intervene. They held fundraising drives and mass demonstrations to show their support for Mussolini’s actions, and they contributed food, clothing, and money to assist Italy in its conquest. In addition, Italian Americans volunteered to serve with Mussolini’s forces. This staunch support for Italy’s actions brought about conflict between Italian Americans and African Americans, most notably a large riot that occurred in March 1935 in New York City.

Italian occupation of Ethiopia ended in 1941, as Italian forces were expelled by British and Commonwealth troops working in concert with Ethiopian exiles and guerrilla forces, and Haile Selassie returned to power.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; ISOLATIONISM; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN

World War I exacerbated old problems and created new challenges. The struggle to overcome these difficulties played an important role in determining the character and duration of the Great Depression in Europe.

THE Legacy of the WAR

The first challenge was to overcome the loss and suffering of war. Somewhere between nine and eleven million Europeans had died, with even greater numbers seriously injured. The slaughter cost France and Germany around 10 percent of their male workforce, Austria-Hungary and Italy more than 6 percent, and Britain 5 percent. If this unprecedented slaughter was not bad enough, widespread famine and a voracious influenza epidemic brought yet more death in the aftermath of the war. The conflict also damaged industry, transport networks, and homes, with France, western Russia, Poland, and Belgium the worst affected. But, however deeply the pain of this destruction was felt by Europe’s population, it did not take long for the workforce and infrastructure to recover. By the mid-1920s population levels had begun to rise, and factories, farms, and railways had been rebuilt.

Of greater consequence to Europe’s long-term prospects were many of the economic and financial changes induced by the war. While Europe’s leading industrial powers had been preoccupied with producing war supplies, American and Japanese businessmen had grown rich thanks to both increased demand and the absence of European competition. The disruption to established patterns of trade was damaging to the European economy and made it hard to recover the financial costs of the war. It proved difficult for Europe to recapture these markets, especially as American economic supremacy was underlined by its enthusiasm for new technologies and innovative ways of managing labor, with the average American factory worker producing twice as much per hour as his or her counterpart in Europe. Europe’s nineteenth-century strength in heavy industry, by contrast, was now a source of weakness, and the war exacerbated an overcapacity in industries like coalmining and shipbuilding that was already evident in 1913.

Not only were American manufactured goods usually superior to and less expensive than those made in Europe, so too were many American agri-
cultural and primary products. This disadvantage hit central and eastern Europe especially hard, inasmuch as around 70 percent of its workforce relied on the land to earn a living. The peace treaties negotiated between 1919 and 1923 added to the challenge of effecting economic stability in this part of Europe. Such new countries as Yugoslavia had to build the trappings of a modern national economy almost from scratch, while the defeated Central Powers were banned from working together to overcome their economic problems (the consequences of this prohibition were especially difficult for Austria and Hungary), and they were forced to pay heavy reparations to the European Allied Powers, although not to America.

Reparations were payments of money and goods levied against Germany and its Central Power allies at the peace conference in 1919. Britain and France demanded an indemnity to cover not just the physical damage wrought by the war, but the cost of waging the entire conflict. It took until 1921 for a reparations commission to fix a precise amount; Germany, for example was to pay 132 billion gold reichsmarks. The findings of the commission’s report were, and remain, highly controversial. In American “Reparations” to Germany, 1919–1933 (1988) Stephen Schuker argued that although Germany was plagued by temporary difficulties, the long-term prospects for Germany’s capacity to pay were excellent given the economic record of the German Empire before 1913. But this view was challenged by Gerald Feldman in The Great Disorder (1993), which underlined the profound harm done by reparations to the Weimar Republic.

Anglo-French demands for reparations were also fuelled by the need to pay back their war debts to the United States. Although President Woodrow Wilson declined to demand reparations from the Central Powers, successive U.S. administrations insisted that Britain, France and Italy, among others, pay back some $12 billion worth of loans. As President Calvin Coolidge put it, “They hired the money, didn’t they?” After 1919, the victorious European powers hoped to trade concessions they might make on reparations for a reduction in their war debts. Although many European countries were able to negotiate some kind of reduction in the amounts owed, the United States consistently denied any link between the ability of the Central Powers to pay their reparations to the Allied ability to meet its war debts.

World War I also generated political change that affected how economic policy was made and what it was expected to achieve. After the sacrifices demanded of them in war, voters now expected politicians to deliver improved social provisions and work opportunities, and when governments failed to manage national economies to benefit the majority of voters, they were increasingly likely to be voted out of office. This tendency was all the more pronounced in Europe because many countries, like Germany and Austria, became democracies for the first time, while established democracies extended the franchise. Britain, for example, gave women and young men the vote for the first time in 1921. The need to manage the home economy to the satisfaction of the electorate also complicated relations between countries. In the 1920s, there were a rising number of trade wars both within and beyond Europe’s frontiers as governments tried to meet the expectations of farmers and businessmen to protect home markets. These economic conflicts damaged diplomatic relations, the operation of the gold standard, and prospects for long-term stability of the international economy.

The first big test for the ability of Europeans to deal with new economic problems came early in the 1920s as the demands of reconstruction and reparations unleashed inflation in many European countries, notably in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. At first the German government was unwilling to take decisive action to calm the rising currency crisis, but after the French invaded Germany’s industrial heartland, the Ruhr, in January 1923, inflation spiralled to over 2,000 percent, and decisive action to save the most important economy in Europe became imperative. It came in the shape of a plan devised by the American general Charles G. Dawes, who proposed a revised schedule for reparation payments and a German return to the gold standard. Announced in 1924, the plan also encouraged foreign investors to purchase German bonds. But the scheme quickly snowballed beyond the expec-
tations of its inventors. By 1928, almost eight billion dollars had been sunk into Europe, with four billion dollars invested in Germany alone.

The impact of the postwar inflation that spiraled into hyperinflation in much of central and eastern Europe played a crucial role in shaping government economic policy after 1924. The dominant preoccupation of government policy became currency stabilization centered on the gold standard. But the determination to avoid inflation or any significant shift in monetary policy, both of which were seen as a gateway to currency chaos, was to make little sense in the world after 1929, with falling prices, diminishing demand, and rising levels of unemployment. The reconstructed gold standard helped to tie the fate of the European economy to that of the United States. So, too, did the messy tangle of war debts, reparations, and Dawes Plan loans. Although each type of debt was notionally separate, in practice one type of payment was seen as dependent on the other. When American commercial loans began to dry up, as they did after 1928, the European economy was in very big trouble.

THE EUROPEAN BANKING CRISIS

By 1928 it was clear that the Dawes Plan was failing. The once mighty stream of American investment into Europe had slowed to a trickle. Negotiations for a new scheme, dubbed the Young Plan, were underway when Wall Street crashed and the Great Depression set in. The American Federal Reserve’s decision to increase interest rates in 1929 and 1930, coupled with the economic downturn in the United States, meant that the American loans that had helped to smooth over the cracks in the European economy were no longer available. By 1931, the level of U.S. investment in Europe dropped to zero. In response, European countries tried to be as “good as gold”; they raised interest rates and tried hard to prevent the national budget from sliding into deficit, with the aspiration of attracting back some of the foreign investment they had lost. But the strategy had painful consequences. Political developments also played a role. Any disputes about taxation increases or government spending, like those that gripped Germany in the summer of 1931, had serious financial implications, as well as political consequences.

By June and July 1931 British banks were struggling to fill the breach in central European finances left by the United States. But as much as politicians from the left and right of the political spectrum blamed “greedy, foreign capitalists” for their woes, many of the problems facing banks in central Europe in the summer of 1931 were homegrown. Not only had much of the foreign investment on which the region had become so dependent been spent on unproductive projects designed to generate prestige rather than profits (in Romania over 30 percent of international loans had been spent this way), banks in central Europe also had a close relationship with local industry that made them especially vulnerable. Austrian industry, for example, was very dependent on bank loans, while the banks, in turn, owned a large number of shares in Austrian industry. When industry failed, so did the banks.

Until the summer of 1931, Austrian banks worked hard to cover up industrial losses, in part by merging with other banks. But the wheels came off this strategy in spectacular fashion on May 8, 1931, when it was revealed that Austria’s largest bank, the Creditanstalt, had incurred losses of 140 million schillings. Investors rushed to the bank to withdraw their savings; over a period of twelve days the bank lost more than 300 million schillings in domestic withdrawals, and a further 120 million schillings were removed by foreign investors. No private institution had sufficient funds to bale out the Creditanstalt, so the Austrian government reluctantly stepped in to end the crisis by effectively taking control of the bank. As a consequence, the Austrian state became the owner of sixty-four different Austrian companies and 65 percent of the nominal capital in Austrian businesses.

The collapse of Austria’s banks also triggered a wave of selling in the Austrian schilling that the Austrian government was powerless to stop. It was only by breaking the “rules of the gold standard game” in October 1931, through the introduction of exchange controls designed to restrict the amount and destination of gold and foreign currency leaving Austria, that the crisis came to an end. These controls became an elaborate network of bilateral
payment agreements that controlled the movement of money and goods between Austria and other countries.

Banking crises similar to that which had taken place in Austria soon engulfed other countries, including Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. But Germany, once again, experienced the most dramatic collapse. The biggest commercial banks—the Darmstätter und Nationalbank (DANAT Bank), the Dresdener, and the Deutsche bank—began to sustain enormous losses as industry failed and nervous investors withdrew their cash. In an effort to hang on to their reserves, the banks put up interest rates and cut back on loans to business, so that even companies that had remained relatively healthy found their working credit withdrawn and faced the prospect of bankruptcy.

Chaos reigned in the German banking system for over two months until 13 July 1931, when all German financial institutions closed down. They reopened after a few days, but the financial, economic, and political landscape in which they now operated had changed dramatically. Political and social changes were immediately visible. Confidence in the future had evaporated, which meant that companies and individuals spent even less. Unemployment rocketed to over six million people, around one-fifth of the German working population, and the extremist political parties, the Communists and the National Socialist Party of Germany (NSDAP, or Nazis), experienced a huge surge in political support. There were also economic and financial changes that were less visible to contemporary observers. The German state, like Austria, had taken on important new powers that enabled it to control the amount of gold and foreign exchange leaving the country. Not only did this mean that American and British investors now found their investments frozen inside Germany, giving Germany important bargaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations with those two countries, it also meant that bilateral payment schemes were set up giving the state power to control German trade. Together, these developments changed the nature of Germany’s relationship with the international economy and helped make it much easier for the Nazis to manage the economy after they took power in 1933.

A very different banking crisis took place in Britain in September 1931. Here it was not the commercial banks that came under pressure, but the central bank, the Bank of England. The widespread collapse of confidence in Europe in the summer of 1931 had taken its toll on the British economy: The pound was sold heavily on the international exchange, interest rates rose, and the financial problems for companies, banks, and households multiplied at a frightening rate. As the British government argued over whether, and how best, to cut the rising budget deficit, the political and financial pressure rose. On August 24, 1931, Britain resorted to a new national government comprised of representatives from the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties to underline national unity in the face of the crisis. But the step was not enough to keep the pound on the gold standard, nor were the efforts of the world’s most powerful central banks. On September 20, 1931, Britain, along with its imperial and commonwealth partners, left the gold standard. It was a move that enabled these countries to take the first tentative steps on the road to economic recovery.

POPULAR AND POLITICAL REACTIONS

The decision of Britain’s leading political parties to work together to present a unified political front was followed by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the mid-1930s. The step was triggered, in part, by political developments in central and eastern Europe, where traditionally dominant political parties—the Conservatives (including Nationalists), the Liberals, and the Social Democrats—were discredited by the economic collapse and their failure to develop any new policies. They increasingly lost out to those on the far left and far right, typified by revolutionary Communist and Fascist parties that appeared to offer radical answers to the suffering of an increasingly desperate electorate. But it is important not to oversimplify the relationship between economic misery and political radicalism. Many countries around the world experienced intense economic hardship yet did not succumb to political extremism; the United States was the most notable example.

On a human level the most visible measure that politicians had failed to staunch the crisis by 1931
was the tremendous surge in unemployment. By 1932 the official figures were impressive, with 6 million unemployed in Germany and 2.7 million jobless in Britain, but it is very likely the real figures were much higher. This is especially true in agricultural Europe, where unemployment was disguised as underemployment and characterized by a silent slide into abject poverty.

Some groups in society were hit disproportionately hard. Young men were especially affected by the social and psychological effects of unemployment. Theirs was a strong contributory voice to the rising intolerance of groups or individuals who were perceived to be economic rivals or outsiders. The crisis triggered a rising culture of blame as people began to point accusatory fingers at other social groups, including bankers and industrialists, or at those who appeared to be different from themselves, such as Jews and gypsies. Women workers were also vulnerable in this climate. In Britain and Germany, for example, married women teachers were sacked as part of a campaign against what were called “double-earners” (because their husbands also brought home a wage packet). However, in industries beyond the state’s control it was often male employees who lost out to the women because women were cheaper to employ and more prepared to work part-time.

GOVERNMENT RECOVERY POLICY

Relations between European countries became increasingly bitter as the Depression deepened. Diplomatic cooperation proved difficult in the atmosphere of intense economic competition, even between countries like Britain and France that shared a common interest in defending democracy and capitalism. Desperate to respond to the clamor of French farmers who demanded protection from cheap imports, by 1932 France had introduced strict quotas on over three thousand different imports, German tariffs had risen by over 50 percent, and most dramatically of all, Britain retreated into protection in the autumn of 1931, ending a commitment to the ethos of free trade that had lasted eighty-five years. Europe was now divided into competing economic blocs.

Freed from gold, the British government dropped interest rates, increased spending, and became the first country in Europe to show signs of recovery. The British government’s first priority became fostering domestic recovery; internationalism, characterized by its unwavering support for the gold standard in the 1920s, was at an end. Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, by contrast, clung to gold until the 1935 to 1936 period, which helps explain why they experienced the worst of their economic and political crises during the mid-1930s—terrible timing when it came to facing German expansionism and civil war in Spain.

In Germany, as in a number of other countries in central and eastern Europe, the break with economic internationalism was much more overt than in Britain. Under the Nazis, emergency measures taken by previous governments, notably during the banking crisis in 1931, evolved into a complex system of trade and monetary restrictions. The regime stepped in to manage trade, the movement of foreign exchange, prices, wages, private investment banks, and all other aspects of investment in its drive to achieve national self-sufficiency (autarky).

In common with other countries, the states in central and eastern Europe also became heavily involved in trying to stimulate demand in the economy. But as the international climate deteriorated, it became difficult to distinguish industrial recovery from preparations for national defense. In Poland in 1936, the government introduced a six-year investment plan under which, by 1939, the state controlled about one hundred industrial enterprises and all of Poland’s transportation networks. Unfortunately, the strategies adopted to fight the Depression by the smaller countries of central and eastern Europe neither assisted the development of their economies in the long-run, nor helped to secure them from the expansionist ambitions of their neighbors, Germany and the Soviet Union.

See Also: ANTI-SEMITISM; DICTATORSHIP; GOLD STANDARD; INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.

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This small country church in Georgia was one of many photographs Walker Evans shot of churches, shops, and other buildings during the 1930s while on assignment in the South for the Farm Security Administration. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

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**EVANS, WALKER**

Walker Evans (1903–1975) was one of the great photographers of the twentieth century, a pivotal figure in establishing the documentary arts movement in the United States, and among the signal artists responsible for fixing the exact look of the Depression for subsequent generations.

He was born Walker Evans III on November 3, 1903, in St. Louis, and moved to Kenilworth, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, in 1908, and to Toledo, Ohio, in 1915. A sensitive but indifferent student, Evans suffered his education in a series of mostly private boarding schools, including the Loomis Institute in Connecticut, Mercersbury Academy in Pennsylvania, and briefly, Philips Andover Aca-

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PATRICIA CLAVIN
my in Massachusetts. Following a rejection from Yale University, he began and ended his university career with a single semester at Williams College in Massachusetts in December 1923.

After a number of clerical jobs in New York City and a renovative thirteen-month stay in Paris, Evans returned to New York City in 1927 and began the study and practice of the camera in earnest. For the next decade and a half, he engaged in a remarkable string of publications, exhibitions, and field trips that constitute not only the most fecund period of his creative life, but also one of the indelible landmarks in the history of American photography. Starting in 1931 and for the next several years, Evans conducted a photographic study of the vanishing Late-Victorian architecture, mostly in New England. In 1933, the Museum of Modern Art presented “Walker Evans: Photographs of 19th Century Homes,” which according to biographer James R. Mellow was “the first one man photographic exhibition mounted by a major museum in the United States” (Mellow 1999, p. 624). In Havana, Cuba (1933), Evans documented the social terrain under the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado in thirty-one illustrations for the radical journalist Carleton Beal’s text *The Crime of Cuba*. Beginning in 1935 and for the next two years, Evans produced a sweeping catalog of the American scene in a series of field trips, mostly in the southern and central regions, as an information specialist for the photographic unit of the historical section of the Resettlement Administration (later the Farm Security Administration), a unit which ultimately produced some 270,000 photographs, including the work of photographers like Dorothea Lange, Ben Shahn, Carl Mydans, and Arthur Rothstein. On loan to *Fortune* magazine in the summer of 1936, he made an excursion to Hale County, Alabama, with the writer James Agee; Evans’s photographs and Agee’s text would become the classic study of three tenant families, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1941). In 1938, before embarking on a three-year project of subway portraits with a hidden camera (eventually published in 1966 as *Many Are Called*) he attained national prominence with the Museum of Modern Art’s exhibition “Walker Evans: American Photographs,” a summary statement of more than a decade’s work, and his single most famous collection.

An Evans composition was the result of both a contrarian spirit and a deliberate aesthetic that planted itself in opposition to the dominant photographic trends in the first quarter of the century; specifically, the mystical aestheticism of Alfred Stieglitz, the commercial gloss and celebrity portraiture of Edward Steichen, the staged theatricals of Margaret Bourke-White, and even the machine-age formalism of Laszlo Moholy-Nagy (of which precocious examples can be found in Evans’s early experiments). Against these, his taste ran to the immediacy of raw fact, the unadorned directness of non- or even anti-art: newsreels, tabloid journalism, and the home snapshot. An Evans photo can disarm the casual eye in its avoidance of romance or prettification, frippery or melodrama, its freedom from overt forms of camera rhetoric and embellishment. Actually the restraint of the shot belies a fierce distillate of mental energy, an astringent appreciation of form, and a personal preference for the poetics of entropy and depletion, the harmonics of disarray and adventitious moments. Evans’s characteristic subjects were torn posters and billboards cropped with a surrealist wit; shop fronts scrabbled with a patchwork of graffiti and rusty slogans; gas stations, junk yards, and railway depots; dusty vistas of replicated housing and stretch landscapes of smoking factory and clapboard shanty; aging Victorian homes, peeling Greek Revival buildings, and the chipped framewood of Black Baptist churches; and the faces and figures of the anonymous caught unguarded in the nick of an interior event. Evans’s treatment of the forms of neglect and the scorings of time coincided almost exactly, whether by accident or design, with the look and fact of the ongoing social crisis of the Great Depression, and become its representative expression.

Starting in 1945, Evans spent twenty years as a full-time staff photographer for *Fortune* magazine, and another eight years (1964-1972) as professor of graphic design at the Yale School of Art and Architecture. Throughout the last phase of his career, he never stopped collecting penny postcards or roadside bric-a-brac, or working obsessively with a Polaroid color camera, with which he produced more than two thousand photographs before his death on April 10, 1975, in New Haven, Connecticut.
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), Ezekiel argued, might assist farmers in the Depression crisis, but it could not restore farm prosperity because of agriculture’s dependence on urban and industrial demand and on international trade. Consequently, he argued throughout the 1930s that agricultural recovery demanded reducing tariffs and trade barriers and creating systems of economic planning to achieve full employment. Ezekiel criticized the National Recovery Administration and other New Deal measures for embracing economic restriction in place of a broad-based recovery strategy. He proposed instead a program of “industrial expansion” that he popularized in two books, $2,500 a Year: From Scarcity to Abundance (1936) and Jobs for All through Industrial Expansion (1939). Building in part on the “administered price” thesis developed by the economist Gardiner Means, Ezekiel argued for a cooperative planning system that would use tax incentives and production quotas to initiate an expansion of the non-farm economy. He also joined with the so-called spenders in the New Deal to advocate Keynesian policies of fiscal expansion to counter the recession of 1937 to 1938.

Ezekiel’s advocacy of economic planning and his status as one of the New Deal’s highest ranking and most visible Jewish figures made him a favorite target of New Deal critics. Anti-Semitic diatribes often warned of his influence in the “Jew Deal.” But although he was a respected economist, his planning proposals never gained a serious hearing from Franklin Roosevelt, and among economists Ezekiel’s proposals were far less influential than the fiscal policies advocated by the economist Alvin Hansen.

During World War II, Ezekiel worked briefly with the War Production Board and also helped organize the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). He joined the FAO staff in 1946 after being forced to resign from the Department of Agriculture under pressure from conservative congressmen. Ezekiel stayed with the FAO until 1961 and worked to develop its economic research division and its policies for economic development.
See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); FARM POLICY; WALLACE, HENRY A.

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DAVID HAMILTON
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

The Fair Labor Standards Act, also known as the Wages and Hours bill, was signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt on June 25, 1938. The Fair Labor Standards Act mandated minimum wage, maximum weekly hours, and child labor standards for workers engaged in interstate commerce. The law represented a departure from the policy of strict voluntarism that organized labor had supported prior to the Great Depression. However, continuing concerns on the part of American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders about the state determining wage standards helped to shape a law that fell short of the aim of those New Dealers who wanted to require employers to pay a “living wage.”

The Progressive era had witnessed various attempts by individual states to regulate working conditions for women, children, and those involved in hazardous jobs. Judicial hostility to any interference with “liberty of contract” and union fears of government intervention becoming a substitute for workers’ self-organization severely limited the scope and effectiveness of such efforts prior to the Great Depression. The federal government did not become directly involved in trying to enforce minimum wage and maximum hours standards throughout the economy until the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was established in 1933.

When the Supreme Court ruled in 1935 that the National Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional, Roosevelt considered offering a labor standards bill to salvage the wages and hours provisions of the industry codes set up under the NRA, but he waited until after his reelection to begin pressing Congress to pass such legislation.

New Deal lawyers Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran prepared the original version of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which in May 1937 was introduced by Hugo Black in the Senate and by William Connery in the House. The Black-Connery bill called for fixing an unstated minimum wage (widely assumed to be forty cents an hour) and a maximum hours standard (assumed to be forty hours per week) for workers involved in interstate commerce. Workers involved in agriculture or holding administrative or supervisory positions were deemed “exempt” from coverage under the law, as were workers in firms with fewer than six employees. Overtime work was to be paid at a rate of time and a half. In addition, the bill provided for the establishment of a five-person Labor Standards Board with discretionary power to set higher wage and lower hours requirements for individual industries in which there was a demonstrated “inadequacy or ineffectiveness of facilities for collective bargaining.” Implicit in such a provision was the hope that the law would contribute to the establish-
ment of “living wage” standards. New Deal proponents of the law saw the forty-forty standard itself as a means of raising the wage level and boosting the level of employment, and thereby contributing to efforts to end the Depression. The proposal also included a ban on child labor.

In spite of Roosevelt’s backing, the Black-Connery bill faced tough going in Congress. The proposal encountered stiff opposition from the nation’s business leaders and also failed to win the support of the AFL, whose leaders feared allowing a government board to exercise such wide authority over wages. The congressional battle over the Fair Labor Standards Act lasted fourteen months, and the law that finally emerged was significantly different from Cohen and Corcoran’s original draft. In response to the concerns of the AFL and the secretary of labor, the independent and potentially powerful Labor Standards Board was eliminated. Administration of the law was given to the Department of Labor. The Fair Labor Standards Act set an initial minimum wage of only twenty-five cents, while providing for the rate to go to forty cents in seven years. The law set an initial weekly hours standard of forty-four, but called for a reduction to forty over three years. Although the law allowed individual industries to reach the forty-forty standard before the end of the phase-in period, the limited flexibility in the final bill was intended primarily to make it possible for southern employers to maintain regional differentials for several more years.

The Fair Labor Standards Act was path-breaking legislation that immediately improved wages for approximately 300,000 workers while reducing hours for more than one million employees. Yet, the standards established by the law were so low that full-time workers receiving the law’s protection could still have incomes that would leave them in poverty. Subsequent increases in the minimum wage have only marginally improved this situation. Moreover, by excluding agricultural labor and domestic workers, who were not considered to be engaged in interstate commerce, the law failed to provide any benefits to large numbers of African-American and women workers.

See Also: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; GUFFEY-SNYDER ACT OF 1935; GUFFEY-VINSON ACT OF 1937.

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FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The Great Depression challenged American families in major ways, placing great economic, social, and psychological strains and demands upon families and their members. Families of various class, ethnic, racial, and regional backgrounds, exhibiting various styles of marital and familial relationships, responded in different manners to the stresses and demands placed upon them. In 1933, the average family income had dropped to $1,500, 40 percent less than the 1929 average family income of $2,300. Millions of families lost their savings as numerous banks collapsed in the early 1930s. Unable to make mortgage or rent payments, many were deprived of their homes or were evicted from their apartments. Both working-class and middle-class families were drastically affected by the Depression.

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION AND DEPRIVATION

From one perspective, the story emerging from the Great Depression can be described as one of family “disorganization” and deprivation. Marriage rates declined, although they started to rise in 1934,
and the trend toward decreasing birthrates, already underway, accelerated during the 1930s. Although divorce rates also declined, this seems to have been largely the consequence of the inability to pay lawyers’ fees; desertion rates increased during the decade. In some cases, two or more families crowded together in apartments or homes designed as single-family residences. Some 250,000 youths were on the road, travelling by freight train or hitchhiking in order to find work or more favorable circumstances. From 1929 to 1931, the number of children entering custodial institutions increased by 50 percent. In many economically deprived families, children suffered from malnutrition and inadequate clothing.

Things seemed to be especially difficult for unemployed and underemployed male heads of families. Traditional conceptions of gender roles prevailed during the 1930s; accordingly, men were expected to be the breadwinners of their families. Unemployed men felt like failures as a result of their inability to provide for their families. Such feelings of inadequacy were accentuated when, often after having used up their life savings, these men were forced to endure the humiliating experience of applying for relief. Unemployed men often found themselves hanging around their homes, irritating their wives; quarrels became more frequent between husbands and wives. At times, men withdrew emotionally and even physically from their families and friends. Children of impoverished families, recalling memories of family life during the 1930s, often remembered their fathers as emotionally distant and indifferent. Some unemployed men took up drinking. Others went off on long trips, looking for employment in other cities. Some deserted their wives and families altogether.

**ADAPTING TO THE DEPRESSION**

From a different perspective, another story of the family emerges—one that emphasizes the resilience and ability of the family to adapt in the face of adverse economic circumstances. Some families, of course, were not affected by major economic deprivation during the 1930s, but even among those that were, many were able to maintain relatively “normal” patterns of family life—with the father securely positioned as the head of the family and relatively harmonious relationships prevailing within the home. In the years after the Depression, many recalled the era, perhaps with an exaggerated sense of nostalgia, as a period of family togetherness and solidarity. Family members listened to the radio together (by the 1930s, millions of urban families owned at least one radio) or engaged in such activities as playing Monopoly, a popular game that appeared in the mid-1930s.

Features that could be considered symptoms of family disorganization, especially the employment of women and children outside the home, can perhaps best be regarded as ways in which families actively adapted to and coped with economic deprivation. In order to help provide economic support for their families, married women increasingly
A Texas family of migrant agricultural laborers lived in this trailer south of Chandler, Arizona, in 1940 during the cotton picking season. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

came to work outside the home during the 1930s, generally in low-status, low-paying jobs, often in the service and light manufacturing sectors. In spite of widespread condemnation of the employment of married women and the refusal of many government agencies, schools, libraries, and so on to employ them, the percentage of married women in the workforce continued to rise during the Depression years. Married women also contributed to the livelihood of their families by intensifying their household labor—by, for example, maintaining vegetable gardens and preserving the resulting produce, or patching and remaking old clothes. Children contributed to their families as well. Boys worked, usually on a part-time basis, in activities such as delivering newspapers, doing janitorial tasks, and assisting as store clerks. Girls, on the other hand, tended to stay home and help with domestic tasks, especially when their mothers worked outside the home.

Another example of how family life was actively adapted to the social and economic circumstances that Americans encountered during the Depression era was the creation of a family-oriented union culture by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in late 1930s. As historian Lizabeth Cohen has demonstrated, CIO unions came to emphasize family life, especially family-oriented social and recreational activities, as a means of enhancing soli-
darity among the diverse ethnic and racial groups involved in the CIO. Recognizing that working-class women played a key role as decision-makers in their families, unions attempted to enlist them in such activities as campaigns to buy union-made products and social events aimed at breaking down racial and ethnic barriers between working-class families. Indeed, women were conceived of as playing a guiding role in the elaboration of a family union culture.

Efforts to adapt the family to economic adversity during the 1930s did not result in a challenge to conventional gender roles. Many married women worked for wages outside their homes during the Depression years, but their children, often coming of age during the post-World War II era, did not come to see the employment of married women as in itself a positive good. Accustomed at an early age to assuming conventional gender roles—as boys worked at part-time jobs outside their homes, while girls worked at domestic chores within the home—the children of the 1930s saw their mothers’ employment as perhaps necessary under the circumstances, but not as an indication that married women should pursue careers rather than devote themselves to being housewives. Similarly, although the CIO encouraged women to join unions in industries such as meat-packing, demanded equal pay for women, and enlisted working-class wives as guides of family union culture, CIO unionists persisted in seeing men as the primary family breadwinners. Women were not encouraged to assume leadership roles in CIO unions, and little effort was made to organize workers in the clerical
Like many families during the Depression, this unemployed miner from Zeigler, Illinois, depended on government relief to support his wife and nine children in 1939. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

and service sectors, which tended to be dominated by women.

With the advent of the New Deal in March 1933, the federal government came to assume a new role in fostering the economic security and welfare of American families. As critics have suggested, however, New Deal programs tended to assume the primacy of the male breadwinner within the family, thus shoring up traditional gender roles. Work relief programs, such as the Works Progress Administration (WPA), discriminated against women, and women workers were generally not adequately covered by the retirement pension and unemployment insurance programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935. Although the New Deal welfare state owed much of its inspiration to the idea of the “maternal commonwealth” formulated by female reformers during the late nineteenth century and the Progressive era, and despite the major role that female administrators and social workers played in implementing the New Deal welfare state, there was little concern for advancing the specific interests and rights of women during the 1930s.

African-American families were especially hard hit by the Depression. Unemployment rates were significantly higher for blacks than for whites in Northern cities, and in the South, where most of the African-American population continued to live during the 1930s, economic conditions were especially bad. Black sharecroppers in the South were forced to subsist on a minimal level, and increasing-
ly they were evicted from their farms as the result of Agricultural Adjustment Administration policies. In urban areas, there was an especially high percentage of female-headed families due to high mortality rates among black males and their inability to provide for their families as breadwinners. Moreover, the eligibility requirements of the Aid to Dependent Children program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935, apparently contributed to the problem by driving black fathers from households. Again, however, the issue of female dominance in many black families is more than simply a story of the “disorganization” of the black family. In fact, in both Northern cities and the rural South, black women tended to be the centers of networks of kin, friends, and neighbors—networks by means of which scarce resources were shared, thus enabling families to survive under conditions of extreme economic adversity. In general, New Deal measures benefitted blacks less (and sometimes not at all) in comparison to whites, though New Deal work relief and welfare programs did provide significant assistance for black families, especially in Northern cities.

THE LEGACY OF THE DEPRESSION

The Depression era bequeathed a mixed legacy to American families and households. Perhaps the major positive aspect of this legacy was the idea that the economic security and welfare of the family should be a fundamental national goal. To be sure, this idea was imperfectly realized in the New Deal welfare state, which often discriminated against women wage-earners and relegated the families of blacks and other nonwhites to second-class status. Nevertheless, during the 1930s and subsequent decades, the federal government did come to play a major role in providing for the health, welfare, education, and housing of American families.

See Also: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; EDUCATION; ELDERLY, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; HOMELESSNESS; MEN, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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James Aloysius Farley (May 30, 1888–June 9, 1976), postmaster general of the United States and chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1933 to 1940, was a shrewd political organizer and one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s closest political advisers during the Great Depression. Ideologically, Farley registered opposition to much of the New Deal program, but until he and Roosevelt parted company in 1940, they made a formidable team that benefited both men and the nation.

A preeminent New York politician who helped orchestrate Roosevelt’s presidential landslides in 1932 and 1936, Farley was born in Grassy Point, New York. After graduating from Stony Point High
School in 1905, he held various Democratic party offices, including town clerk. He later formed a business and served one term in the state legislature before becoming secretary of the New York State Democratic Committee, in which capacity he organized Roosevelt’s successful gubernatorial campaigns in 1928 and 1930. In 1932 Farley arranged the deal that made John Nance Garner of Texas the Democratic vice presidential nominee.

The postmaster generalship provided Farley with immense patronage potentialities, making his position crucial for constructing the foundations of support for the New Deal. Farley knew personally most party leaders throughout the country, corresponding with them regularly and signing his name in green ink. These acquaintances and friendships enabled Farley to fortify and invigorate loyalty to the Democratic party and the administration. His outgoing personality, persuasive techniques, and political skills proved effective in securing congressional and state endorsements for Roosevelt’s New Deal. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, with whom Farley enjoyed a constructive relationship, encouraged him to recommend appointments for women, who constituted 7,560 of the 28,092 postmasters commissioned between 1933 and 1938.

Although at first a moderate liberal, Farley, versed with the economic ramifications that resulted in the Great Depression, exhorted the president in his second term to balance the budget and reduce public works programs. Farley’s disillusionment deepened steadily. His presidential aspira-
tions and strong opposition to Roosevelt’s third-term nomination strained the relations between the two by 1940, when Farley submitted his resignation as postmaster general and head of the national committee. This ideological rift led the increasingly conservative Farley to assail New Deal policies. After his unsuccessful efforts to block Roosevelt’s nomination in 1940 (when Farley sought the nomination himself) and 1944, Farley devoted attention to business concerns while maintaining interests in local, state, and national politics. He died in New York City, leaving a legacy as an astute campaign manager and political operative during the Great Depression.

See Also: DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (FCA)

To combat the deepening debt crisis that was vanquishing farm owners nationwide, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order on March 27, 1933, establishing the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). The agency extended vital relief to debt-ridden farmers throughout the country by refinancing farm mortgages and offering credit under favorable terms. The FCA was an important part of the Roosevelt administration’s broad program of federal assistance to agriculture. During its first two years alone, the FCA refinanced one-fifth of all farm mortgages and saved tens of thousands of farmers from foreclosure.

By 1933 farmers urgently needed mortgage relief and loans to cover their annual crop-production costs. The vast network of locally owned banks that had served as the primary source of farm finance in rural areas could no longer support loans to farmers. As farm income and commodity prices plummeted, the system of farm credit collapsed. In 1930 and 1931, more than 3,600 banks failed. Among the hardest hit ones were undercapitalized rural banks serving small farming communities.

In creating the FCA, the Roosevelt administration set out to alleviate the indebtedness of farmers and to overhaul the government’s large but ineffec- tual system of farm credit. Nine existing farm agencies fell under the control of the FCA, including the Federal Farm Board, the Federal Farm Loan Board, the federal land banks, the federal intermediate credit banks, and the loaning activities of the secretary of agriculture and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. William I. Myers, a Cornell University economics professor, conceived this consolidation and reorganization of disparate farm agencies into the FCA. As David E. Hamilton argues in *From New Day to New Deal* (1991), Myers was committed to cooperative public-private partnerships and associative principles. Although the farm debt crisis required that the government take the lead in making credit available to farmers, the ultimate goal of the FCA was to create a cooperative credit system run by farmers themselves, financed privately and administered through local credit associations. Roosevelt appointed Henry Morgenthau, who had served as Roosevelt’s commissioner of agriculture when he was governor of New York, to the position of governor of the FCA, and he named Myers the deputy governor. When Morgenthau became secretary of the treasury in 1934, Myers took his place as head of the FCA and retained the post until 1938.

The FCA included four divisions. The Land Bank Division controlled the twelve federal land banks and fifty joint-stock land banks. The Intermediate Credit Division supervised the twelve intermediate credit banks that made direct loans to cooperatives and helped private banks become active lenders. The Production Credit Division directed the twelve regional production credit corporations, and the Cooperative Bank Division supervised the Central Bank for Cooperatives, which made short- and long-term loans to the agricultural cooperatives.
In addition to refinancing one-fifth of all farm mortgages, the FCA reduced the interest rates on federal loans to 3.5 percent and, between 1933 and 1936, extended about $800 million in long-term loans. By 1939, the federal land banks held nearly 40 percent of the farm mortgage debt. That same year, the FCA fell under the control of the department of agriculture, then regained its status as an independent agency in 1953. Since 1971, the FCA has continued to provide credit to farmers, and has assumed the additional responsibility of regulating the farm credit system.

See Also: AGRICULTURE; FARMERS’ HOLIDAY ASSOCIATION (FHA); FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION (FMHA); FARM FORECLOSURES; FARM POLICY.

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ADRIENNE M. PETTY

FARMERS’ HOLIDAY ASSOCIATION (FHA)

The national Farmers’ Holiday Association, or FHA, was an organization born of the downturn in farm and crop prices brought about by the Great Depression. FHA members took part in some of the most intense agrarian protests of the early years of the Depression. In February 1932, Glen Miller, a writer for the publication Iowa Union Farmer, argued that Iowa farmers should declare a “holiday” in which farm products would be kept at the farms where they were produced until politicians and the general public began to appreciate the importance of farmers. This idea resonated with the three thousand farmers who gathered in Des Moines, Iowa, in May 1932 to found the national Farmers’ Holiday Association. The group consisted primarily of farmers from Iowa, but also included farmers from Minnesota, Nebraska, Illinois, and Wisconsin, as well as many other states. Milo Reno, a popular agricultural activist and leader of the Iowa Farmers’ Union, was elected president of the organization.

Reno’s constant campaign theme as leader of the Iowa Farmers’ Union was that farmers deserved the right to be compensated for the costs of farm production and to make a reasonable profit on the sale of their goods. Reno continued this theme as he assumed control of the FHA, and one of the first resolutions adopted by the organization called for withholding agricultural products from the marketplace until farmers received fair compensation for the cost of production.

In August 1932, members of the FHA launched the first withholding protests in Sioux City, Iowa, picketing along highways and threatening farmers who refused to cooperate and were attempting to bring their goods to market. The farm strikes quickly spread to other midwestern states as members of the local Farmers’ Holiday Associations in those states began to stage their own protests. Violent encounters continued between protesters and noncooperative farmers in other midwestern states until Reno called for an end to the strikes on September 1, 1932.

Following Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election as president in November 1932, Reno and leaders of local holiday organizations in several midwestern states met in Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss the potential effect of Roosevelt’s presidency on the plight of the farmer. The convention crafted a resolution that called for the suspension of strikes and blockades of farm commodities to give the new president sufficient time to act on the concerns of farmers.

In the meantime, the FHA focused its attention on preventing farm foreclosures through so-called penny auctions. During January and February of 1933, fifteen penny auctions took place in which a farm undergoing foreclosure would be auctioned
off at an extremely low price, sometimes through physical intimidation of potential bidders, to a bidder who would sell the property back to its original owner. While never condoning the illegal methods used by some participants during penny auctions, the FHA did actively support the practice in order to prevent farm foreclosures.

In May 1933, Reno and the FHA once again called for farm strikes following the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the Norris-Simpson amendment, which would have provided cost of production prices for farmers. Reno, however, called off the strike after receiving a letter from Minnesota governor Floyd Olson expressing his belief that the Roosevelt administration would address FHA concerns and after hearing an encouraging statement on the matter from the president.

During the summer months of 1933 Reno began to lose confidence in Roosevelt’s New Deal farm program, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The FHA saw the program as an extension of the American Farm Bureau Federation, which the FHA viewed as a tool of large commercial farmers. In September 1933 Reno again called for farm strikes until the administration and the Congress passed measures to address cost of production and currency inflation. This time, however, the strike movement received a tepid response from many midwestern farmers and collapsed within a few days.

Following the collapse of the farm strikes in the fall of 1933, the power of the FHA began to decrease rapidly and Reno went from popular national figure to relative obscurity. Over the next several years, the FHA turned its attention away from cost of production issues to other causes of interest to farmers. The organization also backed the potential third-party candidacies of such political figures as Father Charles Coughlin and Senator Huey Long. Milo Reno’s death on May 5, 1936, effectively spelled the end of the FHA, which was absorbed back into the Iowa Farmers’ Union in 1937.

See Also: Agriculture; Farm Foreclosures.

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In 1946 Congress replaced the Farm Security Administration (FSA) with the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Congress’s action grew out of its wartime investigations of the FSA, in which the agency was criticized for deliberately disregarding congressional intent and misusing funds to establish and maintain resettlement projects, cooperative farms, and land purchase associations. Congressional disillusionment with these unconventional programs reflected legislators’ broader retreat from New Deal reforms and their more traditional approach to domestic issues during and after the war. In creating the FmHA, Congress authorized it to insure loans, as well to lend money directly. Although some FSA programs, including loans to low-income individuals who lacked other sources of credit for farm purchase, farm operating and rehabilitation loans to individuals, and loans for rural water systems, were continued by the new agency, the FSA’s more controversial rural rehabilitation and resettlement projects, migratory labor camps, and loans to cooperative associations for land purchase were discontinued. The FmHA also continued the emergency crop and feed loan program formerly administered by the Farm Credit Association.

In the ensuing decades the scope of the FmHA’s programs expanded. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 broadened the agency’s role in issuing and guaranteeing loans to farmers for housing. In 1961 Congress authorized the agency to finance housing for nonfarm rural residents and general water projects for rural municipalities. Soon thereafter the FmHA extended credit for construction of low-cost rural apartments and certain types of rural recreational facilities. Increasingly during the 1960s...
the agency shifted away from direct loans for housing and toward insuring loans from private sources. During the 1970s, concerns about revitalizing rural regions led to additional changes. In 1972, the agency began loaning funds for health facilities and public buildings such as fire stations and community centers in rural areas. Two years later the agency became involved in guaranteeing private loans to businesses in an effort to encourage business and industrial development in the countryside. By 1983 the agency had invested $52.9 billion in programs for farmers, such as farm operating, ownership, and emergency loans; $42.1 billion for rural housing; $13.3 billion for development of community facilities, most notably water and sewage systems; and nearly $5.5 billion in guaranteed loans to rural businesses. In 1994, in an attempt to streamline rural services, the Rural Development Mission Area within the Department of Agriculture was created to replace agencies including the FmHA.

See Also: FARM POLICY; FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (FSA); HOUSING.

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FARM FORECLOSURES
During the Great Depression, farm foreclosures became a disturbingly routine feature of rural life. Between 1929 and 1933, a third of all American farmers lost their farms in the worst disaster to hit American agriculture. Hundreds of thousands of farm-owning families had their hard-earned land seized from under them. The record number of foreclosures during the late 1920s and 1930s disillusioned farmers and contributed to an unprecedented degree of federal intervention to improve the farm economy.

What contributed to the large number of foreclosures was a farm debt problem that began during the agricultural depression of the 1920s and grew more severe by 1929. Farmers were knee-deep in debt, with about two-fifths of all farmers holding a mortgage and nearly three-fourths requiring credit to produce a crop from year to year. With crop prices declining, farmers were not able to pay off their mortgage loans. For instance, farm prices for cash crops, such as wheat, cotton, tobacco, and corn, fell steadily beginning in 1920. The price of corn dropped 78 percent, from 1.85 per bushel in June 1920 to 41 cents per bushel in December 1921. Prices rebounded somewhat during the mid-1920s, but plunged once again after the stock market crash in 1929. Between 1929 and 1932, crop and livestock prices plummeted by almost 75 percent. The impact on farm earnings was staggering. Farm income declined by 60 percent, from $13.8 billion to $6.5 billion, and the cash proceeds from marketing farm products in 1932 were about one-third lower than they had been in 1919.

As farmers defaulted on loans and made fewer deposits, many small country banks were forced to go out of business. In 1930 and 1931, more than 3,600 banks failed. Those banks, life insurance companies, and farm mortgage lenders that managed to survive had little choice but to drastically reduce the amount of credit they made available to farmers.

Consequently, farm foreclosures became more prevalent throughout the 1920s, and grew to sobering proportions by the 1930s. While the average foreclosure rate between 1913 and 1920 was 3.2 per 1,000 farms, it jumped to 17.4 per 1,000 farms in 1926, and by 1933 had reached 38.8 per 1,000 farms. During 1933, at the height of the Great Depression, more than 200,000 farms underwent foreclosure. Foreclosure rates were higher in the Great Plains states and some southern states than elsewhere. As Lee J. Alston argues in his article “Farm Foreclosures in the United States During the Interwar Period” (1983), farm distress also was more severe in rural areas that were far from urban areas because farm families had fewer opportunities to supplement their earnings with off-farm employment.

The devastating scale of foreclosures prompted many farmers to challenge the workings of capital-
This farm foreclosure sale, held in Iowa in 1933, was one of many such sales that occurred throughout the Midwest during the Depression. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

ism. Throughout the country, farmers vented their anger at public auctions that banks held to sell foreclosed property. In a phenomenon that came to be known as “penny auctions,” farmers attending the auctions placed ridiculously low bids on the available land. Anyone who attempted to significantly outbid these farmers faced jeers from the crowd and often risked violent reprisals. In many cases, disgruntled farmers managed to block foreclosure sales.

As farmers decried the increase in farm foreclosures and bank failures, the Herbert Hoover administration attempted to tackle the farm debt problem by establishing for the first time a government bureaucracy dedicated to helping farmers maintain prices. With a budget of $500 million, the Federal Farm Board was charged with making loans to farm marketing cooperatives and establishing corporations that would raise farm prices by buying surpluses. However, Hoover did not commit enough money to the Farm Board to make it work.

It was left to the Franklin Roosevelt administration to address the farm debt crisis through its New Deal programs. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 grappled with the underlying problem of falling farm prices through its crop production control program. The Farm Credit Administration provided much-needed mortgage relief to farmers. The Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1934, also known as the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act, enabled
some dispossessed farmers to regain their land even after foreclosure on their mortgages. However, the Supreme Court ruled this law unconstitutional in 1935. A number of states passed laws that attacked farm foreclosures directly. Between 1933 and 1935, twenty-five states passed farm foreclosure moratorium laws that temporarily prevented banks and other creditors from foreclosing on farmers who could not afford to make their mortgage payments. Despite these measures, there was no significant decline in the average rate of farm foreclosures until after 1940.

See Also: FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (FCA); FARMERS’ HOLIDAY ASSOCIATION (FHA).

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ADRIENNE M. PETTY

FARM POLICY

Farmers were among those hardest hit by the Great Depression. Their problems, however, had been around for nearly a decade. During World War I, European agriculture had been largely destroyed, and the U.S. government had been purchasing farm products. The result was inflated prices for many crops. From 1916 to 1919, for example, net farm income rose from $4 billion to $10 billion. In 1920, however, a combination of agricultural recovery in Europe and an end to government purchases of wheat created a situation in which the market was flooded with surplus crops. A bushel of wheat quickly fell from $2.50 to less than a dollar. As prices tumbled, a decline exacerbated by the stock market crash of 1929, American farmers went from producing 16 percent to 9 percent of the national income.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, he promised in his inaugural speech on March 4, 1933, to restore the health of agriculture. If the purchasing power of farmers was restored, he believed, farmers would in turn help boost the demand for manufactured goods. This could be accomplished, Roosevelt and many others believed, by decreasing production. Throughout the 1920s, agriculture had been characterized by overproduction as more crops were produced than the market could handle, thereby effectively driving down the prices. Farmers, then, were seen by Roosevelt as the key to bringing the nation out of the Depression.

Under the direction of Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, the Roosevelt administration drew up the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The theory was that if production could be limited, then prices would rise, demand for farm commodities would more nearly match supply, and agriculture would recover. With these aims, the Act was pushed through Congress in May 1933. The Agricultural Adjustment Act gave subsidies to farmers based on the acreage of farmland that landowners either allowed to lie fallow or used for the production of non-surplus crops. For every bushel of corn, for example, that corn farmers did not raise, the government would pay them thirty cents. Over the next two years, while many Americans were starving, over thirty million acres of cotton, corn, and wheat fields were taken out of production, with farmers receiving over $1.1 billion in government subsidies.

The goals of the Agricultural Adjustment Act were largely attained; from 1932 to 1936, the price of a bushel of wheat almost tripled. And hogs, which had been selling at $3.34 per hundred pounds, rose to $9.37. In terms of overall income, farmers witnessed a rise of $1.8 billion to $5 billion. If landowners benefited from the Agricultural Adjustment Act, those who worked their lands, such as tenant farmers and sharecroppers, did not. Although landowners were supposed to share the government payments with their tenants, they often failed to do so. Landowners, particularly in the South, pocketed the cash while evicting their tenants or sharecroppers, or cutting their acreage and simply not allowing them to grow cash crops.
A Farm Security Administration representative tries to convince three brothers in Box Elder county, Utah, in 1940 to form a cooperative to buy a tractor to replace their horses. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

In addition to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Roosevelt administration launched the Tennessee Valley Authority, which was designed, in part, to aid the farmers of the rural South. In short, this public corporation held as central goals the generation of electricity along the Tennessee River and the making and distributing of nitrogen-based fertilizer. Thus, while attempts were made to limit the production of cash crops through the Agricultural Adjustment Act, other attempts were simultaneously made to increase the productivity of the farmers of the rural South.

While the droughts, floods, and dust storms (such as the 1935 to 1940 dust storms that caused the Dust Bowl in the states of Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, and Colorado) helped to reduce harvests and push up prices, new technologies counteracted the effects of such natural disasters, increasing productivity and driving small farmers from the land. In the 1930s, hybrid corn was developed and became increasingly popular among farmers in the Midwest. This new type of corn proved more resistant to disease and insects. In addition, the stalks grew straight and strong, the crop ripened all at once, and the ears were all at the same height, which meant that by using another new technology—the gasoline tractor—productivity would be increased. Even with other crops, such as cotton and new mechanical cotton-pickers, technology was used to increase production while the Roosevelt administration was simultaneously attempting to limit production.
In *Butler v. U.S.* (1936) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be unconstitutional. To replace it, Congress passed the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act in 1936. This law aimed at eliminating soil-depleting crops and subsidizing farmers with general revenues rather than a special tax. In 1938, however, production quotas returned with a second Agricultural Adjustment Act. This farm bill, much like the original 1933 Act, gave the federal government the authority both to pay farmers not to plant crops and to set market prices for agricultural goods. Until World War II pulled the nation out of the Depression, subsidization served to reduce price inflation for agricultural goods and to increase net farm income.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT; AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); AGRICULTURE; LAND USE PLANNING.

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**FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (FSA)**

Through such novels as Erskine Caldwell’s *Tobacco Road* (1932) and John Steinbeck’s *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939), the American public became aware of the extent of farm poverty in the United States, which was not merely a product of the Depression but of long-term structural forces in the economy. The growth of tenancy, the impoverishment of soils, chronically low income, high levels of debt, and poor social services had produced a rural population that was “ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished,” in the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s second inaugural address.

Initially, the New Deal’s agricultural programs actually contributed to rural misery. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s (AAA) crop subsidization programs often did not reach the tenants and sharecroppers who were in most need of federal support, and these programs also encouraged landowners to displace tenants and mechanize their holdings. The Farm Security Administration (FSA), however, followed a different trajectory than the AAA, giving priority to welfare and social reform goals and targeting poor, marginal farmers.

The FSA succeeded the Resettlement Administration (RA), which had been created by executive order in May 1935. Various existing federal programs relating to land conservation, resettlement, subsistence homesteads, greenbelt communities, and rural rehabilitation were consolidated under the RA. Rexford G. Tugwell, the RA’s first administrator, had ambitions for a technocratic program of land reform, reclamation, and relocation as the administration’s primary initiatives against rural poverty.

**THE FSA’S DEPRESSION-ERA PROGRAMS**

The FSA was created by the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act of July 1937 and was established as a division within the Department of Agriculture. Its first administrator was Will Alexander, who resigned in 1940 and was succeeded by Calvin B. Baldwin. The FSA developed a more focused agenda and a more practical range of measures to help small farmers stay on the land and to improve the farmer’s lot within agriculture. Rural rehabilitation grants or loans constituted the most important aspect of the agency’s work. The bulk of the FSA’s expenditures were used for rehabilitation loans of between $240 and $600, which were intended to finance farm improvements. Some 700,000 families, about one-ninth of the total number of farm families in the United States, received FSA loans. The
FSA also inherited from the RA some 195 community resettlement projects, which were designed to provide small farmers with productive land and modern facilities, the economic benefits of group marketing and purchasing arrangements, the social benefits of cooperative community services, and the expertise of the FSA’s agricultural and home management supervisors. Although these “instant communities” were criticized by FSA opponents for their flouting of the “American way,” the resettlement projects never accounted for more than 10 percent of the FSA’s expenditures and they were downgraded in importance after 1937.

Central to the political defense of the FSA’s work was its role in helping tenants to become landowners. It is ironic that, while historians have come to regard the AAA as the New Deal’s most revolutionary agency because of its influence in driving small farmers off the land, the FSA, conventionally described as one of the New Deal’s most progressive agencies, was trying to retain them there. However, the FSA’s performance never matched its Jeffersonian rhetoric. The administration helped only 44,300 tenants to purchase land, with applications exceeding awards by a ratio of about twenty to one. Tenant purchase allocations accounted for only 13 percent of the aid dispensed by the Administration. The FSA also established camps for migratory laborers, and group medical services for small farmers, as well as various cooperative projects and debt adjustment programs.
Such an ambitious agenda required a large and decentralized bureaucracy; thus the FSA was divided into twelve administrative regions. Each regional headquarters was supplemented by offices at state, district, and county levels, with project managers directing operations at the grass roots. By 1941 the FSA was organized in every state. Approximately three thousand county offices employed more than four thousand rural rehabilitation supervisors and more than four thousand home management supervisors around the country. However, the southern United States was the FSA’s primary focus. More than 50 percent of county offices were located in the South, as were more than 60 percent of the rehabilitation and home management supervisors employed by the administration. Some eight thousand group projects were established in the South, and southern farmers accounted for 60 percent of all rehabilitation loans issued, 47 percent of the rehabilitation credit advanced, and 70 percent of all tenant purchase loans. Furthermore, over 20 percent of the FSA’s resettlement projects were located in FSA region 4, which comprised the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

Southern blacks accounted for approximately 22 to 25 percent of the FSA’s rehabilitation clients, tenant purchase borrowers, and resettled farmers. Although this percentage did not equal the need among black farmers, the administration sought to ensure that its programs would benefit black Americans. Will Alexander, who was also director of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, was supported by administrators within the FSA, including...
Constance Daniel and Joseph H. B. Evans, who were given specific responsibility for racial matters. To promote the agency to African Americans, the FSA purposefully channelled information about its programs through the black press and sought to expand the number of African-Americans in the FSA’s own workforce. However, localism often undermined these efforts, despite the fact that each of the three southern regional directors had a black advisor; by 1941 there were only eighteen African-American employees among the 1,500 total employees of FSA’s region 4.

Although the FSA’s programs and leaders were not radical, the agency was regarded with suspicion and hostility in some quarters. In the South, especially, the FSA was underappreciated by the region’s leadership groups, in part because the administration challenged the central aspects of the plantation system: landlords’ control of labor, merchants’ monopoly of credit, and white control of race relations. The agency also worked outside those institutions, including the Extension Service, land grant colleges, county agricultural agents, and the American Farm Bureau Federation, that maintained close relationships with the Department of Agriculture and through which federal aid to agriculture was traditionally channelled. In addition, the FSA attracted criticism from representatives of the constituencies that it intended to serve. The Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union and the Socialist Party derided the administration’s maintenance of the small farmer as “subsidized peasantry” and called for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives to make farming efficient by achieving economies of scale. Furthermore, the FSA often encountered the opposition of local communities, particularly when it attempted to establish camps for migratory laborers nearby.

The FSA’s own clients provided no significant political counterweight to these powerful and well-connected adversaries. Invariably poor, disfranchised, and unorganized, the FSA’s constituency was politically marginal. It was, therefore, vital to the future of federal aid for small farmers to cultivate a public and congressional mood of sympathy for their plight. This entailed overcoming reservations about the “un-American” nature of assistance programs, reassuring individualist Americans who were apprehensive about the social and economic expansion of the federal government’s role, and convincing the economy-minded that the cost was justified.

To this end, the FSA maintained an Information Division, which was responsible for promoting the agency to the media and to politicians, as well as for disseminating policy and good practice in the regions. The Information Division’s Historical Section, headed by Roy E. Stryker, compiled a visual documentary record of America in Depression and wartime. Over an eight-year period, FSA photographers took more than 145,000 negatives, of which 77,000 were developed into prints. Although initially intended to provide instructional material to regional offices, the Historical Section organized exhibitions, developed filmstrips, and supplied photographic copy to the media in order to generate support for the FSA’s programs and raise awareness of the issues that they addressed. Many of the photographs produced by the project are regarded as exemplary works of cultural significance, and the photographers who produced them, including Walker Evans, Dorothea Lange, and Ben Shahn, are celebrated as leading exponents of documentary photography.

**THE FSA DURING WARTIME**

After Roosevelt’s announcement of a program of national defense in May 1940, the FSA adjusted its role to support preparedness. It initiated a “Food for Defense” program that sought to increase production of premium foodstuffs, such as hogs, chickens, and dairy products. The agency also became responsible for farm families displaced by the acquisition of land for defense purposes, and the FSA was assigned to provide accommodation for defense workers. Under the Lanham Defense Housing Act of October 1940, the FSA embarked on a number of prefabricated housing programs, such as those at Radford and Pulaski in western Virginia. After Congress appropriated funds for the Temporary Shelter Program for defense workers in March 1941, the FSA established trailer parks in the principal industrial centers. There were strong elements of continuity in the agency’s wartime preparedness
work, which grew out of the FSA’s well-established organizational and policy objectives of stimulation of productivity, diversification of small farms, and provision of aid to displaced persons and homeless workers.

Although the FSA sought to adapt to the nation’s wartime needs, its political position eroded as agriculture became crucial to lend-lease and to the war effort. The Farm Bureau, which represented the nation’s larger farmers, was determined to terminate the FSA, and the bureau found allies in conservatives of both parties, including Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri, and Representative Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois. In December 1941 there was a serious move by Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia to abolish the agency; although Byrd’s effort was unsuccessful, the FSA’s funding was cut by 30 percent for the 1942 to 1943 fiscal year. In April 1943, the House passed an appropriations bill that effectively terminated the FSA, although the agency was not officially disbanded until 1946 and some of its credit functions were subsequently adopted by the Farmers Home Administration. The FSA was unable to survive the prospering of the agricultural community during wartime and the burgeoning power of the Farm Bureau, whose administrators were able to use the wartime emergency to dismantle much of the apparatus by which the federal government managed the agricultural economy, as well as eliminate competition and ensure an adequate labor supply for its members. The Farm Bureau and its political allies were united by an underlying ideological objection to the FSA that related not only to the social class and race of the FSA’s constituents, but to the association of welfare and state intervention with alien and radical ideas.

See Also: EVANS, WALKER; FARM POLICY; LANGE, DOR THEA; RESETTLEMENT ASSOCIATION (RA); SHAHN, BEN.

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STUART KIDD

FASCISM

The Communist International in 1933 defined fascism in power as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, most imperialist elements of finance capital.” Others have interpreted fascism as a middle-class radical movement, a cultural revolution, a state power independent of classes, and as a reaction to or a force for modernization.

Fascism is an ultra-right movement that emerged in a period of crisis in European society. Like other right-wing parties and movements before World War II, fascism opposed democracy, liberalism, socialism, and communism and emphasized support for hierarchy, nationalism, militarism, aggressive imperialism, and women’s subordination. In seeking power, fascist movements were organized around a charismatic leader, used the techniques of mass politics to win support from the middle strata of war veterans, shop owners, artisans, and white-collar workers, and sought to con-
trol the streets with the use of paramilitary bands. When they came to power, fascists ended parliamentary systems and terrorized their opponents. The Nazi variant claimed a race-based superiority for “Aryans” and embraced a virulent anti-Semitism both to designate a scapegoat for Germany’s problems and to be able to bribe supporters with property and positions taken from German Jews.

The first fascist movement was that of Italy’s Benito Mussolini, who came to power with the aid of conservative elites seeking to put down the revolutionary workers’ movement arising after World War I. The international influence of fascism greatly increased when the Nazis assumed power in Germany in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression. Significant fascist movements arose in Hungary, Austria, and Romania, and smaller fascist movements, such as the Falange in Spain, became important with support from Germany and Italy. Germany’s power led many authoritarian leaders in Europe to ally with the Nazis. Support for the fascist example existed in Latin America, but only Argentina favored the Axis in World War II. The third Axis power, Japan, was authoritarian, militaristic, nationalist, anticommunist, and aggressive, but its attempt at a fascist mass politics, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, had limited impact.

Fascism had limited appeal in the United States in the 1930s, but, given its growth internationally, liberals and leftists were worried about the potential for it. Important cultural manifestations of this fear were Sinclair Lewis’s play *It Can’t Happen Here*, performed simultaneously by seventeen Federal Theatre Project troupes in 1935, and such films as Anatole Litvak’s *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (1939) and Frank Capra’s *Meet John Doe* (1941).

Small, distinctly fascist organizations in the United States included the Silver Shirt Legion and the Defenders of the Christian Faith, but more important were ethnic-based groups. Mussolini received favorable press coverage in the United States before his alliance with Adolf Hitler, and there was majority support for his government in Italian-American communities on nationalist grounds. Most Italian-American newspapers supported Mussolini, and fascist organizations were influential in the community. However, Italian Americans opposed the anti-Semitic decrees issued by Mussolini in 1938. The German-American Bund, which emphasized anti-Semitism, anti-communism, and alleged unfair treatment in the United States of German Americans, gained a degree of control over some German-American community groups. Recalling the negative attacks on everything German in the World War I period, German-American organizations were slow to criticize the Nazis. In 1938, with increased criticism of Nazi anti-Semitism and fears rising that Nazism was an external and internal danger to the United States, German Americans spoke out against Nazism.

Important movements that may be regarded as semi-fascist include the National Union for Social
Justice led by Father Charles Coughlin. Emerging as an important radio personality in the early Depression years, Coughlin’s organization was anti-communist and organized around devotion to him personally. Coughlin was stridently anti-Semitic and hostile to the Allied cause in World War II. Whether the movement led by Huey Long can also be characterized as fascist or semi-fascist is in dispute. Long was authoritarian in his conduct of the government of Louisiana, anti-communist, and demagogic in his calls to make “Every Man a King” and “Share Our Wealth.” On the other hand, Long opposed the oligarchy in Louisiana, called for taxing the rich, and did not appeal to racism in a region in which movements of the political right usually emphasized racism.

Important Americans who lent support to fascism included Henry Ford, who disseminated the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion forgery in the 1920s, employed the leader of the Bund, and accepted a medal from Nazi Germany in 1938. Famed aviator and isolationist Charles Lindbergh likewise accepted a medal, as did IBM president Thomas J. Watson, although Watson returned his in 1940.

See Also: COUGHLIN, CHARLES; DICTATORSHIP; EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; HITLER, ADOLF; MUSSOLINI, BENITO; SPANISH CIVIL WAR.

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FATHER DIVINE

Father Divine (May 1879–September 10, 1965), the noted and controversial founder of the Peace Mission movement, gained national prominence during the Great Depression for his ability to feed and provide jobs for the poor, as well as for his followers’ claims that he was God.

Born George Baker in Rockville, Maryland, in 1879, Divine grew up in poverty and segregation, the son of ex-slaves who were menial laborers. Although he had limited educational opportunities, he became an avid reader of religious literature. In 1899, he moved to Baltimore, where he worked as a gardener and taught Sunday school in a storefront church. During these years, Baker formulated a unique theology that blended New Thought (the mind power philosophy that encouraged believers to channel God’s inner presence for happiness, prosperity, and health), African-American Christianity, Pentecostalism, and other religious ideologies. In 1912, convinced that he had achieved oneness with God, he set out as an itinerant preacher and attracted a small following who recognized his divinity.

In 1919, Baker, now known as Father Divine, settled with his flock and lived peacefully in Sayville, Long Island. But with the onset of the Depression, Divine’s congregation expanded and his white neighbors turned hostile and complained, which lead to his conviction in 1932 for maintaining a public nuisance. Only four days after handing down the maximum sentence, the presiding judge died suddenly. The incident propelled Father Divine into the national limelight.

After his conviction was overturned, Divine relocated his headquarters to Harlem, where interest in his teachings boomed. Thousands attended Peace Mission banquets and rallies. Nationwide disciples followed his example by pooling their resources to open up Peace Missions and collective business endeavors. Additionally, Divine campaigned vigorously for civil rights, sponsoring voter registration drives and various challenges to segregation. Divine emerged as a critic of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Charging that Roosevelt’s New Deal perpetuated dependency, Divine preached
The Peace Mission movement was one of the few genuinely integrated organizations of the 1930s and offered hope to a variety of Americans. Certainly, many were drawn to Father Divine for their basic needs. But his social agenda, as well as his conviction that everyone could achieve success through positive thinking, was particularly empowering for both blacks, whose community had historically languished economically in depression, and whites who were also confronting economic chaos.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; CHARITY; RELIGION.

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FAULKNER, WILLIAM

William Cuthbert Faulkner (September 25, 1897–July 6, 1962) is one of America’s most important and highly regarded writers of fiction. Although his literary career spanned four decades, almost all of his most important work dates from between 1929 and 1942, a period beginning with the appearance of his novels Sartoris (1929) and The Sound and the Fury (1929), and closing with Go Down, Moses (1942). Faulkner portrayed with often dizzying complexity the life and history of his fictional Mississippi county, Yoknapatawpha. Something close to tragic doom cloaks almost all of Faulkner’s work, particularly in his portrayal of the South’s massive cultural transformations wrought by forces of intolerance, modernization, and greed.

Faulkner’s critical reputation—and financial solvency—floundered precariously until the late 1940s, when publication of Malcolm Cowley’s The Portable Faulkner initiated a resurgence of interest. Capping this stunning critical reappraisal was Faulkner’s receiving of the 1949 Nobel Prize for Literature. Although he continued to write until his death in 1962, little of Faulkner’s later fiction matches the power, intensity, and complexity of his work from the late 1920s through the early 1940s.

Faulkner is now regarded as one of America’s and the world’s greatest writers. His writing style, dense and packed at times to the bursting point, embodies his belief that every moment of existence is pressured almost to suffocation by all that has come before—the past, as he said, is never past. His experiments with narrative form and structure mark Faulkner as one of the greats of high modernism, and profoundly influenced the shape of the twentieth-century novel. Nowhere was his influence more dominant than in the development of twentieth-century Southern literature, where not only his narrative fireworks but also his thematic concerns—particularly the grinding conflict between

self-reliance and collective capitalism. He also attacked Roosevelt’s refusal to address racial issues and endorse anti-lynching legislation.

In the late 1920s, Faulkner returned to Oxford and turned his literary efforts almost exclusively to works exploring life in north Mississippi. In a number of his best novels and stories, including Sartoris (1929), The Sound and the Fury (1929), As I Lay Dying (1930), Sanctuary (1931), Light in August (1932), Absalom! Absalom! (1936), The Unvanquished (1938), The Hamlet (1940), and Go Down, Moses (1942), Faulkner portrayed with often dizzying complexity the life and history of his fictional Mississippi county, Yoknapatawpha. Something close to tragic doom cloaks almost all of Faulkner’s work, particularly in his portrayal of the South’s massive cultural transformations wrought by forces of intolerance, modernization, and greed.

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the traditional and the modern—became for several generations touchstones of Southern expression.

See Also: LITERATURE.

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ROBERT H. BRINKMEYER, JR.

FAUSET, CRYSTAL BIRD

Elected as a Democrat from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Crystal Bird Fauset (June 27, 1894–March 28, 1965) was the first African-American woman state legislator in the United States. She was born in Princess Anne, Maryland, and grew up in Boston. From 1918 to 1926, she worked for the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) as field secretary and adviser for the Program for Younger Girls. In 1931, Bird graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the Teachers College of Columbia University in New York. She was married to Arthur Huff Fauset from 1935 to 1944.

During the early years of the Great Depression, Oscar DePriest was the lone black congressman and thus blacks sought political change primarily at the state and local level. Here Bird was effective. From 1933 to 1935 she worked for Swarthmore College’s Institute of Race Relations in Pennsylvania. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president, Crystal Bird became a member of the Democratic Party; as director of Negro women’s activities in Philadelphia, she encouraged black women to participate in politics. After this, she was appointed director of the Women and Professional Project in the Works Progress Administration (WPA) program in Philadelphia, where she succeeded in getting more black women employed.

In 1935, while serving on the Federal Housing Advisory Board, Fauset advocated better urban housing for the poor. In 1938 she won election to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, where she sponsored legislation protecting women in the workplace. In 1939, however, Fauset resigned her house seat, and through the influence of her friend, first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, she became assistant director of education and recreation programs for the Pennsylvania WPA. Two years later, Fauset became a member of the so-called Roosevelt black cabinet in Washington, D.C., which included Mary McLeod Bethune and Arthur W. Mitchell, among others. As head of the race relations division of the Office of Civilian Affairs (OCD), Fauset promoted civil defense planning in the black community, recruited blacks for the military, and monitored complaints about race discrimination. Disappointed with the Roosevelt administration’s record on civil rights, she bolted the Democratic Party in 1944 to support Republican presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey, who rewarded Fauset’s switch to the GOP by appointing her to the Republican National Committee’s division on Negro affairs. During the postwar period Fauset was a strong supporter of African independence and she was active in local politics in Philadelphia. She died in Philadelphia in 1965.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; DE PRIEST, OSCAR; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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ERIC LEDELL SMITH

FCA. See FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION.
FEDERAL ART PROJECT (FAP)

The Federal Art Project (FAP) was created in August 1935 as one of several cultural programs within the Works Progress Administration (WPA) of the New Deal. Other agencies were established simultaneously to support American theater, writing, and music. The FAP, under the direction of Holger Cahill from its inception until its closing in 1943, marked an important symbolic change in federal governmental subvention for the visual arts. Before its creation, state art patronage had been funded entirely by the U. S. Treasury and had been governed by the principle of commissioning great art that celebrated the United States and its history since the American Revolution. Murals were commissioned and painted in federal buildings such as courts, customs houses, and post offices. Works of the highest quality, based on European historical-painting conventions and values, were placed in all the federal buildings in Washington, D.C., essentially as propagandistic adornments. In contrast, the purpose of the FAP, as part of the WPA, was not to commission the best artists to celebrate the nation-state, but to provide work relief for the thousands of painters, sculptors, and graphic designers who had been thrown out of work by the Depression in the early 1930s.

Holger Cahill, who had been a museum director and specialist in American crafts history before leading the FAP, had a utopian sense of the possible future of his organization and its role in creating a cultural democracy in the United States. Although this vision chimed with the idealism of some radical (left-wing) New Dealers in government, the actual history of the FAP demonstrates the pragmatism of New Deal agencies and the contingent turns and twists in Roosevelt’s statecraft during the 1930s.

The FAP operated a number of programs that utilized artists and artworks in different and sometimes contradictory ways. Cahill had overall control but considerable power was held by the managers of specific sections that dealt with recruitment of artists, organization of their work patterns, and determination of their art tasks. The FAP operated nationally, in every state, and was fairly decentralized in management. The majority of artists, however, were based in New York City, and it was their work that attracted the most attention, both from the mass media and from other parts of government disturbed by the leftist profile the arts program began to develop by 1936.

The FAP Easel Division paid artists to paint and sculpt in return for a weekly wage. This employ-
Among its many initiatives, the Federal Art Project (FAP) organized free art classes, as announced by this poster during the late 1930s. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, WPA Poster Collection

ment of artists as wage laborers in some ways was the most radical aspect of the program because it ostensibly treated painters and sculptors as no different from any other kind of worker in American society. Controversies recurred over how and whom to select for the program, and how to assess their work alongside all the other forms of manual labor supported by New Deal agencies. Many well-known artists found work on this scheme in New York, including Stuart Davis and Willem de Kooning. Unfortunately, many of the thousands of paintings and sculptures produced were destroyed either directly by the government (who retained control of them) on a variety of grounds—some local officials had reasoned, for instance, that the art works were created only for the duration of the Federal Art Project and therefore should be destroyed when the project ended—or inadvertently, through its lack of care in their storage or maintenance in situ.

The FAP also operated a mural division that commissioned artists to design and install large-scale paintings in a range of federal buildings, including hospitals, prisons, and airports. Some of these artists who produced work as part of this scheme became well known in the 1950s as abstract expressionists, including Arshile Gorky, who painted a mural called *Aviation: Evolution of Forms under Aerodynamic Limitations* (1936) at Newark Airport, and Philip Guston, who worked on a mural called *Maintaining America’s Skills* (1939–1940) at the New York World’s Fair WPA pavilion. Many hundreds of murals were placed in buildings across the country in a process that involved the local representatives of prospective host institutions. Relatively few cases of dissatisfaction are recorded. FAP art, on the whole, was subject to relatively few charges of propaganda.

By the late 1930s, however, anticommunist forces in government and in the press attacked the FAP as a left-wing organization, saw that its funding was reduced or suspended, and attempted to intimidate its administrators, who, for the most part, continued to believe that the program was an instrument for radical social change in the country. By that time, however, the radicalism of the New Deal had evaporated, a casualty of the decline in popular support for peacetime Roosevelt, the re-emergence of a conservative coalition in Congress, and the end of already heavily strained alliances between the administration and antifascist organizations in the United States.

By the end of 1943 the FAP had been wrapped up, reorganized, and renamed, shorn entirely of the idealism and populism that had motivated its leaders and many of its artists for nearly eight years. Artists who had painted easel pictures, or murals in federal buildings, or organized art education in the FAP’s community art center scheme, or contributed drawings to its *Index of American Design*, had either been sacked or set to work for the military, producing camouflage patterns or illustrations for guide-
The Federal Art Project sponsored the painting of murals in public buildings across the country, including these by Reginald Marsh on the dome of the New York City Customs House in Manhattan. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

books for U. S. soldiers about to invade the country’s enemies. Only about $35 million was ever spent on FAP activities—less than one percent of federal works funding in the New Deal. In symbolic terms, however, as an intervention into the nation’s culture motivated by a history of democratic idealism that long preceded Roosevelt’s presidency, the FAP was important, and it continues to figure in debates about the role of artists and the place of art in contemporary American society.

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See Also: AMERICAN SCENE, THE; ART; CAHILL, HOLGER; FEDERAL ONE; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).


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JONATHAN HARRIS

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC)

The Federal Communication Commission (FCC), an independent governmental agency, has the responsibility of regulating both wired and wireless communication in the United States. Created in 1934, the FCC took over responsibilities that had been divided between the Interstate Commerce Commission, the U.S. Post Office and the Department of Commerce. Its broad mandate gave it jurisdiction over radio, telegraph, wire, and cable operations and, by extension, made it responsible for television and other forms of new communication as they appeared on the scene in ensuing decades. It replaced the Federal Radio Commission, set up by the Radio Act of 1927, and was charged with the orderly development of broadcasting—but not censorship of content—as well as with ensuring telephone and telegraph services at reasonable rates. It also was given supervision of the National Emergency Broadcast system, a coordinated effort to use licensed communications services for national defense purposes.

The importance of radio during the Depression helped lead to quick passage of the legislation establishing the FCC. There was widespread agreement that the Radio Commission had failed to solve technical, economic, and political questions involved in broadcasting and that unified regulation of communications was needed. President Herbert Hoover, who had been behind passage of the 1927 legislation, however, blocked a more comprehensive act with a pocket veto in 1933. Soon after taking office, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established a committee to study communication issues. It recommended in January 1934 that a federal agency be set up to ensure competition, regulate charges, extend services, and oversee mergers in the communications field. In a message to Congress on February 26, 1934, Roosevelt proposed transferring existing regulatory functions to a new federal commission.

The president’s position was in line with New Deal policies on regulation in general. Under his leadership Congress established three other regulatory bodies, the National Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Including the FCC, these bodies were vested with wide-ranging discretionary power limited only by narrow judicial review. Their aim was to provide a forum in which the clash of business and governmental interests could be resolved peacefully in the depths of the Depression. The establishment of these agencies showed New Deal interest in regulating combinations of businesses rather than protecting individual small businesses. In the case of the FCC, Congress acted, in effect, to permit a concentrated radio system, which became increasing dominated by commercial networks, as radio grew in political, economic, and social importance during the 1930s.

The FCC came into existence when Congress passed the Communications Act on May 31, 1934, and Roosevelt signed it into law on June 19. Passage came after David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), and other industry leaders testified at congressional hearings that consolidated regulation was essential for establishment of effective national communication policy. Under the act, the Congress vested almost unlimited discretion in the FCC, giving it authority to allocate the airwaves by issuing licenses to broadcasters for a period of three years. The com-
mission was directed to take into account public convenience, interest, and necessity.

The legislation called for a bipartisan commission of seven members appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate to serve for seven years each, with one member to be named chair. The commission held its first meeting in Washington on July 11, 1934, and voted unanimously to continue the status quo in broadcast regulation put in place by the Federal Radio Commission. Herbert L. Pettey, who had been named secretary of the radio commission after serving as radio director of Roosevelt’s 1932 presidential campaign, was appointed FCC secretary, and other employees of the radio commission also moved over to the FCC.

The agency was organized into four main operating divisions. The common carrier bureau regulated communications services; the broadcast bureau licensed radio stations; the safety and special radio service bureau supervised aviation, emergency, taxi, and amateur communications; and the engineering bureau conducted licensing examinations. Established with a budget of $1,146,885 and a staff of 442, the FCC initially oversaw about eight hundred commercial and educational radio stations.

In following years, a multitude of technical and political issues confronted the FCC as television, computers, and satellite communication emerged. Critics contended the FCC was too responsive to business and not attuned to educational interests. Nevertheless, the wide-ranging and vaguely defined powers given the commission in 1934 allowed it to deal with enormous changes in communication in the twentieth century.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934; COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; RADIO.

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MAURINE H. BEASLEY

FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORPORATION (FCIC)

The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was established by Congress under the Federal Crop Insurance Act, or Title V of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Thereby, the United States became the first nation to extend crop insurance to farmers. Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace championed crop insurance not only as a means of reducing farmers’ economic risk but as a way to stabilize grain supplies and promote what Wallace called an ever-normal granary.

Wallace chaired a presidential Committee on Crop Insurance from 1936 to 1937. Acting upon the committee’s recommendation, Congress created the FCIC within the Department of Agriculture. Congress authorized the FCIC to insure 50 to 75 percent of a farmer’s average wheat harvest against losses from “unavoidable” calamities, including “drought, flood, hail, wind, winterkill, lightning, tornado, insect infestation, [or] plant disease.” County committees for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration calculated premiums for the program. Premiums and claims could be paid in wheat or cash, but the FCIC maintained its reserves in grain in order to be able to compensate for changes in wheat prices. Planners hoped the program would even out the grain supply, with the government stockpiling wheat in abundant years when few claims were payable, and selling wheat from its storehouses in years of low harvests and numerous claims.
In 1939, its first year of operation, the FCIC insured 165,775 farms and disbursed 2.6 million more bushels in indemnities than it collected in premiums. In 1940 the agency began insuring cotton as well as wheat. From 1939 to 1943, the U.S. Treasury heavily subsidized the FCIC. As a result of the FCIC’s poor financial performance, Congress eliminated the program in mid-1943, only to reinstitute and expand it while doubling the FCIC’s budget in 1944. Beginning in 1945, Congress also permitted the FCIC to experiment with insuring any crop if adequate data existed for determining premiums. As a result of continued losses, Congress scaled back the FCIC’s operations in 1947. In 1948, the agency insured farmers in only 375 counties, down from 2,500 counties in the preceding year. The changes helped to place the FCIC on a firmer financial footing, and during the 1950s and 1960s the agency gradually extended its activities as it experimented with insuring many crops on a piecemeal basis. Despite the modest expansion, by 1974 the agency insured only 7.5 percent of the nation’s harvested cropland. In 1980, Congress removed key restrictions that it had imposed on the agency in 1947 and permitted the FCIC to insure any crop for which sufficient actuarial data existed in any agricultural county. In 1994, the nation’s lawmakers made crop insurance a prerequisite for federal loans or payments under governmental price support programs. Congress ended its experiment with mandatory participation in 1996, but it prohibited growers from receiving any disaster benefits from the government unless they had purchased crop insurance. In 2000, Congress permitted private com-
panies to submit proposals to the FCIC for insurance plans that either supplemented or supplanted insurance contracts offered by the agency.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT; FARM POLICY; WALLACE, HENRY A.

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BRIAN Q. CANNON

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC)

They became, unwittingly, the most powerful image of the Great Depression, standing nervously in long lines, clutching their deposit books, hoping against hope to get inside before the bank closed its doors, leaving them penniless. Today, their visages survive only in the memories of America’s “greatest generation” or in the imaginations of television viewers watching another holiday season broadcast of Frank Capra’s 1946 film It’s a Wonderful Life. The long lines of nervous bank depositors disappeared, thanks to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), arguably the New Deal’s most enduring and least controversial legacy. Knowing that the FDIC, an agency of the federal government, would guarantee all individual bank deposits up to a certain maximum, anxious depositors no longer needed to demand cash at teller windows, and bankers no longer had to engage in fire sale liquidations of assets to satisfy them. In doing so, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ended the gravest threat ever to financial instability in the United States.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, the American banking system underwent a financial meltdown because of undercapitalization, real estate speculation, the agricultural depression, problems on Wall Street, and overcompetition in some markets. Between 1918 and 1933, more than thirty thousand financial institutions—banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and insurance companies—declared insolvency. The problem became so severe in the spring of 1933 that recently inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt had to declare a national bank holiday, closing every bank in the United States and scrambling for short-term and long-term solutions to the problem.

During the end stage of the Herbert Hoover administration, when the banking crisis was reaching catastrophic proportions, Congressman Henry Steagall, a Democrat from Alabama, proposed the establishment of a federal agency to insure individual bank accounts. Such an agency, Steagall argued, would help preserve bank capital and prevent another crisis. If individual depositors knew that the government guaranteed their deposits, they would be less likely to make a so-called run on the bank to empty their accounts. Bankers would then be saved from the need to generate cash by calling in loans and selling stocks, bonds, and real estate, often at highly deflated prices, which badly eroded their capital reserves and permanently weakened them. Most private bankers, however, bitterly opposed the measure, and President Hoover was not inclined to undertake such a vast expansion of federal authority.

By March 1933, however, with Hoover out of the White House, the opposition of private bankers melted away. The nation was caught in an unprecedented financial crisis, and the private sector possessed neither the resources nor the will to address it. Congressman Steagall attached his proposal for a federal agency to guarantee bank deposits to what later became known as the Banking Act of 1933. At first, President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed the notion of federal deposit insurance, not so much
because of any personal philosophical disagreements but because Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, the influential chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, worried that federal deposit insurance would concentrate too much power in Washington, D.C. As the legislation was written and debated, however, Glass’s opposition waned, and so did the president’s.

The measure went through Congress with little opposition, and on June 16, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed it into law. The legislation established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insured individual bank accounts up to $5,000. All national banks had to sign up for FDIC insurance, and all state banks wanting to enroll also had to agree to become part of the Federal Reserve System, requirements that automatically brought more stability to financial markets. The insurance program went into effect on January 1, 1934, financed with $150 million in federal appropriations and premium payments by member banks.

In a matter of weeks, the value of the FDIC became obvious. Americans treated non-FDIC banks like financial pariahs. Bankers had no choice, if they had any hope of surviving and profiting, but to join the FDIC. By the end of 1935, more than 14,400 banks had enrolled for FDIC insurance, and bankers displayed the FDIC sign at every teller’s window. Those signs became American icons, proof that every bank displaying one was safe; if it was not, the federal government would make good on the deposit. During 1934, only thirty-two banks failed in the United States, the fewest in a generation. Since then, the American banking system, from the perspective of depositors, has become the safest in the world, thanks largely to the FDIC.

See Also: BANKING PANICS (1930–1933); GLASS-STEGALL ACT OF 1933.

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Before 1929 public relief was not designed to cope with the continuing effects of mass unemployment. The responsibility for helping the destitute lay with towns, townships, and county governments whose efforts were supplemented by private charities. There was great faith in the ability of community representatives to judge who was, and who was not, entitled to public assistance. In order to prevent the growth of dependency, relief was always minimal and usually given in kind rather than cash.

As early in the Great Depression as the winter of 1930 to 1931, however, it was clear that the existing system could not provide sufficient help for the destitute in some parts of the country. Legitimate demands for assistance grew, but tax revenues declined and taxpayers resisted further calls on their contributions to local budgets. Gradually states were obliged to assist their local units, but state coffers were soon exhausted and in some cases constitutional limitations severely restricted the contributions states could make to the relief problem. Private charities engaged in vigorous fund-raising, but by 1932 many donors had lost the will, or the ability, to maintain contributions at a high level. In the vast majority of cases, public and private relief was given without proper investigation by a trained social worker, and record keeping ranged from poor to nonexistent. Many relief agencies expected the able-bodied to perform a physical task, such as wood chopping, before assistance would be given.

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA)

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governors in the form of a loan, but only if it was shown that the resources of their states were insufficient to meet legitimate relief needs. In other words, federal loans were to supplement, but not replace, the states’ own efforts. By March 1933 the $300 million had been exhausted, but the problems remained acute, and the public waited to see how the new president would respond.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE FERA

On May 12, 1933, Congress established the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). Initially $500 million was made available for the FERA to distribute to the states as grants rather than loans. The loan policy of the RFC was discontinued, and in June 1934 the requirement that the loans be repaid was waived. However, as with the RFC, all FERA applications had to be made by governors, who were required to give detailed information on how the grant would be used and to provide a full accounting of the resources available within the state. Like RFC funds, FERA funds were allocated on the understanding that they supplemented rather than replaced local efforts. The FERA, under its administrator, Harry Hopkins, was authorized to analyze requests and distribute the funds to individual states within the constraints of a newly devised regulatory framework.

The $500 million allocated by Congress was divided into two equal parts, with $250 million available to states on a matching basis. States could secure one dollar of federal money for every three that had been spent on unemployment relief over the previous three months, provided the standards of
relief administration were consistent with those laid down by the FERA. The majority of grants advanced during the first few months of the FERA were made using this rigid formula, but it was soon clear that many states were unable to meet the matching requirements.

The second portion of $250 million was given to the administrator to allocate on a discretionary basis, and all future funding was distributed in this manner. This was a recognition that the impact of the Depression was regionally variable, as was the ability of individual states to cope with the problems posed by it. The imposition of a national formula was, therefore, unrealistic, but the FERA wanted to ensure that each state did what it could to help its own destitute. Hopkins was also determined to impose minimum professional standards for the delivery of relief, including the development of useful work relief projects that would both raise the morale of those employed on them and generate public support. Because its principal concern was loan repayment, the RFC had required governors to provide financial information with their applications. However, the FERA had a more broadly based agenda.

In order to make equitable discretionary allocations, the FERA demanded from all states monthly reports that included details of the numbers receiving relief, the case load, case load costs, the administration of relief operations, and the influence of seasonal factors on relief numbers. In addition, the states provided information on economic conditions, on taxation policy, on current and future debt, and on the possibility of raising additional tax revenue. The data played a crucial role in determining their eligibility. There was widespread support for the view that successful applicants for relief who were fit for work should perform some task that would help maintain work habits. Hopkins and his colleagues were determined that FERA work relief would emphasize projects that were of value to the community, and they encouraged the elimination of demeaning make-work tasks designed solely as a deterrent.

The general rule with all work relief projects was that they should not compete with private business and that remuneration must be sufficient to maintain morale but not so generous that private sector jobs became unattractive. The FERA issued regulations outlining the types of projects that were acceptable, but the selection, planning, and management of them was a matter for states and localities. Relief work was heavily skewed towards road improvements and the construction of public buildings. The unskilled were easily accommodated, but there were relatively few opportunities for white-collar workers and women. Hourly wage rates matched those for similar work in the private sector.
However, the weekly relief wage, or the value of relief in kind, was determined by the **budgetary deficiency principle**. In the course of assessing relief eligibility, social workers, following FERA guidelines, conducted a detailed investigation of the possible sources of income for each applicant. For example, help from churches or local charities, income from part-time work or the sale of garden produce, or the existence of savings were recorded. The investigation also required the social worker to visit the applicant’s home, and an assessment was made of the applicant’s needs: What was the cost of food, housing, fuel, and other necessities required to ensure that living standards did not fall below an unacceptable minimum. The difference between the incomings and the needs represented the deficiency in the applicant’s budget and the amount of relief, either in work relief wages or in kind, to which the applicant was entitled.

The advantage of this system was that differences in circumstances, including the cost of living, could be taken into account. Moreover each relief applicant was, in theory, subject to a proper casework investigation. However, the exercise was initially very time consuming and also called for regular reinvestigation to ensure that any changes in the client’s deficiency budget could be taken into account. There were also formidable managerial problems on relief projects because there was no standard working week. Each worker was employed only for as long as it took to earn the deficiency in his or her budget.

Although the FERA emphasized the need for carefully planned work relief projects paying wages in cash, it proved difficult for some states to deliver this program for their fit needy unemployed. In November 1933, the federal government decided to introduce a new initiative, the Civil Works Administration (CWA), which took over the FERA’s role until April 1934. For a short while the CWA provided work for some four million unemployed, whether they were in need of relief or not.

**EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS**

After the CWA wound down, a new work relief program was introduced with the FERA and the states resuming the relationship they had established before November 1933. The budgetary deficiency principle that had been suspended under the CWA was reactivated and over five million cases received emergency relief each month during the first half of 1935. Although FERA officials were strong supporters of work relief for the able-bodied, during the first six months of 1935 less than half of all relief cases received work relief wages; the remainder were direct relief cases. Only some of the direct relief recipients were unemployable. It was clear that a number of states lacked the zeal and managerial efficiency required to establish effective work relief projects. In 1935 Roosevelt announced a major change in relief policy. With the creation of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the federal government would provide a work relief program that would cater to the needy able-bodied. Unemployables would be cared for by the states and would no longer be a federal responsibility. When the president stated that he wanted the federal government to quit the business of relief, it was care of unemployables he had in mind. During the second half of 1935 the FERA was gradually eliminated.

The realization of the complexity of economic distress had persuaded FERA administrators to develop four special emergency relief programs that targeted specific groups. They were Rural Rehabilitation, Relief for Transients, College Student Aid, and Emergency Education. With the demise of the FERA, care for transients became the responsibility of the states.

**CONCLUSION**

The FERA was a bold initiative of great significance. The federal government assumed responsibility for the welfare of millions of Americans, both employable and unemployable, and did so by means of grants, not loans. FERA staff sought to improve relief administration standards, and they accommodated local problems and tried to support work relief wherever possible. Thanks to the FERA, relief provision became more generous and payment in cash rather than kind became much more common. The collection of detailed information on relief provision across the nation meant that both urban and rural hardship was better understood and could be addressed more systematically.
Total FERA grants to the states amounted to $3,022,602,326, which represented just over 70 percent of the entire expenditure on emergency relief during this period. Because so much of the allocation was distributed on a discretionary basis, some poverty-stricken states, mostly in the South, had over 90 percent of their spending on emergency relief provided by the federal government. This was an extraordinary and necessary intervention by Washington. The flexibility of the FERA and the high administrative standards it sought to impose on all states made it an excellent foundation for future relief initiatives.

See Also: CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION (CWA); EMERGENCY RELIEF AND CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1932; HOPKINS, HARRY; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA)

Created by the Federal Housing Act of 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was the core of the early New Deal’s strategy to revive the construction industry and expand home ownership. The agency did not build homes or loan money but provided federal insurance for private mortgages to protect creditors against default and thereby encouraged banks to loan more money for housing construction and home improvements. Federal mortgage insurance also enabled private lenders to charge lower interest rates and extend mortgage repayment periods, which helped to reduce the national rate of mortgage foreclosure from 250,000 non-farm units in 1932 to 18,000 in 1951. It also brought about lower down payment requirements (average FHA-backed mortgages were for 93 percent of home value compared with 58 percent for savings and loan association mortgages in the 1920s). Furthermore, the FHA’s real assessment regulations did much to establish minimum standards for housing construction throughout the building industry. From 1935 to 1939, the agency insured 400,000 housing units, representing 23.4 percent of the total number of units financed through the mortgage market during this period. Over the next five-year period its mortgage insurance was substantially extended to cover 806,000 units, 45.4 percent of total units that received mortgage finance. Between 1934 and 1972 the FHA helped nearly eleven million families to own their homes and another twenty-two million to improve their properties. Thanks in part to its insurance program, middle-income and lower-middle-income families gained access to home ownership and the number of families living in owner-occupied units rose from 44 percent to 63 percent over this period.

Reflecting the rationale for its creation, the FHA was more concerned to revive home construction than to help cities. In the words of its first administrator, oil executive James Moffett, it also acted like a “conservative business operation” intent on encouraging sound loans by lending agencies, with the agency itself delivering a small profit on its operations for the federal government. As a result, the FHA was reluctant to insure rental housing, the predominant form of accommodation for low-income inner-city residents, because it viewed such property as a relatively nonliquid asset, capable of delivering only long-term profits, and subject to profit constraints like rent control, maintenance costs, and tenant problems. Between 1934 and 1937 it insured only twenty-one rental projects, none of which was intended to provide low-income accommodation. There was a brief policy change in 1938 when the agency insured a low-cost prefabricated municipal project constructed by Works Progress Administration labor in Fort Wayne, Indiana, that was planned to become a model for other munici-
pal ventures until the American Federation of Labor’s opposition to the use of relief labor killed off the scheme.

The FHA also favored suburban over inner-city development as a sounder actuarial risk. Its ideal home was a bungalow or a colonial set on an ample lot with a driveway and garage. Consequently its insurance of single-family units exceeded that of multi-family units by a ratio in excess of four to one between 1940 and 1950. The agency also evaluated the suitability of neighborhoods for mortgage risk through adoption of the conservative appraisal methods of the Home Owners Loan Corporation. It trained underwriters to measure the quality of an area based primarily on its social and economic stability and its protection from so-called adverse influences. Consequently the FHA refused to insure in neighborhoods that suffered blight or were deemed likely to do so. As late as 1966, for example, it did not insure a single mortgage in Camden, New Jersey, a declining industrial city. Its banker-like approach to what constituted sound property investment also made it prejudicial against heterogeneous and racially mixed neighborhoods, as well as districts where African Americans were deemed likely to settle. FHA redlining excluded half of Detroit’s neighborhoods and one-third of Chicago’s from its insurance program in 1940. The agency also promoted racial segregation through its active encouragement of restrictive covenants, even after these were ruled unenforceable by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Shelley v. Kraemer judgment in 1948.

The FHA worked in favor of white suburbanization and against the interests of the increasingly nonwhite inner cities. It helped to transform the American suburb from a rich person’s preserve into a middle-class enclave. The consequences for the other America became evident when urban disorder focused attention on the nation’s ghettos in the 1960s. In 1968 former Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois reported for the National Commission on Urban Problems: “The poor and those on the fringes of poverty have been almost completely excluded. These and the lower middle class, together constituting the 40 percent of the population whose housing needs are greatest, have received only 11 percent of the FHA mortgages.”

See Also: CITIES AND SUBURBS; HOME OWNERS LOAN CORPORATION (HOLC); HOUSING; NATIONAL HOUSING ACT OF 1934.

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Iwan Morgan

FEDERAL MUSIC PROJECT (FMP)

The U. S. federal government created the Federal Music Project (FMP) in July 1935 as part of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Because it was a relief project, the Federal Music Project escaped much of the controversy that Congress and other sources aimed at many other New Deal programs. Nikolai Sokoloff, the director of the project, was given the responsibility of elevating America’s musical standards. To do this, he employed well-trained and highly skilled music teachers, singers, and instrumentalists, and he promoted the understanding of and an appreciation for music in line with the ideals of President Franklin Roosevelt.

The Federal Music Project pursued its goals in a number of ways. It offered free or low-cost concerts to the public, as well as music lessons for poor adults, music appreciation programs for children, and training for music teachers. The project ultimately led to higher standards for musical performance in the United States, and encouraged increased participation by amateurs in music presentation. The project established new orchestras throughout the country in cities that had never had orchestras, and it set up bands, theater groups, opera and vocal companies, black music groups, dance troops, and many other forms of musical ensembles. The Federal Music Project also sponsored radio programs and summer park performances, as
This violin class, held in New York City in 1936, was one of many music classes sponsored by the WPA’s Federal Music Project.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library

well as numerous concerts by itinerant musical groups, many given in high schools.

The program provided work to composers, teachers, and performers, as well as copyists and librarians, who did a great service by compiling, preserving, and centralizing scores, indexes, bibliographies, and other materials that had previously been scattered throughout the country. The Federal Music Project also created a permanent body of unpublished orchestral works.

Foremost among the project’s significant achievements was the establishment of composers’ forum laboratories, which helped define American music by promoting its performance. The first forum was set up in New York in 1935, and they were later established in other cities. Composers whose work was selected for laboratory performances rehearsed the musicians themselves, conducted the orchestra, and essentially organized the entire performance. The composer and musicians also conducted after-performance discussions, where they described what they felt made the music distinctly American.

The Federal Music Project achieved a number of firsts in its list of accomplishments. It was the first federal project to use money for a cultural undertaking, and its creation marked the first time the government assumed responsibility for improving
American cultural life and encouraging Americans to use their leisure time more creatively. Moreover, the project was egalitarian in that it was explicitly established to serve all Americans.

There were, of course, many problematic aspects of the project. Although the Federal Music Project promoted culture, there were questions about whose version of culture should be presented? Should “lowbrow” as well as “highbrow” culture be promoted by the project? What did the phrase “quality of American life” really mean? What constitutes fine art? Moreover, the very idea of a national music proved controversial.

Despite these issues, the project made an honest attempt to grapple with the challenge laid down by nineteenth-century poet and essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson: Emerson challenged American artists and intellectuals to create a distinctively American intellectual and artistic tradition. The issue was relevant in the 1930s when most American composers still preferred to study and perform in Europe before returning to the United States, and the American musical elite worshipped the European masters. Many American musicians thus found themselves at odds with the direction of American popular culture, in which a lively popular music scene was challenging old assumptions.

The recreation and education divisions of the Federal Music Project sought to solve this problem by identifying ways in which people who were not performers could participate in the music. The project set great emphasis on teaching music to the masses, and during the 1930s music programs became part of the public school curriculum. In addition, the WPA began to develop rural music programs in 1936. These programs initially focused entirely on art music, and ignored indigenous music. This neglect ended in November 1937 when Charles Seeger became deputy director of the Federal Music Project and began to promote many varieties of American music. Under Seeger, the project began to promote folk music and recreation associated with music. Seeger’s goal was to have every American singing, playing an instrument, or both. The project also sponsored fieldwork on folk music, most of it in the South and Appalachian Mountain area, where, in spite of terrible rural poverty, there was a vital and rich folk tradition.

Seeger enlisted the support of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt in his endeavors. She commissioned Seeger to plan a program of American folk music for the visiting British Royal Family. Seeger next turned to music education as a means of encouraging appreciation and performance of American music; he also promoted the collection and preservation of American folk and ethnic music. Seeger was aware that Europeans regarded jazz as the greatest American musical contribution of the twentieth century, whereas “serious” American composers tended to neglect it. Seeger thus began a program to encourage the performance and study of British folk music, colonial music, and African-American music.

By 1939, Congress began to cut the Federal Music Project budget, along with the budgets of other New Deal programs and agencies. In 1939 the project was renamed the WPA Music Program. After a year under state control, Congress ended the program entirely.

In spite of setbacks, the Federal Music Project can claim a great number of achievements. The project helped bring about social change by, for example, hiring many women and placing them in charge of arts projects. The Federal Music Project also influenced the style of American musical and theatrical performance, engendered a great interest in American music, especially American folk music, and through its programs for collecting and documenting America’s indigenous music, aided the understanding of the development of American art forms. Despite its accomplishments, however, the Federal Music Project never became a model for subsequent federal aid to the arts.

See Also: EDUCATION; FEDERAL ONE; MUSIC; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FNMA)

At the request of President Franklin Roosevelt, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), popularly known as Fannie Mae, was chartered on February 10, 1938, as a wholly owned and controlled subsidiary of the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). Fannie Mae was designed primarily to increase the availability of mortgage credit in order to stimulate the home construction industry and reduce unemployment. When credit was in short supply due to a recession, Fannie Mae would purchase home mortgages that were made by private lenders and had been insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). When credit became more plentiful, Fannie Mae would resell the mortgages to other lenders, thereby smoothing out the highs and lows of the economic cycle. It was also hoped that Fannie Mae’s purchases would lower national interest rates and generate lender confidence in FHA-insured loans.

The establishment of Fannie Mae marked the culmination of the federal government’s involvement in housing markets during the Great Depression. Both the Home Owners Loan Corporation, created in 1933 to refinance troubled mortgages, and the FHA, established in 1934 to insure new mortgages, substantially increased funds available to homeowners. The National Housing Act, which created the FHA, also authorized the chartering of private national mortgage associations to help market federally insured mortgages. The mortgage associations were to be supervised by the head of the Federal Housing Administration and they were authorized to purchase mortgages with funds raised through the public sale of notes, bonds, and other obligations. It was hoped that primary lenders who sold their existing mortgages would use their new funds to finance additional mortgages.

Contrary to the expectations of policymakers, investors did not form private mortgage associations and home financing continued to be scarce. The first, reluctant experiment with federal mortgage acquisition occurred when the RFC Mortgage Company, set up in March 1935 to support the commercial real estate market, agreed to purchase some FHA-insured mortgages in order to help the ailing construction industry. Fannie Mae finally opened its doors in 1938 with a charter issued by the Federal Housing Administration and $11 million provided by the RFC.

Fannie Mae remained a relatively small operation in its early years. Under its founding president, Sam Husbands, Fannie Mae issued just two series of obligations to pay for mortgage acquisitions, raising $29.7 million in 1938 and $55.5 million in 1939. Since its inception Fannie Mae has undergone many changes. In 1948 it was authorized to purchase loans insured by the Veterans Administration as well. Congress partially privatized Fannie Mae in 1954 and completed the process in 1968 when it set up a new scaled-back federal agency, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Fannie Mae has continued to grow, becoming the third largest corporation in the United States, with total assets of $800 billion in 2001. Fannie Mae is credited with helping to expand homeownership in the immediate postwar years.
However, critics have charged that the secondary mortgage market, which it created, hurt urban communities by allowing financial institutions to transfer savings funds out of cities and into mortgage loans made in profitable suburban developments throughout the country.

See Also: CITIES AND SUBURBS; FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA); HOME OWNERS LOAN CORPORATION (HOLC); HOUSING; RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION (RFC).

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Eduardo F. Canedo

FEDERAL ONE

Federal One was established with an appropriation of $27 million under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. It was to provide work relief to unemployed artists and to preserve their skills until they could be absorbed into the private sector. In effect, Federal One sought to occupy the vacuum left by private patronage of the fine arts and mass support for the popular arts due to the austerity of the Depression. Between 1929 and 1933, as the prices paid for paintings declined by two-thirds and magazines dismissed graphic artists because of declining revenues, ten thousand artists became unemployed. Theater workers were equally hard hit as the number of Broadway productions was drastically reduced and the number of employed actors fell by 50 percent.

Creative and commercial writers also suffered as the revenues of the publishing industry were halved, and when newspapers sales declined, the employment of many journalists and advertising copywriters was terminated. Musicians, whose job security had already been hurt by the advent of sound in motion pictures, experienced the impact of the Depression as hotels cancelled their small ensembles, symphony orchestras were disbanded, and fewer pupils paid for private music lessons. In 1933, two-thirds of the membership of the American Federation of Musicians was unemployed.

Efforts by professional associations and unions to promote self-help were ineffective, and, with the exception of New York and a handful of state relief agencies, no major initiative was taken by government to provide relevant work for unemployed artists. Some of the New Deal’s earliest agencies, including the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and, in particular, the Civil Works Administration, aided artists, but the effort did not match the need.

Four major arts were organized under the aegis of Federal One: the Federal Art Project, the Federal Theatre Project, the Federal Music Project, and the Federal Writers’ Project. Their respective national directors—Holger Cahill, Hallie Flanagan, Nikolai Sokoloff, and Henry Alsberg—headed complex and extensive bureaucracies with a network of state and local offices throughout the United States. However, the directors were not exclusively concerned with the disbursement of funds and the development of projects to provide assistance to unemployed artists. The four directors had clear ideas about the nature of culture and sought to use the federal government to promote them.

Historian Jane De Hart Mathews refers to the New Deal elite’s “quest for a cultural democracy”; its aim was to make art more accessible (“art for the millions”) by creating new civic institutions for the arts and by transforming attitudes and values about how art was produced and to whom it communicated. Federal One challenged the metropolitan dominance of the arts by taking arts to the people through gallery and company tours, and the Federal Music Project, with its three hundred ensembles, established orchestras in states such as Oklahoma.
and Utah, where none had existed previously. Federal One also sought to reach wider audiences by making art more comprehensible and relevant to contemporary issues and by incorporating regional and ethnic distinctions in its productions and presentations. The Federal Theatre Project established production companies in forty states, organized sixteen African-American units in eleven cities, and performed plays in languages other than English. Its Living Newspaper productions courted controversy by addressing contemporary issues, such as slum housing, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and the plight of American agriculture. It is estimated that the Federal Theatre Project organized some 1,200 productions that played to twenty-five million Americans, 65 percent of whom were attending the theater for the first time.

Federal One sought to stimulate involvement as well as appreciation. The Federal Art Project provided free art classes for sixty thousand people each month, while the Federal Music Project employed six thousand music teachers who organized programs in schools, parks, and hospitals, developing the music skills of some fourteen million pupils. The vision of Federal One was extremely ambitious. It sought to sponsor a cultural renaissance in America through a mass movement. The aim was to integrate the artist into society and to make the arts integral to everyday life.

Despite frequent criticisms of some American failings, the projects were self-consciously and assertively nationalistic in both their themes and their forms; one WPA poster declared, “Out of the spirit of a people arises its art.” The nationalism of Federal One is most evident in the Federal Writers’ Project’s American Guide series, a collection of 378 books and pamphlets describing all of America’s states, principal cities, and highways. Federal One sought to orient Americans to their history, as well as to their geography. The arts projects worked to connect contemporary life with American traditions. The Federal Writers’ Project, for example, employed writers to make inventories of state and local archives and to collect the testimony of ex-slaves; a Folklore Studies Division launched oral history projects to preserve American folklore and humor. The Federal Art Project’s Index of American Design recorded the history of the decorative arts from early settlement to 1890, while the Federal Writers’ Project compiled an index of American composers that catalogued about seven thousand compositions by 2,200 composers. In addition, a joint committee on folk arts organized recordings of the songs and music of Latino Americans, Native Americans, African Americans, and Cajuns, as well as music from the Appalachian region. These were not antiquarian endeavors; the sponsors of these projects believed that they were accumulating repositories of American art and expression that would inspire contemporary musicians, artists, and writers. Such an emphatic nationalism has led some cultural historians to claim that Federal One sought to distract Americans from the crisis of the Depression by affirming the United States and by imposing a false, purposeful consensus upon America’s history and the character of its people. However, if a cultural hegemony to buttress the liberal economic and social programs of the New Deal was ever a goal, it was never attained.

Initiatives in 1938 to make Federal One a permanent agency met with failure. A broad range of interests was hostile to the organization. Some politicians were concerned about waste and inefficiency and questioned the relevance of the subsidization of culture in a period of mass unemployment. Republican politicians, in particular, claimed that the cultural projects were a propaganda arm of the Democratic Party. Federal One was also associated with radicalism and, during its investigations in 1938 and 1939, the House Committee on Un-American Activities claimed that the projects had been infiltrated by Communists. Even the arts “establishment” did not favor making Federal One permanent because of the inconsistent quality of the work it produced.

In 1939, following an investigation by the House Committee on Appropriations, the Federal Theatre Project was terminated and Federal One was abolished. The remaining projects were transferred to the supervision of the states with the expectation that the states would contribute 25 percent of their costs and terminate the contracts of workers who had served for eighteen months. Deprived of central direction, the remaining arts proj-
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) came into existence in 1913. To overcome fears that a unified U.S. central bank would become too closely allied to the federal government and to big money interests, the Fed was made up of twelve regional reserve banks each with a high degree of local autonomy. A Federal Reserve Board, located in Washington D.C., operated as a supervisory body with a duty to ensure that the Federal Reserve banks complied with the law. All national banks, that is institutions that had received their charter from the federal government, were required to join the Fed. State banks were permitted to join if they could meet the relatively high reserve requirements laid down by the new system.

**THE EARLY EXPERIENCE: 1913–1921**

Few bankers wanted a strong central bank, and there was widespread support for regional division. In fact the dual system of national and state banks that the majority of bankers wished to retain had been preserved. After 1913 the commercial banking sector was made up of national banks, which were members of the Fed, and state banks, some of which joined the Fed while others remained non-members. In 1921, only 9,779 of the 29,018 commercial banks were members of the reserve system. Even in 1929 the structure was essentially the same. The Fed had 8,522 members while non-members numbered 15,173.

Among the objectives of the new system were the provision of ample credit for legitimate business, the stabilization of interest rates, and the maintenance of the gold standard. A key aspiration stressed by the supporters of central banking was the avoidance of financial panics and the attendant bank failures to which the American financial system was prone. Multiple bank failures during the depression of 1907 had proved to be a decisive turning point in the argument for the creation of a central bank.

Almost as soon as the Fed was established, the economy was affected by the demands of World War I. The Fed successfully lubricated the wheels of credit and after April 1917, when the United States
entered the conflict, it directed credit to essential users and also supported the Treasury in its aim of keeping interest rates low so that the costs of war borrowing would be minimized. Unfortunately this action helped to fan the flames of inflation. When, in 1920, the Fed raised interest rates in order to bring rising prices under control, the severe post-war Depression of 1920 and 1921 quickly followed. Only after 1921 did the Fed begin to operate under normal peacetime conditions.

**MONETARY POLICY: 1922–1928**

During this period the New York Reserve Bank, under its influential governor, Benjamin Strong, emerged as the leading institution. It had become apparent that if the reserve banks insisted on behaving independently, each raising or lowering discount rates or purchasing or selling securities, monetary policy would lack cohesion. Strong advocated the coordination of open market operations, and in 1922 a committee was formed to supervise the sale and purchase of government securities. With this tool, Monetary policy could be used to counter the impact of both booms and slumps and seasonal fluctuations in credit, so that the monetary authorities could influence events rather than simply react to them.

Some scholars believe that the Fed intervened directly to ensure that the minor recessions of 1924 and 1927 did not develop into full-blown Depressions. During each, the Fed adopted liberal credit policies by purchasing government securities and lowering discount rates. As the economy recovered rapidly in both cases, it would seem that the policies were very effective. However, compelling evidence suggests that the motives for the Fed’s actions were linked to international rather than domestic issues. The Reserve wanted to keep U.S. interest rates low in order to assist European countries in either returning to the gold standard or staying on it. Credit was extended to European central banks, and low U.S. interest rates encouraged capital to flow to the old world. In other words, the domestic benefits of expansionary monetary policy were entirely secondary.

While the Fed encouraged the adoption of the gold standard overseas, it efficiently managed the massive influx of gold into the United States during the war and post-war years. The gold was effectively sterilized and not allowed to exert inflationary pressure. Indeed, this period is one of remarkable price stability given the economy’s vigorous growth. However, the actions of the Fed in accumulating a large gold reserve, a strategy also pursued by the French, put pressure on other gold standard countries that were attempting to operate the system with inadequate reserves.

By 1928 the domestic advantages of reserve bank monetary co-operation had become apparent. For example, collective action had reduced seasonal fluctuations in interest rates, and bankers were becoming more confident in their ability to use monetary policy effectively. Bank failures, however, continued to be a problem. Between 1921 and 1929, some 776 national banks, 229 state banks, and 4,416 non-member banks closed their doors. The vast majority of the failed institutions were small banks adversely affected by farm misfortune. The figures reflect the fact that big banks joined the Fed, and the small, usually under-capitalized unit banks, remained outside and were unable to call on central bank help when in need.

**THE FED AND THE ONSET OF THE DEPRESSION**

In 1928 danger signals from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were becoming a concern. The Fed reacted to growing stock market speculation by introducing a tight money policy. Intended to make borrowing for speculation less attractive, the higher interest rates were expected to reduce frenetic speculative activity. Unfortunately, this policy was totally ineffective as speculative activity actually increased. However, the policy did have an adverse effect on economic performance, and in the middle of 1929 it was clear that the economic boom had come to an end. Wall Street quickly absorbed these signs, the stock market collapsed in October 1929, and then the Fed, seeing speculation quashed, reduced interest rates.

The economic recovery that followed the crash did not last long. From the middle of 1930 the economy began a long slide, which took it to a trough in the winter of 1932 and 1933. A sustained recov-
ery did not begin until the spring of 1933. A central feature of the Great Depression was extensive bank failure. Indeed, in mid-March 1933 there were approximately 12,600 fewer commercial banks than had been open for business in June 1929. Yet one of the duties of the reserve system was to act as a bulwark against bank failure. Why did the Fed fail in this task?

Scholars usually identify three banking crises in which the failures were concentrated: the first took place in 1930, the second in the fall of 1931, and finally the banking system reached an almost total state of collapse in the winter of 1932 and 1933. There is now widespread agreement that the 1930 wave of bank failures was part of a regional problem and had little national impact. However, the 1931 crisis was far more serious and occurred after Great Britain left the gold standard and devalued sterling. Speculators who had previously worried about the ability of the Bank of England to support the pound now turned their attention to the dollar. To give speculators a clear message that protecting the currency was a priority, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates and pursued a tight money policy. This was a logical move to protect the dollar, but it was disastrous for a banking system under great pressure. The beleaguered banks needed low interest rates and an easy money policy that would give them ready access to central bank support, quite the reverse of what was provided. As some institutions failed, panic spread and even soundly run banks could not keep their doors open when faced with so many customers who wished to withdraw deposits. Exactly the same thing happened during the “lame duck” period between Roosevelt’s election in November 1932 and his inauguration in March 1933. Uncertainty led to further speculation against the dollar and the Fed responded by raising interest rates. By this time the financial sector had been exposed to such shocks that most state governors were forced to close their banks in order to save them from failing. The creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in January 1932, with powers to assist troubled banks, is a clear indication that the Fed was failing to do its job. In February, the Glass-Steagall Act liberalized the Fed’s discount provisions but, unfortunately, this move came too late to have a major impact.

Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz are highly critical of the Federal Reserve and believe that its perverse decisions, which led to the failure of so many banks and a severe contraction in the money supply, transformed a recession into a major depression. However, the actions of the Fed in defending the dollar were consistent with the policies that seemed so effective in 1924 and in 1927, when external factors determined action. Elmus Wicker, the most authoritative of banking historians for this period, is cautious in his assessment of Federal Reserve policy. Unlike most commentators he does not believe that the Fed initiated the 1931 banking crisis, but he is critical of the failure to implement vigorous open market operations in 1930 and in 1931 that could have prevented the dramatic fall in depositor confidence. Even though most of the failed banks were not reserve members, the Fed wins few friends for its policy choices in the worst years of the Depression. Most scholars debate whether the failures were just bad or disastrous.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE NEW DEAL

There was unanimous agreement that the banking sector needed assistance to achieve stability, and the first response of the Roosevelt administration was to create a breathing space by declaring a national bank holiday. On March 9, 1933, the Emergency Banking Act gave the executive branch of the government power to reopen banks once they had been examined and declared sound. The Banking Act (June 16, 1933), gave the Fed increased control over bank credit, called for greater coordination of open market operations and the legal recognition of an Open Market Committee. The act forbade the payment of interest on demand deposits by member banks and also regulated the interest payments on time deposits. The decision to separate commercial and investment banks so that the former could no longer underwrite securities gained widespread support. In spite of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of both the president and bankers, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established to ensure that depositors would be so confident in the security of their deposits that bank runs would become a thing of
the past. All members of the Federal Reserve System were obliged to join FDIC.

A further refinement of the banking system came with the Banking Act (1935), which brought about fundamental changes in the Federal Reserve System. Marriner Eccles had assumed the chairmanship of the Board of Governors. An experienced banker with a forceful personality and known by Congress to be no friend of Wall Street, Eccles insisted on greater centralization and more power for the board. The 1935 Act was one of the most significant pieces of legislation in U.S. financial history establishing with its predecessor a structure for banking that was to last half a century. It created a Federal Reserve Board consisting of seven members to be appointed by the president and confirmed by Senate. The Federal Open Market Committee, which had consisted of the twelve governors of the Federal Reserve banks, was replaced by one consisting of the board and just five representatives from the Reserve Banks. The new Committee, which had far more authority than the one it replaced, came to play a leading role in shaping policy. It exercised a firm control over interest rates, the provision of credit, and the money supply. The board also gained the power to approve the appointments of the presidents, as they came to be called, of reserve banks and the authority to alter the reserve requirements of member banks.

The 1935 act transferred power from the reserve banks to the Reserve Board. This shift was possible because of Eccles’s determination and authority combined with a congressional distrust of the reserve bankers that was shared by many members of the public. The U.S. president also acquired new powers of appointment to the board.

It is ironic that the Fed, having relentlessly pursued policies that most scholars believe made the impact of the Depression more acute, was given so much additional power by New Dealers. Moreover, an early action of the newly constituted board was to tighten the reserve requirements of member banks, which were viewed as excessive and a potential inflationary threat. This action, together with the imposition of a restrictive fiscal policy as Roosevelt strove to balance the federal budget, contributed to the onset of the deep recession of 1937 and 1938.

See Also: Banking Panics (1930–1933); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Gold Standard; Glass-Steagall Act of 1933; Monetary Policy; Recession of 1937; Stock Market Crash (1929).

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FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION (FSLIC)

The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was created by the federal government on June 27, 1934, to secure the stability of the savings and loan industry. The main purpose of savings and loans, also known as S&Ls, was to receive deposits from individuals and institutions and reinvest those funds in residential mortgages. During the banking crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s,
many savings and loans collapsed. If a bank or savings and loan failed, depositors who had not withdrawn their money lost everything. After the onset of the Great Depression many unemployed workers could not repay their loans and nearly one-quarter of all home mortgages went into default. Between 1930 and 1935 nearly one thousand savings and loans collapsed, wiping out almost $300 million in assets.

In 1934 Congress moved to boost both the savings and loan and the residential construction industries with the National Housing Act. One provision created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) that encouraged banks and savings and loans to make loans for building homes, farm buildings, and small business establishments. The FHA insured the loans so that if the debtor defaulted, the FHA would reimburse the creditor. Because of the reduced risk, creditors demanded lower down payments and extended the length of mortgages. More people were able to manage these new loans and buy their own homes. Title IV of the National Housing Act created the FSLIC to insure deposits in savings and loans up to $5,000. Depositors knew that if their savings and loan failed the FSLIC would reimburse them for the amount in their account up to a $5,000 limit. Federally chartered savings and loans had to pay a mandatory fee for coverage, while those with state charters could voluntarily insure their deposits with the FSLIC by paying the fee. The FSLIC, modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) created the previous year, revived public confidence in the stability of the industry. As a result, people returned their deposits to savings and loans and the frequency of runs was diminished. Smaller savings and loans were more able to compete with larger institutions because they also held the confidence of the public. Savings and loans were able to loan more money for housing purchases and construction and consequently contributed to the recovery of the residential real estate market.

The housing policies of the New Deal that created the FSLIC, FHA, Home Owners Loan Corporation, and Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) stimulated private home building and individual homeownership by coordinating private and public institutions. Before the New Deal only two out of five Americans owned their homes. The New Deal built a system of home building finance that allowed private money to fund the construction of postwar suburbia. By the 1970s two out of three Americans lived in owner-occupied houses.

Along with insurance for the industry came regulation. In 1934 Congress established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to maintain the stability of savings and loans by restricting their financial practices. The New Deal housing and banking policies ultimately demonstrated, however, that the expansion of the state did not result in the reduction of private power and flexibility. In fact historian David M. Kennedy argues in *Freedom from Fear* (1999) that these reforms actually liberated capital. Government regulations made people secure about depositing their money in banks and savings and loans. As a result, banks and S&Ls had a reliable cash reserve which freed them to make loans and invest in mortgages.

Traditionally most savings and loans were mutuals or community-based institutions owned by the depositors themselves. But in the 1980s the federal government initiated deregulatory measures, which transformed the savings and loan industry. Speculators were allowed to convert savings and loans into stock corporations. This freedom enabled savings and loans to raise more capital but the new owners were less concerned with the local community and more interested in quick profit. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 raised the deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000. This change, along with higher interest rates, doubled the amount of money deposited in the savings and loans and as a result increased the taxpayers’ burden when savings and loans failed in great numbers at the end of the decade. As more money was deposited, savings and loans were forced to meet rising interest rate payments to depositors. Congress freed them to engage in commercial lending and non-mortgage consumer lending to help them meet the new commitments. Many critics contend the increase in coverage emboldened savings and loans to provide riskier loans than they might have otherwise. The 1984 Depository Institutions Act permitted devel-
opers to own savings and loans and allowed owners of these institutions to lend to themselves. Savings and loans quickly took advantage of the new rules to engage in high-risk speculation, particularly in commercial real estate. When these deals failed so did many savings and loans. Over five hundred savings and loans collapsed during the 1980s and created a crisis that forced the FSLIC into insolvency in 1989. Responsibility for FSLIC’s insurance obligations fell to the FDIC. The U.S. government expects taxpayers will have to pay more than $500 billion over thirty years to bail out the failed savings and loan associations.

See Also: CITIES AND SUBURBS; FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA); FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FNMA); HOME OWNERS LOAN CORPORATION (HOLC); HOUSING; NATIONAL HOUSING ACT OF 1934.

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DAVID EISENBAICH

FEDERAL SURPLUS COMMODITIES CORPORATION (FSCC)

The famous “slaughter of the innocents” (the slaughter of some six million piglets to prevent a surplus of pork in the market) that took place during the early months of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s (AAA) surplus reduction program led to a public outcry against the emergency purchases. The idea of government-sponsored waste at a time of intense need nationwide led to a redirection of federal policy, and the creation of a new division, the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (FSRC), within the country’s primary relief organization, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). The mission of the FSRC was to divert surplus agricultural commodities from the open market to state and local relief administrations for the use of destitute families, thus redistributing products as it removed price-depressing surpluses from the market. The original members of the FSRC were Henry A. Wallace, the secretary of agriculture; Harold L. Ickes, the emergency administrator of public works; and FERA head Harry L. Hopkins. The governor of the Farm Credit Administration was later added to the group. Thus, some of President Franklin Roosevelt’s top aides were involved with this aspect of federal relief.

The commodities that the FSRC accumulated for redistribution came from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s crop adjustment program purchases, as well as from state relief purchases. The FSRC was responsible not only for processing the commodities, work that was often contracted out, but also for initial storage and distribution of the surplus goods. Once the FSRC received surplus crops it passed title to the states; thus state and local relief agencies were directly responsible for distributing the goods under the regulatory control of the federal corporation.

Between October 1933 and October 1935, the FSRC distributed to the states a variety of surplus commodities with a value totaling $265,271,056. In November 1935, the program was transferred to the AAA and renamed the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (FSCC). The corporation was reorganized again in 1937, though it still retained its function as a purchaser and distributor of surplus agricultural commodities.

The FSCC sought to encourage consumption, and its primary function was to distribute products to relief clients “over and above” the aid they re-
received based upon need. Thus the FSRC and FSCC augmented relief benefits, while avoiding direct competition with private industry. Among the foods the corporation distributed were beef, pork, sausage, mutton, lard, rice, fruits, eggs, and cereals. The corporation also handled various processed goods that had been produced by state work relief industries, including clothing, mattresses, bedding, and towels from textile factories, and preserved meats, fruits, and vegetables from canneries. In addition, the FSCC coordinated a state-level school lunch program from 1936 to 1940; in 1939 it initiated an experimental Food Stamp Program, the precursor to the modern food stamp program. The corporation was abolished in 1940 and its functions were reorganized into the Surplus Marketing Administration, with duties shifting to meet wartime demand.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA).

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SARA M. GREGG
The Federal Theatre Project (FTP) was a New Deal initiative that was spawned by hard times. Part of the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Federal Theatre Project democratized modern American culture, signaling a distinct openness to new formats and ideas. Devised in part as a welfare measure, the American theater in the 1930s gained a major infusion of federal money, fostered an explosion of new talent, and stimulated wide public involvement. The actor, director, and producer John Houseman later saw this as “the most creative and dynamic approach that has yet been made to an American National Theater.” Although the project was terminated in 1939 due to its political vulnerability and the overall erosion of support for the New Deal, its influence as a model for expanding the public sphere remains.

The Depression accentuated a broad set of problems affecting the theater industry. More than twenty thousand theater workers were unemployed. Half of New York City’s theaters closed and regional theaters across the nation were hard hit. Yet the Federal Theatre Project also grew out of the inadequacies of American commercial theater, inadequacies that had become clear to many by the early 1930s. Syndicates and the star system had grown powerful, reinforcing formulaic productions that standardized content, form, promotion, and
distribution of the theater industry’s product. The movie industry had also siphoned off much of its market. Vaudeville, as well as regional and repertory theater companies, was badly hurt by the growing Depression. Yet even within this context there were signs of creative vitality: the “little theater movement,” the Group Theater, and the attractions of European and Soviet theater all created an atmosphere of expectation, experimentation, and the politicization of social issues in American theater.

Although some theater workers had earlier received minor assistance from the Civil Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), funding for a full-scale Federal Theatre Project was funneled through the WPA, which was created in April 1935. The Federal Theatre Project was officially launched that August when the directors of the writers’, music, art, and theater projects, collectively known as Federal Project Number One, were announced. President Roosevelt’s close associate and WPA head Harry Hopkins chose Hallie Flanagan, an old friend from Iowa, to be director of the Federal Theatre Project.

Hopkins made an inspired choice. Born in 1890, Flanagan was a gifted drama teacher and producer who had worked at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. Upon taking office she noted that “while our aim is to put to work thousands of theater people, our more far-reaching purpose is to organize and support theatrical enterprises so excellent in quality, so low in cost and so vital to the communities involved that they will be able to continue after federal aid is withdrawn.” She later noted the novelty of the government getting into the theater business, saying, “We all believed that theater was more than a private enterprise, that it was also a public interest which, properly fostered, might come to be a social and educative force.” Energetic and politically sensitive, Flanagan originally worked out of the old McLean Mansion in Washington, D.C., and dealt with a welter of bureaucratic nightmares—workers needed to prove residence for a year in a city where they would collect their checks, for example.

The Theatre Project employed more than twelve thousand theater workers at its peak, including numerous actors and directors who later became famous, such as Orson Welles, E.G. Marshall, Sidney Lumet, John Houseman, Burt Lancaster, and Will Geer. Units were established in thirty-one states and New York City. Overall the Federal Theatre Project produced more than one thousand productions and one thousand performances each month before nearly a million people. Seventy-eight percent of these audience members were admitted free of charge. Major radio networks carried the Federal Theatre of the Air to an estimated ten million listeners, while the Federal Theatre Project’s National Service Bureau provided research, consultation, and play-reading services to all the units. It even created a Federal Theater Magazine and an Audience Research Department in October 1936 to track public interest in its productions.

Numerous productions were staged that raised provocative questions about the social and economic conditions of the time. Classic or ideologically conservative dramas such as Shakespeare’s Mac-
beth and T. S. Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral were counterpoised with contemporary themes and new formats. One of the most controversial was a production of It Can’t Happen Here, based on Sinclair Lewis’s novel about fascism in the United States. The “Living Newspapers” productions were derived from social issues of the day and were often produced simultaneously in several cities. They used photographs, short films, animated sequences, and other novel techniques to gain audience attention.

The Federal Theatre Project placed special emphasis on promoting minority culture. Black theater companies were established in a dozen cities. Foreign language companies performed works in Yiddish, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Although Flanagan wielded power from Washington, the Federal Theatre Project allowed considerable regional variation in its productions. States experimented with theaters for the blind, and puppeteers toured CCC camps. Some project employees assisted local dramatic clubs, while others provided historical information for playwrights.

However, the Federal Theatre Project was the most vulnerable of all New Deal cultural programs when it came to censorship. Its productions were sometimes provocative and many theater workers were outspoken advocates on the political left. Some Federal Theatre Project employees demonstrated when the government cut the project’s funding. WPA chief Harry Hopkins had originally said that “what we want is a free, adult, uncensored theater,” but that proved difficult to accomplish, especially after southern committee chairmen in Congress began voicing their concerns. Censorship quickly reared its head against the first Living Newspaper production, Ethiopia, which addressed the Italian invasion of that African nation. The White House feared international repercussions and sought to constrain elements of the production, which led to the resignation of the Federal Theatre Project’s New York director, the playwright Elmer Rice.

Issues surrounding federal cutbacks, censorship, and criticism of the leftist political content of some of the Federal Theatre Project’s productions grew after the 1936 election. By 1938, the Dies Committee held hearings into what some of its members labeled communist subversion of the Federal Theatre Project. Newspapers provided few opportunities for the Federal Theatre Project to defend itself against committee allegations of workers’ association with the Communist Party. On June 30, 1939, the House Appropriations Committee suspended use of WPA funds for any theater activities, and the Federal Theater Project ended abruptly. A grand experiment had ended in a manner that presaged the red-baiting of the postwar era.

See Also: CRADLE WILL ROCK, THE; FEDERAL ONE; FLANAGAN, HALLIE; WELLES, ORSON; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT (FWP)

The Federal Writers’ Project (FWP) was created in 1935 as part of the service branch of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) to provide work relief for writers and to develop writing and research projects approved by the WPA. In July 1935 Henry Alsberg was appointed project director. The project was organized into state branches across the country, and special units were also established in Puerto Rico, New York City, and Washington, D.C. From 1935 until the WPA’s demise in 1943, about seven thousand people worked for the FWP, including a number of the most important American writers of the 1930s and 1940s. It produced several keystone anthologies of American writing that remain central to the study of American literature. The FWP also made the first comprehensive attempt to document American folklore and oral history, and created a series of guidebooks to states and regions of the United States that remain unparalleled in scope and quality.

The largest state branches of the Federal Writers’ Project existed in Illinois and New York. Chicago was the center of the Illinois Project, which attracted the most important writers of the Midwest. Among them were Arna Bontemps and Jack Conroy, who gathered material for their important migration study They Seek a City; novelist Nelson Algren, author of The Man with the Golden Arm; dancer and choreographer Katherine Dunham; novelists Willard Motley and Frank Yerby; novelist Saul Bellow; and poet Margaret Walker. While working for the FWP, Richard Wright gathered materials for his 1941 book, Twelve Million Black Voices, in collaboration with Farm Security Administration photographer Edward Rosskam. Many of these Chicago writers comprised what critic Robert Bone later termed the Chicago Renaissance in American literature.

Notable writers who worked for the New York City Project included novelist and short story writer John Cheever; poet Waring Cuney; novelist Ralph Ellison (who drew on FWP interviews with Harlem residents in writing the 1952 classic Invisible Man); poet Claude McKay; social historian Roi Ottley; poet Kenneth Fearing; and novelist Anzia Yezierska. Many of the New York City writers, such as Earl Conrad, SolFunaro, and Claude McKay, had ties to the organized Left, including to the Communist Party; FWP writer Philip Rahv famously broke with the Communist Party and became an editor at the important literary journal Partisan Review. Other major American writers who participated in state FWPs include Zora Neale Hurston in Florida, John Steinbeck in California, and Conrad Aiken in Massachusetts. Among the important literary anthologies to emerge from the Federal Writers Project were American Stuff: An Anthology of Prose and Verse, published in 1937, and Poetry, published in 1938. Special issues of literary journals, such as the winter 1938 Frontier and Midland, were devoted entirely to FWP writings, and the May 11, 1938, New Republic included a feature titled “Federal Poets: An Anthology.”

Yet it was in folklore and ethnic studies that the FWP made its most original contributions. From 1936 to 1937 scholar John A. Lomax served as national advisor on folklore to the FWP. Between 1936 and 1938, project writers conducted interviews with former slaves in more than a dozen states. During 1938, Benjamin A. Botkin served as both folklore consultant and folklore editor to the Federal Writers’ Project. In 1944, Botkin assembled a selection of the slave interviews into Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery. Botkin also collected industrial folktales gathered such writers as Jack Conroy and Nelson Algren into A Treasury of American Folklore, which was published in 1944. FWP recordings of African-American musicians led to the release of records by Louis Armstrong and such compilations as News and the Blues: Telling It Like It Is. Other significant ethnic studies conducted by the project include The Italians of New York, published in 1938, Jewish Families and Family Circles of New York, published in 1939, The Armenians in Massachusetts, published in 1937, and The Hopi and The Navaho, published by the FWP in Arizona in 1937 and 1938, respectively.

In addition to the state and area guidebooks, the project also produced regional studies, both serious and light. Notable studies of regional folklore and folk music included Sodbusters: Tales of South-
eastern South Dakota and South Carolina Folk Tales: Stories of Animals and Supernatural Beings. Baseball, bird-watching, reptiles and amphibians, and skiing were subjects of other FWP books. Materials collected by FWP staffers also appeared in important books published after the demise of the project, including Horace Cayton and St. Clair Drake’s Black Metropolis, a monumental study of Chicago’s South Side, and Jerre Mangione’s The Dream and the Deal, still the most comprehensive first-person account of the Federal Writers’ Project.

In September 1939 the Works Progress Administration changed its name to the Work Projects Administration, and the Federal Writers’ Project became known as the WPA Writers’ Program. The FWP, hobbled by funding cuts and accusations of communist influence, produced its last guidebook (on Oklahoma) in 1941. The WPA itself disbanded June 30, 1943.

The Federal Writers’ Project was one of the great successes of the Roosevelt administration. It nurtured and sustained some of the most important American literary careers of the 1930s and 1940s, and its focus on social documentary approaches influenced the realism and naturalistic themes of American letters during the Depression and World War II. Oral historians such as Studs Terkel and archival enterprises such as Folkways Records extended the methods and findings of the FWP into the contemporary period. The FWP’s attention to migration, urbanization, folk culture, ethnic studies, labor, and race also predicted the themes of government and university study of American culture and society in the postwar period.

See Also: AMERICAN GUIDE SERIES; FEDERAL ONE; FOLKLORE; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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FIELDS, W.C. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; HUMOR.

FIRESIDE CHATS

During his twelve years as president, Franklin Roosevelt delivered thirty-one radio addresses called “fireside chats,” a name coined in May 1933, immediately before the second of them, by Harry M. Butcher, a CBS radio executive. The public, the press, and Roosevelt himself adopted the homely appellation, and the label stuck. These speeches were intended to be relatively brief and informal reports to the American people, delivered in a conversational tone and in simple, unadorned language. Roosevelt, who had experimented with this use of the radio when he was governor of New York, was a master of that form of communication; he had a clear, bell-like voice and developed an unpretentious and good-humored style that endeared him to millions of Americans across the country.

The first fireside chat was given on March 12, 1933, only a week after Roosevelt’s inauguration. It
addressed the banking crisis, and the everyday language and easy tone of the opening sentences set the pattern for all the fireside chats that were to follow: “My friends, I want to talk for a few minutes with the people of the United States about banking—to talk with the comparatively few who understand the mechanics of banking, but more particularly with the overwhelming majority of you who use banks for the making of deposits and the drawing of checks. I want to tell you what has been done in the last few days, and why it was done, and what the next steps are going to be.”

The first thirteen of these radio talks (aired from March 1933 through July 1938) were devoted to domestic policy, explaining aspects of the New Deal and asking for political support for his various programs. The final eighteen talks (aired from September 1939 through January 1945) addressed the issues and dangers raised by the war in Europe and, once the United States entered, reported on the progress toward ultimate victory. Although Roosevelt occasionally shared bad news in the fireside chats, their prevailing tone was patriotic, inspirational, and upbeat—the president of the United States trying, in his neighborly way, to encourage optimism, pride in America, and confidence in the future.

Most of the fireside chats were delivered by Roosevelt from the diplomatic reception room on the first floor of the White House, seated at a table loaded with microphones from the major radio networks. About a third of the talks were given on Sunday evenings. Normally the president invited a small audience to be present—twenty or thirty
friends, civil servants, and houseguests, all seated on folding chairs. The president would be wheeled into the room about ten minutes before airtime, carrying his reading copy and smoking the usual cigarette.

Roosevelt had the benefit of a team of talented speechwriters. Some of them were political operatives with other duties, advisers such as Samuel Rosenman, Harry Hopkins, Rexford Tugwell, Adolph Berle, and a half dozen others. The wartime fireside chats had the additional advantage of two legendary American writers, Robert Sherwood and Archibald MacLeish. But the accounts of all the participants agree that the president himself was an active participant in the speechwriting process. He would dictate initial versions of certain passages, review each draft meticulously, require changes and rearrangements, and practice speaking the sentences until he had the material just the way he wanted it. He also sometimes changed words here and there as he delivered the speech.

The impact of these talks on the American people would be difficult to overestimate. The first fireside chat was carried by around 150 radio stations and entered an estimated twenty million homes (reaching perhaps sixty million Americans). By the late 1930s, around five hundred of the nation’s eight hundred radio stations were carrying the speeches, and estimates of the audience range as high as one hundred million. It was not unusual for the White House to receive forty thousand letters from around the country after a broadcast. The picture of a family gathered around the kitchen table listening to the president on the radio, became one of the enduring images of the 1930s and early 1940s.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; RADIO; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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**FISH, HAMILTON**

Hamilton Fish (December 7, 1888–January 18, 1991) served in the U.S. Congress as Republican representative from New York from 1925 to 1945. Fish was best known for his investigations into domestic communism. A Hudson Valley blueblood whose grandfather had been secretary of state, Fish graduated from Harvard University in 1910, sat in the New York state assembly from 1914 to 1916 as a member of the Progressive Party, served overseas as an infantry captain during World War I, and helped to organized the American Legion in 1919. Though he hailed from New York’s Dutchess county, the home of Franklin Roosevelt, Fish voiced strong opposition to Roosevelt’s foreign policy.

In May 1933 Fish claimed that the extraordinary powers that had been given to Roosevelt constituted “an American dictatorship based on the consent of the governed.” In 1933 Fish voted for the Economy Act, while opposing the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and inflationary measures. In January 1934 Fish backed an increase in Civil Works Administration payments, but that March he found the New Deal dominated by “professors, radicals, and near-Socialists.” In February 1935 Fish accused the National Recovery Administration of strangling small enterprises, and he fought pending banking legislation for giving the Federal Reserve Board too much power. He continually sought compromise on veterans’ bonus legislation, opposing the bills of Congressman Wright Patman, a Democrat from Texas, while favoring installment payments to veterans. To solve the depression in agriculture, Fish endorsed the McNary-Haugen bill, which centered on dumping surpluses overseas.
As the 1936 campaign approached, Fish expressed interest in the Republican presidential nomination, and was backed by Representative Harold Knutson from Minnesota. A man as far to the left as New York Representative Vito Marcantonio wanted Fish to serve as a delegate to the party convention, saying he stood “for social and economic justice and a square deal for labor and small business interests.” Like Marcantonio, Fish endorsed the candidacy of William E. Borah, advancing the argument that the Idaho senator, as the most liberal of the contenders, could best carry New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. Though he supported the Supreme Court’s ruling against the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Fish was disturbed enough by the Tipaldo decision, which struck down a state minimum wage law, to offer a constitutional amendment giving each state the power to fix minimum wages for workers. In the wake of the Republican defeat in 1936, he called for the resignation of conservative party chairman John Hamilton and maintained that his party must endorse old-age pensions and protection for children.

Though Fish found Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme a “revolutionary, unlawful and a monstrous doctrine,” he pledged to vote for mandatory retirement of aged Supreme Court justices and desired a constitutional amendment that would require a two-thirds vote to invalidate congressional legislation. He welcomed the court’s decisions backing the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), arguing that the court showed that liberal legislation would receive “a square deal.” In October 1937 he blamed the president for the stock market decline, saying business lacked confidence in his rule. In 1938 Fish accused the Works Progress Administration of political corruption, supported the wages and hours bill, and wanted his state party organization to endorse Democrats Al Smith and Herbert Lehman for the Senate. That year the American Federation of Labor, pleased with Fish’s pro-labor stance, endorsed his reelection. In 1944, Fish lost the House race by a decisive margin, partly as a result of the gerrymandering of his district. As a private citizen, he increasingly espoused rightwing views until his death at age 102.

See Also: ELECTION OF 1936; NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD (NRPB); REPUBLICAN PARTY.

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JUSTUS D. DOENECKE

FLANAGAN, HALLIE

A theater director, educator, and playwright, Hallie Mae Ferguson Flanagan (August 27, 1890–July 23, 1969) served as the administrator of the Federal Theatre Project from 1935 to 1939. Born in Redfield, South Dakota, Flanagan graduated in 1911 from Iowa’s Grinnell College, where she was a classmate of Harry Hopkins. Flanagan taught high school before marrying insurance salesman Murray Flanagan in 1912. The couple produced two sons, one of whom survived to adulthood. After her husband’s 1919 death, Flanagan returned to the classroom.

A charismatic woman who loved to be at the center of attention, Flanagan ventured into the dramatic arts in 1921. While an assistant director at Grinnell’s Colonial Theatre, she penned several plays. The Curtain, about two likable liars, won the Iowa State Playwriting Contest in 1922 and propelled Flanagan into Harvard professor George Pierce Baker’s 47 Workshop for playwriting. In 1924, after completing her master of arts degree at Radcliffe College in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Flanagan returned to Grinnell College to head the theater program. She left in 1925 to teach at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York.

Flanagan’s Vassar duties were delayed when she won a Guggenheim Fellowship for study
abroad. During her year in Europe she saw not only new plays but also new methods of staging. Politically to the left of center, Flanagan appreciated the Soviet Union’s employment of drama as an instrument of social and political change. Once back in the United States, she developed a reputation as an authority on Soviet drama and contributed regularly to various theater publications. At the Vassar Experimental Theatre, she became one of the first Americans to use agitprop plays to rouse public opinion against poverty and unemployment.

In 1935 Harry Hopkins, head of the Works Progress Administration, asked his friend Flanagan to run the new Federal Theatre Project (FTP). Flanagan saw the mission of the FTP as providing a social and educational contribution to the country through the establishment of a federation of non-commercial theaters. She spent most of her tenure battling administrators who had no interest in culture and wanted only an inconspicuous jobs program. To educate through drama without building expensive sets, Flanagan created Living Newspaper productions similar to works she had seen in Russia. Innovative and controversial, these plays documented current social and political issues. The FTP ended in 1939, amidst charges of Communist infiltration.

Flanagan returned to Vassar. She joined Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, in 1942 as a dean and then resumed full-time theater teaching in 1946. She died in Old Tappan, New Jersey.

See Also: CRADLE WILL ROCK, THE; FEDERAL THEATRE PROJECT (FTP).

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CARYN E. NEUMANN

FLYNN, EDWARD J.

Longtime boss of the Bronx, Edward (Ed) Joseph Flynn (September 22, 1891–August 18, 1953) helped Franklin D. Roosevelt rise to power and then served as his presidential campaign organizer and chief political advisor on urban machine politics.

Unlike most city bosses, Flynn came from a comfortable background. The son of a college-educated Irish immigrant father, Flynn was born in New York City in 1891. He earned a law degree from Fordham University in 1912 and quickly became a successful Bronx attorney. Flynn’s name recognition brought him to the notice of the Tammany Hall machine, a Democratic organization that had controlled New York City politics for decades. Tammany Hall pushed Flynn into running for the New York State Assembly in 1917. He served two terms and then in 1921 was elected sheriff of Bronx County. In 1925, Mayor James J. Walker named Flynn as New York City chamberlain. Already one of the mightiest men in New York City, Flynn showed more interest in politics than power. In 1922 he became chairman of the Bronx County Democratic Executive Committee—in effect, the political chief of the county—a position that he retained until his death thirty years later.

Quiet, reserved, and more comfortable with books than people, Flynn proved to have a flair for behind-the-scenes politics. As boss, he tightened up the Democratic organization in the Bronx by running an efficient borough, judiciously distributing patronage, and avoiding the corruption scandals that had plagued earlier administrations. In 1928, he campaigned hard for Roosevelt’s successful New York gubernatorial campaign and earned the loyalty of the rising star. Upon taking office in 1929, Roosevelt appointed Flynn to be secretary of New York state, a post that he held for ten years.

After setting his sights on the White House, Roosevelt relied on Flynn to gather the support of Democrats in big-city machines throughout the nation. Flynn, a pragmatic liberal who appreciated creative solutions to vexing problems, emerged from the campaign as one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors. Always a loyalist, Flynn supported the president even when the two disagreed over political matters, such as Roosevelt’s support of New York City mayor Fiorello La Guardia.

Roosevelt appointed Flynn to positions as regional administrator of the National Recovery Ad-
administration public works program and as U.S. commissioner general to the New York World’s Fair, but Flynn’s political actions were more significant. In the mid-1930s, Flynn joined other politicians who advised Roosevelt of the potential importance of the African-American vote and of the need to take action to bring black voters into the party. Flynn also assisted James A. Farley with the second presidential campaign and then, as a proponent of Roosevelt’s third presidential bid, replaced Farley in 1940 as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. After Congress rejected Flynn’s 1943 nomination as ambassador to Australia, he gradually withdrew from national politics, although he continued to serve as chairman of the Bronx County Democrats. Flynn succumbed to a heart attack while visiting Dublin.

See Also: CITIES AND SUBURBS; DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ELECTION OF 1940; TAMMANY HALL.

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FMP. See FEDERAL MUSIC PROJECT.

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FOLKLORISTS

The key figures in charting new directions in folklore studies in the 1930s were New Deal folklorists B. A. Botkin (national folklore editor, Federal Writers’ Project, 1938–39; chief editor, Writers’ Unit, Library of Congress Project, 1939–1941; head, Archive of American Folksong, 1942–1945); Alan Lomax (head, Archive of American Folksong, 1937–1942); and Charles Seeger (head, Resettlement Administration’s Special Skills Division, 1935–1937; assistant director, Federal Music Project, 1937–1939). These three men paid special attention to the culture of marginalized rural and urban communities. They saw themselves as contributing to a new liberal/Popular Front culture for an emerging, pluralistic, and industrial society.

Botkin, Lomax, and Seeger rejected traditional folklore scholarship’s privileged hierarchies regarding what constituted the object of study—the lore over the folk, the past over the present, the rural over the urban, the agrarian over the industrial, survivals over revivals, older genres over newer emergent forms, oral transmission over technological media, homogeneous groups over heterogeneous ones. The New Deal provided an institutional base for an approach to folklore that would have been virtually impossible to pursue at that time in the university world. The New Deal folklorists argued for a rejection of evolutionary anthropology and for a functionalist approach to the role of lore in a culture. They were also cultural nationalists, who sought to reconcile romantic nationalist assumptions about the need for a homogenous folk tradition on which to build a national culture with the reality of American diversity. They envisioned the study and use of American folklore as playing an important role in a democratic culture.

Botkin most fully articulated the views of New Deal folklorists. He disagreed with those folklorists, and other students of American culture, who felt there were no folk in America and with those who felt threatened by American diversity. He declared that “there is not one folk [in America] but many folk groups—as many folk groups as there are regional cultures or occupational groups within a region.” He also insisted that it was time “to recognize that we have in America a variety of folk groups, representing different racial, regional, and even industrial cultures.” Botkin argued that while once geography had been a key factor in creating folklore, in the modern world the social structure itself produces the isolation and separation out of which comes a folklore of the educated, as well as the uneducated.
Federal Writers’ Project director Henry Alsberg was convinced that Botkin’s appointment would help the project move into a new phase of cultural studies focusing on the contemporary life of the nation’s ethnic minorities and working class. Although John Lomax, Alan’s father and Botkin’s predecessor as Federal Writers’ Project folklore editor, was a great folksong collector who broadened the canon of American folksong, he also saw folklore as flourishing only when the folk who valued it were separated from the mainstream of modern life. In sharp contrast, Botkin pioneered in the study of urban and labor lore and created experimental Federal Writers’ Project Living Lore units consisting of creative writers. He believed folklore had an important role to play in a democratic culture: “The WPA looks upon folklore research not as a private but as a public function, and folklore as public, not private property.”

In 1937 Alan Lomax succeeded John Lomax as head of the Archive of American Folksong. Like Botkin, but unlike his father, Alan Lomax thought the creation of folklore was a permanent and ongoing activity. He formed close ties with other New Deal folklorists and shared their left-of-center politics, egalitarian values, and functionalist approach. In an unprecedented manner, Alan Lomax used commercial radio to share the materials folklorists collected and his view that although folklore reflected specific traditions it could also help create intercultural understanding.

New Deal folklorists strove to institutionalize the informal supportive network that existed among them. Like Botkin and Lomax, Charles Seeger also regarded American folklore as hybrid forms best understood by documenting their function in cultures in transition. After becoming national Federal Writers’ Project folklore editor, Botkin established a Joint WPA (Works Progress Administration) Folklore Committee. Botkin and Seeger co-chaired the committee. When it became apparent that the days of the Federal Writers’ Project and Federal Music Project were numbered, Botkin and Seeger used the contacts they had made through the Committee to try to find a permanent home in the Library of Congress for the projects they had begun and those they still wanted to undertake.

As it turned out, New Deal folklorists were not able to establish a permanent federal agency to promote such work. Nevertheless the episode was hardly without value. Botkin, Lomax, and Seeger would find ways to continue their work along lines they had established during the New Deal. Botkin published for general readers a collection of Federal Writers’ Project ex-slave narratives, *Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery* (1945). Although much of the Living Lore and other Federal Writers’ Project folklore material remained unpublished, Botkin would draw on it in *A Treasury of American Folklore* (1944), and in his later regional and topical folklore treasuries. In the 1950s, he argued for *applied folklore*, a new term that embodied the values of New Deal folklorists. The work that Alan Lomax began in the 1930s later earned him the title “godfather of the folksong revival.” Charles Seeger became one of the founders of the discipline of ethnomusicology.

In the 1950s, folklorist Richard Dorson, who as a young scholar in 1939 had sought Botkin’s guidance, worked to secure a foothold in academe for folklore as a Ph.D. granting discipline. To achieve this he sought to enforce a narrow definition of what folklorists studied and to define the role of the folklorist strictly in terms of academic scholarship. He viewed the New Deal folklorists’ ideas about folklore for the public as a threat to the academic identity of folklore, the authority of folklore as an academic discipline, and most importantly as a threat to the authority of academic folklorists.

Even during the postwar years, when New Deal folklorists’ opponents in folklore studies sought to marginalize their influence, some younger folklorists sought contact with them and received the encouragement they sought in resisting narrow approaches to the material of folklore studies and to the role of the folklorist in the larger culture. In time, a group of folklorists, including some who had participated in the folksong revival, and who had been brought up on Botkin and Lomax’s folklore anthologies, supported (1) the establishment in 1967 of the Smithsonian Institution’s Annual Festival of American Folklife; (2) folklorist Archie Green’s efforts to create an American Folklife Center, established in the Library of Congress in 1976;
and (3) the creation of a network of public sector folklorists funded by the National Endowment for the Arts’ Folk Arts Program, which was established in 1974. Given that much of the theory and practice of New Deal folklorists needs further study and given the constant ferment of a multicultural and advanced technological society, there is reason to think that the New Deal folklorist have left future generations a living legacy.

See Also: FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT (FWP); LITERATURE; LOMAX, ALAN; MUSIC; POETRY; SLAVE NARRATIVES.

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Henry Ford (July 30, 1863–April 7, 1947), who gained international fame as an innovator and entrepreneur in the automobile industry, was born into a farm family in present-day Dearborn, Michigan. Ford channeled an engineering background and a notable stint as a motorcar racer into a career as a pioneer in the development of mass production systems and the manufacture of low-priced vehicles, beginning with the Model T in 1908. The spectacular expansion of the Ford Motor Company between 1910 and 1923 established it as the country’s leading automobile producer, transformed the automobile industry, and enabled Henry Ford to secure complete control of his business. The associated publicity established Henry Ford’s international reputation as the inventor of mass production and a symbol of successful entrepreneurship. Prominent aspects of this public persona included the introduction of the $5 per day wage, peace campaigning during World War I, and a virulent anti-Semitism that was propounded through Ford’s own newspaper, the Dearborn Independent, between 1920 and 1927. Henry Ford’s anti-Semitic views reflected a strand of midwestern populist thought that was also reflected in his distrust of financial interests and international agencies. It created considerable controversy that tarnished his public image considerably by 1927.

Although Ford Motor Company was the industry leader and extended its multinational operations considerably from 1911 to 1926, General Motors and Chrysler were potent competitors after 1923. Ford’s investment in associated enterprises, such as mines, steelworks, and shipping, and the firm’s focus on a single model imposed higher fixed costs than the less integrated General Motors, which of-
ford's industrial relations were explicitly coercive, especially in the giant Rouge plant. Henry Ford placed control of labor policies in the hands of Harry Bennett and his Service Department. Bennett oversaw a network of spies, employed violence to intimidate workers, awarded catering contracts to underworld associates, and parlayed his control of personnel and his close relationship with Henry Ford into wider influence. The latter element compounded the disunity and turnover among executives, but the consequences were more direct for the workers. Competitive pressures translated into wage reductions and “speed-up” of the assembly line, as well as an intense work regime, favoritism, and a repressive management culture. By the 1930s Ford was among the worst examples of industrial practices in American manufacturing.

Always eager for complete control, Ford was hostile to New Deal initiatives and to the emergence of union organizing campaigns. This was demonstrated graphically on March 7, 1932, when three thousand people marched to the River Rouge demanding work-sharing, union representation, and reforms to labor practices. The Dearborn police and members of Ford’s service department acted violently to disburse the crowd, eventually firing directly into them. Four people were killed and at least twenty seriously wounded. Antipathy to the New Deal, combined with distaste for trade associations, was reflected in Ford’s refusal to participate in the automobile industry code under the National Recovery Administration (NRA) between 1933 and 1935. Since the industry monitored its trade practices effectively, the NRA code centered on labor relations. Despite federal rhetoric, Ford’s opposition to the NRA had little adverse impact on the company. However, union organizing activities gained momentum with the creation of United Automobile Workers (UAW) in 1935 and its transfer to the newly formed Committee for Industrial Organization, later called the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Legal support for the union came from the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. A series of sit-down strikes and organizing drives, plus the revival of business, persuaded General Motors and Chrysler to recognize the UAW in 1937. Yet Henry Ford ensured that his firm continued to resist unionization through intimidation and
legal challenges. The most striking public images of this opposition came in May 1937 when photographers captured the “Battle of the Overpass” at the Rouge plant as Bennett’s men assaulted UAW organizers. Similar tactics were used at Ford plants in Dallas and Kansas City. Finally, in 1941 Ford faced a more unified UAW after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the firm’s labor practices. A strike and blockade of the Rouge plant in April convinced Ford to negotiate, and the UAW emerged from the resulting National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election as the representative union. The first union contract was signed in June in spite of Henry Ford’s opposition.

During the 1930s Henry Ford’s other interests included opening Greenfield Village, a museum that symbolized the rural childhood that had shaped his attitudes, including his preference for political isolationism and his suspicion of financiers. Ford also promoted “village industries” by locating plants in rural areas, and he promoted experiments in the cultivation of soybeans and their use in manufacturing. World War II revived Ford’s pacifist ideals: In 1940 he refused to manufacture Rolls Royce engines for Great Britain. Once the United States entered the war, Ford concentrated the company’s production on defense contracts, including trucks, jeeps, munitions, and aircraft. After a stroke in 1941, Ford became less active, though more capricious, in management, and the death of his son Edsel in 1943 weakened the firm’s leadership. Henry Ford became company president and his grandson, Henry Ford II, was released from the navy to join management. Bennett’s ambitions for control were thwarted by Clara Ford and Eleanor Ford, the wives of Henry and Edsel respectively, who mobilized the family’s financial power and Clara’s influence over Henry to ensure a transition to Henry Ford II. In 1947, Ford died quietly at the Fair Lane estate. His lying “in state” in Greenfield Village attracted thousands and his funeral was a major civic occasion.

See Also: Anti-Semitism; Organized Labor; Sit-down Strikes; Strikes; United Auto Workers (UAW).

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FORD, JOHN

John Ford (February 1, 1894–August 31, 1973), motion-picture director, was born John Martin Feeney in Cape Elizabeth, Maine, to first-generation Irish Catholic immigrants. He spent his childhood in Portland, Maine, and in July 1914 he followed his older brother Francis, a movie actor and director, to California. There he began working in silent films as a crew member, stuntman, actor, and, from 1917 on, director. Until the start of the Depression, he was best known as a director of westerns, for Universal through 1921 and for Fox thereafter. The Iron Horse (1924) was his most famous western during the silent era. Between 1930 and 1941, Ford directed thirty-one films in a number of genres for a variety of studios, often working with screenwriter Dudley Nichols. His reputation and confidence grew after he was awarded an Oscar for best direction for The Informer (1935), an honor he also received for Grapes of Wrath in 1940 and for How Green Was My Valley in 1941.

Although Ford’s political views evolved throughout his life, the progressive and antifascist
political climate in Hollywood in the late 1930s and the influence of liberal screenwriters with whom he worked (such as Nichols) helped move his political views further left during the Depression than at any other time of his life. During that period he joined several leftist organizations, including the Motion Picture Democratic Committee, the Motion Picture Artists Committee to Aid Republican Spain, and the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League.

Two of Ford’s films in particular bear the imprint of this political climate. In Ford’s first western of the 1930s, *Stagecoach* (1939), the most sympathetically portrayed characters are the escaped convict Ringo, the prostitute Dallas, and the drunken Doc Boone, and the chief antagonist is the banker Gatewood. In line with Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition, the common people are celebrated while greedy elites are scorned. *Grapes of Wrath* (1940), the adaptation of John Steinbeck’s celebrated 1939 novel about Oklahoma farmers displaced by the Dust Bowl and seeking a new life in California, likewise drew a sympathetic portrait of the Joad family, who struggle to survive in a system stacked against them, even if Ford softened the novel’s dark ending by concluding with Ma Joad’s optimistic speech about the endurance of the common people.

In 1939 Ford fed the growing American nationalism on the eve of World War II with two historical films, *Drums along the Mohawk* and *Young Mr. Lincoln*. His final film before the U. S. entered World War II was *They Were Expendable* (1945), a war film about the exploits of a makeshift shipyard at Pearl Harbor and the sinking of U.S. battleships.
War II, How Green Was My Valley (1941), nostalgically portrayed a Welsh coal-mining family from the adult point of view of the family's youngest son. Together, these three films foreshadowed Ford's evolution from leftist politics to concerns of patriotism, national myths, and memory that would preoccupy him in his films of the next decade.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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CHARLES J. MALAND

FOREMAN, CLARK

Clark Howell Foreman (February 19, 1902–June 15, 1977) served in the Franklin Roosevelt administration from 1933 to 1941. As a New Deal administrator and a founding member of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, Foreman was a leading advocate of racial integration and actively supported the expansion of economic and political democracy in the South.

Foreman, the grandson of the founder of The Atlanta Constitution, had rejected the racial mores of his native Georgia by the time he joined the Roosevelt administration in 1933. He supported an activist role for the federal government in advancing the economic and social welfare of all citizens. As special advisor on the economic status of Negroes from 1933 to 1935 under Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Foreman and his assistant Robert Weaver actively promoted full and fair inclusion of African Americans in New Deal programs. In 1935, Weaver succeeded Foreman in that post and Foreman became director of the Public Works Administration’s Division of Public Power, where he developed an expanded program of grants and loans to cities to establish municipally owned power plants. This ambitious effort withstood a major legal challenge from private power companies.

In 1938, Roosevelt sought Foreman’s advice regarding the president’s effort to defeat southern congressional opponents of the New Deal during the 1938 Democratic primary elections. Foreman recommended that the president sponsor a report documenting what the New Deal had done for the South, and the importance of federal assistance to the region’s economic development. As a result, Foreman and other southerners compiled The Report on the Economic Conditions of the South, and Foreman went on to help organize the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) in November of 1938 as an expression of southern support for the New Deal.

Foreman became director of defense housing in 1940. A year later a major controversy developed around a housing project built for black defense workers in Detroit in an area bordering a predominantly white neighborhood. When Foreman refused to give in to demands that the Sojourner Truth housing project be changed to white occupancy, southern conservatives in Congress joined with Republicans and successfully pressured for Foreman’s dismissal. After leaving the federal government, Foreman became chairman of the SCHW, and devoted his efforts towards challenging segregation and voter restrictions in the South, and expanding the political participation of both blacks and whites.

See Also: REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTH; SOUTH, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; SOUTHERN CONFERENCE FOR HUMAN WELFARE (SCHW).

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William Zebulon Foster (February 25, 1881–September 1, 1961), a leading member of the Communist Party for four decades, was possibly the best-known radical activist of Depression-era America. Born in Taunton, Massachusetts, the son of immigrants, Foster grew up in an impoverished community in Philadelphia. His formal education ended at the age of ten, and, after a brief stint as an apprentice to a craftsman, he worked at a variety of unskilled jobs.

In 1901, at the age of nineteen, Foster joined the Socialist Party and for the next two decades crisscrossed the country as an itinerant worker. In 1909 he became a member of the International Workers of the World (IWW) but left the organization in 1911 over the issue of dual unionism, advocating instead capturing and radicalizing mainstream unions. To that end he joined the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and became one of its most effective organizers. Foster gained a national reputation for his leading role in major organizing campaigns in the meat and steel industries.

Foster joined the Communist Party in 1921 and assumed a prominent role in party work. As a highly respected labor organizer he directed trade union activities throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s. In 1924, he became party chairman (a position he held until 1957) and also headed the party’s ticket for president, as he did in 1928 and 1932. By the end of the 1920s he had risen to the top of the Communist Party hierarchy as a member of a three-man secretariat that included Earl Browder and William Weinstone.

In 1930, Foster launched the party’s unemployed campaign with a mass demonstration of an estimated 100,000 in New York City. While campaigning in 1932, he suffered a heart attack and for the next three years was unable to engage in active party work. Once recuperated, Foster found Browder firmly in control and his role limited primarily to “literary activities.” A prolific writer, he made good use of this period. Between 1932 and 1939, he penned three books, including two autobiographies, and numerous articles and tracts.

Throughout the 1930s Foster wrangled with Browder over the direction of the party. Respected but isolated, he regained a dominant voice in party affairs after Browder’s removal from leadership and expulsion from the party in 1945. In 1957, Foster’s health again collapsed, and he died four years later in the Soviet Union, where he had gone to seek medical treatment. Foster’s widow returned his ashes to the United States and deposited them near the graves of the Haymarket martyrs in Chicago.

See Also: BROWDER, EARL; COMMUNIST PARTY.

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FRANK, JEROME

Born in New York City to parents of German-Jewish descent, Jerome Frank (September 10, 1889–January 13, 1957) grew up there and in Chicago, where his family moved in his youth. Exceptionally bright, Frank graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Chicago in 1909 and set a new academic standard at Chicago’s law school three years later. A corporate lawyer in Chicago, he dabbled in Progressive politics and underwent Freudian analysis to confirm that the legal profession was for him. It was. Joining a New York law firm in the late 1920s, he soon published the first of several books, Law and the Modern Mind, wherein Frank championed “Legal Realism,” a Freudian-informed assault on the rigidity of law and jurisprudence. Appointments at Yale and the New School in New York followed, as did his entree into national public service in the New Deal, mediated by his friend, Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter. As general counsel of the new Agricultural Adjustment
Administration (AAA) in 1933, Frank assembled a legendary cadre of brilliant lawyers, including future Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson, future Supreme Court justice Abe Fortas, future trustbuster Thurman Arnold, and Alger Hiss, later convicted of perjury over passing secrets to the Soviet Union in the trial-of-the-century.

While the AAA's huge Legal Division included communists or sympathizers, Frank remained a liberal pragmatist within the profit system, paralleling the New Deal itself. But clashes between the Legal Division and the conservative landlord and processor establishment were inevitable. Led first by AAA administrator George N. Peek and then by Chester C. Davis, the conservatives wanted to raise commodity prices and limit production but resisted upsetting landlord-tenant relationships or making the AAA an instrument of land reform. Tensions over policy and procedure flared frequently in 1933 and 1934 but climaxed in early 1935 when the liberals tried to reinterpret a controversial paragraph in the cotton acreage reduction contract in favor of sharecroppers against landlords. That led to the infamous "purge" wherein Davis ousted Frank along with others in the Legal Division and the AAA's Consumer's Counsel. The firings were confirmed by Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, while President Franklin D. Roosevelt, with friends on both sides, pleaded ignorance and remained aloof. The purge ended any liberal hope of serious agricultural reform in the AAA. Professionally unharmed by his ouster, Frank held other federal jobs before his 1941 appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the influential Second Circuit, a position he held until his death in January 1957.

See Also: AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION (AAA); WALLACE, HENRY A.

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FRANKFURTER, FELIX

Felix Frankfurter (November 15, 1882–February 21, 1965) was associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1939 to 1962. He was born in Vienna, Austria, one of six children of Leopold and Emma (Winter) Frankfurter. In 1894, the family moved to New York. Financial fortune proved elusive to Frankfurter's father; selling linen door-to-door and from their apartment, the kindhearted tradesman managed only a meager living and often spent any extra money he acquired on fruit baskets for less fortunate neighbors.

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

Felix's two older brothers had to work to supplement their father's income, but the future justice was largely spared that fate. Leopold's brother Solomon had become a successful scholar in Vienna, and Emma seemed determined to give Felix the same opportunity, allowing her precocious son to attend lectures and spend hours in the Cooper Union library. After graduating third in his class at the City College of New York, Felix attended Harvard Law School, ranking first each of his three years there. One of his Harvard examinations was so impressive that a faculty member regularly read it aloud to classes over the years.

In 1906, Frankfurter joined Hornblower, Byrne, Miller and Potter, becoming the first Jewish person ever hired by that New York firm. He quickly became bored with private practice, however, and
when an opening became available in the office of the U.S. attorney for New York’s southern district, Frankfurter jumped at the opportunity. Despite marked differences in their backgrounds, Frankfurter and Henry Stimson, the patrician federal attorney for the district, worked well together, pursuing corporate misconduct and more mundane law violators with equal zeal. When President William Howard Taft named Stimson secretary of war, Frankfurter also went to Washington, becoming counsel in the War Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs.

A master at flattery, the diminutive and effusive Frankfurter, with his piercing bird-like eyes and keen intellect, cultivated many new and influential Washington friends, not least among them justices Oliver W. Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis. The Washington house he shared with several friends became a center for nightly gatherings and frank intellectual discussions—Holmes, apparently, dubbed it “The House of Truth.” There Frankfurter met the love of his life, Marion Denman, the Congregational minister’s daughter he would marry in 1920, over his mother’s intense opposition, after a six-year courtship. The couple would have no children, and Marion suffered periodic bouts of depression, but Frankfurter remained totally devoted to her throughout their marriage.

In 1914, Frankfurter took a position on the law faculty at Harvard. A natural teacher (to both willing and unwilling students), he enjoyed his new role immensely, particularly the opportunity his professorship offered him for continued involvement in contemporary political and policy issues. Like Brandeis before him, Frankfurter represented clients defending wage and hour legislation before the Supreme Court. On special assignments for the Wilson administration, he filed a report charging that the conviction and death sentence handed labor leader Tom Mooney for a San Francisco bombing was based on perjured evidence and he concluded that Arizona copper miners had been subject to gross brutality and injustice. He also spoke out vehemently against Wilson attorney general Mitchell Palmer’s raids on suspected subversives, became a very vocal critic of the Sacco and Vanzetti convictions and executions, and urged U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union.

**ADVISER TO ROOSEVELT**

As the nation became preoccupied with the Depression, Frankfurter was again a figure of influence in Washington. He and Franklin D. Roosevelt had first met when Frankfurter was working in the War Department and Roosevelt was assistant Navy secretary. Frankfurter became a close friend and adviser to the future president during Roosevelt’s tenure as governor of New York. When Roosevelt went to the White House in 1933, he offered Frankfurter the post of solicitor general, chief representative of the United States before the Supreme Court. Frankfurter declined, explaining that he could make a more substantial contribution as a source of personnel and ideas for the New Deal.

The future justice quickly became a major Washington figure. He played a prominent role in drafting and pushing recovery legislation through Congress. Holding Wall Street and big business primarily responsible for the nation’s economic woes, Frankfurter relished the opportunity to oversee drafting of the Securities Act, subjecting the stock market to extensive federal control. Although others were primarily responsible for writing that legislation, Frankfurter mounted a brilliant defense of its provisions in testimony before Congress.

The future justice obviously had competition in his efforts to influence the direction of New Deal policies. James Farley and certain others in Roosevelt’s inner circle were essentially political tacticians, largely unconcerned with substantive policy. But three Columbia University academics—Raymond Moley, Adolph Berle, and Rexford Tugwell—became Frankfurter’s major intellectual rivals. The trio contended that continued domination of the economy by giant businesses was inevitable and favored the administration’s use of centralized planning to channel that power toward service of the public interest. Frankfurter, on the other hand, was suspicious of concentrated economic power and the notion that national affairs could be managed best by Tugwell and other Washington experts. Instead, he favored heavy spending for public works and substantial corporate taxation as major weapons of economic recovery. Roosevelt never became the complete captive of either side, but Frankfurter would gradually gain influence over his Columbia counterparts.
Frankfurter became what one administrative official termed “the most influential single individual in the United States,” largely through his recruitment of talented individuals—who were called Felix’s “Happy Hot Dogs”—for the new administration. He brought Benjamin V. Cohen and James M. Landis, principal authors of the Securities Act, to the administration’s attention. Tommy Corcoran, one of Frankfurter’s Harvard students in the 1920s and a clerk to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes largely on Frankfurter’s recommendation, was the future justice’s most spectacular “hot dog,” becoming one of the most influential players in Depression-era Washington.

Frankfurter also assumed a key role in Roosevelt’s growing attachment to the ideas of British economist John Maynard Keynes, who considered massive deficit government spending a major remedy for a stagnant economy. Long a supporter of balanced budgeting, Frankfurter came to know Keynes and admire his economic philosophy while teaching as a professor at Oxford in 1933 and 1934. Back in the United States, Frankfurter helped persuade Roosevelt to partially embrace Keynesian economics, especially during the 1937 recession. In fact, as a result of his immense knowledge and contacts, not to mention his constant flattery of the president, Frankfurter became one of Roosevelt’s closest advisers. He even lived in the White House during much of the summer of 1935.

During Roosevelt’s first term, Congress enacted much recovery legislation. But a laissez-faire Supreme Court coalition rejected most of those statutes, including the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). To a degree, such rulings played into Frankfurter’s hands. Drawing on the thinking of Moley, Berle, and Tugwell, the early New Deal had emphasized the development of a planned economy through, among other things, business participation in the creation of industry codes. Suspicious of business leaders, Frankfurter favored legislation directly imposing federal controls over the economy and creating social programs. The Court’s invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act in *Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States* (1935) helped to convince Roosevelt that the administration should pursue Frankfurter’s approach.

Frankfurter privately opposed and refused to defend publicly, however, Roosevelt’s 1937 plan to enlarge the judiciary in an effort to defeat conservative domination of the bench. Ever optimistic, Frankfurter suggested patience, hopeful that the justices might alter the Court’s course; if not, a constitutional amendment could be passed modifying the Court’s composition and powers. When the president opted for Court-packing legislation rather than the more time-consuming amendment process, Frankfurter assured his friend and political benefactor that he would take no public stance on the controversial measure, then privately suggested ways Roosevelt might get it through Congress. But Frankfurter resented Roosevelt’s failure to inform him of the plan until the eve of its submission to Congress.

**SUPREME COURT JUSTICE**

Although the Court-packing plan failed, Roosevelt was given the opportunity, beginning early in his second term, to fill all but one seat on the high bench. His first choice was Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, his second Stanley Reed of Kentucky, his solicitor general. With the untimely death of Frankfurter’s esteemed friend Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo in 1938, the president had a chance to name a third justice. Whether out of a sincere concern for regional balance or simply because he wanted to keep the supremely confident Frankfurter dangling for a time, Roosevelt at first told his friend that since the current Court was composed entirely of easterners, Cardozo’s successor must come from the West. Roosevelt even asked Frankfurter to compile files on prospective candidates. But members of the president’s inner circle were virtually unanimous that Roosevelt choose Frankfurter for the position. On the evening of January 4, 1939, the president telephoned Frankfurter’s home to offer him the seat, but only after a lengthy, and for Frankfurter exasperating, conversation in which Roosevelt appeared determined not to appoint his adviser to the bench.

In those days, Supreme Court nominees rarely attended Senate judiciary committee confirmation hearings, and none had done so since Harlan F. Stone’s brief appearance in 1925. But after a parade
of anti-Semitic witnesses appeared, viciously misrepresenting Frankfurter's views, the committee decided to ask the nominee to appear as a witness. Only Senator Pat McCarran subjected Frankfurter, though, to extensive interrogation. Twelve days after the nomination was announced, the Senate, by voice vote, unanimously confirmed Roosevelt's choice.

Once on the bench, Frankfurter readily joined in the dismantling of the Court's laissez-faire precedents that a majority had begun in 1937. The new justice had long been firmly convinced that policy issues should be left to elected representatives and that judges should overturn statutes only when they lacked any rational basis. He thus had no difficulty affirming Roosevelt's New Deal program and comparable state recovery legislation.

The Roosevelt Court not only rejected the pre-1937 Court's laissez-faire precedents, but in a footnote to United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938), decided the year before Frankfurter's appointment, Justice Stone laid the foundation for a constitutional double standard: The courts would defer to the political branches of government in economic cases, but would subject laws impinging on non-economic personal rights, such as the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, to close judicial scrutiny.

Contrary to the expectations of his liberal friends, however, Justice Frankfurter was almost equally willing to defer to the political branches when non-economic civil liberties were at stake as he was in economic cases; he had little use for the notion that the Constitution contained clear constitutional commands invulnerable to countervailing societal interests. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940), he spoke for the Court in upholding compulsory school flag programs over the objections of Jehovah's Witness parents who considered such exercises contrary to their religious beliefs. When the Court overturned Gobitis in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), Frankfurter dissented, emphasizing his sensitivity as a Jew to religious liberty claims, but also insisting that in wartime individual freedom must yield to society's overriding interest in promoting patriotism.

Frankfurter assumed the same stance in cases involving free speech claims, repeatedly attacking the First Amendment absolutism of Justice Black, his principal jurisprudential antagonist on the bench. A staunch apostle of federalism, Justice Frankfurter accorded state laws and proceedings particularly broad latitude. Justice Black, convinced that the Fourteenth Amendment's first section was intended by its framers to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, first set forth his total incorporation thesis extensively in his dissent for Adamson v. California (1947). Frankfurter was equally certain that the states would never have ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had they thought it would bind their officials to the specifics of the Bill of Rights—that "eighteenth century straitjacket," as Frankfurter characterized those fundamental guarantees.

Frankfurter was especially reluctant to interfere in state criminal proceedings. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), he spoke for the Court in concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause included within its scope a right of privacy comparable to the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. But he refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the states, preferring instead that states adopt their own devices for deterring police misconduct. In Rochin v. California (1952), the Court, per Frankfurter, overturned a conviction based on morphine extracted from the defendant with a stomach pump, but only because he found such conduct "shocking to the conscience" and thus in violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial. When the Court, in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), ultimately rejected Frankfurter's "shock-the-conscience" standard as, among other things, highly subjective, the justice dissented, emphasizing once again his regard for state autonomy and rejection of the incorporation doctrine.

But Frankfurter's deference to the states was not absolute. When a five-four majority, speaking through Justice Black, espoused a separatist interpretation of the religious establishment guarantee in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), yet upheld state reimbursement of bus fares for parochial school students, Frankfurter dissented. Although reluctant to have the federal judiciary interfere in local education, he ultimately joined Chief Justice Earl Warren's unanimous school desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.
(1954). In an effort to underscore the Court’s unity on the issue, all nine justices signed the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron (1958), rejecting further delay in the desegregation of Little Rock’s high school and underscoring the final authority of the courts to determine the Constitution’s meaning. Characteristically, however, Frankfurter insisted on filing a concurrence, outraging, among others, Black and William J. Brennan (Frankfurter’s former law student), who prepared but ultimately withdrew an opinion indicating that Frankfurter’s concurrence should in no way be viewed as a “dilution” of the Court’s firm stance in the case.

Frankfurter spoke for the Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), striking down on Fifteenth Amendment grounds Alabama’s racial gerrymander of the city of Tuskegee, which excluded all but a few of the community’s African-American voters from local elections. The justice was unwilling, however, to join the Court’s reapportionment revolution of the sixties. Speaking for a plurality in Colegrove v. Green (1946), he had rejected judicial intervention in that “political thicket.” When the Court, in Baker v. Carr (1962), rejected such thinking, declaring that malapportioned governmental bodies raised justiciable constitutional questions, Frankfurter filed one of his most caustic dissents, reiterating his Colegrove stance and warning—forcefully, if not prophetically—that courts would be unable to force reapportionment on unwilling legislators.

Frankfurter’s Baker dissent would be his last opinion. Shortly after the decision was announced, he suffered a serious stroke. On August 28, he sent President John F. Kennedy his letter of retirement. Through much of his tenure, Frankfurter had often been able to muster majorities to defeat civil liberties claims, especially in national security cases. The 1955 appointment of Justice John M. Harlan had given him another ally on the bench. Gradually, however, Frankfurter’s principal judicial antagonists—Black, Warren, and Brennan—had come to dominate the Court. With his 1962 retirement, and replacement with Arthur Goldberg, the Court was poised to embark upon the most ambitious expansion of civil liberties in its history, including substantial incorporation of Bill of Rights safeguards into the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even in retirement, however, Frankfurter sought to influence the Court’s work. Concerned that, without his presence at the Court, Justice Harlan might falter in his opposition to court-ordered reapportionment, he even attempted to enlist Harlan’s clerks in a campaign to strengthen his colleague’s resolve, an effort neither Harlan nor his clerks appreciated. Frankfurter also encouraged Justice Black to file a dissent from rulings overturning the trespass convictions of restaurant sit-ins. And when Black registered vigorous dissents in two 1964 sit-in cases, arguing that even bigoted restaurant proprietors had the right to choose their clientele, absent a valid statute to the contrary, Frankfurter wrote his old adversary an admiring letter. Less than a year later, Frankfurter died. Along with Black, he had been the most controversial justice of his era.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O.; HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, JR.; HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS; SUPREME COURT.

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TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH

FREAKS

Even among the myriad of 1930s horror films, perhaps no movie of the Great Depression was as bi-
zarre or as disturbing as director Tod Browning’s *Freaks* (1932). Browning built a noted film career during the 1920s on a series of collaborations with actor Lon Chaney, Sr., and he also ushered in the era of sound horror films with his highly successful *Dracula* (1931), starring Bela Lugosi. At MGM in 1932, Browning promised that he would direct the ultimate horror film: *Freaks*.

Based on the short story “Spurs” by Tod Robbins, *Freaks* offers a tale of circus and carnival performers who, despite their various physical deformities, exist within a kind of mutually caring family. When the dwarf Hans decides to marry the physically “normal” Cleopatra, the family accepts her as “one of us.” But then they learn the truth: Cleopatra is plotting to poison Hans, inherit his money, and then marry the strong man Hercules. The film’s epilogue shows her as a physically deformed sideshow act, the result of the “freaks’” vengeance.

Browning’s cast, which included a “half boy” and “Siamese twins,” was largely made up of actual sideshow performers who possessed a range of physical deformities. The emphasis on actual “freaks,” as the studio called them, rather than the use of actors with makeup, created concern even before the film was released. By the time of its premiere, publicity hype around *Freaks* emphasized both the “real life” qualities of the players, as well as the oddity of a love affair between a dwarf and a “normal” woman.

The story of the film’s release has become legendary, with historians generally claiming that MGM shelved *Freaks* due to audience outrage. The movie was even banned outright in England. While this is certainly true, what is often forgotten is that the film did receive some positive reviews and garnered strong box office receipts in some American cities, while being vilified in others. Many Depres-
sion-era audience members found the film to be lit-
tle different from what they had actually seen at
carnival sideshows. For those who were outraged,
their alarm seems to have stemmed less from con-
cerns over cast exploitation than from the shock of
simply seeing them on screen.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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GARY D. RHODES

FSA. See FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

FSCC. See FEDERAL SURPLUS COMMODITIES
CORPORATION.

FSLIC. See FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
INSURANCE CORPORATION.

FTP. See FEDERAL THEATRE PROJECT.

FWP. See FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT.
**GABRIEL OVER THE WHITE HOUSE**

*Gabriel Over the White House,* released in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression and on the eve of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inauguration, is a political fable based on T. F. Tweed’s novel, *Rinehard.* In the film, newly elected President Judson Hammond (played by Walter Huston) is transformed from a corrupt city politician to a benevolent dictator after a near-fatal car crash. He miraculously awakens from a coma, divinely inspired by the Archangel Gabriel, to rescue the nation from crime and economic disaster. Employing the radio to explain his aim to do “the greatest good for the greatest number,” Hammond creates a dole to feed the hungry, musters an “Army of Construction” for the unemployed, declares war on rum-running criminals, imposes martial law, and steamrolls Congress into giving him dictatorial powers. He then invites world leaders to the presidential yacht and demands that they disarm to save their treasuries from bankruptcy and the world from war. The heads of state watch in horror as an American bomber plane destroys a battleship while Hammond warns that in the future warplanes will “bomb cities, kill populations.” Mobilizing the navy and threatening force, he bullies the statesmen into promising to repay their war debts and into signing a new disarmament proclamation (with the same quill pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation). His work on earth done, Hammond dies a martyr to strains of “The Battle Hymn of the Republic.”

To the modern eye, the film seems naive, heavy-handed, and dangerously fascistic, relying as it does on the not-so-subtle message that the United States required a benevolent dictator in order to solve its problems, and the world required a well-armed United States to keep the peace. Yet at the time, it was among the top six releases in the spring of 1933. In the days before the rise of Nazi Germany, the film reflected the belief in some quarters that the country—and the world—needed an iron fist to set things right. Certainly that was the feeling of William Randolph Hearst, the newspaper magnate whose Cosmopolitan Pictures produced and released the movie in conjunction with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios. Indeed, some historians have concluded that the film was a thinly veiled “blueprint” for the New Deal. Admittedly, it did foretell, albeit in extreme fashion, Roosevelt’s use of broad executive power to combat the Depression, of radio to rally public support, and of air power to wage war.

*See Also:* HEARST, WILLIAM RANDOLPH; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.
GANGSTER FILMS

The gangster genre became codified and prominent during the early 1930s due to the success and the public outcry following the releases of such films as Mervyn LeRoy’s *Little Caesar* (1930), William Wellman’s *Public Enemy* (1931), and Howard Hawks’s *Scarface* (1932). Celluloid gangsters did not have a literary source like the cowboy and the hard-boiled detective; gangsters were transferred onto the screen directly from the front-page headlines of contemporary newspapers. Gangster films therefore had a strong topical impact on audiences, and they based their narratives on events derived from criminal activity that was taking place in America’s shadowy metropolises during the prohibition and Depression years.

Although the genre refined its conventions and reached its box-office popularity during the 1930s, there are important forerunners to the Depression gangster films that date back to the silent era. D. W. Griffith’s *The Musketeers of Pig Alley* (1912) was probably the first film to fully exploit urban-based crime for its plot. This prototype was followed by two other silent films that would lay the foundations for what was to become the gangster genre: Lewis Milestone’s *The Racket* (1927) and Josef von Sternberg’s *Underworld* (1928).

According to Thomas Schatz, the catalyst for the evolution of the gangster film is to be found in the confluence of technical innovation and the peculiar social context in which it took place. Warner Brothers’ conversion to sound movies in the late 1920s coincided with a desperate economic and social climate. A year after the introduction of sound, the studio had already produced the first sound film in the gangster genre, Bryan Foy’s *Lights of New York* (1928). Although it has not enjoyed the critical consideration of later gangster films, *Lights of New York* showed that sound could be effectively used in the genre to increase its impact on audiences. Sound gave to gangster films the screams, gun shots, and other audio effects they needed to develop incisive narratives. Warner Brothers was to lead the production of gangster films for years.

Gangster films focus on the rise to power of cold-blooded criminals who were modelled after notorious men of the era, such as Al Capone and Hymie Weiss, although several critics have argued that the impact of the genre was so strong that these real-life models tended to modify their mannerism and outlook so that they would resemble their celluloid counterparts. The conventions of the genre usually require a contrast between two men, either related through friendship or kinship, with one of them getting an honest job while the other resorts to crime. The contrast is usually set in an urban environment at night. The criminal is always the one gaining status, and this rise on the social ladder makes him, in Schatz’s definition, “the perverse alter-ego of the ambitious, profit-minded American male.” The criminal’s growing status is visually signalled by the expensive clothes, flashy cars, and attractive women he acquires.

Because of their thematic and visual conventions, classic gangster films such as *Little Caesar, The Public Enemy,* and *Scarface* were accused of glamorizing violence and thus presenting the criminal as an appealing hero. The enforcement of the Motion Picture Production Code posed several important problems to the genre, so that studios tried to balance the social and economic career of the gangster with elements that could effectively de-glamorize it. The gangster usually dies, showing that crime does not pay after all, a concept that in some films, such as *Scarface*, is reinforced by added scenes (not shot by Hawks) where reformers and
officers speak out against gangland and its culture. The struggle with censors not only affected the films’ content, but also their distribution and promotion strategies. The press books for Little Caesar and The Public Enemy clearly claimed to present an exciting narrative of crime. Yet this is said not to be the ultimate purpose of the movies, which is instead, it is asserted, to present a serious social problem affecting urban America. Thus, the press book for The Public Enemy advised the managers of the cinemas where the film was being shown to send free tickets and a letter of invitation to “such organizations as the Parent-Teacher Association, the Y.M.H.A., the Y.M.C.A., Big Brothers, Catholic Big Brothers, Boy Scouts, Campfire Girls, School Teachers, [and] Sunday Schools.” The invitation claimed that the film “is more vital and more important to everybody interested in child welfare than any picture we have ever shown before” and assured that “the work of your organization ties in directly with the powerful message embodied in The Public Enemy.”

Strong censorship pressure ultimately brought to the genre significant modifications that were designed to redeem it, but that ultimately led to its demise. In such films as William Keighley’s G-Men (1935) the cops become more prominent than the criminals and are played by actors, such as James Cagney and Edward G. Robinson, who are strongly associated with the genre’s classic phase. The gangster also becomes less central in films that contrast him with a socially integrated and positive figure. Clear examples of this variation are William Wyler’s Dead End (1938), based on a screenplay by Lillian Hellman, and Michael Curtiz’s Angels with Dirty Faces (1938), both of which openly advise youth against taking a gangster as a role model.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; LITTLE CAESAR; ROBINSON, EDWARD G.

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GARNER, JOHN NANCE

John Nance “Cactus Jack” Garner (November 22, 1868–November 7, 1967) served in Congress from his election in 1902 until 1933, holding the post of minority leader between 1929 and 1931 and speaker of the House for the last two years. He was elected vice president of the United States on the Democratic ticket with Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 and 1936. Garner was a hard-drinking, poker-playing, straight-talking politician, who believed that compromise always superceded demagogy. In his earliest days in the Texas state legislature, he advocated railroad and insurance company regulation. As he matured politically in the U.S. House, though, he became more pragmatic in his outlook, becoming close friends with Republicans as well as Democrats.

Garner quickly advanced in the Democratic leadership, becoming the whip in 1911. His pre-Depression era agenda included legislation providing construction projects for his district and tariff protection for agricultural producers. However, his greatest influence on national politics came from his behind-the-scenes leadership. He operated a hideaway office called the Board of Education during the Depression and New Deal years, in which he counseled members on the art of compromise. His years as speaker were less productive legislatively; he took an increasingly conservative and independent view of major economic questions on issues such as a national sales tax, which he favored, thus making it difficult to unify the Democratic congressional opposition to Herbert Hoover and the Republicans. One historian has called the period an “interregnum of despair.”

Garner made an aborted run for the presidency in 1932, taking the vice presidential nomination
when it became clear after three ballots that a continued push for the presidency would likely deadlock his party and spell defeat in the November election. During his first term in office, he masterminded the strategy necessary for passage of much of the New Deal legislation and he maintained a solid working relationship with Roosevelt, differing with the president on issues such as diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union and deficit spending. Garner’s frustration with the vice presidency emerged after the 1936 election when Roosevelt pushed to expand membership on the Supreme Court in 1937 and attempted to purge conservative southern Democrats from Congress in 1938, moves that Garner opposed. Garner attempted a run for the presidency in 1940 but gave up after leading Texas Democrats refused to back him. His national political career ended unceremoniously, and Garner returned to Uvalde, Texas, where his wife later burned his public papers.

See Also: ELECTION OF 1932; ELECTION OF 1936; ELECTION OF 1940.

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The strike in the Loray Mill, in Gastonia, North Carolina, which began in April 1929, had lasting repercussions for the community. Though not the most violent of that year’s industrial outbreaks in the South’s textile mills, it has passed into the mythology of the American left, largely because its leaders were not from the country’s homegrown textile unions. Rather, they were young activists from the National Textile Workers Union (NTWU), an adjunct of the Communist Party of the United States.

The immediate cause of the strike was the steady deterioration of the Loray Mill’s working conditions as management attempted to cut costs to deal with the industry’s massive overproduction. Quickly the NTWU leadership pictured it as a symbol of capitalism in its death throes. Their propaganda bore little relationship to reality, and the strike was largely ineffective. Nevertheless the climate of tension in the town soon led to violence against the NTWU leadership, who fought back. National guardsmen were deployed, vigilante groups patrolled the streets, and in June the town’s chief of police, Orville Aderholt, was fatally shot during a fracas between deputies and strike leaders. For the rest of the year the repercussions of his death kept the town divided. The NTWU leaders were all charged with Aderholt’s murder, and vigilantes took their revenge, murdering one of the local strike leaders, twenty-nine year old Ella May Wiggins, a mill worker, mother of nine young children, and the strikers’ balladeer. Convicted after an emotive and highly politically charged trial, and freed on bail pending appeal, most of the strike leaders escaped into the vastness of the Soviet Union. No one was ever convicted of Wiggins’s murder, though mill management was generally believed to have been behind it.

The strike at the Loray Mill was celebrated by the American left as a serious challenge to capitalism, and both Wiggins and the convicted strike leaders became its martyrs. In fact, the strike was a comprehensive failure. Never again did Communist union organizers venture below the Mason-Dixon line. The territory was deemed too hostile. Moreover, the violence they had provoked made the task of organizing southern textile mills even more difficult for those who followed the NTWU. The events in Gastonia cast a very long shadow.

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GAYS AND LESBIANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The 1930s marked a particularly important moment for the transformation of sexuality within the United States. While the 1920s, with its economic and sexual exuberance, significantly rejected Victorian notions of sexuality, such changes were seen as much more threatening to the social order with the economic collapse that began in 1929. The prohibition era ushered in an increased visibility of homosexuality that peaked in the early years of the Depression. Indeed, on the theater and cabaret stages in large cities, in a number of Hollywood films, and in popular novels, implicit and explicit images of gay men and lesbians reached a wide audience. In speakeasies in New York City’s Greenwich Village, nightclubs in Harlem, cabarets in Times Square, jazz clubs on Chicago’s South Side, upper- and middle-class men and women enjoyed the spectacle of drag performers and mingled with overtly gay men, lesbians, and transvestites. During prohibi-
tion, these commercialized venues coupled sexual and legal transgressions that gave visibility and acceptability to homosexuality as an exotic feature of urban nightlife.

However, as the Depression deepened, homosexuality increasingly symbolized the prohibition era’s excess and frivolity that undermined traditional values. Whereas homosexuality was seen as an entertaining diversion during the 1920s, by the late 1930s it was viewed much more as a threat to social and economic stability.

The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933 ushered in new state agencies that regulated the sale of alcohol and set laws regarding the activities of bars, restaurants, and cabarets. Often these laws required owners to maintain an “orderly” environment or risk the loss of their liquor licenses. While the definition of orderly was often left vague, these laws had a severe impact on gay and lesbian sociability because the presence of overtly homosexual patrons was taken as indicative of a disorderly establishment. Police, with the backing of city officials and community leaders, raided such establishments and closed them down. Thus, these agencies became increasingly powerful in controlling the nature of social life in the 1930s, and served as vehicles in the larger campaigns to police homosexuality in the city.

In 1930, the Hayes Office, which was established as a self-monitoring agency set up by the film industry in 1922, instituted a strict Production Code that censored a range of behaviors on screen. Made even more stringent in 1934 under pressure from the Catholic organization the Legion of Decency, the Production Code censored any film that portrayed, among other things, cohabitation, seduction, violence, nudity, and, more specifically, any references to homosexuality. While homosexuality was expressed on screen through highly coded images, overt references were impossible until the 1960s. Lesbians were often coded as masculine through clothing, such as Greta Garbo’s famous attire in *Queen Christina* (1933), in which the queen passionately kisses another woman on screen. More often, suggestions of lesbianism held tragic implications, where homosexuality was coupled with destructive and deadly power. Films such as *Girls in Uniform* (1931) and *These Three* (1936), based on the hugely successful 1934 Broadway play *The Children’s Hour* by Lillian Hellman, take place in all-girl boarding schools, and end with the tragic death of the lesbian character.

Films suggested the gay nature of male characters through effeminate behavior and the association of these characters with the seedy underworld of urban culture. Films such as *The Warrior’s Husband* (1933), *Sailor’s Luck* (1933), and *Wonder Bar* (1934), which showed two men dancing together, implied gay characters through feminine body language and gestures. Other films, such as *Little Caesar* (1931) and *Blood Money* (1933), portrayed suggestive relationships between mobsters and their sidekicks. In these coded portrayals, gay men and lesbians were increasingly depicted as tragic victims set within the margins of society.

Unlike Hollywood producers, publishers were less constrained by censorship. Radclyffe Hall’s *The Well of Loneliness* was the most popular homosexual novel of the 1930s, a popularity promoted when its publisher was taken to court on obscenity charges in 1929 and ultimately won on appeal. Gertrude Stein’s *Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas* (1932) and Djuna Barnes’s *Nightwood* (1936) explicitly portray relationships between lesbians in the expatriate community of Paris. These works have become central to the modernist canon of American literature. Publishers of more popular literature produced a number of novels with lesbian themes. While novels such as *Hellcat* (1934), *Scorpion* (1933), *Love Like a Shadow* (1935), *Queer Patterns* (1935), and *Pity for Women* (1937) preached a moral disapproval of homosexuality, other works such as Gale Wilhelm’s *We Too Are Drifting* (1935), Sheila Donisthorpe’s *Loneliest of Friends* (1931), and Elizabeth Craigin’s *Either Is Love* (1937) presented less judgmental portrayals of lesbian relationships, even as most of these novels ended with the tragic death or suicide of the main character.

Publishers were also producing a number of gay male novels that promoted or proscribed homosexuality. Popular works such as Blair Niles’s *Strange Brother* (1931), Andrew Tellier’s *Twilight Men* (1931), Robert Scully’s *The Scarlet Pansy* (1932), Kennilworth Bruce’s *Goldie* (1933), Richard...
Meeker’s Better Angel (1933), and Lew Levenson’s Butterfly Man (1934) brought stories of gay male experience to a large audience. While these works portrayed the complexities of homosexual experience, they, like their lesbian counterparts, often concluded with the tragic demise of the protagonist. However, since these works were circulated in stores and rental libraries in many large cities, they conveyed a homosexual sensibility that promoted a shared identity for the men who read them. Indeed, many of these novels, as well as films, promoted the formation of a gay and lesbian subculture where such individuals began to see themselves as part of a larger group.

Research on sexuality grew significantly in the 1930s as a number of institutions conducted and published studies investigating the nature of sexuality and homosexuality in particular. La Forest Potter’s Strange Loves: A Study of Sexual Abnormalities and James Segal’s Sex Life in America, along with a number of other studies, represent the first wide-ranging, multi-institutional effort to study and analyze sexuality in the United States. While some of these studies were sympathetic to homosexuality, such as the exhaustive study Sex Variants, directed by George Henry and begun in 1935, most were efforts to cure sexual abnormalities that the researchers often explicitly interpreted as a social disease. Concerns for sexuality entered into many discussions about migrant labor and homelessness. For example, the writers of Twenty-Thousand Homeless Men: A Study of Unemployed Men in Chicago Shelters (1936) suggested that one cause for the men’s unemployment was a lack of normal sexual experiences with women. These studies reflect the era’s concern with gender and sexual abnormalities, which were increasingly viewed as a crucial social problem and a threat to the already fragile family and gender stability brought on by the Depression.

Eventually these studies began to circulate within legal and legislative venues, effecting the creation of a whole new set of crimes focused on sexual deviancy. The term sex crime emerged in newspapers and court rooms alike, encompassing a range of behaviors, including rape, child molestation, indecent exposure, and homosexuality. The sex crime laws set up the first extensive legislative efforts that criminalized homosexuality within a broader category of violent crimes. By the late 1930s, homosexuals were increasingly the target of violence and scapegoats for social campaigns meant to “clean up” the moral standards of the community.

See Also: CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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GELLHORN, MARTHA

Martha Gellhorn (November 8, 1908–February 15, 1998) was a relief investigator for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) during the 1930s. Gellhorn later provided vivid coverage of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) as a reporter for Collier’s Weekly. In addition, she is known for fictional accounts of her experiences, including What Mad Pursuit (1934), The Trouble I’ve Seen (1936), and The Lowest Trees Have Tops (1967).
Gellhorn began her college studies at Bryn Mawr in 1924, but she left in 1927 before completing her degree. She wrote briefly for the Albany Times Union, and then began sending pieces to The New Republic, which published her first signed piece, a review of a Rudy Vallee performance, in August 1929. Gellhorn then traveled to France in 1930 and struggled to find permanent journalistic employment for several years.

In October 1934, Gellhorn returned in New York and secured an interview with Harry L. Hopkins, the director of FERA. Her new job required her to travel extensively and interview average Americans about their economic well-being, including their access to adequate food and medical care and their overall outlook for the future. She traveled to small textile towns in North Carolina, large urban areas such as Boston and Providence, Rhode Island, and desperate manufacturing towns like Camden, New Jersey. She wrote Hopkins meticulous reports, detailing malnutrition, rates of tuberculosis, lack of running water, and people’s inability to secure employment at a living wage. She severely criticized local relief officials, particularly for graft and corruption, but she noted that most people with whom she talked did not blame President Roosevelt. Instead they held him in very high esteem. She met with Eleanor Roosevelt, and the two soon became good friends. Gellhorn worked as a FERA investigator for almost a year, and by the time she was done, she noted that the mood in the country was becoming more pessimistic and skeptical regarding the government’s plans for reform. After leaving FERA, she wrote a fictionalized account of her travels and experiences, published in 1936 as The Trouble I’ve Seen.

Gellhorn met Ernest Hemingway in 1936, and they struck up a companionship that later led to a brief marriage. In March 1937, she arrived in Spain and began to cover the war for Collier’s Weekly. This launched her journalistic career, and she moved from the Spanish Civil War, to the tumult in Germany, and finally to World War II.

Following World War II, Gellhorn continued her focus on wartime reporting, covering the Six-Day War in the Middle East, the Vietnam War, and conflicts in Central America. In addition to publishing regular articles in the Atlantic Monthly, Gellhorn tackled issues of social justice, including the McCarthy trials, in her novel The Lowest Trees Have Tops.

See Also: FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA); HOPKINS, HARRY.

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GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

Among the many momentous effects of the massive unemployment and deprivation caused by the Great Depression, those on gender roles and sexual relations can easily be overlooked, but they are profoundly important.

THREATENED MASCULINITY
In most societies, that of the United States prominent among them, men have traditionally defined their principal roles as being providers and protectors. The gender definition of a “real man” is one who has authority, who is in charge. The character Muley Graves speaks for this understanding of manhood when he proclaims in John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939): “Jesus Christ, a man can’t [do something], when he’s tol’ to!” Men were seen as the ones who rightfully made decisions. “Ma looked to Tom to speak, because he was a man,” Steinbeck wrote. “She let him have the chance that was his right.” That “right,” however, was linked to his fulfillment of the roles assigned to men. For millions of American men who lost their jobs during the Great Depression, the loss of the ability to provide for their families posed a direct threat to their sense of manhood.

It was bad enough for a man’s ego to be unable to provide; it was worse for him to become depen-
dent on a woman. And this circumstance was more common during the 1930s than one might expect. Women’s employment increased during the Depression, in part because the jobs from which they had been excluded, such as those in heavy industry, were most often in the areas of the economy hardest hit by the collapse, while some of the jobs that had been defined as “women’s work,” such as teaching, clerical work, and domestic service, were less severely affected by the Depression.

Many people saw the differential between female and male employment as a major cause of male unemployment. “Simply fire all the women, who shouldn’t be working anyway, and hire the [unemployed] men,” Norman Cousins wrote in 1939, summarizing this simplistic argument. “Presto! No unemployment. No relief rolls. No depression.” Such arguments ignored a fundamental fact about the power of gender roles in the era: No matter how desperate they were for work, most men would not consider taking a job that was culturally defined as “women’s work.”

It is highly significant in terms of just how powerful was men’s desire to avoid threats to their self-perceived masculinity that many white men during the Depression were willing to take jobs that had previously been defined as “Negro work,” but not those that had been classified as “women’s work.” While women’s employment actually increased during the Depression, African Americans were displaced by whites to an extraordinary degree. It has been estimated that black unemployment across the United States reached 50 percent in 1932. But take a job that was “woman’s work”? Most men, it seemed, would sooner starve. The reason for this rigidity is not hard to discern. If one of the worst aspects for a man of being unable to provide was the effect of this circumstance on his sense of masculinity, taking on a woman’s role would be seen as a remedy worse than the problem. To have no job was a serious blow to a man’s masculinity; to have a woman’s job was to abandon the argument that one was a “real man” at all.

A fictional depiction of a man attempting to go against this perception occurs in The Grapes of Wrath when Preacher Jim Casy offers to perform a kitchen task and Ma is taken aback. “It’s women’s work,” she says. “‘It’s all work,’ the preacher replied. ‘They’s too much of it to split it up to men’s or women’s work.’” More often during the Depression, though, the problem was that there was too little work to split it up into men’s and women’s work, but the line of division remained sharp nonetheless.

DECREASING DEPENDENCE OF WOMEN

Men without work tended to lose their authority within the family. “The eyes of the whole family shifted back to Ma,” Steinbeck wrote. “She was the power. She had taken control.” Nor was such a power shift in families merely a fictional creation. In his 1940 book Citizens without Work, sociologist E. Wight Bakke found instances of men who lost their jobs and within a year or two the center of authority in the family had shifted to the wife.

Steinbeck uses the image of a stick as an appropriate metaphor for this transfer of authority from men to women. “Time was when a man said what we’d do,” Pa Joad complains. “Seems like women is tellin’ now.” He threatens to get out his stick to put women in their place. “Times when they’s food an’ a place to set,” Ma responds, “then maybe you can use your stick an’ keep your skin whole. But you ain’t a-doin’ your job, either a thinkin’ or aworkin’. If you was, why, you could use your stick, an’ women folks’d sniffle their nose an’ creepmouse aroun’. But you jus’ get you a stick now and you ain’t lickin’ no woman; you’re a-fightin’, cause I got a stick all laid out, too.”

Men whose self-perceived masculinity was a casualty of unemployment yearned for a return to what they believed to be the natural order of gender. This vision was perhaps best captured in the words of the 1933 song, “Remember My Forgotten Man”: “Ever since the world began, a woman’s got to have a man.”

During the Depression that male profession of faith in female dependence no longer seemed certain. We not only see increasing images of women who don’t fit either of the categories in the traditional dichotomy, we see whores who are “virgins,” such as Dallas in the 1939 John Ford film Stagecoach, and women with “sticks,” such as Mae West in She Done Him Wrong and her other films and
Scarlett O’Hara in *Gone with the Wind*. And even if women didn’t have sticks, they still had the female powers that had for so long been the source of feelings of inferiority in many men, as Steinbeck so memorably indicated with the novel’s ending: a helpless, starving man being breast-fed by the Joacls’ daughter Rose of Sharon. The female is plainly the provider and the male the dependent one in that scene.

**MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY IN THE DEPRESSION**

“It’s no wonder these young girls refuse to marry, refuse to rear children,” Meridel LeSueur wrote in her 1932 article, “Women on Breadlines.” She asserted that they were like the women in some parts of the world “who, when they have been conquered, refuse to breed.”

Such an analysis seemed plausible and, with so many men unable to fulfill the role of provider, marriage rates did drop sharply early in the Depression, reaching a low of 7.9 marriages per 1000 population in 1932, down from 10.1 in 1929. Yet the rate of marriage rebounded in 1934 and remained at levels similar to those of the relatively prosperous 1920s for the remainder of the Depression. Birth rates, which had already been trending downward in the 1920s as women gained more independence, declined sharply under the impact of the Depression. The birth rate in the United States bottomed out at 126 per 10,000 23-year-old women in the United States in 1935 (compared with 181 in 1921 and 152 in 1928).

In her 1940 book *The Unemployed Man and His Family*, sociologist Mirra Komarovsky found that sexual activity virtually ceased in some families after the man lost his job. Another sociologist, Eli Ginsburg, reported that some women had “supposed it was [the husband’s] right to have sexual relations” as long as he “was working and supporting her,” but that changed when he was no longer earning the pleasure he derived from her acquiescence.

Even for those young people who postponed marriage, however, sexual desires were not easily switched off. Nor did the fact that married couples could not afford to have children mean that most of them would simply refrain from having sex. Accordingly, there was a boom in the number and business of birth-control clinics during the Depression and, following favorable court rulings in 1930 and 1936, physicians were allowed to provide birth control devices in most states. Being able to purchase birth control legally was of scant help, though, to people on relief who had no money. And it was in such destitute families that it often seemed more necessary to have sex because the men were so psychologically devastated and in need of having their self-respect boosted.

A man shorn of the sources of masculine identification usually found in the roles of provider and protector is left with one other means of asserting his masculinity—the most basic role of his sex. “You don’t know what it’s like when your husband’s out of work,” a woman in California’s San Joaquin Valley told federal relief investigator Lorena Hickok in 1934. Of course they did not want to have additional mouths to feed, the woman explained, “but you don’t have any money to buy anything at the drug store.” Abstinence was not a realistic option, she maintained. “He’s gloomy and unhappy all the time. Life is terrible. You must try all the time to keep him from going crazy. And many times—that’s the only way,” she said, alluding to sexual intercourse.

**SNOW WHITE AND THE VISION OF A RETURN TO GENDER “NORMALCY”**

Men in search of their lost masculinity could turn to Hollywood for the prescription they sought to cure their ailment. Most notably, Walt Disney’s 1938 animated feature, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*, reflected the male fears and longings of the Depression years. The film portrays the “two kinds of women” view of the world with a vengeance. The Wicked Queen is a woman with power, like all too many women seemed, in the view of many men, to have in the 1930s. The heroine, on the other hand, is domestic, naive, and finally completely helpless. Snow White must be restored to life by a man’s kiss, reversing the reality of the Depression years for many men, who were in their own form of sleeping death, from which they could be brought back to life, however briefly, only by a woman’s “kiss” (i.e., intercourse).
Thus Disney’s fairy tale world of 1938 served as an architect’s sketch for a reconstructed post-Depression (and, as it happened, postwar) world of gender relations.

See Also: FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; GAYS AND LESBIANS, IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION ON; GRAPES OF WRATH, THE; MEN, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; “REMEMBER MY FORGOTTEN MAN”; SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS; WOMEN, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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GERSHWIN, GEORGE AND IRA

George Gershwin (September 26, 1898–July 11, 1937) and his brother Ira Gershwin (December 6, 1896–August 17, 1983) were children of Russian Jewish parents who emigrated to the United States in the late nineteenth century. Their surname was changed from Gershovitz to Gershwin and finally to Gershwin. George studied classical piano at an early age with Charles Hambitzer and music theory with Edward Kilenyi. He began writing songs after working as an accompanist on New York City’s Tin Pan Alley in the early part of the twentieth century. George Gershwin wrote many popular songs, including “Swanee,” memorably sung by Al Jolson in 1920, and he soon began writing musicals, which included Lady Be Good! (1924), Funny Face (1927), and Girl Crazy (1930). His musical Of Thee I Sing (1931), a socio-political satire concerning ineffectual government policies, was the first Broadway musical to win a Pulitzer Prize.

George Gershwin was ebullient, friendly, and outgoing, whereas his older brother Ira was quiet and introspective. Nevertheless, they began what became a long and successful collaboration, combining George’s music with lyrics by Ira, who was a masterful wordsmith. This partnership resulted in songs that have stood the test of time, including “The Man I Love” (1924), “Fascinating Rhythm” (1926), “Someone to Watch over Me” (1926), and “Embraceable You” (1930). Although written in 1926, Gershwin’s “Someone to Watch over Me” took on special significance for many Americans during the Depression years. Gershwin sought to span the chasm between popular and classic musical styles by writing such works as the piano concerto Rhapsody in Blue (1924), An American in Paris (1928), and a group of preludes for piano. These compositions contain elements of jazz and blues couched in traditional romantic orchestration, as does George Gershwin’s folk opera, Porgy and Bess, produced in 1935. Before writing this opera, which was based on DuBose Heyward’s book Porgy and set on South Carolina’s coastal islands, Gershwin traveled to South Carolina and lived among the people portrayed in the book, absorbing their rhythms, dialect, and culture. He then incorporated what he had learned into his music for the opera, with lyrics by Ira. Porgy and Bess was not an immediate success because audiences were confused by its tone, which was too heavy for Broadway and too light for serious opera. Though it appeared in 1935 to mixed reviews, it eventually, though not in George Gershwin’s lifetime, became a great success around the world, possibly the first American opera to do so.
George Gershwin continued to compose and remained productive until his untimely death in July 1937. Ira Gershwin later wrote lyrics for other composers, including Kurt Weill, Aaron Copland, and Jerome Kern, but he is best known for his collaborations with his brother.

See Also: MUSIC.

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Glass, Carter (January 4, 1858–May 28, 1946) was a U.S. senator from Virginia. Along with his colleague Senator Harry Byrd, Glass was a leading member of the Republican–Democratic congressional coalition that emerged to oppose the New Deal by 1938. In 1934 Glass declared that the New Deal “is not only a mistake; it is a disgrace to the Nation.” According to historian James T. Patterson, Glass voted against the Roosevelt administration 81 percent of the time, more than any other Democrat.

Born in Lynchburg, Virginia, Carter Glass began his career in 1880 as city editor of the Lynchburg News; he soon rose to the position of editor and purchased the newspaper in 1888. As an outspoken editor, Glass grew more involved in politics. He was elected to the Virginia State Senate in 1899, and in 1901 he served as a delegate to the Virginia state constitutional convention, where he helped to devise voting restrictions that disfranchised African Americans. In 1902, Glass was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the sixth district of Virginia. As a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Glass was responsible for drafting the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. A close ally of President Woodrow Wilson, Glass became his secretary of the treasury in 1919.

In 1920, upon the death of Senator Thomas Martin, Virginia Governor Westmoreland Davis appointed Glass to the U.S. Senate. The efficiency of the Virginia Democratic Party machine, along with its tightly restricted electorate, ensured Glass’s repeated reelection to the Senate. This enabled Glass to become an early and outspoken critic of the New Deal. As one of the architects of the national financial system, he decried currency devaluation and the abandonment of the gold standard. He believed such federal programs as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Social Security undermined states’ rights. Illness prevented Glass from being an active senator after 1942, but he remained in office until his death in 1946.

See Also: BYRD, HARRY; CONSERVATIVE COALITION; GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1932; GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1933.

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Glass-Steagall Act of 1932

Waves of commercial bank failures and a progressive contraction of credit to businesses and individuals were central features of the economic collapse beginning in 1930. Both were exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s policy of reducing the money supply and by its decision to raise interest rates in the fall of 1931 with the aim of protecting the value of the dollar after Great Britain quit the gold standard. President Herbert Hoover’s administration supported such orthodoxy, but recognized the need to buttress the banking system and the supply of credit. The administration’s preferred strategy of bank cooperation and “self-help” via the National Credit Corporation failed in 1931, in part because of the unwillingness of leading bankers to lend to weaker institutions. Hoover was compelled to pro-
provide federal loans to banks and other businesses through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

As the credit crisis worsened both Hoover and Congress supported more liberal credit policies. By early 1932 a group of governors from the Federal Reserve temporarily sought a more expansionary policy based on buying government securities from banks so as to increase the banks’ reserves. The Reserve banks could lend only on gold, government securities, or short-term commercial loans (known as eligible paper), in line with the conventions of commercial loan banking theories. However the banking system’s gold reserves appeared inadequate; many banks lacked sufficient government securities or eligible paper to support further borrowing. Banks might also use extra funds to reduce their overall borrowings, leaving the Federal Reserve more reliant on its own gold reserves.

The Glass-Steagall Act of February 1932 was an emergency measure designed to support the expansion of bank credit through lending by district or regional Federal Reserve banks to banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System. Sponsored by Senator Carter Glass of Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama, the Act widened the range of assets against which commercial banks could borrow to include promissory notes or government bonds if they had no other eligible assets. Senator Glass, who disliked such liberalization, ensured that these loans attracted higher interest rates. The measure eased the immediate availability of credit between February and August 1932, but the Act did not signal a full commitment to expansion by the Federal Reserve Board; its provisions were marginal amid the atmosphere of diminishing confidence among the public, businesses, and the banking community. More active use of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s powers and more interventionist banking legislation had to await the New Deal.

See Also: FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; GLASS, CARTER; GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1933.

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GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1933

Severe problems in the money markets were readily visible in the 1920s, but the prevailing economic prosperity blinded most Americans to the looming catastrophe. More than 5,600 banks failed during the 1920s, primarily because of undercapitalization, over competition, real-estate speculation, and corporate venality, and the stock market rocketed to new heights based more on mindless euphoria than on sound company profits. In the process, the line between commercial banking and investment banking grew perilously thin, with the money of millions of depositors leaking into stock and bond accounts of Wall Street securities affiliates. The stock market crash of October 1929 created a liquidity crisis of unprecedented proportions, leading to the meltdown of 1932 to 1933, when the nation’s banking system finally collapsed. Senator Carter Glass of Virginia and Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama proposed reform legislation, but the outgoing Herbert Hoover administration refused to act. In 1931, Congressman Ferdinand Pecora had launched an investigation of the banking system, setting the stage for reform legislation.

In March 1933, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt recently inaugurated, Glass and Steagall found more support in the White House. By then, of course, the crisis demanded action. The president had declared a nationwide banking holiday, shutting down every bank in the country and assuring Americans that only sound banks would reopen. He also promised reforms in the banking system that would prevent future systemic catastrophes in the money markets. During the famous first “One Hundred Days” of the Roosevelt administration, Glass and Steagall resubmitted the legislation. Both houses of Congress passed the measure in mid-June, and on June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt signed it into law.

The Glass-Steagall Act, also known as the Banking Act of 1933, formally separated investment
banking and commercial banking and prohibited individual banks from engaging in both. Each institution had to declare itself either a commercial bank or an investment bank, and commercial banks had one year to divest themselves of securities affiliates. To prevent panic-stricken depositors from making runs on banks and forcing them into bankruptcy, the law established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to guarantee individual bank accounts. To limit the possibilities of external manipulation of domestic money markets, the legislation also handed over control of the foreign operations of all Federal Reserve member banks to the Federal Reserve Board. Commercial banks were allowed to underwrite the securities only of state and local governments. Finally, the measure tightened Federal Reserve control over bank credit and provided more careful coordination of Federal Reserve open market operations. The Banking Act of 1933 helped restore confidence and liquidity to the money markets.

See Also: BANKING PANICS (1930–1933); FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC); GLASS, CARTER; GLASS-STEAGALL ACT OF 1932.

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GOLD DIGGERS OF 1933

In the 1930s, Warner Bros., a studio most often associated with gangster and social problem films, also pioneered in the musical genre. Drawing on the talents of choreographer Busby Berkeley and a stable of former vaudeville and Broadway performers, the studio produced three hugely popular back-stage musicals in 1933: *Gold Diggers of 1933*, *Footlight Parade*, and *42nd Street*. Budgeted at only $433,000, but ranking second at the box office for the year, *Gold Diggers of 1933* infused its predictable rags-to-riches romance and show-stopping musical numbers with a working-class elan and escapist glamour that appealed to Depression-era audiences.

When Broadway producer Barney Hopkins (Ned Sparks) can’t pay the bills, the cops close down his show, and plucky chorus girls Polly (the ubiquitous Ruby Keeler), Carol (Joan Blondell), Trixie (Aline MacMahon), and Fay (Ginger Rogers) find themselves out of work and flat broke. Luckily, Polly’s songwriter boyfriend Brad Roberts (Dick Powell) is really Robert Bradford, the scion of a wealthy Boston family that is opposed to his career in show business. Brad puts up the money for Barney’s new show, and Barney hires Brad to write all the songs. When the male lead gets lumbago on opening night, the girls and Barney convince the reluctant Brad that he must step in to save the show. However, his secret is out and his older brother J. Lawrence Bradford (Warren William) and Faneul H. Peabody (Guy Kibbee), the family banker, soon arrive to put a stop to Brad’s stage career and to his marriage to Polly. Offering her a bribe to leave Brad, J. Lawrence mistakes Carol for Polly. Thus begins a madcap charade as Carol and Trixie pretend to be “gold diggers” to teach the blue bloods a lesson in manners and class. In the end, of course, the mistaken identity farce is resolved, true love triumphs over class differences, and each chorus girl gets her man.

Though Mervyn LeRoy directed the narrative sections of *Gold Diggers*, Busby Berkeley both choreographed and directed the wildly extravagant musical numbers. The ironic opening number, “We’re in the Money,” is classic Berkeley: fragmented, interchangeable female bodies scantily costumed in huge gold coins, the precision choreography and elaborate geometric patterns highlighted by dizzying close-ups and innovative camera shots. In contrast to the glitzy spectacle and tongue-in-cheek frivolity of much of the film, *Gold Diggers* closes with “Remember My Forgotten Man,” which invokes breadlines, homelessness,
and the Bonus Marchers, World War I veterans who had marched on Washington in 1932 demanding payment for their war service.

See Also: BERKELEY, BUSBY; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; “REMEMBER MY FORGOTTEN MAN.”

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GOLDEN GATE INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION (1939–1940)
San Francisco’s rebirth after its 1906 earthquake and fire culminated in 1939 with the Golden Gate International Exposition. The fair celebrated the recent completion of two landmark bridges—the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, which spans San Francisco Bay, and the Golden Gate Bridge, which crosses the strait at the entrance to the Bay. Still intent on capitalizing on boosterism, San Francisco started planning its third exposition in fifty years in 1934. The Bureau of International Exhibitions, however, refused to recognize the Golden Gate International Exposition, although it did endorse the 1939 New York World’s Fair.
The setting for the fair was Treasure Island, an artificial 400-acre island built on the shoals near Yerba Buena Island between San Francisco and Oakland. The Works Progress Administration chipped in with 300,000 tons of boulders for a seawall that was filled with sand and silt dredged from the Bay. Treasure Island became accessible by automobile when the Bay Bridge was completed in 1936. The city was planning to use the island for an airport once the fair closed.

The fair opened on February 17, 1939, with the theme “A Pageant of the Pacific.” Architect Arthur Brown, Jr., a beaux arts classicist who designed San Francisco’s City Hall, designed the island’s landscape and some of the buildings. Brown headed a panel of architects who decided on a blend of oriental and occidental styles that would symbolize the city’s role linking East and West. Two massive Elephant Towers designed by Donald Macky flanked the entrance to the island. Ralph Stackpole’s eighty-foot sculpture of the allegorical goddess Pacifica was the central emblem of peaceful Oriental trade. Lewis P. Hobart melded styles in his coral-colored, quasi-oriental, ninety-foot-tall Arch of Triumph in the Court of Flowers, with included a fountain called Rainbow Girl by O. C. Malmquist. George W. Kelham designed the Court of the Moon and Stars, which was topped by sculptor Ettore Cadorin’s allegoric Evening Star. Timothy L. Pflueger’s Federal Building featured forty-eight columns for the number of states. The fair also featured exhibitions of over $40 million worth of “educational” art, largely from Europe.

Attractions included the Pan-American or “China” Clipper, promising continuing trade with Asia. “The Cavalcade of the Golden West” and “America! Cavalcade of a Nation” provided historic pageantry. Site themes varied from South Sea Islands to Chinatown to the Old West. There was a scale model of San Francisco as it was predicted to appear in 1999 and dioramas of futuristic college campuses, vacation resorts, and industries.

The entertainment zone featured mechanical rides and numerous shows by such performers as Count Basie, Bing Crosby, Eddie Duchin, Benny Goodman, and the Folies Bergere from Paris. Esther Williams swam in Billy Rose’s Aquacade. Sally Rand, the fan dancer, performed in her Nude Ranch. Military bands and roaming Mexican folk musicians played amid camels and rickshaws giving tourists rides.

Despite predictions of “California’s greatest tourist season,” the fair was a financial disaster, losing $4,166,000 in 1939. A court order forestalled bankruptcy, awarding creditors eighty-two cents on the dollar and permitting a second season. The fair closed in the red in September 1940, despite seventeen million visitors, most from the West. Stackpole’s Pacifica fell to planned destruction six weeks after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The U.S. Navy began using Treasure Island as a base during World War II and continued to occupy the site until 1997, when the Navy began the process of turning the island over to the control of the city of San Francisco.

See Also: NEW YORK WORLD’S FAIR (1939–1940).

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GOLD STANDARD

The end of World War I triggered a heartfelt desire across much of the world to make a new world. But when it came to economics, it was a different story. The spectacular growth of the international economy before 1914 persuaded almost everyone that the main objective was to recreate the international gold standard system, a stable currency exchange mechanism that facilitated the movement of money and goods around by stabilizing currency values at a fixed rate.
The war had caused most countries to abandon "gold," the shorthand term for the mechanism; however, by 1919 the need to recreate the gold standard seemed imperative thanks to the currency instability and inflation that were sweeping Europe. The lead was taken by the United States and Great Britain, which, sometimes with the assistance of the League of Nations, organized stabilization loans and technical support to help countries back onto gold, but the lion’s share of the work was undertaken by national governments and their central banks. To be a member of the gold standard, countries had to follow the three central rules of what has become known as “orthodox economic policy.” The first two rules applied to governments, which had to sustain a positive balance of payments (spending could not exceed income levels) and a positive balance of trade (exports should exceed imports). The third rule affected central banks, which were expected to shadow the interest rates of all the other members of the system and use all their resources to stay on gold when the national currency was under speculative pressure.

By 1928 forty-four countries had returned to the gold standard. Cracks in the system quickly began to appear, however, as countries struggled to follow the rules of economic orthodoxy, particularly after 1930. The effective end of the gold standard order came when its chief supporter, the United States, left the system on April 19, 1933. A temporary shortage of gold within the U.S. banking system had prompted Franklin Roosevelt to call an extended bank holiday, but the real reason for the U.S. break with gold was to free Roosevelt to make economic policy as he saw fit. Subsequently, interest rates were allowed to fall (bank loans now cost less) and the dollar fell on the international exchange by almost 40 percent, helping prices to rise and making U.S. exports cheaper and imports from gold countries more expensive. Equally importantly, Roosevelt was now able to increase government spending.

This U.S. shift in policy greatly increased the pressures on countries such as France and Poland, which were still committed to the system. In contrast to the 1920s, there were now competing views on monetary policy, making international co-operation all the more difficult to achieve given the increasingly nationalist climate of the 1930s.

See Also: MONETARY POLICY.

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GONE WITH THE WIND
Margaret Mitchell’s bestselling novel of the Civil War and Reconstruction revolves around the tempestuous love triangle of fiery southern belle Scarlett O’Hara, the noble but weak Ashley Wilkes, and the dashing scoundrel Rhett Butler. At the story’s opening in the halcyon days of a romanticized Old South, the willful and spoiled Scarlett schemes to win Ashley’s love, despite his impending marriage to his cousin Melanie. Over the course of this thousand-page novel, Scarlett survives the burning of Atlanta and the devastation of Tara, the O’Hara family plantation, by the Union army; picks cotton side-by-side with her former slaves to keep her family from starving; marries her sister’s beau in order to pay the taxes on Tara; makes a fortune selling lumber during Atlanta’s postwar boom; provokes a Ku Klux Klan raid on the local shantytown; and marries Rhett for his money only to find, after he no longer gives “a damn,” that it is Rhett, not Ashley, whom she truly loves.

Outraged black and liberal critics condemned Gone with the Wind as an apologia for American racism, arguing that Mitchell’s unabashedly pro-Confederate depiction glossed over the realities of slavery and condemned the atrocities of the Klan. Nonetheless, Scarlett’s indomitable will to survive war, poverty, and heartbreak resonated powerfully for many readers in the midst of the trials of the Great Depression and with the prospect of a second
world war on the horizon. Published by Macmillan in the summer of 1936, *Gone with the Wind* sold over a million copies in the first six months.

Independent producer David O. Selznick purchased the film rights for $50,000, a hefty sum at the time for the first work of an unknown novelist. The making of *Gone with the Wind*, which took three years and cost over $4 million, became an obsession for Selznick. His unwillingness to compromise his grand vision for the film ultimately cost him control of his studio, Selznick International Pictures. Selznick spent $100,000 on the now-legendary “search for Scarlett,” a brilliant publicity campaign that involved screen tests for dozens of major Hollywood actresses, including Bette Davis, Paulette Goddard, and Katherine Hepburn, as well as beauty queens from around the country. Ultimately the part went to Vivien Leigh, a relatively unknown British actress. Fan mail convinced Selznick that only Clark Gable could play Rhett, and he paid MGM an exorbitant sum for Gable’s services. Olivia de Havilland was cast as Melanie, Leslie Howard as Ashley, and Hattie McDaniel as Mammy.

Capturing the historical sweep and political themes of Mitchell’s epic novel without offending the sensibilities of either African-American or white Southern audiences required eleven screenwriters, including F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ben Hecht, though playwright Sidney Howard received a sole writing credit. Similarly, four directors worked on the film, though only Victor Fleming received screen credit. Filmed in Technicolor, *Gone with the Wind* is a visually opulent extravaganza, thanks to set designer Lyle Wheeler and production designer William Cameron MacKenzie, who also directed key scenes, including the burning of Atlanta.

*Gone with the Wind* was a blockbuster hit with mainstream audiences and critics. At the film’s premier in Atlanta on December 15, 1939, over one million spectators crowded the streets to catch a glimpse of the motorcade of Hollywood stars. The film grossed over $1 million on opening weekend and eventually won eight Academy Awards, including Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actress, and Best Supporting Actress for Hattie McDaniel, the first African-American to win an Oscar. Though picketers protested in several major cities, for the most part black leaders and critics chose to overlook the film’s questionable racial politics and stereotypical “darky” performances (particularly Butterfly McQueen as Prissy), emphasizing instead the more rounded character of Mammy and the breakthrough of McDaniel’s Oscar. Ranked as the top-grossing film for nearly thirty years, *Gone with the Wind* is still considered one of the best films ever made.

See Also: HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY.

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GOODMAN, BENNY

Jazz clarinetist and bandleader Benjamin David Goodman (May 30, 1909–June 13, 1986) was born in Chicago, the ninth of twelve children of poor immigrant parents. The children worked at early ages but also studied music. Benny showed talent on the clarinet, and he soon acquired a professional competence. While in Chicago Benny was exposed to “hot” African-American jazz, which deeply influenced his tastes.

At sixteen Goodman joined Ben Pollack’s rising orchestra and began touring and recording. In 1929 he began freelancing in New York City to help support his family. He hoped to form his own band, but prospects during the Depression were dim. In 1933, though, the important young jazz promoter John Hammond (Goodman’s future brother-in-law) hired the clarinetist to lead a recording ensemble. The two soon created a “hot” orchestra that challenged the dominance of “sweet” band music. Skilled white musicians, such as the trumpeter...
Bunny Berigan, drummer Gene Krupa, and Goodman’s brother Harry, a bassist, were hired, as was the African-American arranger and ex-bandleader Fletcher Henderson. In 1935, appearances on the NBC Radio program *Let's Dance* inspired a cross-country tour. The final engagement at Los Angeles’s Palomar Ballroom was a wild success. The band’s youthful hot “swing”—performed by white musicians—arrived just as economic optimism stirred and young listeners were spending more on leisure. Extended bookings and recording contracts resulted; Goodman was dubbed “the King of Swing,” and the big-band era had begun.

Hammond, a civil rights activist, encouraged the hiring of the pianist Teddy Wilson and the vibraphonist Lionel Hampton for recordings also featuring Goodman and Krupa. When the quartet appeared in public with the band, Goodman was credited by many with breaking jazz’s color line. The combo’s brilliant improvisations enhanced swing artistically and inspired other bandleaders to integrate. Goodman later hired such fine white and black players as the trumpeters Harry James and Cootie Williams and the guitarist Charlie Christian.

The 1938 Carnegie Hall concert, instigated by Hammond, was a highlight of this period.

In the late 1930s Goodman confronted frequent personnel changes and competition from other bands. His popularity fluctuated, but his almost fanatical work ethic kept the band (and his own playing) at artistically high levels. After 1940 he would commission clarinet works from Béla Bartók and Aaron Copland and increasingly perform classical music. Jazz’s most important white bandleader and clarinetist, Goodman established his reputation in his twenties and maintained it for the rest of his long career.

*See Also: Big Band Music; Ellington, Duke; Jazz; Music.*

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*Burton W. Peretti*

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**GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY**

The term “Good Neighbor Policy” is used to describe the Latin American policy of the United States from 1933 to 1945. But the policy did not actually begin in 1933. During the 1920s there had been increasing criticism in Latin America that the United States was an aggressive and overbearing power. President Herbert Hoover, who was elected president in 1928, sought an improvement in inter-American relations and visited a number of Latin American countries prior to his inauguration. This conciliatory policy was continued by Hoover’s successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt. In fact it acquired a name as a result of part of Roosevelt’s inaugural address of March 4, 1933, in which he stated that American foreign policy would in future be dedicated to “the policy of the good neighbor.” The concept of acting as a good neighbor implied equality and mutual respect among adjacent nations and was specifically applied by Roosevelt to the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Thus, it was Roosevelt and not Hoover who became popularly regarded as the originator of the Good Neighbor Policy.

Roosevelt’s speech in 1933 affirmed American good intentions but was vague on detail. Indeed, the resulting Good Neighbor Policy was neither planned nor systematically implemented. Behind the uplifting rhetoric, however, was a desire to promote commercial relations to help the American economy recover from the Great Depression. In practical terms, closer economic contact was secured by the negotiation of a series of reciprocal trade agreements. Starting with Cuba in 1934, reciprocity arrangements were concluded with eleven Latin American countries by 1939. Trade was also expanded by the creation in 1934 of the Export-Import Bank to provide foreign countries with credit for the purchase of imports from the United States. Further inter-American contact and cooperation was achieved by cultural and educational exchange programs that facilitated the movement of scholars and scientists.

For Latin Americans the sincerity of U.S. pretensions to be a good neighbor was contingent on U.S. disavowal of the policy of military intervention.
in Latin American domestic affairs. Hoover had already ordered the withdrawal of U.S. marines from Nicaragua. Roosevelt accelerated a similar plan for withdrawal from Haiti. The right of the United States to interfere in Cuba ended in 1934 with the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, which had been incorporated into the 1901 Cuban Constitution and gave the U.S. the legal right of military intervention in Cuban affairs. Similar evidence of good neighborliness was illustrated by the U.S. refusal to give military support to American oil companies in their disputes with the governments of Bolivia and Mexico. These actions contributed to a distinct improvement in inter-American relations, so that most Latin American countries joined the United States in organizing resistance against the fascist threat posed by Germany and Italy during World War II. The Good Neighbor Policy was, therefore, successful in improving the image of the United States in Latin America. At the same time, however, the policy also served to increase U.S. economic and military influence. The Latin American nations were nominal equals of the United States, but they remained vulnerable to the great power of their northern neighbor.

See Also: INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; LATIN AMERICA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN.

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JOSEPH SMITH

GOVERNMENT, UNITED STATES FEDERAL, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

Prior to 1930, the economic role of the federal government was relatively small. Federal civilian employment barely exceeded 1 percent of total employment, and the government’s share of the gross national product (GNP) was a mere 1.6 percent. Aside from veterans’ pensions, the federal government did not provide a social safety net of transfer payments to the aged, the unemployed, or the merely poor. Larger banks were federally regulated, but there was no federal deposit insurance, and failures among smaller banks were common in the 1920s. The stock market boom of the 1920s proceeded without significant federal oversight. Only 2.5 million families paid any federal income tax in 1929.

After 1929, the federal government’s economic role increased substantially. By 1940 its civilian payroll exceeded one million workers, and federal purchases of goods and services accounted for over 6 percent of the GNP. From the New Deal period beginning in 1933 came many programs that have remained important into the twenty-first century, including Social Security, unemployment compensation, the minimum wage, agricultural price supports, deposit insurance, and protection for labor unions.

The decrease in aggregate demand that underlay the Depression caused production to fall. By 1933, about one-fourth of the labor force was unemployed. Falling prices increased the burden of debt on farmers, business firms, and home owners, and bankruptcies and foreclosures increased.

The federal government under President Herbert Hoover moved promptly to try to deal with the Depression. Hoover pressed employers not to reduce wages, and he increased federal funding for public works projects. He also persuaded Congress to reduce income tax rates in December 1929. Despite misgivings, he accepted a bill to pay about $1 billion as a bonus to war veterans in 1931. Beyond this, Hoover opposed giving federal money to the unemployed. In June 1930, he signed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff bill, which greatly increased the taxes imposed on imports. The tariff reduced U.S. imports and helped spread the Depression to other countries.

Worsening business led to a rising tide of bank failures, beginning in late 1930. This in turn provoked depositors to withdraw currency and gold coin. Hoover refused to suspend convertibility of
dollars into gold, and gold outflows exerted a strong deflationary force. At Hoover’s urging, Congress created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in January 1932. It provided funds to distressed banks.

The federal government entered the Depression with a substantial surplus of revenues over expenditures. Hoover was willing to see federal spending increase as long as it did not lead to deficit spending. However, as declining incomes led to declining tax revenues and a deficit of $2 billion in 1931, Hoover reduced federal spending and persuaded Congress to enact the largest peace-time tax increase in American history.

ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL

During the presidential campaign of 1932, Franklin Roosevelt criticized the deficits under Hoover, and on taking office in March 1933 he moved to cut federal spending, including veterans’ benefits. He also suspended the convertibility of dollars into gold; private individuals were required to turn in all their gold coins. Roosevelt ordered all the banks to close and be examined, so the sound ones could be reopened. When they reopened, depositors stopped drawing out funds, and the tide of bank failures ceased. In June 1933, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which successfully prevented a recurrence of the massive deposit withdrawals.

Roosevelt then undertook an extensive economic program that sought relief, recovery, and reform. Unlike Hoover, Roosevelt was willing to use federal money to make direct assistance payments to the unemployed. The Federal Emergency Relief Act of May 1933 authorized $500 million for such purposes. In June 1933 the government created the Public Works Administration (PWA), which was empowered to undertake government construction projects that would provide employment and produce useful infrastructure. Among its many activities were slum clearance and the development of public housing projects. These activities were extended by the U.S. Housing Act of September 1937. Greater stress on job creation was provided by the Civil Works Administration (CWA), begun in December 1933. Lasting for only four months, the CWA employed approximately five million people and spent nearly $1 billion. By early 1934, about one-fifth of American families were receiving direct benefits from one or more of these programs. The Works Progress Administration (WPA), established in August 1935, gave primary emphasis to providing jobs for the unemployed, with secondary attention to the quality of the projects undertaken. WPA employment through the rest of the 1930s averaged slightly over two million persons. Much more popular was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), established in April 1933. It recruited young men for outdoor work, such as tree planting and improving national parks.

In May 1933 Congress created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Initiated out of the debate over the disposition of the government power dam and nitrate plants built at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, during World War I, the TVA was designed as a comprehensive economic development plan for the region. Multipurpose dams provided cheap electricity and created recreational facilities on the resulting lakes.

In the area of international trade, the high-tariff policy adopted in 1930 with the Hawley-Smoot Tariff was modified by the Trade Agreements Act of May 1934. This authorized the government to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with other countries, providing for mutual reduction of trade barriers. It helped expand the value of U.S. merchandise exports from $1.6 billion in 1932 to $5 billion in 1941.

“RECOVERY” MEASURES: THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT AND THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT

The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 1933 authorized—even pressured—business firms in each industry to adopt codes of “fair competition.” Such codes, when approved by the National Recovery Administration (NRA), were binding on all firms in the industry that joined the NRA and were exempt from antitrust laws. Each code was required to contain pro-labor provisions, such as minimum wages, maximum hours, and protection for collective bargaining. Many of the codes contained provisions to reduce competition. Since the
program did nothing to increase the demand for goods and services, it also did little to improve employment and was generally condemned by economists. The Supreme Court held it to be unconstitutional in 1935. However, measures to limit competition in individual industries, such as airlines, motor transport, petroleum, and coal, were subsequently adopted.

The New Deal recovery program also involved agriculture. On average, farm prices in 1932 were 56 percent below their 1929 levels. Raising farm prices and farm incomes was the major goal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 1933. This legislation provided for cash benefits to farmers who agreed to reduce their output. To finance the benefits, the government levied a “processing tax” on firms that processed farm products. In addition, the government created the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, which purchased farm products and distributed them to needy persons.

In response to these programs and to the international depreciation of the dollar, farm prices rose more than 50 percent from 1933 to 1935. The price increases benefited the wealthiest farmers and tended to burden consumers in proportion to their food consumption, falling most heavily on low-income families.

Like the National Industrial Recovery Act, the first Agricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconstitutional, in January 1936. Congress responded by adopting the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act in February 1936. This paid farmers to reduce output of soil-depleting crops. The second Agricultural Adjustment Act of February 1938 sought to implement the principle of the ever-normal granary—buying up surplus products in times of abundant production to be carried over for periods of less abundance. Emphasis tended to shift from reducing farm output to buying surplus products, but all with the goal of raising farm incomes.

The New Deal “reform” campaign extended into numerous industries and activities. Notable were the regulations imposed on corporate finance by the Securities Act of May 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of June 1934. The latter created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Any firm wishing to issue new securities (stocks and bonds) was required to publish information about the company and how it would use the money. Companies whose securities were traded on organized exchanges were also required to file periodic reports of their condition and activities. Various unfair methods of securities trading, such as insider trading, were outlawed.

THE LABOR MARKET

The Depression fell heavily on workers through loss of jobs, shorter hours, and reduced wages. Labor unions pressed for measures to improve their bargaining position. In 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act restricted the use of injunctions as an anti-union practice. As noted, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 had contained provisions relating to minimum wages and collective bargaining. In May 1935 Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), which gave workers the right to organize unions and to bargain collectively with employers. It also outlawed a number of anti-union practices and created the National Labor Relations Board, which had the authority to conduct elections among workers to determine if they wanted to be represented by a union. When a union was certified by the National Labor Relations Board, the employer was required to bargain with it in good faith.

In June 1938 Congress approved the Fair Labor Standards Act, which instituted a minimum wage law. Employers in interstate commerce were required to pay workers at least twenty-five cents per hour and to pay extra for overtime in excess of (initially) forty-four hours per week, and ultimately forty hours per week. The minimum wage was steadily increased over time, as was the proportion of workers covered by the law.

SOCIAL SECURITY

One of the most far-reaching of New Deal economic measures was the Social Security Act of August 1935. It created three types of programs: (1) old-age pensions to be financed by a tax on wages—benefits were paid as a matter of right, not according to need; (2) unemployment insurance to be administered by states, financed by another wage tax—both of these programs developed into
large elements of the federal fiscal system over the rest of the twentieth century; and (3) federally funded, state-administered programs to aid low-income families—benefits were based on need and financed from general revenue. The most controversial was the program of aid to families with dependent children—“welfare.”

From fiscal year 1932 to fiscal year 1940, federal cash payments to the public roughly doubled, from $4.8 billion to $9.6 billion. Higher tax rates raised the government’s cash receipts from the public by almost the same dollar amount, from $2 billion to $7 billion. Most economists now believe this high-tax policy held down the potential stimulating effect of federal expenditures.

The New Deal economic program did not succeed in producing rapid recovery of production and employment, but recovery was rapid after the United States went to war in 1941. Most of the relief and recovery measures lapsed. However, the scale and scope of the federal government were vastly enlarged in response to the Depression. Notable areas that persisted through the twentieth century included:

1. Agricultural price supports and production controls.
2. The social “safety net” associated with Social Security, which transfers payments to the elderly, the unemployed, and the unfortunate.
3. Measures to protect workers through the minimum wage law and support for labor unions.
4. A vast array of regulatory programs directed at individual industries, including railroads, highway transport, airlines, electric power, and natural gas.
5. Regulation of banking and finance, particularly through the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and through direct loan and loan guarantee programs, particularly involving housing.

Influenced to an extent by the macroeconomic ideas of John Maynard Keynes, the government became committed to “demand management” to promote full employment, stable prices, and economic growth. Abolition of the gold standard enabled the money supply to be controlled by the government through the Federal Reserve System. Commitment to the balanced budget was replaced by a willingness to use deficit finance to combat depression. As a result, no serious economic depression occurred in the remaining years of the twentieth century.

One of the most significant legacies of the Great Depression was the dramatically altered relationship between the people and the federal government. The role of the federal government would continue to grow in later years, but it is clear that the decisive shift occurred during the Depression.

See Also: CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS (CCC); CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION (CWA); GOVERNMENTS, STATE, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT (NIRA); NEW DEAL; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.

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GOVERNMENTS, STATE, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

The New Deal policies enacted by the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration during the 1930s in response to the Great Depression are traditionally interpreted in terms of how they affected the nation as a whole. However, New Deal policies also had a dramatic impact at the state and local level. Because many officials of state and local governments were unwilling to work in cooperation with the federal government, their response to New Deal policies often did not help the nation to recover as quickly and fully as it could have.

During the 1920s the states, rather than the federal government, led social reform efforts by improving schools and highways, establishing minimum labor standards, and regulating corporations. During this decade, state and local governments accounted for about three-fourths of public spending, while the federal government discouraged most reform efforts, concentrating only on such major reforms as prohibition, immigration restriction, and tariff revision.

State reform efforts, however, could not accurately be called progressive. Most state officials were only willing to spend money on necessities, such as hospitals and bridges, and rarely were eager to fund such non-essentials as factory inspections and public housing. More importantly, whatever legislation was enacted by the states was usually poorly financed, incompetently administered, and indifferently enforced. Still, the readiness of most states to go into debt for these social programs meant that they were poorly prepared for the Great Depression.

WHY STATE GOVERNMENTS FAILED

Historians offer several explanations for the failure of state governments to deal with the magnitude of the Depression: (1) diminishing tax revenues, (2) constitutional/statutory debt restrictions, such as a balanced budget requirement, (3) localism, (4) outdated administrative organizations, and (5) inefficient and weak political leadership. The latter three reasons are most relevant to the Depression.

The southern states were especially immersed in localism. The South persisted in clinging to its traditional “southern way of life” throughout the Depression. Their region having been forced to suffer defeat and humiliation from the federal government during the Civil War and Reconstruction, southern politicians fought to preserve what they considered a superior way of life, which they saw embodied in racial segregation, fundamentalist religion, and one-party politics. Because political groups in each southern state were based primarily in localities, coordinated state action at the federal level was difficult even under normal conditions. Similarly, in the fiercely independent West, the recurring comment from county officials was similar to this statement from a Colorado report: “We will not need nor ask for any help outside our county as we have a great deal of local pride and will not ask for outside help as long as we can help ourselves.”

Archaic administrative structures were rampant in state legislatures where inexperienced men, who were poorly prepared and paid, operated under outdated constitutions. For example, Pennsylvania’s relief agencies broke down completely as 425 state boards under the control of 920 directors handled all public relief.

States benefited significantly from liberal New Deal programs, yet state politicians often blocked specific federal initiatives that did not parallel their conservative views. These defenders of states’ rights did not appreciate the federal government
delving into state matters, but during the Depression relief funds, employment, and construction overrode most concerns. Although most politicians continued to support Roosevelt’s general policies, they increasingly disagreed with his New Deal policies. Because of this, state politicians often used corrupt or anti-federal methods against New Deal programs. In fact, historian Lyle W. Dorsett stated that politicians could be dishonest and incompetent, but little was said about their behavior as long as they remained loyal to the president. Mayor Ed Crump of Memphis, Tennessee, for example, supported nearly all of Roosevelt’s New Deal measures because they brought thousands of jobs to Memphis. But all federal money first had to pass through Crump’s organization, which was empowered to appoint local dispensing agents, who distributed to constituents. Crump’s political organization was the frequent object of federal investigation into such practices as using federal jobs and relief to coerce voters. Even though newspapers such as the Memphis Press-Scimitar regularly published articles on the chicanery of the Crump machine, little action was taken against Crump because he was a strong Roosevelt supporter.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE RESCUE**

From the end of 1929 to 1933, most state governments clearly demonstrated that they were incapable of dealing with the economic conditions that left millions of Americans destitute. Social programs were often studied rather than implemented, and most governors were unwilling to call special sessions to handle the problems. Many governors and state legislators simply made reassuring, but hollow, public statements about self-sufficiency. Unfortunately, many states were deep in debt from deficit spending during the 1920s, and during the Depression they strained under rising welfare costs and falling tax revenues.

State governments eventually called on the federal government for help, albeit reluctantly. Roosevelt decisively called for broad executive power in 1933 and Congress responded quickly. Such a positive response was primarily due to the growing realization that national problems, such as the Great Depression, required national remedies.

After 1933, federal government programs were much more successful than state efforts in providing relief and promoting recovery. However, the New Deal programs were often hampered by the partnership between federal, state, and local governments. For the most part, conflict occurred more frequently than cooperation between the federal government and state governments. That conflict occurred primarily within three areas: (1) the requirement of state matching funds for many New Deal programs, (2) the federal requirement to centralize and professionally manage welfare administration, and (3) the efforts by state and local politicians to exploit federal money and programs for their own political advantage.

Various improvements to state governments helped support the impression that federal matching funds strengthened the states. Eleven states passed reorganization statutes during the decade, while others removed administrative control and financial responsibility from archaic local units. Most matching funds came from the newly created (in 1933) Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which initially distributed a total of about $500 million, of which $250 million was targeted for matching grants, with states contributing $3 for every $1 of federal funds, and the remaining $250 million earmarked for states facing immediate emergencies. Over the next two years a total of about $3 billion was distributed.

In 1933 the FERA offered relief funds, for example, to Louisiana. Louisiana officials had requested additional money, pleading that state funds were insufficient, while, at the same time, local parishes exploited the FERA money by inappropriately using portions of it for unemployable people (FERA’s federal money was reserved solely for employable people who were out of work, while state money was meant for people who were unemployable). By mid-1939, Louisiana had received about $750 million in federal grants and loans, but as the flow of funds increased, so did state political corruption. The federal government initiated investigations into the use of federal relief funds, and numerous indictments were levied against Louisiana officials. A number of politicians in other states, including Governor William Langer of North Dakota, were convicted of misusing funds and served time in jail.
A variety of relief and recovery measures were introduced into Colorado, including approximately $330 million dollars each month from FERA as long as state and local funds contributed their share. However, the Colorado legislature did not approve any such funds. Because of Colorado’s failure to contribute, the federal government threatened to remove all federal aid, and pressure from citizens forced the state to divert highway funds and tax gasoline sales in order to match federal funds.

Before the Great Depression, politicians all too often were elected on the basis of their ability to control the state and demolish opposition. Such political machines included those of Huey Long of Louisiana, James Michael Curley of Massachusetts, and C. Ben Ross of Idaho. Because of New Deal programs, the 1930s saw noticeable expansion of performance-based merit systems within the states. Five states passed workable statutes in 1937 and 6 others applied the merit system to various departments. After nearly two decades of ignoring performance-based policies, the trend toward improving state merit systems continued throughout the forties, fifties, and sixties. The insistence of FERA administrators on merit in order to professionally manage state governments and later requirements in 1939 with regard to civil service procedures helped to increase state administrative efficiency. Most governors, however, resented federal stipulations calling for merit appointments.

**FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP**

Roosevelt’s New Deal relief efforts rested largely on the development of a strong federal-state partnership. A state’s support of federal expenditures had little to do with the acceptance or rejection of the New Deal or any reinterpretation of federalism. When a state desperately needed immediate help for relief and recovery, it usually received it. In the short-term, the New Deal helped the states survive the Depression. In the long-term, the states lost authority to a more powerful federal government. With a stronger federal government now in charge, state and local officials had to account to powerful federal entities for their actions, and corrupt or inefficient officials were consequently more likely to lose office.

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See Also: Government, United States Federal, Impact of the Great Depression on; South, Great Depression in the.

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**GRAND COULEE PROJECT**

Construction of Grand Coulee Dam, built from 1934 to 1942, began as a New Deal works project. The dam is located on the Columbia River in eastern Washington state north of the semi-arid Columbia Basin. It remains among the world’s most productive sites for generating hydroelectric power, irrigates more than one-half million acres (the largest reclamation project in the United States), and creates the 151-mile long Lake Roosevelt. Touted as “the Mightiest thing ever built by a man” by folksinger Woody Guthrie when he was employed in May 1941 by the Bonneville Power Administration to compose songs about the project, Grand Coulee was smaller, in fact, than the earth-fill Fort Peck dam built at the same time in Montana. Still, at the time of its completion Grand Coulee Dam was the largest concrete structure in the world. The size and scope of the project, combined with its rural isolation, resulted in achievements in technology, innovations in employer-provided health care, and the nation’s first completely electric city.

The project was originally proposed in the 1890s as one of two ambitious schemes for irrigating the Big Bend region; the other proposal would have resulted in a canal flowing into the region from the east from near Albeni Falls, Idaho, on the Pend Orielle River. In the battles between advocates of these contrasting visions for agricultural
The massive Grand Coulee Dam, under construction in 1936 on the Columbia River in Washington. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection

development, and within Congress after the project began, hyperbolic rhetoric characterized the dispute as between socialism on the one hand, and undemocratic control of the government and the economy by under-regulated power companies on the other. The New Deal promoted federal government-funded economic development of the Columbia River and other Western waters in the name of jobs and reclamation. Grand Coulee’s power production and irrigation established a strong foundation for economic growth in the Pacific Northwest, but the loss of the salmon fishery devastated tribal economies.

When construction began the Roosevelt administration approved only a low dam, funded through the Public Works Administration—the low dam would provide power, but not irrigation. The MWAK Company began construction in July 1934, contracted to build a dam 350 feet high above bedrock with the proviso that the contract might change prior to completion. In August 1935 plans for a higher dam (550 feet above bedrock) were approved by Congress. After MWAK concluded its work by completing the foundation in February 1938, Consolidated Builders Incorporated built the rest of the structure.
Over 12,000 workers were employed over the course of construction, with as many as 7,400 employed at one time. Wages were good while there was work, but most workers endured frequent layoffs as the project moved through several stages of construction, and as cold winters forced slowdowns. Although a disproportionate number of the workers were white, American Indians from the Colville Reservation (which occupies the north shore of the Columbia where the dam is located) were also hired, as were some African Americans. Clearing the land that would be flooded became the largest single Works Progress Administration project, employing two thousand men by the end of 1939.

See Also: BOULDER DAM; PUBLIC POWER; WEST, GREAT DEPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN; WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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GRAPES OF WRATH, THE

For several years before 1939, John Steinbeck had been familiarizing himself with the plight of the Okies, the Depression-era Oklahoma migrants to Steinbeck’s native California. He had written about oppressed agricultural workers in his 1936 novel In Dubious Battle and that same year in a series of reports on “the Harvest Gypsies” in the San Francisco News. Steinbeck had also visited migrant camps around his hometown of Salinas and at Bakersfield. In the fall of 1937, he retraced the migrants’ westward journey along Route 66. He began his masterpiece in May 1938, and finished the final draft in late October. The Grapes of Wrath was released by Viking on April 14, 1939.

The novel tells the story of the Joads, a poverty-stricken, uneducated, and “dusted out” family of Oklahoma farmers. The first fifth of the book describes the desolate and dreary landscape of Dust Bowl Oklahoma, the Joads’ hopeless situation, and the excruciating decision to load their meager possessions on an ancient jalopy and head for the promised land of California. Another fifth of the novel depicts the arduous cross-country trek and the hardships endured by the steadily dwindling Joad family. The rest of the story traces the disappointments of California, disappointments in the midst of plenty, caused by the selfishness, heartless dishonesty, and paranoia of the landowners and their law-enforcement lackeys. The only relief the Joads know comes during their stay at a “government camp,” where they temporarily find democratic self-government, communal good-fellowship, and dignity.

The raw oppression of the migrants leads Tom Joad and Jim Casy, a former preacher traveling with the family, to become labor organizers. Casy, a kind of secularized Christ figure, is killed, and Tom is forced to leave the family and continue his work in the shadows. The novel ends with a controversial scene: The remaining Joads find a starving man in a barn, and Rose of Sharon, her own baby stillborn because of the horrid conditions the family faces, feeds the stranger with her breast milk. Alternating with the chapters about the family, Steinbeck brilliantly inserts brief “interchapters.” These comprise about a sixth of the novel and attempt by dramatic episodes, eloquent exposition, and sometimes outright preaching to generalize and make universal the experience of the Joads.

The Grapes of Wrath was an instantaneous sensation. Despite angry responses from some who objected to the novel’s “vulgarity,” and from some proud Californians and Oklahomans (one Oklahoma congressman branded the work “a lie, a black, infernal creation of a twisted, distorted mind”), the book sold 430,000 copies its first year. It has never been out of print. It was also adapted into an acclaimed film with the same title, produced by Darryl Zanuck and directed by John Ford and rushed into release on January 24, 1940.
The novel’s high reputation springs in part from Steinbeck’s ability to deftly combine two purposes within the same work. First, he presents a graphic, realistic, heartrending account of a terrible social problem of the Great Depression era. In this way the book resembles other sociological novels, such as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1851–1852) and Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle* (1906); like those works, *The Grapes of Wrath* raised the awareness and aroused the sympathies of Americans. Second, *The Grapes of Wrath* is a literary triumph, beautifully and movingly written, artistically interweaving great themes of westward movement, Biblical sacrifice, human courage and endurance, the centrality of the family and of women within the family, the importance of community and human brotherhood, and the evils of selfish individualism. In the end, Steinbeck’s skill in employing magnificent writing to explicate a shocking social injustice of the 1930s will insure the continuance of the book’s reputation as a national epic and a classic expression of the courage and vitality of the American spirit in the face of adversity.

See Also: FORD, JOHN; GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; OKIES; STEINBECK, JOHN.

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GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY

Born of desperation and political impotence, grassroots democratic action in the 1930s sought to force government and business leaders to assist in providing direct assistance to individuals while at the same time improving overall economic conditions. As the effects of the Great Depression spread across the United States, most Americans had few options for seeking relief. Private charities were quickly overwhelmed, while state and local governments did not have the financial resources to combat the economic crisis. On the federal level, a mechanism did not exist to provide support for these beleaguered institutions.

Spontaneous demonstrations erupted across the nation as more Americans found themselves entangled in poverty. Starving farmers rioted for food in the South while their brethren in the Midwest violently opposed property foreclosures and destroyed crops in the hope of increasing farm prices. In the cities, industrial workers struck for increased wages, apartment dwellers refused to pay high rent and ignored eviction notices, and property owners refused to pay taxes.

Hunger marches held simultaneously in several cities on March 6, 1930, brought 500,000 people into the streets demanding government assistance for the unemployed. Sixteen thousand World War I veterans marched on Washington, D.C., in June 1932 demanding early payment of their promised bonus for military service. This grassroots organizing influenced both of the major political parties and began to subtly alter the relationship between citizen and government.

The first major shift came in July 1932 when Congress passed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, which authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to provide $300 million in loans to states for relief payments and $1.5 million for public works projects. The relationship between the federal government and the people evolved dramatically after the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt in March 1933. The New Deal programs and government agencies adopted by Roosevelt and the Congress were not only designed to provide assistance to the thousands suffering from economic disaster, but were also a response to the grassroots activism of the American people.

Several New Deal agencies adopted measures demanded by citizens. In 1933 the Department of
Agriculture, under the aegis of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, ordered the destruction of crops in an attempt to raise farm prices, just as Midwestern farmers had advocated. Responding to the discontent over property foreclosures, the Federal Housing Administration regulated and underwrote home mortgages. Agitation by Francis Townsend and his millions of followers for federally guaranteed old-age retirement pensions helped lead to the adoption of the Social Security Act in 1935.

Politics was also influenced by this marriage between grassroots democracy and government bureaucracy. Much of the discontent evidenced before 1933 was absorbed by the New Deal and redirected into the traditional two-party system. Farmers, industrial workers, African Americans, and progressive liberals recast the Democratic Party, altering the American political landscape. The reforms introduced by the Roosevelt administration transformed the economic and social life of the nation, but they were largely adopted because of grassroots democracy practiced by the American people.

See Also: EMERGENCY RELIEF AND CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1932; HUNGER MARCHES.

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G. WAYNE DOWDY

GREEN, WILLIAM

William Green (March 3, 1870–November 21, 1952) was a labor leader and president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Green was born in Coshocton, Ohio, the son of Hugh Green, a coal miner, and Jane Oram. He completed the eighth grade and aspired to the Baptist ministry, but at fourteen he began work as a water boy for the railroad. Two years later he became his father’s helper in the mines, and within a few years he was a skilled pick miner. In 1892 he married Jennie Mobley, daughter of a local miner. In time he fathered six children, and he remained in the mines for nineteen years.

In 1891 Green was elected secretary of his United Mine Workers (UMW) local, and the union movement became the calling he had once sought in the ministry. He was elected president of the Ohio district in 1906. In 1913 miners elected Green UMW national secretary-treasurer, a post he would hold until 1924. Also in 1913, Green was appointed to the powerful AFL executive committee. When AFL president Samuel Gompers died in December 1924, executive council members chose Green to succeed him. Green served as AFL president for the next twenty-eight years.

Although Green was a moralistic man who pursued a policy of peaceful cooperation with employers in the 1920s, the Great Depression clearly proved that his strategy had failed. By 1932, Green’s speeches were replete with militant rhetoric about the need for “forceful methods” to bring about full employment. But militancy never suited Green. With rising rank-and-file pressure to seek legislative redress, Green happily assumed his chores as leading lobbyist for labor. His efforts helped to shape and pass many New Deal reforms, including the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), the National Labor Relations Act (1935), the Social Security Act (1935), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938).

When many AFL organizing campaigns during the Depression failed, a rupture developed between conservative craft union leaders, who dominated the AFL executive council, and more militant industrial union advocates. The second group, led by John L. Lewis of the UMW, pushed for aggressive campaigns to organize mass-production workers on an industry wide basis. The defeat of Lewis’s resolutions at the 1935 AFL convention and the subsequent rise of the Committee for Industrial Organization (in 1938 to become the Congress of Industrial Organizations, CIO) shaped the remainder
of Green’s career as a labor official. Green voted with the executive council majority in 1936 to suspend the CIO unions and in 1938 to expel them. For the rest of his life his energies would be consumed by a crusade against the rebel movement. Although he attended peace conferences with the CIO, the two labor federations remained divided until after his death.

By 1939, however, Green’s power and influence within the AFL began to decline with the rise of an ambitious George Meany in the post of secretary-treasurer. Green did spearhead a vigorous but unsuccessful campaign to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, but by the time of his death in 1952 he had become a largely forgotten figure.

See Also: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); LEWIS, JOHN L.; ORGANIZED LABOR; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).

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CRAIG PHELAN

GREENBELT TOWNS

The Greenbelt town program originated as part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, aiding the poor by hiring the unemployed to build the towns and then by providing housing for low-income families. Placed within the Resettlement Administration headed by Rexford Tugwell, the Suburban Division, administered by John Lansill, constructed three towns: Greenbelt, Maryland, outside of Washington, D.C.; Greendale, Wisconsin, outside of Milwaukee; and Greenhills, Ohio, outside of Cincinnati. A fourth, Greenbrook, New Jersey, was initiated but not completed. Economist Tugwell yearned for a collectivized society and incorporated his desires into the town plans, placing an emphasis on economic and social cooperatives to serve town residents. Tugwell hoped to have 3,000 such communities built.

Tugwell left the design of the towns to planners who relied heavily on Clarence Perry’s concept of the neighborhood unit, in which neighborhood boundaries consisted of major streets, but interior neighborhood roads carried only local traffic. In Perry’s design, a central area containing shops, a park, and an elementary school that also served as a community center provided focus for the neighborhood and were within walking distance of residents. The planners for Greenbelt and Greenhills were also influenced heavily by Clarence Stein’s design of Radburn, New Jersey, which utilized superblocks with central greens, separation of automobile and pedestrian traffic, cul-de-sacs, and homes facing their gardens with backs facing the street. In addition, a surrounding greenbelt provided land for parks or farming.

Frederick Bigger functioned as the chief planner for all three towns, and Hale Walker was the town planner for Greenbelt. Tenants first occupied Greenbelt’s 885 rowhouses and apartment units in September 1937. Justin Hartzog and William Strong were the town planners for the 676 units of Greenhills, which looked much like Greenbelt, with rowhouses and apartments built in contemporary or “international” style. Residents first moved into Greenhills in April 1938 and into Greendale in May 1938. Jacob Crane and Elbert Peets, town planners for Greendale, used recently restored Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia, as a model for their work, copying the style of restored Williamsburg for its public buildings, as well as placing homes only a few feet from the street. The town consisted of 572 units, of which 274 were single-family detached homes and the remainder rowhouses.

The greenbelt town program in general and Tugwell in particular received much negative press coverage. Congressional critics of the New Deal focused on the expense of the towns, and businessmen clamored against the perceived communist
and socialistic aspects. As a result, Tugwell resigned and Roosevelt dismantled the Resettlement Administration at the end of 1936, and the Farm Security Administration oversaw the completion of the towns. After World War II, the government resolved to sell the towns; in response, town residents who wanted to maintain their communities as planned cooperatives formed groups to purchase the government housing. In both Greenbelt and Greenhills, residents formed cooperatives to buy their homes, and Greenhills managed to retain most of its greenbelt. In 2000, each of the three towns had a population of about 20,000. The ideas and plans used in the Greenbelt towns reappeared briefly in the 1960s with the development of cities such as Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, and appeared again in the 1990s in the guise of the New Urbanism or Neotraditional development.

See Also: CITIES AND SUBURBS; HOUSING; TUGWELL, REXFORD G.

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GUFFEY-SNYDER ACT OF 1935

Under Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, the bituminous coal industry in late 1933 drafted a code governing business and labor practices in an effort to stabilize an industry long plagued by cutthroat competition and labor conflict. The code brought higher profits and wages, an increase in union membership, and a reduction in strikes. But the industry's peace and prosperity were fleeting, for within months the code began to collapse in the face of widespread violations. Thereupon, the United Mine Workers (UMW), with the support of many operators in the northern coalfields, fashioned a bill to bring stricter controls to the industry than the National Recovery Administration (NRA) had provided.

Introduced in Congress in January 1935 by Senator Joseph F. Guffey and Representative J. Buell Snyder, both Democrats from Pennsylvania, the bill initially made little headway. Large consumers of coal contended it would unreasonably increase prices; southern and western operators said it would discriminate against low-wage and nonunion mines; and political conservatives, fearing it would set a precedent for regulatory measures affecting other industries, questioned its constitutionality.

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in May 1935, proponents of coal stabilization urged Congress to pass the Guffey-Snyder bill or see the industry degenerate into chaos, a warning given added weight when John L. Lewis, head of the UMW, threatened a strike if Congress did not act. Nevertheless, the bill remained stalled until President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked legislators to leave constitutional questions to the courts, prompting the House of Representatives to approve it on August 20 by a vote of 194 to 168 and the Senate on August 23, 45 to 37.

The Guffey-Snyder Act established a National Bituminous Coal Commission to determine prices and approve and enforce trade practices and marketing agreements. It also guaranteed workers the right to collective bargaining and uniform wages and hours. To enforce compliance, it prescribed a penalty tax on the selling price of coal, most of which would be rebated to those who adhered to the law.

Sometimes called “a little NRA,” the Guffey-Snyder Act was designed to favor those who had benefited from the coal code. From the outset, however, it was ineffective. Operators feuded over prices, and restraining orders crippled the commission’s authority. Finally, on May 18, 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional in Carter v. Carter Coal Company. In the majority’s opinion, the labor provisions were a federal intru-
sion on states rights and therefore made the price provisions invalid since the two were inextricably intertwined.

See Also: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; GUFFEY-VINSON ACT OF 1937; LEWIS, JOHN L.; ORGANIZED LABOR; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).

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JOHN KENNEDY OHL

GUFFEY-VINSON ACT OF 1937

In May 1936 the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Guffey-Snyder Act, a measure enacted in 1935 to curb the destructive effects of cutthroat competition in the bituminous coal industry through agreements on business practices and prices and the improvement of wages and labor conditions. Anxious to preserve the essentials of the act, proponents of federal legislation to stabilize the industry, primarily operators in the northern coalfields and the United Mine Workers (UMW), pressed Congress to approve a revised measure, minus the labor provisions the court had found objectionable. Sponsored by Senator Joseph F. Guffey, Democrat of Pennsylvania, and Representative Fred Vinson, Democrat of Kentucky, it passed the House of Representatives in June 1936, but was killed in the Senate by a filibuster.

Aided by the decisive Democratic victory in the 1936 election and the growing political power of John L. Lewis, head of the UMW, the bill’s proponents in 1937 overcame the opposition of southern operators, who had argued that it would negate the competitive advantage they enjoyed from the use of low-wage nonunion labor. The House approved the bill without a record vote on March 11, while the Senate passed it on April 5 by a vote of 58 to 18.

The Guffey-Vinson Act, which was to run for four years, provided for a National Bituminous Coal Commission (NBCC) with authority to determine minimum prices for coal and enforce marketing and fair practices agreements. Almost immediately implementation floundered. Patronage squabbles involving the filling of the hundreds of posts within the NBCC divided the commissioners, and the process of getting operators to establish coal classifications and fix prices dragged on for years, running afoul of the regional splits that had long bedeviled the industry. Complaints about increased prices from such large consumers of coal as railroads and public utilities and disputes over the lack of public hearings added fuel to the commission’s difficulties. Tiring of the turmoil, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 transferred the NBCC’s functions to the Department of the Interior.

Despite Roosevelt’s action, the wrangling over prices continued, and not until October 1940 did the coal authorities promulgate the minimum prices sought by northern operators and the UMW. By this time prices were already climbing because of the emerging war economy, eliminating the need for minimum prices. Nevertheless, Congress in 1941 extended the Guffey-Vinson Act for two more years, but in 1943, no longer seeing any need for legislation to protect operators and miners from competitive pressures, Congress let the act die when it reached its legal limit.

See Also: GUFFEY-SNYDER ACT OF 1935; LEWIS, JOHN L.; ORGANIZED LABOR; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA).

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Woodrow Wilson Guthrie (July 14, 1912–October 3, 1967) was arguably the most influential songwriter and performer in twentieth-century American folk music. As the first major artist to combine traditional American folk melodies with lyrics about contemporary political, social, and personal concerns, Guthrie left behind an unparalleled collection of ballads and populist anthems. Both his music and performing style have continued to influence artists long after his death.

Guthrie was born in Okemah, Oklahoma. As a youth, he saw his family disintegrate in a series of personal and financial tragedies. During his adolescent years, he worked odd jobs and learned the guitar in his spare time. When the dust storms of 1935 hit the area, Guthrie took his guitar and drifted, hitchhiked, and hopped freight trains, eventually joining other “Okie” refugees in California. Already a keen observer of the world, Guthrie became radically politicized by what he saw and experienced there. Empathizing with the migrant orchard workers, union organizers, and other victims of greed and social injustice, Guthrie channeled his populist patriotism and moral outrage into songwriting. Singing his plainspoken lyrics in high nasally vocals to the tune of simple chords and melodies derived from traditional Appalachian folk songs, Guthrie established a mythic voice for beaten-down Americans. Radio performances from Los Angeles won Guthrie wide renown, especially with intellectuals and activists associated with the Popular Front and the Communist Party.

In 1939 Guthrie moved to New York City, where he became more active in left-wing politics, writing articles for Communist newspapers and penning some of his best-known songs, including “God Blessed America” (usually known as “This Land Is Your Land”). A passionate antifascist and champion of the Popular Front, Guthrie felt dismayed and conflicted by the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939. But the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union removed any doubts that he had about the need for America to enter World War II. Guthrie emblazoned his guitar with the slogan, “This Machine Kills Fascists,” and he contributed to the war effort not only with patriotic ballads like “Reuben James,” but by serving for two years in the American merchant marine. Upon returning, he resumed his songwriting and toured in the late 1940s with his protégé Pete Seeger and the Almanac Singers. Cold War blacklists and a debilitating affliction with Huntington’s chorea limited Guthrie’s activities in his later years, but in the 1960s a new generation of songwriters and performers revived both his songs and his spirit with their own contemporary folk music.

A prolific songwriter with far more versatility than his common image suggests, Guthrie’s sub-
ects ranged from political corruption and hunger to romantic love and children’s songs. But he has always been best known for his Dust Bowl ballads and common-man anthems written in the late 1930s and first recorded in 1940 by folklorist Alan Lomax. These included songs about poverty and deprivation (“Dust Bowl Blues” and “I Ain’t Got No Home”), greed and intolerance (“Do Re Mi” and “Vigilante Man”), and odes to mythical heroes and outlaws (“Pretty Boy Floyd” and “Tom Joad”). The first few verses of his most famous composition, commonly known as “This Land Is Your Land,” rank among America’s most recognizable anthems. Less well known are the rest of the original lyrics, which include reference to the traveling narrator being obstructed by a sign reading “Private Property” and witnessing hungry people waiting outside a relief office.

A figure of towering importance in the history of both folk and popular music, Woody Guthrie helped to revolutionize what songs could mean in American culture. His 1988 induction into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame speaks to a legacy that transcends the boundaries of Depression-era topical songs. The moral authority and personal integrity at the heart of Guthrie’s music truly make him a hero for all artists who have aspired to move the conscience and soul of an audience with a song.

See Also: “BALLAD OF PRETTY BOY FLOYD;” MUSIC.

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BRADFORD W. WRIGHT
HAGUE, FRANK

Of all the bosses who ruled their machines during the 1930s, none exerted greater power or held it longer than Mayor Frank Hague (January 17, 1876–January 1, 1956) of Jersey City, New Jersey. Hague’s influence not only made him the most powerful Democrat in his state, it helped nominate Franklin D. Roosevelt and delivered New Jersey’s electoral vote to Roosevelt in all four presidential elections in which Roosevelt ran. Critics condemned Hague as the “Hitler of Hudson County,” where he was also accurately called “the law.”

Hague’s career began in a Jersey City slum known as the Horseshoe, where he was born to Catholic parents. Juvenile delinquency, tempered by an occasional appearance at Sunday Mass, characterized his childhood. A sixth-grade dropout, Hague learned the political game from local Democratic bosses and became mayor in 1917. Thirty years would pass before he relinquished power.

During the Depression, Hague’s machine cared for the poor, built social clubs for the middle class, and gave tax breaks to the rich and money to all religions, especially the Catholic Church. People loved and feared the dapper mayor. In 1932 he dropped his support for Al Smith and delivered New Jersey to Franklin D. Roosevelt for the first of four consecutive presidential elections.

In turn, the New Deal funneled massive amounts of patronage and money, as well as numerous projects, through Hague’s organization. Choosing to ignore the machine’s scandals, Roosevelt allowed the Jersey boss to add hundreds of thousands of federal jobs and millions of dollars to the power that the machine already wielded throughout the state. The Public Works Administration (PWA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) enabled the mayor to exert national influence and near total control over New Jersey. The machine coerced 115,000 CWA and WPA employees to support its candidates. As a result, Hague manipulated governors, senators, and congressmen because he could (sometimes illegally) produce huge election-day majorities.

Roosevelt wanted to prosecute the machine’s criminals, but he also wanted to provide Depression relief and New Jersey’s electoral vote, both of which the mayor controlled. This reality proved crucial to Roosevelt’s election to an unprecedented third term in 1940. Thanks to 173,000 ballots produced by the mayor in Hudson County, Roosevelt overcame Wendell Willkie’s lead of 101,500 and won the state’s electoral vote by a plurality of 71,500. Although most of the ballots were legal, critics complained of extensive fraud.
The New Deal’s Department of Justice did not investigate Republican complaints because Roosevelt appreciated the electoral and legislative support rendered by the machine and its senators and representatives. For these and other reasons, Roosevelt never got around to ousting the totalitarian mayor who outlasted him by two years before voluntarily retiring in 1947. When Frank Hague died on New Year’s Day, 1956, obituary writers noted that his rule constituted perhaps the most exceptional exhibition of power wielded by any city leader in American history.

See Also: ELECTION OF 1932.

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J. CHRISTOPHER SCHNELL

HAMMETT, DASHIELL

Dashiel Hammett (May 27, 1894–January 10, 1961) was born on a tobacco farm in St. Mary’s County, Maryland, and raised in Baltimore, where he attended school until the age of 14. He worked for several years in low-paying jobs before joining the Pinkerton National Detectives, where he gathered the detective lore that would be crucial to his later writing. During World War I, he served in the Army (though without leaving the United States) and contracted a case of tuberculosis that would compromise his health for the remainder of his life. In the mid-twenties, Hammett began publishing stories in the pulp magazine Black Mask, where the verisimilitude of his detective fiction soon made him the magazine’s marquee writer. Leaping to the prestigious publishing house of Alfred A. Knopf, Hammett published four novels in quick succession: Red Harvest and The Dain Curse (1929), The Maltese Falcon (1930), and The Glass Key (1931). Widely praised for their streamlined construction and their coolly dispassionate tone, the novels made Hammett an instant literary celebrity, successful with popular readers and prominent intellectuals alike.

Yet, though he achieved fame during the early thirties and though he influenced writers who would become successful later in the decade, Hammett was not truly a writer shaped by the Depression. His most significant work was done during the late twenties and reflected the attraction to intellectual sophistication prevalent among intellectuals at the time. Emphasizing the professional skill of his detective heroes, Hammett’s fiction placed great stress on the values of discipline and expertise and showed consistent doubtfulness about the intelligence of ordinary people. By 1931, his burst of creative energy was drawing to a close. After The Glass Key, Hammett published one additional novel, The Thin Man (1934), whose renowned wit barely conceals the fears of the novel’s playboy detective that he is slipping toward decadence.

For the remainder of the thirties, the bulk of Hammett’s energies were devoted to left-wing political activity, to which he and his lover, the playwright Lillian Hellman, were fiercely committed. During World War II, he served as an enlisted man on an Alaskan military base. In 1951, he served six months in federal prison for contempt of court after he refused to disclose the names of contributors to the bail bond fund of the Civil Rights Congress, an organization associated with the Communist Party, of which he was a trustee. Hammett died in 1961.

See Also: HARD-BOILED DETECTIVES; LITERATURE.

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HANSEN, ALVIN

Alvin Harvey Hansen (August 23, 1887–June 6, 1975) transformed American economics from 1933 to 1945. Born into a Danish family in Viborg, North Dakota, Hansen studied economics at Yankton College and the University of Wisconsin. He taught at Wisconsin and Brown University before joining the University of Minnesota, where he worked from 1919 to 1937. Known for his Business Cycle Theory (1927), Hansen advised Social Science Research Council commissions and Secretary of State Cordell Hull on international trade policy. Hansen came to Keynesian economics via orthodox ideas in the work of Knut Wicksell, Arthur Spiethoff, Joseph Schumpeter, Gustav Cassel, and E. H. Robertson. Combining these with his interest in business cycles, Hansen evolved into an advocate of government compensatory spending policy.

In September 1937, Hansen moved to Harvard University to teach the Fiscal Policy Seminar with Dean John H. Williams. Participants included John Kenneth Galbraith, Walter S. Salant, Paul A. Samuelson, and James Tobin. In December 1938 in the presidential address to the American Economic Association, Hansen presented his “secular stagnation thesis.” Lagging private investment, consumer credit, and decreased federal spending led to long-term stagnation. As population, land, natural resources, and technological innovation slowed, the economy went through a structural shift with few private investment opportunities. Only more consumer and government spending could spark increased production, consumption, and employment. On May 16, 1939, Hansen testified about his policy ideas before the Temporary National Economic Committee in Congress.

Between 1935 and 1943, Hansen advised the Social Security Board, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Federal Reserve Board, and the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB). When he promoted Keynesian spending policy in NRPB pamphlets during the war, outraged conservatives in Congress demanded abolition of the board. In 1958, he retired from Harvard. Known as the “American Keynes,” Hansen helped to educate an entire postwar generation of Keynesians who changed professional economics into a policy discipline.

See Also: ECONOMISTS.

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PATRICK D. REAGAN

“HAPPY DAYS ARE HERE AGAIN”

This popular song was written by lyricist Jack Yellen and composer Milton Ager in 1929 for a joyous scene in the MGM motion picture Chasing Rainbows, in which American soldiers celebrate the armistice that concluded World War I. When the composer asked the lyricist to suggest a title for a song to fit the celebratory scene, Yellen uttered the first phrase that popped into his head, “Happy Days Are Here Again.”

Although the motion picture was not released until 1930, “Happy Days Are Here Again” was pub-
lished in sheet music. George Olsen’s society orchestra performed it at New York’s Hotel Pennsylvania on October 24, 1929, which was Black Thursday, the day of the stock market crash. Noting the discrepancy between his despondent audience and the ebullient sentiments of the song, Olsen passed out the music to his musicians and told his soloist to “sing it for the corpses.” The audience roared with laughter, rose, and danced, shouting the title phrase sardonically with the singer.

The song became an ironic anthem for the Great Depression, a risible counterpart to the grim “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?” “Perhaps the success of ‘Happy Days Are Here Again,’” Michael Lasser observes in American Song Lyricists, 1920–1960 (2002), “derives from its directness and naïveté. The brief lyric has only two words of more than one syllable. Its sentiments are as simple as its words... Its narrow melodic range, its insistent repetition of the title, and triple rhymes (‘here again/clear again/cheer again’) zip us through the chorus.”

In 1932, then-Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt took “Happy Days Are Here Again” as the theme song for his presidential campaign because its optimistic sentiments and rousing melody resonated with his hopes that the New Deal would bring back prosperity. The party used it again for the campaigns of John F. Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and other nominees.

The song has become an enduring expression of optimism in the face of dire events, and it has transcended its era to become a familiar standard. In 1963, the American Society of Authors, Composers, and Publishers, the licensing organization that controls performing rights for the songs of the twentieth-century’s greatest songwriters, named “Happy Days Are Here Again” as one of sixteen songs on its All-Time Hit Parade, alongside classic songs by such songwriters as George and Ira Gershwin, Irving Berlin, and Cole Porter.

See Also: MUSIC.

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raised by the Depression. Abandoning the cool skepticism of Hammett’s fiction, Chandler imagined his detective hero as a knight-errant crusading for justice in a corrupt world and driven by sentimental affection for the victims of an unjust society.

In subsequent years, many other writers would follow Chandler and use the genre as a potent vehicle for exploring corruption and social injustice, making the hard-boiled detective story an ever-vital vein of popular mythology. Beginning with John Huston’s film adaptation of *The Maltese Falcon* (1940) and Howard Hawks’s version of *The Big Sleep* (1946), the hard-boiled story also became a staple of the movies and, from there, of radio and TV.

See Also: CHANDLER, RAYMOND; HAMMETT, DASHIELL; HEROES; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; LITERATURE; LITTLE CAESAR.

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SEAN MCCANN

Harlan County, Kentucky, is a rural county located in a major coal-mining region in the Appalachian Mountains. The county became nationally famous in 1931 and 1932 when it was the site of one of the earliest and bloodiest labor battles of the decade. The desperation and the courage of the miners of Harlan County, and the violent repression visited upon them by the coal operators of the region when they attempted to organize a union, attracted national attention.

Most of the miners in Harlan County were local people, with deep roots in the Appalachian countryside. By contrast, the coal operators were primarily absentee owners. There was virtually no other industry in the region. The result was that the coal operators tightly controlled the Appalachian communities. They owned the houses in which the miners lived, the stores from which they bought food, and even the funeral homes that would bury them when they died. The miners, however, shared an intense local culture, giving them a measure of political independence from the coal operators.

When the Great Depression hit the coal fields, the paternalism that had characterized coal town life vanished. Coal operators slashed wages and fired thousands of miners. Workers contacted the United Mine Workers (UMW), which was at that time a fragile organization with low membership, and started to organize. The first mass meetings were held in February and March of 1931. The companies responded harshly, immediately evicting thousands of miners from their homes. In April, 2,800 men, women, and children from Harlan County marched into town and demanded money and food from the company. Strikes spread through the coal fields. On May 5, one hundred armed miners engaged in open warfare with company deputies in a skirmish that left one miner and three company men dead. Hundreds of state troopers arrived to quell the conflict, and the UMW, overwhelmed, declared that the miners were on their own. Even though over 11,000 miners joined the union in the spring organizing drive, the UMW did not have the institutional resources to provide strike relief.

Still seeking to organize, the miners turned to the National Miners’ Union, a group that was supported by the Communist Party. The National Miners’ Union attempted to organize a strike beginning in the first days of January 1932. On the eve of the strike, two miners were shot and killed, and in the days that followed, organizers were arrested and more people were killed. One 19-year-old organizer who had come from New York was murdered; his body was sent back to New York and thousands of people marched in a funeral procession from Penn Station to Union Square. But under the repression of the coal operators and their deputies, the strike fell apart.

Unionism finally came to Harlan County in May 1933, when section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act recognized the legal right of
workers to organize unions. The UMW organized the coal mines in a matter of months. By autumn of 1933, the workers signed their first collective bargaining agreement with the coal operators.

One of the most important things about Harlan County is that it attracted national attention to the plight of the coal miners, much as the civil rights demonstrations of the early 1960s brought the injustice of segregation to the awareness of the nation. In late 1931, novelist Theodore Dreiser and a team of writers came down to report on (as Dreiser put it) “terrorism in the Kentucky coalfields.” And during the strike, writer Waldo Frank organized an “Independent Miners Relief Committee” to bring food to the miners. Busloads of northern college students came South to support the miners, handing out food and copies of the Bill of Rights. Florence Reece’s song, “Which Side Are You On?” also served to spread the word about the conflict, and became a lasting favorite of labor and civil rights activists.

For people around the country, the Harlan County uprising of the early 1930s demonstrated the limits of the company paternalism and welfare capitalism of the 1920s. In this way, it helped pave the way for the Wagner Act of 1935, which guaranteed workers the right to organize and created a legal process for attaining union recognition. The northern writers and organizers who told the story of Harlan County to the rest of the country helped to cast union organization as American and democratic, and the actions of the companies as tyrannical, violent, and arbitrary. Finally, the ultimate victory of the miners showed that even under the most difficult conditions, in the most rural communities, workers could organize and win union representation. The mineworkers’ union, with its stronghold in Harlan County and Appalachia, would remain a powerful force in the United States throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and the entire postwar era.

See Also: APPALACHIA, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UMWA); “WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?”

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Kim Phillips-Fein

HARLEM RIOT (1935)

On the afternoon of March 19, 1935, Lino Rivera, a 16-year-old Puerto Rican youth, was observed stealing a ten-cent pocket knife from the E. H. Kress store on 125th street in New York’s Harlem. When two store employees attempted to detain him, Rivera resisted, biting both of his captors. A police officer was called. To avoid a hostile crowd gathering at the front of the store, the patrolman escorted the suspect from the store through the basement to a rear entrance. Rumors began to circulate that Rivera had been beaten by the police. Soon reports claimed that he had been killed. Police attempted to persuade irate shoppers that no harm had come to the boy, but they refused to be calmed. At 5:30 the store was closed and the crowd spilled onto the streets. A group of men tried to hold a public meeting to protest the alleged beating, but two speakers were arrested and charged with “unlawful assembly.”

The mob spread to 7th Avenue and Lennox Avenue, smashing store windows and looting shops as they went. More than five hundred police officers were summoned to put down the disturbance. They were pelted with rocks and bottles; eight were injured. The New York Times reported that one hundred people were treated at local hospitals. Four people, three of them African American, died from injuries suffered during the night of rioting. More than one hundred persons were arrested. Two hundred stores were sacked and property damage was estimated at two million dollars.
The following day, Mayor Fiorello La Guardia claimed that the riot was “instigated and artificially stimulated by a few irresponsible individuals.” District Attorney William C. Dodge announced that he was launching a grand jury investigation into Communist influence behind the rioting. Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., writing in the *New York Post*, discounted charges of radical agitation. He blamed the unrest on “empty stomachs, overcrowded tenements, filthy sanitation, rotten foodstuffs, chiseling landlords and merchants, discrimination in relief, disenfranchisement, and . . . [a] disinterested administration.”

The committee of prominent citizens appointed by LaGuardia to investigate the causes of the riot found no evidence that it had been instigated by Communists, terming it a “spontaneous outbreak.” Their unpublished report echoed Powell’s charges, identifying the riot’s causes as “the injustices of discrimination in employment, the aggressions of the police, and the racial segregation.” Another factor, not mentioned by the committee, was the “don’t buy where you can’t work” campaign against white merchants organized by Powell and other community activists.

The Harlem Riot has been identified by sociologist Allen D. Grimshaw, in his work *Racial Violence in the United States* (1969), as the first manifestation of a “modern” form of racial rioting. He cites three distinctive features that set it apart from previous instances of urban racial conflict: (1) violence “directed almost entirely against property,” (2) the absence of clashes between racial groups, and (3) “struggles between the lower-class Negro population and the police forces.” Previous race riots had been characterized either by mobs of whites attacking blacks or by clashes between groups of both races. Most subsequent racial disturbances would resemble the Harlem riot.

*See Also:* AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; BLACK METROPOLIS; DON’T BUY WHERE YOU CAN’T WORK MOVEMENT; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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**PAUL T. MURRAY**

**HARRISON, BYRON “PAT”**

Byron Patton ("Pat") Harrison (August 29, 1881–June 22, 1941) was a United States senator and strategist for major New Deal legislation. He was born in Crystal Springs, Mississippi, to Robert A. Harrison, a Civil War veteran, and Anna Patton Harrison. He was educated in the public schools of Crystal Springs and attended Louisiana State University on a baseball scholarship for two years. Later, while a high school teacher and principal, he studied law in the evenings. After admission to the bar in 1902 he moved rapidly into political office through election for two terms as a state district attorney and then U.S. congressman from 1911 to 1919.

Harrison was an ardent supporter of President Woodrow Wilson, but his reservations about significant aspects of New Freedom legislation suggested that Harrison was not truly committed to progressivism. In 1918, as a strong advocate of Wilson’s preparedness program, however, Harrison defeated the obstructionist James K. Vardaman in a campaign for the U.S. Senate. He was reelected three times. During the 1920s, as one of the leaders of the Democratic minority, he was known as an effective and zestful “gadfly.”

The ascension of the Democrats to majority control in 1933 placed Harrison as chair of the Finance Committee, where he wielded enormous influence based on congressional longevity and a happy combination of personal qualities that made him perhaps the most popular man in the Senate. He was a consummate legislative broker who succeeded in steering to passage major components of the New Deal: fourteen revenue bills, including the Wealth Tax Act (1935) and the undistributed profits tax (1936); the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1939 amendments; the National Industrial Recovery Act; and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Acts.
of 1934 and 1940. Harrison’s support of the early New Deal was based upon his devotion to the Democratic Party and the exigencies of the Great Depression. He differed with President Franklin D. Roosevelt over revenue measures that redistributed wealth and New Deal reform that veered toward social engineering. The president’s support for the election of Alben W. Barkley as Senate majority leader in 1937, a contest Harrison lost by one vote, led to an open break. The breach was not healed until Roosevelt turned to Harrison in 1940 to win passage of the Lend-Lease Act. He was voted in 1939 by Washington correspondents as the most influential of all senators. In January 1941, six months before his death due to colon cancer, Harrison became Senate president pro tempore.

See Also: DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

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HATCH ACT OF 1939

The Hatch Act of 1939 banned federal employees from participating actively in political campaigns or from using their official positions to coerce voters. The Pendleton Act of 1883 and several executive orders had limited partisan political activity by career civil servants. During the 1930s, the number of federal government relief workers ballooned. Conservative Democrats and Republicans hoped to prevent Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration from using relief money to influence congressional primaries and elections. In 1938, New Deal liberal candidates seeking renomination or to unseat conservative Democrats in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania were accused of diverting Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds to enhance their electoral prospects. The Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee upheld those accusations in January 1939.

Democratic Senator Carl Hatch of New Mexico complained that several relatives of rival New Mexico Democratic Senator Dennis Chavez had coerced WPA officials. In January 1939 Hatch introduced legislation prohibiting the assessment or solicitation of funds from WPA employees and the removal of any personnel because of refusal to change political affiliation. Section 9 prevented federal officials and workers from using their positions to interfere in presidential or congressional primaries or elections. Enforcement was left to department heads, and violators were subject to a $1,000 fine or imprisonment for one year.

Hatch Act supporters claimed that a politically neutral civil service would achieve an impartial government and protect federal workers from coercion or threats by superiors. Critics countered that the Hatch Act was vague and overly broad, denied millions of federal employees freedom of speech and association, and discouraged political participation among political activists.

The Senate adopted the Hatch measure in April 1939 and the House followed suit in July. President Roosevelt disliked Section 9, but reluctantly signed the bill into law on August 2. The Hatch Act initially magnified the influence of local bosses, rural legislators, and labor unions. The original law, therefore, was extended in 1940 to include 250,000 state employees paid wholly or partially from federal funds and to require the nonpayment and removal of violators. A 1950 amendment reduced the penalty to 90 days suspension without pay.

Divided Supreme Courts upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act in 1947 and 1972, regarding public employment as a privilege subject to reasonable conditions. The Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel in 1966 recommended relaxing restrictions and penalties. In 1993 Congress adopted the Federal Employees Political Activities Act, which permitted most federal civil servants to run for public office in nonpartisan elections, contribute money to political organizations, and campaign for or against candidates in partisan elections.
The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of June 17, 1930, was the final act in a phase begun in the 1860s, during which, with occasional counter movements, duties on imports increased, particularly under Republican administrations. The destabilizing economic effects of World War I led Congress to raise duties substantially via the Fordney-McCumber tariff in 1922 in response to the traditional protectionist pleas from manufacturers in labor-intensive industries. The trigger for renewed tariff debate in 1929 was the crisis in American agriculture. After facing high prices and increasing indebtedness during the wartime expansion, American farmers experienced an abrupt collapse of prices, land values, and incomes in the early 1920s. With increased world production, the terms of trade shifted against primary producers, especially for staples crops. In response, a vocal and more politically organized farm lobby campaigned for various public policies to alleviate their economic problems. New measures attempted to bolster farm credit, but schemes to raise agricultural prices via federal intervention were vetoed by President Calvin Coolidge in 1927 and 1928.

In 1929 President Herbert Hoover called a special session of Congress to consider the agricultural crisis; one result, fourteen months later, was the Hawley-Smoot Act. The pro-tariff elements among the farming interests included western sugar beet growers, wheat producers, and farmers who were vulnerable to imports from Canada. Once the congressional debate was initiated, these groups formed a coalition with labor-intensive manufacturers; through standard lobbying and political deal-making, the coalition persuaded Congress to extend the scale and scope of the increased duties on agricultural produce and selected manufactured products. In the latter case, the Hawley-Smoot Act built on the 1922 tariff. Overall Hawley-Smoot substantially increased U.S. tariff levels. Indeed, the effective levels of duties, which were fixed in dollar terms, increased steeply as the general level of prices fell during the economic slump. President Hoover had a mixed view of the tariff bill, but was not prepared to veto a measure that was in line with Republican trade policies.

The consequences of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act remain debatable. The early and conventional view was that the higher tariffs were a key step in the downward spiral of protectionism in the early 1930s. This interpretation stressed the decline in imports to the United States and the associated fall in incomes overseas as contributing to the international transmission of the slump. Hawley-Smoot was also associated with a spread of protectionism overseas, either in retaliation or in response to the loss of export earnings. More recently, economic historians have noted that trade was a relatively small sector of the U.S. economy, and duties would have advantaged domestic producers, so Hawley-Smoot was not a major contractionary force domestically. Many European nations had already extended their protection of farmers in the late 1920s, so the American action continued a trend rather than initiating it. Even so, Hawley-Smoot signaled an American emphasis on domestic priorities and a further constraint on flows of trade and finance that compounded the destabilization of the international economy in 1930 and 1931.

See Also: INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION.
HEALTH AND NUTRITION

The Great Depression was both the cause of increased suffering and a decline in the health status of millions of Americans, and, through the New Deal, the occasion for some of the most innovative and substantive federal reforms in American health care. Ironically, while some historically disadvantaged groups, especially rural Americans, gained greater access to health care than they had had prior to the Depression, this period also marked the beginning of one of the worst scandals in American public health and medical ethics.

The massive unemployment and wage cuts of the early years of the Depression had a conspicuous negative effect on the ability of workers and farmers to take care of their medical needs and assure adequate nutrition for their families. As a result there was a marked decline in the quantity and quality of health care for those in the lower income brackets, a consequent increase in doctors having to provide free consultations, and an increase in free care in clinics and hospitals. Rural areas, especially in the South, were particularly hard hit, with about half of the South’s population not capable of paying for medical care. Cities slashed their appropriations for health and sanitation, and some used fear of contagion to justify violence against migrants and the dispossessed who gathered in Hoovervilles within their borders.

Some studies suggest that those on relief were almost twice as likely to endure a chronic disease as those who made $3,000 a year (a moderate income), but other studies suggested that those who had fallen from middle-class or strong working-class positions suffered the most because of their unwillingness to take advantage of food and relief programs. One study found, for instance, that in several major cities undernourishment increased noticeably among school children of families who had undergone a dramatic decline in their economic fortunes.

Out of these conditions, cities and states started to provide food and medical care as early as 1930, but these efforts were soon overwhelmed by the massive need, and in 1933 the New Deal’s Federal Emergency Relief Administration intervened to provide direct medical care for the indigent. Subsequent programs provided support for states and cities to build and improve hospitals, sanatoria, and medical clinics; hundreds of such buildings were constructed during the New Deal years. The Social Security Act of 1935 appropriated funds for the expansion of institutions for children with various disabilities and the development of health education all over the country.

Probably the most important New Deal health programs were the Resettlement Administration’s (1935–1937) efforts to provide medical care for the poor in the South, and later the programs of the Farm Security Administration (FSA, 1937–1946), which, as Michael Grey’s New Deal Medicine documents, made “medical care delivery a cardinal feature of the New Deal’s rural rehabilitation program.” Over the course of the next six years, the FSA established medical care cooperatives in one-third of the rural counties in the United States, concentrated in the South and the West. The cooperatives were open to all FSA borrowers and their families and covered ordinary medical care, obstetrical care, emergency surgery, some hospitalizations, and ordinary drugs. FSA leaders involved county and state medical societies in the planning process, ensuring that participation by clients and doctors was voluntary, and allowing a free choice of doctors. While these medical cooperatives were critical to the melioration of rural health care, the FSA’s migrant health program was probably the most innovative and pathbreaking New Deal health initia-

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Emphasizing health education and prevention, as well as treatment, the migrant health program depended upon nurses (all women) and stretched professional boundaries to give them widespread clinical and administrative responsibility.

The tumultuous economic, political, and social environment of the New Deal was also the occasion for major initiatives in occupational health. Workers who were thrown out of work in what were known as the dusty trades (jobs in mining, construction, foundries, steel mills, etc. that exposed workers to a wide variety of poisonous dusts) argued that industry bore the responsibility for their predicament. They contended that their plight was not the result of individual failing or bad luck, but, rather, was due to the inadequate protection offered them by their employers, and they turned to the courts for redress. Thousands of workers in the dusty trades, laid off during the Depression, brought lawsuits against employers seeking damages for exposure to silica. This led to a broad liability crisis threatening the closing of industrial plants and a vast economic loss. For the first time, the problem of occupational disease moved out of the domain of professionals and a few labor unions into the arenas of politics, public policy, and popular culture, with the result that silicosis (a chronic occupational lung disease caused by the inhalation of finely ground sand) came to be called the “king of occupational disease.” Before the Depression ended, novels, movies, national magazine exposés, and intense media attention forced the issue of industrially caused chronic disease, especially silicosis, onto the national agenda.

The financial crisis was addressed, however inadequately, through the eventual inclusion of silicosis in the various state compensation systems. But the political crisis remained as long as the issue was in the public arena, and during the mid-1930s came the revelation that perhaps as many as 1,500 workers had been killed by exposure to silica dust while working on a tunnel project in Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, an incident that Martin Cherniack describes in The Hawk’s Nest Incident as “America’s worst industrial disaster.” Newspapers and weeklies all over the country made silicosis a national scandal, telling the story of how workers had died of acute silicosis and other respiratory diseases while constructing this tunnel for the Union Carbide Company. The two thousand workers were mostly southern rural blacks drawn to the job and away from their families farther south by the promise of steady pay during the Depression. They had been ordered to drill through a mountain that was composed of nearly pure silica, even then known as a substance that destroyed lung tissue, incapacitating and killing its victims. The fact that the workers were primarily poor, black migrants far away from...
These New Mexico schoolchildren, photographed in 1941, enjoy lunch supplied by the WPA school lunch program, which paid cooks to prepare healthful meals using food from the surplus commodities program. National Archives and Records Administration

their loved ones led management to believe that they could cover up the deaths.

As a result of the publicity and subsequent congressional hearings, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins sponsored a conference in 1936 that brought together representatives of government, labor, and industry to help resolve the silicosis crisis. The importance of a national approach that gave workers a voice was represented institutionally through the creation of the Division of Labor Standards, which for the first time focused the attention of the federal government on occupational diseases and the need for engineering reforms to protect the work force. Indeed, under the Social Security Act, the Public U.S. Health Service provided funds to state departments of health for the establishment of industrial hygiene divisions.

The Public Health Service also initiated a variety of programs to improve sanitation and health, especially in rural areas, but it was one project that it began in 1932 and continued for forty years that would overshadow the constructive work that the Public Health Service did during the Depression. In 1972 it was revealed that the Public Health Service had been engaged in a study of the effects of untreated syphilis on black men in Macon County, Alabama. The study involved 399 men who had syphilis, and 201 more who were disease-free and used as controls. Macon County was one of the poorest counties in the South, with an epi-
The FSA agricultural workers camp in Bridgeton, New Jersey, included a clinic, where this child was treated in 1942.

Academic of chronic malnutrition and other serious health problems. Rather than deal with the widespread syphilis among its residents, the Public Health Service chose to study what happened to these men if their syphilis was left untreated. According to Jim Jones’s Bad Blood, the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male, as it was called, was the longest-running non-therapeutic experiment on human beings in medical history. The Tuskegee study is probably the best-known health-related activity of the Depression era, and it casts a shadow over the government’s many positive accomplishments in health and nutrition during the period.

See Also: BREADLINES; CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; HOMELESSNESS; TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS PROJECT.

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HEARST, WILLIAM RANDOLPH

William Randolph Hearst (April 29, 1863–August 14, 1951) was from the 1890s until his death the most powerful newspaper publisher in the United States. Born in San Francisco to millionaire miner George Hearst and philanthropist Phoebe Apperson Hearst, William Randolph Hearst, known to his friends and employees as “the Chief,” built a media empire that at its height in the late 1920s encompassed twenty-six daily newspapers in eighteen cities; a Sunday supplement; nine magazines, including Good Housekeeping and Cosmopolitan; newsreel, wire, and syndicated feature services; a film production company; and several radio stations.

When, in October and November of 1929, the stock market crashed, Hearst called for calm, arguing that the American economy was fundamentally sound. Although his personal fortunes were not immediately harmed—his primary investments were in real estate—his media empire, particularly his newspapers, suffered from a fall in advertising revenues. Hearst had borrowed heavily to support his extravagant lifestyle and purchase new media properties, and he could not afford the slightest loss of revenues. In May 1930, to raise funds to pay off outstanding debts, he incorporated Hearst Consolidated Publications, Inc., and offered preferred stock in the new corporation to the public. While the preferred stock offered a 7 percent dividend, which was paid regularly until mid 1938, it carried no voting rights.

By the late spring of 1931, when it had become apparent that no rapid economic recovery was in store, Hearst urged President Herbert Hoover to authorize the immediate expenditure of $5 billion to provide public works jobs for the unemployed at prevailing wages. When Hoover declined to follow his advice, Hearst became determined to oppose his bid for reelection. Instead, Hearst endorsed Texas congressman and Speaker of the House John Nance Garner for the Democratic nomination for the presidency in 1932, but Hearst switched his endorsement to Franklin Delano Roosevelt when it became clear that Garner could not win the nomination. Hearst became an enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt and contributed advice and funds to his campaign. Though the publisher opposed the National Industrial Recovery Act and other New Deal economic measures, he did not turn against the Roosevelt presidency until 1935, when Roosevelt notified Hearst that he was going to raise income taxes in an effort to preserve democracy and capitalism from threats on the left and on the right. Hearst, still deeply in debt from overspending for business and personal purposes, responded that Roosevelt’s graduated income tax was “communist” because it redistributed wealth. Hearst promised to oppose the president and the tax increase with all his resources.

Hearst’s anti-Communist tirades and his newspapers’ attacks on Roosevelt and the New Deal were so vicious, especially during Roosevelt’s campaign for a second term in 1936, that many of Hearst’s readers were forced to choose between the president and the publisher. When large numbers chose Roosevelt and boycotted the Hearst publications, the resulting circulation and advertising decline pushed the Hearst corporations towards bankruptcy. In 1937, the Hearst corporations went into receivership and Hearst was forced to sell off many of his assets, including significant real estate holdings, portions of his art collections, and several publications.
As newspaper circulations increased during World War II and costs declined with the rationing of newsprint and the printing of smaller issues, the Hearst corporations were able to refinance their outstanding loans. By the middle of the 1940s, William Randolph Hearst had regained control of his publishing empire. He spent the last years of his life in Beverly Hills, and died in August 1951 at age eighty-eight.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; ELECTION OF 1932; ISOLATIONISM.

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HELLMAN, LILLIAN

Lillian Florence Hellman (June 20, 1905–June 30, 1984) was one of the greatest American playwrights of the twentieth century. She is best known for The Children’s Hour (1934), The Little Foxes (1939), Watch on the Rhine (1941), and Toys in the Attic (1960). Many of her plays have been turned into successful motion pictures. Hellman’s focus on the basic human problems of jealousy, greed, cowardice, and ambition give her dramas a weight of emotional depth, while they also shed light on the broader historical and political conflicts of Western society in the middle of the twentieth century. The Little Foxes, staged at the end of the Great Depression with Tallullah Bankhead in a starring role, provided a withering indictment of the American capitalist system through its portrayal of a southern family torn apart in the course of haggling over seed money for the construction of a mill. The radical sentiments expressed in the play were a possible outgrowth of Hellman’s peripheral involvement in various Communist front organizations in the 1930s. Though she later claimed to have never belonged to the Communist Party, Hellman also never avoided relationships with those who did. This proximity to possible Communists eventually led to her being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1952, an ordeal that she recounts in one of her famous memoirs, Scoundrel Time (1976).

Hellman was born in New Orleans, Louisiana. As a child, she spent half of each year in the South, and half in New York City, where her father did business. Though she preferred the more easygoing lifestyle of New Orleans, she went to college in New York and got a job at a publishing house after leaving school. Her vivacious personality could not endure an office environment for long, however, and when the writer Arthur Krober offered to marry her and take her to California, she jumped at the chance to escape. The working relationship Hellman established with Hollywood lasted much longer than her marriage, and by the early 1930s she was living with mystery writer Dashiell Hammett. The two writers remained close companions until Hammett’s death in 1961.

Due to her accomplishments and growth as a writer during the 1930s, Hellman became one of America’s foremost public intellectuals. She was never shy about confronting inflammatory topics. For instance, her acclaimed play The Children’s Hour explored issues of lesbianism while also examining, twenty years before McCarthyism, the damage caused by unsubstantiated public accusations. Other writers often criticized her by calling her a publicity hound, and author Mary McCarthy once said that “everything [Hellman] writes is a lie, including and the.” But these surly critics rarely matched Hellman’s natural ability to be a true public figure. In her later years, Hellman turned to teaching and to the writing of her much-acclaimed memoirs, the first volume of which, An Unfinished Woman, was awarded the National Book Award in 1969. Hellman died on Martha’s Vineyard in 1984.

See Also: HAMMETT, DASHIELL; HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (HUAC).
HENDERSON, LEON

Economist and administrator Leon Henderson (May 26, 1895–October 19, 1986) was born in Millville, New Jersey. He earned a bachelor’s degree in economics from Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania in 1920, and gained a national reputation as a consumer credit specialist after joining the Russell Sage Foundation in 1925.

Henderson was a prominent critic of the early New Deal’s pro-business orientation. To assuage consumer interests, National Recovery Administration (NRA) chief Hugh Johnson appointed Henderson as special adviser in December 1933 and then as director of the NRA’s research and planning division in February 1934. However, Henderson remained a persistent critic of the NRA’s industry-written Blue Eagle codes, which supported restricted production and high prices. Henderson’s research revealed the inequity and inefficiency of the codes, a conclusion presented at the NRA’s price hearings in January 1935, which helped to discredit the agency prior to its abolition.

Henderson’s ideas influenced the evolution of the New Deal. He believed that strong competition, government enforced if necessary, would generate prosperity and that monopolies and price-fixing by big business deterred competition. Henderson also championed economic planning that empowered the government to make basic decisions about production and prices in major industries. Moreover, the recession of 1937 to 1938 convinced him that increased deficit spending was needed to stimulate consumption and bring recovery. As economic adviser to Works Progress Administration director Harry Hopkins, Henderson helped Federal Reserve chairman Marriner Eccles persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt to accept this approach in April 1938. Accordingly, Henderson acted as a bridge between New Dealers who favored a trust-busting solution to America’s economic problems and those who advocated an approach that would later be called Keynesianism. Henderson hoped to integrate both elements into a broad liberal agenda with his appointment as first executive secretary of the Congressional Temporary Economic Committee, established in June 1938. Disappointed that its final report in March 1941 focused on antimonopoly concerns, Henderson called for a comprehensive statement of national economic needs and a broad program to meet these needs.

In April 1941 Roosevelt appointed Henderson to head the Office of Price Administration (OPA), which regulated the production, distribution, and price increases of retail goods. Henderson’s robust use of government powers to protect consumers increased his unpopularity with business and congressional conservatives. Suffering from ill health and overwork, Henderson left government after the Republicans gained seats in the 1942 congressional elections, in which the OPA was an issue. His vision of a reform agenda that combined the regulatory, planning, and fiscal powers of government went unfulfilled. With the success of wartime deficit spending, it was the more limited Keynesian approach that became the liberal orthodoxy.

See Also: ECONOMISTS; KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD.

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HERNDON, ANGELO, CASE

During a five-year period in the mid-1930s, the Angelo Herndon case focused national attention on racial inequality within the southern legal system and on the politicized nature of southern justice. The affair began in June 1932, when Angelo Hern-
don, a nineteen-year-old black Communist, helped organize a large interracial demonstration of unemployed workers in Atlanta, Georgia. Fearful that the worsening Depression provided a fertile environment for radical political groups, local authorities arrested Herndon the following month. Utilizing an old law originally enacted to prohibit slave revolts, they charged him with “attempting to incite insurrection” against the state of Georgia, a capital offense.

While in jail Herndon turned for assistance to the International Labor Defense (ILD), a radical legal defense organization. Established by Communists and other leftists in 1925 in order to defend “class war prisoners,” the ILD contended that in a capitalistic society most legal prosecutions were politically based. Thus the organization insisted that a proper defense must involve not only skillful courtroom maneuvers but also “mass pressure” outside the courthouse. To defend Herndon the ILD violated deep South racial etiquette by retaining two local African-American attorneys, Benjamin J. Davis and John Geer. At Herndon’s controversial trial in January 1933, Davis and Geer challenged the constitutionality of the insurrection law, arguing that it unreasonably restricted free speech. Judge Lee B. Wyatt promptly rejected their motions. Following three days of testimony marked by prosecutors’ emotional attacks on Communism and interracial activity, an all-white jury returned a verdict of guilty and sentenced the young organizer to eighteen to twenty years in prison.

The ILD promptly initiated a national campaign on Herndon’s behalf, eventually developing the case into a cause celebre. After the state supreme court rejected Herdon’s appeal, the ILD retained several specialists in constitutional law and took the case to the United States Supreme Court. But in May 1935 the court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the constitutional issues had not been properly raised at the original trial. While the ILD prepared to initiate a new round of legal action back in Georgia, the group sought additional allies for the Herndon campaign. As part of “united front” efforts by Communists to organize a broad political coalition against fascism in Europe, the ILD now sought assistance from non-Communist organizations that it had previously disdained. The organization eventually formed the Joint Committee to Aid the Herndon Defense, which included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union. In December 1935 in Atlanta, Judge Hugh M. Dorsey unexpectedly struck down the insurrection law, but the state supreme court promptly reversed his ruling, setting the stage for another trip to the U.S. Supreme Court. In April 1937 the high court ruled by a vote of five to four in *Herndon v. Lowry* that the insurrection law, as construed and applied, was unconstitutional. Justice Owen J. Roberts wrote that the Georgia statute “amounts merely to a dragnet which may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of government.” The ruling not only freed Herndon but virtually eliminated further prosecutions under the controversial law.

The Herndon case has often been compared to the epic Scottsboro case in Alabama, since both highlighted racial injustice in southern courtrooms. But unlike Scottsboro, the Herndon Case was also an important civil liberties case, one that demonstrated that southern prosecutors and judges were quite willing to violate first amendment rights in order to silence radical political movements. Finally, by vigorously defending Herndon and openly challenging white supremacy in Dixie, the ILD and American Communists earned new respect from African Americans.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE (ILD); SCOTTSBORO CASE.

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Heroes serve a vital function in every culture and every time. They reconcile existing social tensions, affirm community values, and give people symbols to help shape their identities. Heroes are what people imagine them to be, they exist only so long as they are needed, and are transformed according to people’s needs and expectations. Such needs were acute during the Depression years when much of what Americans had come to assume about their culture was in a state of disarray and disintegration. New types of heroes emerged to address this confusion. In an age of disorder, heroes defied, embraced, or subverted the chaos. In so doing, they helped the public survive it. Traditional heroes no longer sufficed during the Great Depression, when scarcity and widespread unemployment called into question the traditional middle-class axiom that success followed hard work. As millions were victimized by forces beyond their control, the “self-made men” and Horatio Alger heroes of yesterday gave way to the suffering, outlaw, and trickster heroes of the Great Depression.

Throughout 1930s American culture, victims assumed heroic proportions: the impoverished Joad family of John Steinbeck’s *Grapes of Wrath*, the tragically afflicted Lou Gehrig, the resolute Rhett Butler at the end of *Gone with the Wind*, and the migrant workers and union organizers celebrated in the songs of Woody Guthrie. Herbert Hoover, the most famous self-made man in America, had become the chief villain of the Depression, his very name synonymous with misery and hopelessness. Taking his place was a son of wealth and privilege struck unexpectedly by a debilitating disease. Franklin Roosevelt’s struggle with polio and his courageous triumph over adversity mirrored how suffering Americans imagined their own plight.

Outlaw heroes, on the other hand, refused to be victimized. Turning the Victorian work ethic inside-out, they cynically demonstrated the benefits of subverting and assaulting the system. Such Hollywood gangster films as *Scarface* (1932), *Public Enemy* (1931), and *Little Caesar* (1931) mocked immigrant and business success stories with Italian and Irish-American antiheroes who advanced in their “professions” through ruthless ambition, deceit, and murder. The exploits of such real-life bank-robbers as Bonnie and Clyde and John Dillinger excited Americans so much that the authorities felt compelled to remind people that these were criminals and not folk heroes.

Other heroes found it more suitable to simply work around the system. The hard-boiled detectives of pulp fiction and film existed alongside the legal authorities, going places where the police would not and achieving results that they could not by circumventing the law. Pulp and comic book superheroes such as the Shadow, Batman, and even Superman sometimes came into conflict with the police in the course of their own vigilante crusades. At a time when the institutions of power seemed inadequate in the face of social crises, these heroes appealed to the desire for swift and righteous justice.

Sometimes humor is the best response to a bad situation, and Depression-era trickster heroes spoke to that virtue. Building upon the comedic working-class sensibilities of Charlie Chaplin and pioneering in the art of improvised anarchy on film, the Marx Brothers ridiculed the ruling classes even as they dished out self-deprecating humor for the unemployed. Mae West mocked the “important” men in her films and demonstrated the sexual power that women could wield over them. Warner Brothers cartoon characters like Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck provided even more outrageous laughs at the expense of snobs, fat-cats, and blowhards. In such heroes, powerless Americans could see the qualities of resilience, resourcefulness, and wits that would get them through the difficult days. For these were the true heroes of the Great Depression, the common people themselves.

See Also: GANGSTER FILMS; HARD-BOILED DETECTIVES; SUPERMAN.
**HICKOK, LORENA**

Lorena Alice Hickok (March 7, 1893–May 3, 1968), Eleanor Roosevelt’s trusted confidante, was born in East Troy, Wisconsin. Beaten by a father who moved frequently to find work, Hickok left home at fourteen, and struggled to finish one year of college before joining a Battle Creek, Michigan, newspaper as a personal features writer. In 1915, she returned to Wisconsin to become the society editor for the Milwaukee Sentinel. Bored, Hickok convinced her editor to assign her to the city desk, where she developed a reputation as a skilled interviewer. She transferred to the Minneapolis Tribune in 1917 where, under the guidance of Tribune editor Thomas J. Dillon, Hickok became such a skilled political and sports reporter that in 1928 the Associated Press (AP) hired her as a wire reporter. At the AP, she became so adept at covering politics, the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, and other dramatic assignments that her byline appeared atop her stories.

Hickok, who first met Eleanor Roosevelt in 1928 when Hickok covered the New York Democratic Committee, grew close to Mrs. Roosevelt during the 1932 campaign. The women soon trusted one another, with Mrs. Roosevelt speaking honestly to Hickok about politics, social issues, and her fears about her life should her husband win the election. The two woman became so close that Hickok let Mrs. Roosevelt see her stories before she submitted them, and in one case, agreed to Mrs. Roosevelt’s request that a story be delayed. Their campaign experience led to a lifetime of devotion to one another.

In 1933, Hickok, who had fallen in love with Mrs. Roosevelt, left the AP because she felt she could not write objectively about the Roosevelts. The First Lady then recommended that Harry Hopkins hire Hickok to investigate for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) the conditions average Americans confronted during the Depression. From 1933 to 1935, Hickok visited thirty-two states and provided detailed reports on New Deal policy, living conditions, and politics to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Hopkins. An astute and engaged observer, Hickok assessed the problems a community faced quickly and solicited trenchant comments that helped the Roosevelts and Hopkins see their policies from a citizen’s perspective.

Hickok provided invaluable advice to Mrs. Roosevelt as the First Lady struggled to adjust to White House life. Hickok recommended that Mrs. Roosevelt hold press conferences with women reporters and encouraged her to resume writing, most notably the First Lady’s monthly column *Mrs. Roosevelt’s Page* and her daily column *My Day*. Hickok also edited articles Mrs. Roosevelt submitted for publication, and served as her friend’s trusted sounding board, especially after Louis Howe’s death in 1935 and the president’s death in 1945. Hickok’s intense concern for unemployed coal miners spurred Eleanor Roosevelt’s interest and helped introduce her to the West Virginia resettlement community later known as Arthurdale. In the early years of the New Deal, the two women vacationed together and Hickok accompanied Mrs. Roosevelt on her official visit to Puerto Rico. When Hickok’s FERA assignment ended, the First Lady arranged for Hickok to work for the New York World’s Fair from 1937 to 1940, to serve as executive secretary of the women’s division of the Democratic National Committee from 1940 and 1945, and to live in the wartime White House.

Hickok’s worsening diabetes forced her to leave her job with the Democratic National Committee. In 1947, Eleanor Roosevelt helped her friend secure a job with the New York State Democratic Committee. Hickok’s health continued to decline, and in 1954, a frail, partially blind Hickok moved to Hyde Park to be closer to Mrs. Roosevelt. The two women collaborated on *Women of Courage* and Eleanor Roosevelt tried to stabilize Hickok’s fi-
HIGHLANDER FOLK SCHOOL

Established near Monteagle, Tennessee, in 1932, the Highlander Folk School was an important outpost of labor education and union organizing in the South during the 1930s. Through residential workshops, off-campus extension efforts, and community-based programs, the staff, headed by Myles Horton, simultaneously attempted to educate leaders for a new social order while enriching the cultural values of the southern Appalachian region.

In its initial years, Highlander’s objectives usually outpaced its actual achievements. The school involved itself in local strikes that were no more than temporarily successful, and internal differences over policies, curriculum, finances, and ideol-
ogy were almost constant concerns. Highlander’s staff members sincerely supported the interests of the working class and the cause of racial integration. But the faculty’s participation in socialist-related activities in the early and mid-1930s did little to increase the school’s appeal to southern wage earners, and it repeatedly found itself compelled to acquiesce to southern white sentiment and not admit black workers as students.

Nonetheless, in aiding mine, lumber, textile, and relief workers in Tennessee, and in introducing ways to overcome racial prejudice, Highlander anticipated the efforts of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to form interracial industrial unions in the South. Staff members served as union organizers for the 1937 Textile Workers Organizing Committee campaign and managed the educational component of several other union drives thereafter, assisting locals in maintaining and expanding their activities and teaching workers how to bargain collectively and live successfully under union contracts. Through its fieldwork, the Highlander faculty learned more about the problems facing unionizing southern laborers and used these experiences to improve the school’s promotion of the southern labor movement. Indeed, by the late 1930s Highlander was a vital source of labor education in the South, holding semiannual residence terms for men and women representing nearly every labor and progressive organization in the region and experimenting with educational ventures such as music and drama programs, writers’ workshops, and junior union camps. It would become fully integrated in 1944.

Such initiatives generated both controversy and support. Attacked on the one hand by southern industrialists, some Tennessee newspapers, and local officials angered by Highlander’s mobilization of a labor-led political coalition, and on the other by leftists impatient with the school’s refusal to be sufficiently doctrinaire, staff members adhered to a loosely-defined set of democratic principles that they believed offered concrete solutions to the concerns of southern workers. This broad-based commitment led to a decade of close cooperation between Highlander and the CIO.

That relationship soured after World War II, however. Frustrated by what it considered to be the narrowing of organized labor’s agenda, and unable to forge a farmer-labor coalition, the school’s leadership resolved that it would not attain its goals until it challenged southern segregation. Highlander subsequently became a significant forum for the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The center remains committed to ongoing struggles for social justice in Appalachia and the Deep South in the twenty-first century.

See Also: American Federation of Labor (AFL); Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO); Race and Ethnic Relations.

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HILLMAN, SIDNEY

Sidney “Hilkie” Hillman (March 23, 1887–July 10, 1946) was president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACW), founding member of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), co-director of the federal Office of Production Management (OPM) during World War II, and director of the CIO Political Action Committee. Born in Zagare, Lithuania, to a family of merchants and rabbis, Hillman’s intellectual achievements at a young age enabled him to pursue rabbinical studies. At Yeshiva, Hillman chafed under severe restrictions against secular training, and in 1903, he joined the socialist Bund. As a young revolutionary and labor organizer, Hillman fled Russia in late 1906 to avoid the czar’s persecution. He immigrated to the United States the following year.

Settling in Chicago, Hillman went to work in the needle trades where he experienced oppressive
labor conditions. He emerged as a local leader of independent immigrant garment workers during the violent Chicago garment strike of 1910, garnering notice from such Progressive leaders as Jane Ad-dams. In 1914 Hillman assumed the presidency of the new Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, an organization devoted to industrial unionism, led largely by socialists, anarchists, and Bundists, and made up predominantly of women and Jewish immigrants—three factors that encouraged the en-mity of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and conservative craft unions. Hillman’s organizing talents were prodigious: by the end of World War I the ACW represented nearly 50 percent of the nation’s garment workers.

In the reactionary 1920s, employers, AFL officials, and government representatives increasingly targeted Hillman for his allegiance to left-labor political organizations, especially his close relationship to supporters of the Russian revolution. Some of the nation’s leading attorneys, including Harvard’s Felix Frankfurter, rushed to defend Hillman. The 1924 convention of the ACW endorsed the presidential candidacy of Progressive Robert M. La Follette, signaling a moderation in Hillman’s social-ist activism. For founding ACW cooperative banks and housing programs, and for instituting a union unemployment insurance plan, Hillman was recog-nized by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch as “the flaming genius of union labor in the U.S.” by the late 1920s.

As the Depression worsened in the early 1930s, Hillman’s commitment to a workers’ vision of “industrial democracy,” in which workers’ organizations were made more powerful without revolution-ary class struggle, led him to endorse a cautious course of action for the ACW, including agreeing to wage cuts, endorse prohibitions against child labor, and boycotting sweatshop-manufactured goods. He campaigned vigorously for a national unemployment insurance plan. Hillman was well regarded within the Democratic Party of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and he counted among his con-fidantes such leading New Dealers as Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, Harold Ickes, and Senator Robert Wagner. Although Hillman held reservations about the labor provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, he did accept appointment to the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Board (NIRB) and quickly emerged as labor’s most audible voice in the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and in Washington.

Hillman found his service on the NIRB acutely frustrating, though by 1935 the ACW had recovered from its early Depression-era slump and its members had achieved significant wage increases. With the Schechter decision, which declared the NRA unconstitutional, Hillman’s optimism that government intervention in the economy would lead to economic recovery faded. In response, Hillman turned to the solution of mass industrial unionism. At the 1935 AFL convention, Hillman advocated the right of autoworkers to industrial union representation in a series of floor debates that culminated in a fight between the United Mineworkers’ John L. Lewis and the craft-based carpenter’s president William Hutcheson. Within days, the Committee for Industrial Organization, later called the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was founded as a federation of industrial unions closely tied to the Democratic Party. Among the unions newly af-filiated with the CIO were those in mining, the needle trades, typography, auto, steel, rubber, radio, oil, millinery, and mill and smelting. Initially, the CIO attempted to work within the institutional framework of the AFL, but by mid-1936 the AFL executive council suspended the ten founding unions of the new federation; expulsion of the ren-gade unions followed in 1937. Hillman served as vice-president of the fledgling organization.

Although considered a labor moderate, Hillman himself had little patience for peacemaking within the AFL; instead, his experience as president of the ACW led him to endorse a “new unionism,” incorporating a mass movement for industrial unionism with bureaucratic interventionism of the sort expressed most clearly by Roosevelt’s Second New Deal and the expansion of the welfare state. A significant component of the new unionism vision was rationalization within the workplace with the intent of eliminating outmoded work practices and bringing efficiency in production to employers. Roosevelt’s secretary of labor, Frances Perkins, called regularly on Hillman for advice. That advice was respected even by Roosevelt, who reportedly...
said upon encountering congressional opposition to the 1937 Fair Labor Standards Act, “I will never let Hillman down.”

Hillman was so wedded to the Roosevelt administration and the new unionism ideal that by the late 1930s his political opponents within and outside of organized labor questioned his commitment to the CIO rank and file. As a supporter of Roosevelt’s reelection to an unprecedented third term, Hillman found himself in opposition to Lewis, the president of the CIO, and to members of the Communist Party. Hillman’s support proved key to Roosevelt’s reelection in 1940, while the Hillman-Roosevelt coalition secured the election of Philip Murray to the presidency of the CIO in the same year. For his unwavering support, the administration rewarded Hillman with positions on the National Defense Advisory Commission, the Office of Production Management, and in 1942 the War Production Board. Hillman also directed the CIO’s Political Action Committee, an organization seen by opponents as too closely tied to the Roosevelt administration.

Troubled by President Harry Truman’s unpredictable attitudes toward progressive labor, alarmed by what seemed an impending red scare, and frustrated by failures of the CIO’s southern organizing campaign Operation Dixie, Hillman died of heart disease in July 1946.

See Also: AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS (ACW); AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); ORGANIZED LABOR.

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HINE, LEWIS

Lewis Wickes Hine (September 26, 1874–November 3, 1940) was born in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. After taking extension courses from Frank E. Manning, professor at the Wisconsin Normal School, he attended the University of Chicago for one year in 1900. Manning, just appointed superintendent of New York’s Ethical Culture School (ECS), hired Hine in 1901 as an assistant teacher of geography and nature study. Hine used his camera as an educational tool and ran the ECS photography club. After completing his degree in education at New York University, Hine decided to forge a free-lance career in sociological photography. In 1904 he directed his attention to photographing immigrants
arriving at Ellis Island in New York Harbor. In 1907, he began illustrating the six-volume Pittsburgh Survey (1909–1914) of steelworkers’ working and living conditions. He then gained renown among social reformers when the National Child Labor Committee enlisted him to document the problem of working children in America, a project he pursued from 1908 to 1918. Hine also photographed the aftermath of World War I in France and Belgium for the American Red Cross.

In the early 1920s Hine concluded, “I had done my share of negative,” and he decided to turn his lens toward the “intelligent interpretation of the world’s workers” through a “new-worker” series of photographs depicting heroic visions of human strength, dignity, and productivity in the context of the machine age. The most important series from this project, published as Men at Work (1932), followed laborers during the construction of New York’s Empire State Building. Although one critic decried Hine’s “exaggerated desire to glorify the working class,” Hine insisted that his work was “interpretative” rather than “documentary.” He noted, “If I could tell the story with words, I wouldn’t need to lug around a camera.” He further declared, “I wanted to show the things that had to be corrected . . . that had to be appreciated.” Still, he experimented with “art” photography while taking a few commercial assignments. The first major exhibition of his work was held at the Yonkers Art Museum in New York in 1931.

The American Red Cross sent Hine to drought-ridden rural Arkansas and Kentucky in 1931. After the publishing of his portfolio of mill workers, Through the Loom (1933), and its exhibition at the 1933 World’s Fair, the Tennessee Valley Authority hired Hine to photograph construction of two dams. Roy Stryker, head of the Historical Section of the Farm Security Administration, chose not hire Hine for the FSA photography staff; although Stryker admired Hine’s work, he knew his artistic temperament demanded more control over images than Stryker permitted FSA photographers. However, in 1936 the Works Progress Administration appointed Hine head photographer for the National Research Project studying productivity and technological change for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He focused on Civilian Construction Camps, unemployed miners, rural communities, and urban workers, but his work was not completed by 1937 due to poor health.

In 1938, the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation and the British Broadcasting Corporation hired Hine to prepare specials on the working man. Life magazine later bought some of his photos, the New York State Museum assembled a permanent collection of his work, and the New York Public Library began collecting it, as did a number of major art museums. The reformist Russell Sage Foundation funded two folios of his images of Ellis Island and child laborers. Applauded for the pioneering quality of his documentary vision, Hine nevertheless struggled financially throughout his career, and he died in near poverty in 1940.

See Also: PHOTOGRAPHY.

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BLANCHE M. G. LINDEN HISTORIY, INTERPRETATION, AND MEMORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

From Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan, the legacy and memory of the Great Depression shaped American culture and politics, and continue to stand as major interpretive questions for scholars. Because of the Depression and New Deal, generations of Americans supported an active presi-
dency and expansive national government, and insisted that frugality was a virtue, even as they enjoyed economic prosperity. Perhaps the most enduring political legacy of the Great Depression was the Democratic Party’s half-century hold on Congress. A coalition crafted by Roosevelt insisted that Social Security, farm commodity price supports, and the regulation of banking, securities, wages, and working hours remained essential duties of the national government. Generations of labor union members voted for the party that secured their right to organize. As direct memories of the Depression receded, Americans’ loyalties to particular New Deal programs waned, but most citizens still look to the president and Congress for economic initiatives and leadership in times of crisis, both legacies of the Depression years.

Great Depression scholarship has focused not only on the event’s causes, but also on the government’s responses to the challenge. Herbert Hoover’s presidency was long judged a failure on the grounds that he did little to ameliorate the crisis. By the 1970s a more nuanced version of Hoover appeared, one that emphasized his progressive impulses and recognized that he took unprecedented government action in the face of hard times. Many Americans of the 1930s and later assumed a direct causal relationship between the stock market crash of October 1929 and the Great Depression. Most scholarship (e.g., Robert S. McElvaine) has pointed to the more fundamental problem—that consumer demand could no longer keep up with production—and has emphasized the weakness of the nation’s banking system and relatively unregulated securities markets of the 1920s. Historians and economists continue to debate the roots of American economic conditions of the 1930s, although practically all agree that the phenomenon was international rather than strictly American in character. Such interpretations trace the Depression to the unstable international economic situation created by post-World War I tariff barriers and war reparations.

From the 1930s through the 1960s Roosevelt himself stood as the central figure in most accounts of the Great Depression. The image of Roosevelt as master pragmatist and unparelleled politician reached its zenith in Arthur Schlesinger’s Age of Roosevelt trilogy (1957–1960). By the 1960s some historians viewed the Depression less as the occasion for the emergence of Rooseveltian consensus than as the crisis of liberal capitalism; the New Deal thus became not a triumph of moderate reform, but a successful maneuver by capitalists to save the old order (e.g., Barton Bernstein). By the 1970s and the 1980s, historians continued to produce a rich literature on the Depression years, assessing the particular impact of the Depression on minorities and women (e.g., Harvard Sitkoff and Susan Ware), for instance, and exploring the social and cultural history of the Depression (e.g., Richard Pells). Recent scholarship on Depression-era politics has emphasized not the boldness and initiatives of the New Deal, but the relatively limited bureaucratic capacity of the American government.

Representations of the Depression have appeared regularly in American culture from the 1930s to the present. In the 1930s, comic strips such as Dick Tracy and Little Orphan Annie noted the country’s hard times, sometimes excoriating the rich, but always assuring Americans that their institutions were sound. Films such as William Wellman’s The Public Enemy (1931) and Frank Capra’s Meet John Doe (1941) attempted to explain the Depression. John Steinbeck’s novel The Grapes of Wrath (1939) and John Ford’s 1940 film adaptation provided the most enduring representation of Dust Bowl poverty. Economic hard times also appeared in popular songs, such as “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?” However, most music painted a rosier picture; “Happy Days Are Here Again” became the Democratic Party theme song until the Clinton years. During the prosperous years of the 1950s and 1960s fewer writers and artists gave their works a Depression setting, perhaps because some 1930s communitarian responses to the Depression appeared suspect in the context of the Cold War, but also because of a changed focus on civil rights and other contemporary struggles. By the 1970s some television series, such as The Waltons (1972–1981), rediscovered the Depression. But such images were tinged by nostalgic longing for home and community bonds rather than an anxious memory of systemic economic failure. The musical and movie Annie (1982) emphasized grit, individualism, and
luck. Studs Terkel’s oral history of the Depression reminded readers that for millions of Americans the 1930s were not the good old days, but hard times. Nostalgia for World War II during the late 1990s and early 2000s again focused popular attention on the generation that weathered the Depression, although the lessons drawn emphasized individual character rather than the need for bold, large-scale government responses to common national problems.

See Also: ALLEN, FREDERICK LEWIS; CAUSES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION; HOOVER, HERBERT; NEW DEAL; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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HITLER, ADOLF

Adolf Hitler (April 20, 1889–April 30, 1945) was a founding member and leader of the National Socialist Party of Germany (NSDAP, Nazi Party) from 1922. He became chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933, a post he held until taking his own life as the victorious Allied powers marched on Berlin in April 1945.

BEGINNINGS
Hitler was born into lower-middle-class respectability in the small Austrian town Braunau am Inn near the border with Germany. Unsuccessful and unhappy at school, he left at the age of sixteen to pursue a career as a painter in the imperial capital but twice was rejected by the Academy of Graphic Arts in Vienna. The rejection was a serious blow to his pride, and he spent the years from 1907 to 1913 in Vienna, eking out an impoverished existence by selling his paintings and sleeping in flophouses. Life in Vienna played a crucial role in shaping Hitler’s anti-Semitism, which was to become his guiding principle in NSDAP policies. Moreover, his decision to join a Bavarian infantry regiment in 1914 (he was rejected as unfit by the Austrian army) helped to cement his prejudices and his determination to right the wrongs that, he believed, had brought on Germany’s World War I defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, the peace agreement signed at the palace of Versailles in June 1919. Hitler believed this treaty humiliated the German people.

Twice decorated with the Iron Cross by the German Imperial government, Hitler nonetheless failed to rise above the lowly rank of lance-corporal during the war because he was deemed to lack the right qualities to make him an effective leader. Injured in combat, he was employed by the German army to collect intelligence against extremist political groups operating in Munich. In September 1919 the work brought him into contact with the German Workers’ Party, a small group consisting of no more than forty members. By July 1921 Hitler had become leader of the party, demonstrating his particular skills as an orator who was both appealing and charismatic while articulating bigoted views and woolly promises. He now exuded the self-confidence of a man who believed his destiny was to lead the German people. Hitler experienced a short period of notoriety as leader of an attempted putsch against the regional government in Bavaria.
and the national government in Weimar—the small town in the state of Thuringia that was home to Germany’s first republican government—in November 1923, which landed him in jail for less than a year. It took the following five years for the NSDAP or Nazi Party to begin making political inroads in the Weimar Republic.

THE ROAD TO POWER

Hitler used the years from 1924 to 1928 to strengthen the party and his grip on it, while the early half-baked policies of the NSDAP developed into a cohesive ideology. The Nazi Party’s first political victory came in May 1928 when the town of Coburg in Bavaria gave the NSDAP a majority in local elections. The timing of the Nazis first electoral success coincided with early signs that German economic performance was stalling: industrial output had dropped for the first time since 1924, levels of foreign investment had fallen, and the number of people employed had begun to slide downward. By the following year, Germany was in the midst of a full-blown economic crisis. Declining levels of foreign investment and rules governing monetary policy imposed on the German government and the central bank, the Reichsbank, meant that government at every level, local, regional, and national, found itself desperately short of funds to pay for even the most basic of services.

The rules governing membership in the gold standard meant that the successive German governments found it almost impossible to formulate an effective policy to combat the crisis. In order to regain the foreign investment they had lost, the Reichsbank raised interest rates, while the minority government of the “Hunger Chancellor” Heinrich Brüning, which took office in March 1930, adhered to the principles of economic orthodoxy by raising interest rates and acting to limit government spending. Germany had become very dependent on foreign investment, and Brüning believed he had to go along with what the bankers wanted—gold standard orthodoxy—if he were to regain foreign investment in Germany. However, this strategy lay in tatters in the wake of the banking crisis that gripped Germany in the summer of 1931.

Brüning’s inability to offer the German electorate any real solutions to the second major economic crisis to grip the country in less than ten years reflected the widespread failure of all politicians in the center of German politics to offer either viable or appealing solutions to the economic collapse. Instead, it was the extremist political parties, the German Communist Party (KPD) and the Nazi Party, which were the political beneficiaries. The crisis provided Hitler with the opportunity to capture the support of more than one-third of the voting population. Hitler became chancellor on January 30, 1933, because of a potent combination of well-organized party activism (the NSDAP was successful in capturing the support of farmers by combining party political rallies with practical agricultural advice for example), winning slogans, and the collusion of leading political figures who, while not Nazis, supported Hitler’s rise to power because they believed he would prevent Germany’s slide into civil war. The Nazis also made enthusiastic use of political violence, particularly against the Com-

Adolf Hitler (standing in car) salutes parading troops in Nuremberg in 1935. National Archives and Records Administration
munists. But the NSDAP made it clear that Jews, Poles, and other groups whom they considered socially undesirable were their enemies too. After January 1933 these groups were to become Nazism’s first victims.

The first big electoral breakthrough came on September 14, 1930, when the NSDAP became the second-largest party in the German parliament, the Reichstag. By July 1932 Hitler had run Germany’s aging president and war hero Paul von Hindenburg a close race in presidential elections, and Hitler’s position in the Reichstag was strengthened by elections in which the NSDAP gained 37.3 percent of the vote, making it the largest party in the Reichstag. Although the Nazi vote fell by some four percent in the November elections of 1932, the machinations of power-brokers in the German state, such as former Director of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht and ex-Chancellor Franz von Papen, ensured that the chancellorship was delivered into Nazi hands. Although at first in a cabinet dominated by conservatives, by March 1933 the Nazis had succeeded in suspending civil rights in Germany, arrested their leading left-wing opponents, and with the passage of the Enabling Act on March 23, 1933, secured comprehensive law-making powers and unprecedented control of German society.

THE NAZI RECOVERY

Part of the Nazis’ electoral appeal lay in their bold prescriptions for economic recovery. They promised to reorganize the economy to serve the interests of the nation and not the greedy demands of foreign bankers; they proposed new schemes to generate employment and to value the “ordinary German.” But they skillfully avoided any talk of redistributing wealth, so as not to put off middle-class supporters, including big business groups. The Nazis intended to exploit capitalism, not destroy it.

The measures put in place to quell the German banking crisis of 1931 provided the foundation for Nazi economics. In September 1934, Schacht, now restored as director of the Reichsbank, issued the “New Plan,” which turned the 1931 exchange controls into a complex system of monetary and trade restrictions. All imports had to be authorized by the German government, and German capital could not be moved abroad freely. (Of course, this action had implications for Jews and other groups who were trying to escape the country.) Germany became increasingly detached from the international economy, signing only bilateral trading agreements with countries that either sold essential commodities or whose governments were central to German diplomatic ambitions.

Under the Nazis, state policy came to control prices, wages, private investment banks, and all other aspects of investment. Despite all the hype, however, not all Nazi public works schemes were as effective as they claimed to be in soaking up unemployment or generating recovery more broadly. The most effective schemes centered on public building and construction programs that involved renovating houses and building new roads. From 1935, the state’s management of the domestic economy took a sinister turn as public investment in rearmament replaced civilian job creation as the basis for continued economic expansion—a move cemented by the introduction of the Four-Year Plan under the control of Nazi Minister and Chief Commander of the Luftwaffe (airforce) Hermann Göring. Aircraft production, for example, now leaped from its 1935 level of around three thousand aircraft a year to an annual average well in excess of five thousand. But this emphasis on military output also meant that consumables like clothing and household goods became a poor second in Nazi priorities.

Nazi spending policies were also used as a lever to extend the party’s control over German society. Trade unions were destroyed; the government controlled wage rates (between 1933 and 1938 they dropped by around seven percent) and introduced compulsory labor service for some 400,000 men between 1933 and 1935. The drop in German unemployment from a level of more than six million in 1932 to less than a million by 1937 was spectacular, but the cost to civil liberties in Germany was incalculable. In 1933 the Nazi publication the Völkischer Beobachter was proud to claim that Franklin Roosevelt had adopted the policies of Hitler and Mussolini. There were parallels, albeit superficial ones, between, for example, U.S. and German public-works schemes and the declared ambitions of the Reich Labor Service and the Civilian Conservation Corps.
But the curtailment of individual and corporate freedoms in Germany was the clearest indication that U.S. and German recovery policies differed fundamentally from one another.

See Also: DICTATORSHIP; EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; KRISTALLNACHT; MUSSOLINI, BENITO; STALIN, JOSEPH; WORLD WAR II AND THE ENDING OF THE DEPRESSION.

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PATRICIA CLAVIN

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HOLIDAY, BILLIE

One of the most innovative jazz singers of all time, Billie Holiday (April 7, 1915–July 17, 1959) began her legendary singing career in Harlem nightclubs at the height of the Great Depression, catching the public’s attention with her unique diction, phrasing, and emotive vocals.

Born Eleanora Fagan Gough in 1915 to teenage parents, Holiday spent her early years in poverty in Baltimore, Maryland. Her father, a jazz guitarist with Fletcher Henderson’s band, never supported his family. Young Holiday dropped out of school in the fifth grade to run errands for a brothel. In 1927, she and her mother moved to New York City. Desperate for money, she auditioned as a dancer in a Harlem speakeasy, Pod and Jerry’s Log Cabin, but was hired as a singer instead. Growing up imitating Louis Armstrong and Bessie Smith, singing came naturally to Holiday.

In 1933, jazz writer and producer John Hammond heard Holiday perform. Impressed with her bluesy renditions of jazz standards, he signed her to Columbia Records. The Depression created financial and racial difficulties for many African Americans, but black artists prospered during the 1930s because New Deal legislation established the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935, providing unemployed artists and writers with work. The WPA contributed to the flourishing cultural scene in Harlem, in which Holiday was an integral figure. She spent much of the 1930s performing and touring with jazz legends Count Basie, Benny Goodman, and Duke Ellington, but it was her collaboration with saxophonist Lester Young, who nicknamed her “Lady Day,” that highlighted her unique vocal talents, jumpstarting her recording career. Between 1935 and 1938, she released approximately eighty songs marketed for the black jukebox audience. In 1935, she made her first of many appearances at Harlem’s Apollo Theater, and in 1939 she became the first black performer to integrate Artie Shaw’s band.

The same year, she performed her trademark song “Strange Fruit,” a powerful condemnation of lynching, to an integrated audience at the Café Society, a New York nightclub. The song came to represent the black artist’s experience with racism. Increasing racial hostilities slowed Holiday’s touring and hindered her commercial success. She spent the majority of the 1940s in New York performing and recording hit songs for Decca Records to avoid the violence of the South. In 1946, she appeared alongside Louis Armstrong in the film New Orleans, but expressed anger over having to portray a domestic. Her popularity as a singer afforded her little protection from the racial discrimination of the era.
Although a success professionally, addiction and abusive relationships marred her personal life. She died in 1959 of complications from drug addiction. Despite poverty, racism, and sexism, Holiday remains one of the most influential American singers of all time.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; ELLINGTON, DUKE; JAZZ; MUSIC.

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Holiday, Billie, with William Duffy. Lady Sings the Blues. 1956.

MARY L. NASH

HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY

Motion pictures had already occupied a central place in American entertainment for nearly thirty years prior to the onset of the Great Depression. But during the ensuing decade, the Hollywood film industry assumed a new level of importance in the lives of Americans and in the shaping of a national culture. Movies offered needed escape for Depression-weary audiences, and they created powerful myths to reconcile social tensions and affirm traditional values. Indeed, by the time the nation went to war, the products of Hollywood had become virtually synonymous with America itself.

SOCIAL DISORDER IN THE MOVIES, 1930–1934

The stock market crash of 1929 came at a particularly difficult moment for Hollywood movie studios caught in the process of financing the transition from silent to talking pictures. Initially, the popular novelty of sound was enough to keep audiences coming to the movies, and moviegoers in 1930 actually outnumbered those in 1929. But by 1931 attendance had dropped, and Hollywood lost millions of dollars over the next several years. The movie industry cut salaries and production costs, lowered admission prices, and closed up to a third of the nation’s theaters. Despite the steady popular demand for entertainment and escape, Hollywood appeared far from Depression-proof. Desperate to lure audiences back into theaters, the motion picture industry experimented with new genres, themes, and subject matter. Hollywood’s own financial depression had largely ended by 1934, but not before the industry had tested the boundaries of cultural acceptability in its drive to win over moviegoers wracked by social dislocation.

Certainly the most controversial films to emerge from this era were the gangster pictures. Director Mervyn LeRoy’s Little Caesar (1930), starring Edward G. Robinson as the Al Capone-inspired nemesis, established the basic elements of the genre. An ethnic criminal protagonist would climb his way to the top of the mob, leaving a path of bullet-riddled corpses behind him, only to meet his fatal comeuppance in a hail of police gunfire at the end. The recent introduction of sound allowed for gunshots, screams, and squealing tires to amplify the unprecedented violence central to all these films. The Public Enemy (1931) included an unforgettable scene of Jimmy Cagney’s gangster character shoving a grapefruit into Mae Clarke’s face. Director Howard Hawk’s Scarface (1932), starring Paul Muni, featured characters and situations so disturbing that it was almost too explosive for its time.

While there are many ways to interpret such films, it seems clear that Depression-era audiences must have experienced a vicarious thrill by seeing nihilistic gangster antiheroes shoot their way through a society in chaos, for such disorder paralleled the lives of millions of suffering and frustrated Americans. Gangster pictures also reflected a cynical view of society, in which the Victorian middle-class success ethic had been perverted into a drive fueled by merciless and ultimately self-destructive ambition—a suitable metaphor for the causes of the Depression itself.

Some movies spoke even more directly to the theme of common Americans victimized by cruel
Economic and social forces. In LeRoy’s powerful *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang* (1932), Paul Muni plays an unemployed war veteran wrongly implicated in a robbery and sentenced to hard labor in a brutal Southern prison. After escaping, he establishes a new life as a respected engineer, but is sent back to prison after his venegful wife betrays his identity to the authorities. He escapes once again, but only to the life of a fugitive, running from shadows and stealing to survive. An unjust society thus forces a good man to become a criminal.

Comedies of the early 1930s also captured the prevailing mood of disorientation. The Marx Brothers (Groucho, Chico, Harpo, and Zeppo) developed an inimitable style of lightning-quick improvisation and anarchic humor that sometimes left even their supporting cast confused but had audiences literally rolling in the aisles. In such films as *Animal Crackers* (1930), *Horse Feathers* (1932), and *A Night at the Opera* (1935) the Marx Brothers typically played the role of unemployed charlatans who mocked the pretensions and snobbery of the upper class. In *Duck Soup* (1933) Groucho satirized a “reforming” national leader who was in fact out for himself. At a time when much of the nation was pinning their hopes on Franklin D. Roosevelt, the film was not as well received as it was to be in later years. Mae West became the most influential female comedian of her time by subverting middle-class norms of sexual propriety and male dominance with smirking
double entendres. W. C. Fields sharply satirized family life in *The Man on the Flying Trapeze* (1935) and established a funny, yet vaguely unsettling, screen character deeply at odds with civilization.

The search for a winning formula to get audiences into the theaters led some studios to exploit the fantastic, the bizarre, and the grotesque. Universal Pictures found a youthful market for horror with such films as *Dracula* (1931), *Frankenstein* (1931), and *The Mummy* (1932). RKO’s *King Kong* (1933) employed pioneering special effects to tell the story of a gigantic ape captured from his tropical island home and brought to New York City by greedy promoters. After escaping, rampaging through the city, and scaling the Empire State Building with his captive woman, Kong is killed by American fighter planes, and the audience is left oddly ambivalent about the justice in his tragic fate.

The Depression era also saw the birth of the exploitation film. Certainly the most bizarre stab at winning an audience through shock was *Freaks* (1932), which documented the underworld of actual deformed sideshow performers. Not for the squeamish, this oddity has since become a cult favorite, but it is doubtful whether many contemporary moviegoers were ready for it. The remarkably lurid and inept *Reefer Madness* (1938) purported to be an expose of the demented marijuana subculture. Its effect, however, was probably more likely to titillate and inspire curiosity in the “devil weed.”

While most of Hollywood’s output during the early Depression years remained well within the bounds of mainstream social acceptability, the attention generated by the most lurid, violent, and sexually provocative films supplied new ammunition to those calling for greater censorship. Since the earliest days of the motion picture industry, such interest groups as the Catholic Legion of Decency had worked to restrain the cultural influence of movies and control their content, but the studios had so far resisted most outside pressure. Confronted with diminishing profits and the uncertainties of a Depression-wracked market, however, Hollywood capitulated. In 1934 the industry appointed Joseph Breen to supervise the Motion Picture Production Code Administration. When Martin Quigley, a Catholic layman and motion picture trade publisher, first prepared the Production Code in 1930, moviemakers had treated it mainly as a public relations tool. But now Breen would have the absolute authority to approve, censor, or reject any Hollywood movie subject to the code. The code prohibited a whole range of actions and expressions, including the kind of suggestive sexuality that had recently made its way into the movies. It also dictated that all “bad” acts had to be followed by sure punishment or rehabilitation, and insisted on no ambiguity between good and evil. The enforcement of the Production Code effectively ended Hollywood’s brief era of adventurism in the early 1930s.

**THE RETURN TO ORDER, 1935–1940**

The films of the second half of the decade reflected both the influence of the code and the desire of leading moviemakers to shift the artistic focus of their industry. Top Hollywood producers like Darryl Zanuck at Twentieth Century Fox and MGM’s Irving Thalberg and David O. Selznick decided that there was greater prestige and profit to be gained from more conservative and dignified pictures that appealed to the ideals, dreams, and traditional values of moviegoers. As a result, the films of the later Depression years tended to reinforce and reaffirm the social order, rather than challenge or disrupt it.

One could see the changes, for example, in the new style of comedy. Gone was the edgy and subversive humor of the early 1930s, and in its place were such lighthearted “screwball” comedies as *My Man Godfrey* (1936), *Topper* (1937), and *The Philadelphia Story* (1940). Although these films sometimes played with social conventions, they ultimately affirmed the sanctity of marriage, accepted class divisions, and upheld the status quo. Mae West, W. C. Fields, and the Marx Brothers continued to make movies, but only with their wilder impulses tamed into more insipid vehicles that traded on past glories. The most anarchic and irreverent humor in film could no longer be found in live-action features, but survived in the madcap animated shorts directed by Leon Schlesinger and Chuck Jones at Warner Brothers and by Tex Avery at MGM.

The later Depression years also saw the steady release of big-budget films based on classic novels
and respectable best-sellers. Such pictures as Mutiny on the Bounty (1935), The Wizard of Oz (1939), and the biggest film of the decade, Gone with the Wind (1939) provided high-quality entertainment couched within conservative morality: respect authority, cherish small-town communities, and persevere with individual courage in the face of adversity. Likewise, Walt Disney produced dazzling animated films adapted from classic fairy tales and children’s stories like Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937) and Pinocchio (1940), each of which extolled respect for traditional values.

Two of the most important directors of the decade, Frank Capra and John Ford, produced films that aimed to reconcile traditional Jeffersonian values with the new reality of big government interventionism in the New Deal era. Americans would prevail in these hard times, so assured the movies, because of their intrinsic morality and simple integrity. Capra celebrated the decency of the common man and praised the virtues of small-town America in films like Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939), which pitted the plainspoken idealist Jefferson Smith, played by Jimmy Stewart, against corrupt senators presiding over an ineffectual U.S. government. Ford reinvented the Western film as cinematic art and a symbol of patriotic regeneration with Stagecoach (1939), featuring a star-making performance by John Wayne. He then went on to direct the greatest of all motion pictures about the Depression, The Grapes of Wrath (1940). While acknowledging the positive role played by federal New Deal agencies, the true heroes in Ford’s adaptation of John Steinbeck’s novel are the Joad family themselves, who maintain their heartland spirit and noble dignity throughout a grim exodus from the Oklahoma Dust Bowl to the wretched migrant camps of California. As Tom Joad, actor Henry Fonda delivered the film’s definitive speech, promising his mother as he bids her farewell, “I’ll be all around... Wherever there’s a fight so hungry people can eat... Wherever there’s a cop beating a guy, I’ll be there... And when the people are eatin’ the stuff they raise and livin’ in the houses they build, I’ll be there too.” In further affirmation, his mother closes the film with another rallying speech, “Can’t wipe us out. Can’t lick us. We’ll go on forever. ‘Cause we’re the people.”

With few exceptions, Hollywood’s image of the “common man” did not include a place for black Americans. Aside from a few roles allotted for servants and slaves, such as Hattie McDaniel’s character in Gone with the Wind and Paul Robeson’s singing performance in Showboat (1936), blacks found expression primarily in independently-produced “race movies.” Oscar Micheaux, the pioneering black filmmaker of the silent era, directed several films during the 1930s. And the gangster genre lived on in black films like Am I Guilty (1940) years after the Production Code effectively killed it in Hollywood.

Various political winds blew through the motion picture industry during the 1930s, some with a far-lasting impact. Frightened by the 1934 California gubernatorial campaign of socialist Upton Sinclair, the studios distributed to theaters reels of what amounted to campaign attack ads that helped to foil his election bid. But the film industry as a whole tilted toward liberal causes. In 1936, despite wide mainstream isolationist sentiment, the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League organized to highlight the menace of international fascism and champion the Loyalist cause in the Spanish Civil War. The leftist politics of the Popular Front attracted idealists within Hollywood, and the film industry also became a base for Communist Party organizers, who successfully recruited a number of movie workers. Within a decade many of these leftist writers, directors, and actors would find themselves under attack and sometimes even blacklisted for their Depression-era politics, as Hollywood succumbed to the red-baiting of the Cold War.

See Also: CAGNEY, JAMES; CAPRA, FRANK; CHAPLIN, CHARLIE; DISNEY, WALT; FORD, JOHN; FREAKS; GABRIEL OVER THE WHITE HOUSE; GANGSTER FILMS; GOLD DIGGERS OF 1933; GONE WITH THE WIND; I AM A FUGITIVE FROM A CHAIN GANG; LITTLE CAESAR; MARX BROTHERS; MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON; OUR DAILY BREAD; PRODUCTION CODE ADMINISTRATION (HAYS OFFICE); SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS; WELLES, ORSON; WEST, MAE; WIZARD OF OZ.
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HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, JR.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (March 8, 1841–March 6, 1935) was born in Boston, Massachusetts. His father was a physician and literary figure; his mother, Amelia Lee Jackson, a prominent society leader active in charitable causes. Holmes’s mother, to whom the future Supreme Court justice bore a close physical resemblance, was the daughter of a prominent Boston lawyer and judge. Holmes attended private schools and Harvard but he benefited especially from the strong intellectual influence of his parents, whose visitors regularly included major writers and thinkers of the day.

A student at Harvard when the nation erupted in civil war, Holmes promptly enlisted in the infantry, graduated from college, and was given a commission as a second lieutenant. As a member of the Army of the Potomac, he developed an impressive record and was injured in combat on three occasions. When his injuries forced his resignation from the service in 1864, he held the rank of captain.

On returning to Boston, Holmes attended Harvard Law School, then toured Great Britain and the continent of Europe to complete his education. A clerkship in Boston and admission to the bar in 1867 followed. In 1872, Holmes married his childhood friend Fanny Dixwell and joined a Boston firm specializing in commercial and admiralty law. But he also had an enduring interest in legal scholarship, and in 1881, a few days before his fortieth birthday, his Lowell Lectures in Boston were published as a book, The Common Law would become one of the most influential studies of its kind, exerting a major impact on the development of the sociological and legal realist schools of jurisprudence.

Following publication of The Common Law, Holmes taught a semester at Harvard University, then accepted an appointment as a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on which he served twenty years, becoming its chief justice in 1899.

In 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Holmes to a seat on the United States Supreme Court. In his scholarly writings, Holmes had stressed the degree to which judges’ life experiences, rather than logic, guided their decisions. As a justice, however, he generally opposed judicial interference with legislative judgments, especially in regulatory cases. Dissenting in Lochner v. New York (1905) and related cases, striking down maximum
hour (Lochner), minimum wage, and other state and federal regulations, he attacked the Court’s use of substantive due process as a weapon against economic legislation. Personally, he was skeptical of government efforts to control the economy. But in his view such decisions rested with legislators and the electorate, not with the courts.

Holmes usually gave non-economic substantive guarantees a narrow reading as well, refusing to equate laws forbidding tenant farmers to break their labor contracts with involuntary servitude. But the version of the clear and present danger test he ultimately embraced in Abrams v. United States (1919) and other World War I dissents was clearly more protective of free speech than the majority interpretation of the First Amendment in that era. He also joined Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States (1928), declaring that wiretapping should be subjected to Fourth Amendment requirements.

When Chief Justice William Howard Taft resigned from the bench in 1930, Holmes thrived in his brief role as acting chief justice. He also continued to challenge the Court’s growing body of rulings restricting federal and state regulatory authority. When a majority, in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930), overturned his opinion generously construing state tax power in Blackstone v. Miller (1903), the justice dissented, expressing his “anxiety” over the Court’s further encroachment on “the Constitutional rights of the States.”

After Holmes’ beloved wife Fanny died in 1929, however, his own health had begun to decline, as had his ability to keep abreast of the Court’s work. In 1932, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes visited his home, explaining that a majority of the Court had asked Hughes to suggest that Holmes resign. Without apparent opposition or resentment, Holmes complied, sending the president his retirement letter on January 12, 1932. In 1935, he died at his home in Washington. He had served thirty years on the bench, under four chief justices. He is remembered as one of the Court’s most outstanding jurists.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS; SUPREME COURT.

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TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH

HOMELESSNESS

Poor people without permanent shelter have always had a presence in the United States, and the homeless were much noticed on the edges of growing cities or riding the railroads during the nineteenth century. But Hooverville shantytowns and migrant Okie families driving West during the Depression brought unprecedented national attention and federal intervention to the problem of homelessness. Even during the Depression years, however, the experience of the homeless was not uniform and aid programs were far from comprehensive. Public response to the homeless alternated between antagonism and empathy.

In the late 1920s there were already increasing numbers of homeless people in community shelters. When the Depression hit, many of the newly unemployed headed to cities looking for jobs, overwhelming municipal lodging houses and private agencies. In 1931, for example, the number of homeless using shelters in Minneapolis increased fourfold over the previous year. Local and regional response was mixed, but certain patterns emerged. Cities could be more or less lenient in enforcing settlement laws, which mandated prior residency for relief and the return of potential public charges to their state of legal residence. In practice, though, few cities offered more than a night’s shelter and a meal for nonresidents. In the Deep South, transients could be arrested and sent to work on chain gangs, and the few cities that had municipal shelters for the local poor excluded African Americans from them. Chicago expanded separate services for
the homeless of both races, and a 1931 protest of the homeless in New York City led to improvements at the municipal lodging house. Still, much of the additional shelter was provided by private organizations like the Salvation Army. Religious missions provided shelter regardless of residency status, though they required that the homeless attend religious services. Small charities started soup kitchens and breadlines for anyone who was hungry.

Contemporary depictions of the homeless portrayed those waiting in breadlines as iconic victims of the nation’s economic ruin. Though single women were frequently absent from the lines and rarely represented, they made up an increasing, though still small, percentage of the conservatively estimated 1.25 million unattached (i.e., not in families) homeless tallied in a 1933 census of 765 cities. The standard social work policy was to send transient women back to the residence of their families or husbands, so some homeless women avoided urban aid agencies. Many traveled on trains dressed in men’s clothes, though this did not insure their safety. As “Boxcar” Bertha Thompson recalled, female hobos, like their male counterparts, took to the road for lack of money and the desire for freedom.

More visible was the increasing number of beggars. It became untenable to enforce anti-begging laws when some poor people deliberately tried to
get arrested for the shelter of a lockup and when the increasing number of newly unemployed semi-skilled and white-collar workers elicited public sympathy. Most visible, perhaps, were the homeless who rode in boxcars and set up hobo camps or “jungles” at junctions and in cities. In 1932, World War I veterans traveled by train to Washington, D.C., and set up a large shantytown that swelled with those who supported their demand for advance payment of war bonuses. When President Herbert Hoover sent the U.S. Army to route this “bonus army” of the country’s “worthiest” poor, public opinion turned even more against him.

The increasing number of homeless children—an estimated one-fifth of the homeless population was nineteen or younger—also attracted the attention of advocates. Many of these youngsters left home so as not to burden their families, which often were already disrupted or on relief. In 1932 a coalition of welfare advocates urged the Senate to pass a federal homeless program that would, in providing relief for the transient homeless, save the character of America’s children.

In May 1933, President Roosevelt established the Federal Transient Service (FTS) as part of the Federal Emergency Relief Act. FTS was designed to provide aid for homeless people who were ineligible for local relief because they had not lived in any given state for more than the year required for settlement status. FTS eventually established programs in every state except Vermont. The service allotted the most money to California, which, with 4.7 percent of the nation’s population, handled 14 percent of the nation’s transients. FTS ran shelters that provided food, clothing, and medical care to residents, as well as work training and education programs to some who stayed for long periods. FTS also started camps in rural areas where homeless men were assigned public work and conservation projects, such as flood control and park improvement. Many camps and centers were partly self-governed and staffed by residents. FTS also paid for rooms in boarding houses or YMCAs to accommodate transient women, and the agency allotted apartments and relief payments to families; as Harry Hopkins, director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, wrote, “shelter care for families was taboo.” FTS left the issue of integration and equality up to local practice. Many urban FTS centers were segregated, and in the South separate black shelters were, according to a 1934 FTS report, “not quite equal to those provided for the whites.”

In 1935, FTS was phased out because, according to Hopkins, transients had “to be recognized as being no different from the rest of the unemployed.” The end of FTS marked a general shift away from direct relief and toward work-related and constituency-specific New Deal programs. However, only about 20 percent of the unemployed transients formerly housed by FTS were able to get jobs with the Works Progress Administration; few young transients were eligible for the Civilian Con-
Homeless men take shelter in the local homeless men’s bureau dormitory in Sioux City, Iowa, in 1936. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION

Homelessness

John Steinbeck’s portrayal of a transient farm family’s struggle for survival in *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939) raised public sympathy for the homeless, though it did not address the majority of the homeless population, which lived in cities, and the disproportionate number of homeless African Americans and Mexican seasonal workers. A month after the premier of John Ford’s 1940 film version of Steinbeck’s story, a House committee began hearings on interstate migration of the destitute, but the advent of World War II shifted its focus to an investigation of defense migration. As many of the homeless joined the army and found employment in war industries, relief programs were reduced and city shelters closed; those homeless who remained were left to the missions, casual employment agencies, and skid row hotels. It was not until 1969 that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the residency requirements for benefit eligibility. Homelessness would not recapture the national attention it had during the Depression until the late
1970s, when it was thrust to the fore as a result of deindustrialization and urban renewal.

See Also: BONUS ARMY/BONUS MARCH; BREADLINES; CHARITY; CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; FAMILY AND HOME, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; SOUP KITCHENS; TRANSIENTS.

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Yael Schacher

HOME OWNERS LOAN CORPORATION (HOLC)

Diminished wages, widespread unemployment, and few, if any, refinancing options made it difficult for home owners to meet monthly mortgage payments during the Great Depression. By the spring of 1933, with almost a thousand foreclosures a day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress on April 13, 1933, for “legislation to protect small home owners from foreclosure.” Lawmakers responded by creating the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) on June 13, 1933.

The HOLC, which was under the supervision of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, did not actually lend money to home owners. Instead, the agency purchased and refinanced mortgages in default or foreclosure from financial institutions (lenders). In exchange for mortgages, the HOLC gave lenders government bonds paying 4 percent interest (later reduced to 3 percent). Capitalized with $200 million from the U.S. Treasury, the HOLC was authorized to issue $2 billion in bonds, an amount eventually increased to $4.75 billion. During a peak period in the spring of 1934, it processed over 35,000 loan applications per week and employed almost 21,000 people in 458 offices throughout the country. The law authorizing the HOLC’s lending activities expired on June 12, 1936. By that time, the HOLC had made 1,021,587 loans, making it the owner of approximately one-sixth of the urban home mortgage debt in the United States. The HOLC’s operations were not officially terminated until February 3, 1954.

The Roosevelt administration credited the HOLC with a restoration of economic morale, a reduction of foreclosure rates, and payment of almost $250 million in delinquent taxes to state and municipal governments. Subsequent scholars have generally agreed with this positive evaluation, asserting that the HOLC was significant because it introduced the long-term, self-amortizing mortgage. Indeed, with HOLC mortgages refinanced at 5 percent interest over fifteen years, home ownership became feasible for those who had been previously unable to afford short-term mortgages at high interest rates.

Some commentators, however, criticized the HOLC’s practice of indirectly assisting home owners through programs that directly aided mortgage lenders. The urban reformer Charles Abrams pointed out that, on average, the HOLC refinanced the mortgages it purchased for only 7 percent less than the previous, admittedly inflated, value of the property in question (the value of residential real estate had risen appreciably during the 1920s). The HOLC, for example, might refinance a $10,000 mortgage as if the initial amount loaned to the home owner had been $9,300, but that figure—$9,300—could still be significantly higher than the
current deflated market value of the property. Under this arrangement, lenders only had to forego a small part of their capital, plus they received government-backed bonds in place of frozen mortgages. On the other hand, by propping up the face values of its refinanced mortgages, the HOLC compelled home owners to repay inflated 1920s mortgage loans with deflated 1930s wages.

The HOLC also developed a neighborhood mortgage rating system. The lowest rated neighborhoods—those with high concentrations of racial minorities—were “redlined” by the HOLC, a term denoting an area considered too risky for government mortgage assistance. Redlining was adopted not only by private lenders, but also by public agencies, most notably the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which was part of the National Housing Act of 1934. The FHA, by extending mortgage insurance to lenders, encouraged banks to liberalize financing terms for potential homeowners. Thus, while the HOLC and the FHA assisted some Americans in keeping their homes or in purchasing new ones, they both used redlining to prevent minority groups, especially African Americans, from doing likewise. This practice helped perpetuate and extend the pattern of segregated neighborhoods and suburbs throughout America.

See Also: FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA); HOUSING; NATIONAL HOUSING ACT OF 1934.

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A. SCOTT HENDERSON

HOOVER, HERBERT

Herbert Clark Hoover (August 10, 1874–October 20, 1964) was an engineer, financier, humanitarian, public servant, president of the United States, and elder statesman. Born in West Branch, Iowa, he was the second of three children of Jesse Clark Hoover, a blacksmith, inventor, and seller of farm implements, and his wife, Huldah Minthorn, a minister of the Society of Friends. Both parents died before “Bertie” was ten. He spent his adolescence in Oregon in the household of his maternal uncle and attended the Quaker academy his uncle superintended before going to work as an office boy in his uncle’s land development office.

At age seventeen, Hoover became the youngest member of the “pioneer class” of Leland Stanford Junior University in Palo Alto, California. He studied geology, engaged in campus politics as an anti-fraternity “barbarian," was elected treasurer, introduced fiscal responsibility in the football program, and met his future wife, Lou Henry, a fellow Iowan. He graduated in May 1895, not yet twenty-one years old. Always a loyal alumnus and generous contributor, in 1912 Hoover began half a century of service on Stanford’s board of trustees. His benefactions included the Stanford Union, the Food Research Institute, and the Graduate School of Business. In 1919, he founded at Stanford the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, a vast archive of records relating to political events of the early and mid-twentieth century.

Hoover worked briefly as a common miner before joining a prestigious San Francisco engineering firm. In 1897, Bewick, Moreing and Company of London hired him as an “inspecting engineer" to find and develop new properties in Australia, the most spectacular of which was the Sons of Gwalia mine. Success led to an assignment to China as technical consultant to the director-general of mines in Chihli province, at a substantial increase in salary. En route, Hoover stopped in Monterey, California, to marry Lou Henry. In Tientsin, they came under fire during the Boxer Rebellion. Again, success earned promotion, a partnership in Bewick, Moreing, which lasted until he established his own firm in 1908. As an engineer and financier, Hoover
became known as the “doctor of sick mines,” traveling around the world five times with his wife and two sons. In addition, Hoover and his wife collaborated in the translation of a sixteenth-century Latin mining text, *De Re Metallica*, by Georg Bauer (known as Agricola). Hoover also published extensively in mining journals and lectured at the Columbia School of Mines. By 1914, he had made a considerable fortune and was looking for a way to enter public life, perhaps as the publisher of an American newspaper.

**FOOD RELIEF DURING WORLD WAR I**

When war broke out in Europe in August 1914, both Hoovers aided the repatriation of stranded Americans. Herbert Hoover next established the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which provided millions of tons of food to starving people in Belgium and France from 1914 until the American declaration of war in 1917. Hoover then returned to the United States as food administrator in the Wilson administration. Orchestrating a massive but decentralized campaign for voluntary cooperation in food conservation to support the war effort, Hoover became a master of public relations as well as a valued member of Wilson’s war cabinet. At the end of the war, he resumed international food relief with the American Relief Administration, which combined humanitarian aid with major contributions to the economic reconstruction of Europe.

**SECRETARY OF COMMERCE**

Although briefly considered by both parties as a presidential nominee in 1920, Hoover became secretary of commerce in the cabinet of Warren G. Harding, remaining in that post through most of the administration of Calvin Coolidge as well.

Hoover energetically reorganized and expanded the Department of Commerce from a minor agency into a complex organization with far-reaching domestic and international influence. Major divisions dealt with industry, trade, and transportation. A new bureau collected and distributed statistics, consistent with Hoover’s belief that business efficiency depended on accurate and shared information. The Bureau of Standards encouraged systematization of industrial technology.

Appropriations for the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce increased by nearly half, its branch offices at home and abroad doubled, and personnel grew five-fold. The workforce was racially desegregated. New divisions supervised aviation, radio, and housing.

With an engineer’s concern for efficiency and a progressive’s dedication to community responsibility, Hoover advocated a form of capitalism based on associationalism and cooperation. Believing that waste, selfishness, and destructive competition led to inefficiency and unemployment, he sought to make government a servant of self-regulating economic units. He favored diversification of stock ownership, attacked the twelve-hour workday in the steel industry, and encouraged trade associations and individual firms to standardize products and processes to eliminate waste. The Department of Commerce undertook massive educational cam-
campaigns to convince business leaders and the public to embrace fact-based planning, voluntary cooperation, and community responsibility. More than two hundred conferences addressed topics ranging from unemployment to highway safety, housing, conservation, and child health. Experts highlighted conditions, disseminated information, and rallied public support for already-developed solutions.

In 1927 when the Mississippi River flooded a 20,000 square mile area, leaving 600,000 people homeless, Hoover took personal charge, mobilizing local and state resources, the Red Cross, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, and countless volunteers to evacuate, shelter, and feed flood victims; to provide sanitation and combat epidemics; and to finance low-cost rehabilitation loans. In another example of federal, local, and private partnership, he negotiated an interstate agreement for access to the waters of the Colorado River and federal construction of a dam in Boulder Canyon that would provide hydroelectric power to municipal and private distributors. He advocated a network of waterways that eventually became the Saint Lawrence Seaway.

Hoover articulated his philosophy of “American Individualism” in a small book published in 1922. A unique combination of individual enterprise and community obligation, it called for education, competition, individual liberties, and “voluntary organizational cooperation for the common good.”

PRESIDENCY

When Calvin Coolidge did not “choose to run” for another term as president in 1928, Hoover rode “Republican prosperity” to an easy victory over Alfred E. Smith, who also suffered the political liabilities of being a Roman Catholic and an opponent of prohibition. The president-elect then made a “good neighbor” tour of eleven Latin American countries.
President Hoover (left) and President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, on the way to Roosevelt’s inauguration in Washington, D.C., on March 4, 1933. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

Hoover hoped for a presidency in which American individualism, associationalism, expertise, and technology would bring greater rationality, efficiency, humanity, and more widespread prosperity to the American people. As he had during his years as secretary of commerce, he recruited experts and commissioned extensive research, expecting that their data and analysis would form the basis for enlightened public policy. The White House Conference on Child Health and Protection produced a nineteen-point Children’s Charter as well as a 35-volume report that influenced social workers for many years and inspired much local legislation. Ironically, a major set of findings, published in 1933 as Recent Social Trends documented the extraordinary modernization of the United States at precisely the time when public belief in the “American dream” was at its lowest.

Events forced Hoover’s administration to focus primarily on the domestic economy rather than foreign affairs. He welcomed the London Treaty of 1930, which reduced all categories of naval armaments, but he failed to obtain abolition of offensive weapons, such as bombers and chemical warfare, by participants at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932. In Latin America, he renounced dollar diplomacy, repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary, removed the Marines from their twenty-year occupation of Nicaragua, and prepared for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Haiti. When
Japan invaded China, Hoover’s belief in voluntary international cooperation, collective persuasion, and moral force led him to insist on a doctrine of nonrecognition of territorial acquisitions obtained by force in violation of treaty rights.

As one of the few who had recognized economic imbalances and warned about a runaway stock market in the 1920s, Hoover anticipated that he would have to oversee remedies and corrections. To combat the long-standing agricultural depression, the Federal Farm Board encouraged creation of farmers’ organizations to withhold surpluses until prices became more favorable. The stock market crash of 1929 revealed serious structural weaknesses in the domestic and international economies. Depressed farm incomes, values, and purchasing power led to failures of country banks that gradually expanded to undermine larger financial institutions. Sales declined; manufacturers stockpiled inventories of durable goods. Overproduction in industries like automobiles had an impact on collateral production, such as steel. Building stagnated. European financial dependence on the United States required an increase in exports or a decrease in debt, but the Hawley-Smoot tariff proved an insurmountable obstacle.

Hoover struggled to persuade industrial, labor, agricultural, utility, and financial leaders to maintain wages, hence purchasing power, and plan for renewed business progress. Believing that the nation suffered from a crisis in confidence, he worked tirelessly to restore faith in the spiritual and economic strength of the country. He appealed to the traditions of voluntary cooperation, private charity, and community responsibility to combat human suffering and launched an anti-hoarding campaign to encourage Americans to spend their way out of the Depression. His efforts failed. Employers furloughed first a few and then more workers. Bankers refused to risk loans without full collateral. Relief needs outstripped the resources of private and local relief agencies. And frightened Americans hid cash they might soon need if conditions worsened. Hoover’s own optimistic statements rang hollow in the face of mounting unemployment. A devastating drought in the summer of 1930 accelerated farm problems and rural bank closings. Hoover resisted demands for direct federal relief because he feared undermining the character of independent, self-reliant Americans. He hoped that construction of public works that would eventually pay for themselves would provide employment until the economy revived. He left direct relief to local and state governments, but their resources proved insufficient to stem the tide of economic decline and human suffering.

Hoover traced the origins of America’s Depression to Europe. American loans, German reparations, and Allied war debts formed a vicious cycle. Federal Reserve manipulation of credit to aid European countries had created too-easy money in the United States during the 1920s. And, beginning in 1931, a series of European financial debacles marched inexorably toward the United States. French withdrawals from Central European banks brought them to the verge of collapse. Hoover countered with a one-year moratorium on intergovernmental debts and reparations to provide a respite for retrenchment. That September, however, Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard, and the gold drain shifted to New York. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 shored up American currency, but bank failures escalated.

At this point, Hoover substantially modified his resistance to federal government intervention. To stem the tide of bank failures, he first encouraged private bankers to form the National Credit Corporation to make loans to industrial concerns and banks. When their efforts proved perfunctory and problems increased, he proposed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), primarily funded by the Treasury, for the same purposes. RFC loans significantly reduced the number of bank failures in 1932. He would soon support RFC financing of public works and loans to states for direct relief.

But Hoover labored under serious political handicaps. He had never run for public office before winning the presidency. His previous experiences with public persuasion had been fueled by wartime patriotism or 1920s optimism. During his presidency, however, even when the Republicans controlled both houses of Congress in the first two years, he proved too progressive for the conservatives and too conservative for the progressives. The 1930 in-
terim election brought about a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives, where presidential hopeful John Nance Garner presided as speaker. Garner obstructed the Hoover administration whenever possible, most particularly by delaying passage of the Relief and Reconstruction Act until July 1932. Although Hoover’s analysts claimed that the Depression was coming to an end that summer, it would take six months for the impact to “trickle down” to the ordinary citizen. The presidential election was four months away.

By summer 1932, in an effort to boost prices, farmers were using roadblocks to prevent delivery of milk and livestock to markets. Cities such as Detroit saw hunger marches and demonstrations demanding half-wages for those laid off. The destitute lived in tarpaper shacks in “Hoovervilles” and existed on handouts or scraps from garbage cans. Veterans journeyed to Washington to demand early payment of a war service bonus but were routed by the army commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover received the blame. Meanwhile, Democratic Party publicist Charles Michaelson orchestrated a highly effective smear campaign against Hoover. The 1932 election was less a victory for Franklin D. Roosevelt than a resounding defeat for Hoover.

The lame-duck administration remained in office for nearly four months, an interregnum that was nearly as calamitous as that in 1860 to 1861. Hoover tried to tie his successor to his repudiated policies. Roosevelt avoided that contamination, while appearing ignorant of economics and the international situation. European countries defaulted on their World War I debts in December. Publication of RFC loans, at the initiative of Speaker and Vice President-elect Garner, precipitated new and disastrous runs on the banks in January. Revelations before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in February uncovered gross improprieties by major banks and bankers during the 1920s that further undermined public morale. Roosevelt first ignored and then rejected Hoover’s proposal of a joint statement to bolster public confidence. On March 3, 1933, the eve of the inauguration, even the biggest New York and Chicago banks were in peril. Despite pleas from the Federal Reserve Board and others, Hoover refused to act without an endorsement from Roosevelt, which the president-elect refused to give. The governors of New York and Illinois declared bank holidays, bringing to thirty-four the number of states that had closed their banks rather than face ruin. Roosevelt subsequently declared a national bank holiday and holdovers from Hoover’s administration crafted the plans for reopening the banks.

POST-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS

After he left office on March 4, 1933, Hoover remained publicly silent for eighteen months, primarily out of concern that his criticism of the new administration’s policies might be blamed for impeding economic recovery. During this time, however, he arranged for publication of collections of public papers to demonstrate the effectiveness of the policies of his presidency. In the fall of 1934, he broke his silence with the publication of The Challenge to Liberty. Originally conceived as an updated reissue of American Individualism, The Challenge reaffirmed Hoover’s belief in American liberalism and expressed his alarm at the social and economic changes he perceived in “National Regimentation” in fascist regimes abroad and, by implication, in the New Deal at home. Liberty, liberalism, and the sanctity of the United States Constitution became recurring themes as Hoover spoke out during the 1930s. He became a major critic of the New Deal, arguing that it failed to bring the United States out of the Great Depression while undermining both the capitalist economic system and the independent initiative of American citizens.

Simultaneously, Hoover pursued his own reentry into the political arena, unsuccessfully seeking the 1936 and 1940 Republican presidential nominations. Hoping to persuade Republicans to vindicate his anti-Depression activities as president and to affirm his political philosophy, he tried to persuade the party to initiate a new “interim convention” in 1938 to craft a platform for the next national contest that would shape the choice of a candidate in 1940. The party resisted transformation according to the Hoover model. Meanwhile, the Democrats established a pattern of running against Hoover in every presidential election from 1932 on-
wards, while Republican candidates did their best to avoid association with him.

Facing continued rejection at home, Hoover returned to Europe in 1938, his first visit since Versailles. Lauded by governments and those he had fed, he also received a first-hand education in European politics. He returned home convinced that another great war was coming and that the United States should stand aside from the conflagration. He devoted himself to that position from the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 until the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Hoover loyally supported the declaration of war and hoped that he might be of service. Ignored again, he and his longtime associate, former ambassador Hugh Gibson, were among the many prominent persons who published plans for a framework of postwar peace.

The new war produced new human suffering, and Hoover tried to recreate his feeding activities of the 1914 to 1917 period, but he failed in the face of resistance by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Hoover would have to wait for Roosevelt’s successor to recall him to national service. In 1946, President Harry Truman dispatched the “Great Humanitarian” on a worldwide mission to assess the needs of the hungry and the capabilities of food-producing nations to contribute to postwar relief. The following year, he went abroad again to address hunger in Germany and Austria. His reports also contributed to the mitigation of harsh postwar treatment of defeated Germany.

Truman, and his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, also drafted Hoover to address the enormous growth of federal bureaucracy resulting from the New Deal and the war. In both cases, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known as the Hoover Commission, concluded in 1949 and in 1955 with recommendations for increasing efficiency, streamlining federal bureaucracy, and rolling back New Deal encroachments. Some of its proposals, such as the creation of a Department of Defense, were enacted.

After his presidency, Hoover devoted himself to the preservation and propagation of the historical record of his public life. Virtually every speech and public statement between 1933 and 1960 was reprinted in eight volumes called Addresses upon the American Road. He published three volumes of memoirs and edited several collections of documents, ranging from The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson about Versailles to An American Epic, a four-volume annotated collection of papers from his long career in international relief. At the end of his life, he had completed a volume tentatively entitled Freedom Betrayed, as yet unpublished, dealing with the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration.

Hoover also devoted himself to gentler subjects. As chairman of the Boys’ Clubs of America, he took particular pleasure in establishing clubs for a million of those he described as “pavement boys.” He published a collection of his correspondence with children under the title On Growing Up. He wrote a slim volume of his observations on angling, called Fishing for Fun and to Wash Your Soul. He was the force behind the creation of the humanitarian organization CARE and the United Nations agency UNICEF.

Herbert Hoover—orphan boy from West Branch, self-made millionaire, public servant more than politician—personified the American dream. If his presidency was blighted by the crisis of that dream in the Great Depression, he lived long enough to be acknowledged as both an elder statesman and a world humanitarian.

See Also: ELECTION OF 1928; ELECTION OF 1932; HOOVER, LOU HENRY; PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY COMMITTEE FOR EMPLOYMENT (PECE); PRESIDENT’S ORGANIZATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF (POUR); REPUBLICAN PARTY.

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J. Edgar Hoover, circa 1950. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

**HOOVER, J. EDGAR**

John Edgar Hoover (January 1, 1895–May 2, 1972) was appointed director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1924 and served until his death forty-eight years later. Founded in 1908 as the Bureau of Investigation (the word Federal was added in 1935), the FBI blossomed under Hoover during the Great Depression and particularly during the New Deal years.

A lifelong resident of Washington, D.C., Hoover worked in the Library of Congress while studying law at George Washington University. He joined the Department of Justice in 1917, working in the Alien Enemies Bureau. Appointed chief of the General Intelligence Division in 1919, Hoover helped organize the notorious Palmer Raids that rounded up aliens suspected of radicalism. Five years later, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone appointed the 29-year-old Hoover director of the
In the wake of Teapot Dome and other Warren G. Harding administration scandals, the new director had a mandate to terminate all domestic political surveillance and confine all investigations to violations of federal law.

Having quickly purged the FBI of corrupt agents, Hoover had little to do because there were few federal criminal statutes on the books. He filled the time, in direct defiance of Stone’s order, by dabbling in surveillance. This was especially true after the Great Depression commenced. The FBI opened files on such things as Communist Party involvement in the Scottsboro Boys rape case and occasionally provided political intelligence to the Herbert Hoover White House. For the Depression’s first four years, however, the director’s bureaucracy remained a tiny and relatively insignificant part of the federal government.

Things began to change in 1933 with the Depression era’s creeping nationalization of crime control. In effect, the FBI emerged as one of the New Deal’s alphabet agencies with a mission to investigate a rapidly expanding list of federal crimes. This included spectacular combat against John Dillinger and other high-profile bank robbers. For example, the New Deal’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided the wherewithal for the FBI to investigate any robbery of a bank insured by the FDIC. The Roosevelt administration also helped Hoover with a massive media campaign to portray G-men as heroic defenders of public life and limb, property and virtue. A public relations genius in his own right, Hoover tilted this campaign to construct what might best be described, with only a hint of exaggeration, as a cult of personality.

Pumped up into a formidable crime fighting force as the Great Depression wound down in the late 1930s, Hoover’s FBI moved on to exploit a cautious Roosevelt administration mandate to revive political surveillance under the rubric of “subversive activities.” If the White House was principally concerned with native fascism as the nation reluctantly prepared for the possibility of war with Germany and Japan, Hoover was principally concerned with domestic Communist activities. In one of the Depression era’s greater ironies, the director defined subversive activities on the left broadly enough to encompass the very New Deal liberals who had rescued the FBI from oblivion. Another irony is that the director did so while successfully cultivating what several cabinet officials described as a close personal relationship with the president. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, for one, claimed that Roosevelt believed that Hoover was devoted to him personally.

In the wake of the Great Depression and World War II, Hoover and his FBI went on to help shape the history of McCarthyism and the modern civil rights movement. The latter included not only extensive surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr. (e.g., wiretaps), but systematic harassment pursued with a startling ferocity. The pressures of the Depression had simply reinforced the things Hoover had learned as a young man, in the aftermath of World War I, on his old Alien Enemies and General Intelligence desks. The pressures of the 1960s would do the same. By the time of his death, Hoover had, in his own way in both cases, enforced the law and spied on law abiding citizens in seven different decades.

See Also: CRIME; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PROHIBITION.

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KENNETH O’REILLY

HOOVER, LOU HENRY

Best known as the wife of Depression-era president Herbert Hoover, Lou Henry Hoover (March 29,
1874–January 7, 1944) was also actively involved in organizations that promoted independence and health for girls and women. Born in Waterloo, Iowa, the elder of two daughters of a banker who encouraged her independence and love of the outdoors, she moved with her family to Whittier, California, and later to Monterey. After completing normal school, she earned a degree in geology at Stanford University, where she met Herbert Hoover. They married in 1899 and immediately sailed for China, where they survived the Boxer Rebellion. Many more journeys took them and their two sons around the world several times in the first decade of the twentieth century, while Herbert prospered as a consulting engineer and financier. An accomplished linguist, Lou Hoover, with assistance from her husband, also translated from Latin and privately published *De Re Metallica*, a sixteenth-century mining text.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, both Hoovers assisted Americans stranded abroad and later headed relief organizations for starving Europeans. Lou Hoover became an effective speaker and fundraiser in the United States. America’s declaration of war in 1917 brought the couple to Washington, D.C., he as food administrator and she to engage in civic works, including creating living and eating facilities for the growing number of young women in war agencies. A quiet philanthropist throughout her life, Lou Hoover “lent” college tuition money to young people but did not cash their repayment checks.

When Herbert Hoover became secretary of commerce, Lou embraced the Girl Scouts as an ideal organization to foster education, recreation, and independence of young women. She served the organization as national commissioner, national president from 1922 to 1925, vice president and chairman of the national board of commissioners, and, after she became first lady, honorary president. During the 1920s, she focused on organization and emphasized recruitment and training of leaders, obtaining grants to support these activities. In the 1930s, she was again named national Girl Scout president and she became a more public voice, travelling extensively on Girl Scout business. Meanwhile she was an early supporter of the National Amateur Athletic Federation and served as president of its women’s division. She encouraged women to pursue careers as well as marriage and motherhood.

During Herbert Hoover’s term as president of the United States from 1929 to 1933, the first lady attended to social obligations and also arranged the first extensive inventory and history of White House furnishings. She was severely criticized for entertaining the wife of the only black member of Congress. She promulgated her husband’s voluntary approaches to the Great Depression with women’s groups and the Girl Scouts. Hiring her own staff, she became a clearinghouse for relief appeals.

After leaving the White House, Hoover supported the Friends of Music at Stanford, the Salvation Army, and Republican organizations. When her husband crusaded for relief of the “small democracies” at the start of World War II, she again supported his efforts. In all her activities, Lou Henry Hoover lived by two mottoes: “don’t forget joy” and “lead from behind.”

*See Also: Hoover, Herbert.*

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*SUSAN ESTABROOK KENNEDY*

**HOPKINS, HARRY**

Harry Lloyd Hopkins (August 17, 1890–January 29, 1946) was a progressive-era social worker, federal
relief administrator during the Great Depression, and wartime presidential advisor who carved out a unique niche for himself in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administrations. Hopkins and Roosevelt developed a close relationship based on mutual trust and admiration, a position that afforded Hopkins a considerable amount of power. From 1933 to 1938, Hopkins played a crucial role in the development of social policies and legislation devised by the administration to counteract the devastating effects of the Depression. In this sense, Hopkins became one of the major architects of the American welfare system. Beginning in 1939, Roosevelt educated Hopkins in international affairs, and during the war years, Hopkins served as the president’s unofficial wartime emissary to Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, as administrator of war production, and as an advisor at most of the major conferences.

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

Harry Hopkins was born in 1890 in Sioux City, Iowa, the fourth child of David Aldona (Al) Hopkins and Anna Pickett Hopkins. The family, always struggling financially, moved numerous times around the Midwest before finally settling in Grinnell, Iowa, in 1901, a town selected by Anna mainly because Grinnell College was located there. During Hopkins’s four years at Grinnell, where he was a mediocre student but a first-rate athlete and student leader, he absorbed a blend of the Social Gos-
pel and the practical workings of the American republic as taught in his political science and applied Christianity courses. In addition, Hopkins’s professors impressed upon him a reverence for democracy and a dedication to public service.

Soon after his graduation in 1912, Hopkins left rural Iowa to pursue a career as a social worker at Christodora Settlement House in New York City’s Lower East Side, where he quickly became attuned to the squalid conditions in the urban slum and the destitution that so often accompanied the instability of waged labor in industrial centers. His first job there was as a counselor for the settlement house’s summer camp for boys in Bound Brook, New Jersey. He later served as head of boys’ activities at the settlement house on Avenue B. There he met and married his first wife, fellow settlement worker and suffragist Ethel Gross, who initiated Hopkins into the exciting reform environment of lower Manhattan. This work in progressive-era New York City had a profound effect on Hopkins. He began to formulate a secular view of poverty and came to understand that there were profound consequences to unemployment, that most people wanted to be self-sufficient, and that the dole took away a person’s pride.

In 1913, in the midst of an economic recession, Hopkins accepted a position with New York City’s Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP), a private charitable agency dedicated to both relieving poverty and reforming the individual. Hopkins joined the agency first as a friendly visitor, but soon, having demonstrated his capabilities as an observant and efficient social worker, he was appointed superintendent of the Association’s Employment Bureau. His mandate was to suggest ways to eliminate unemployment, which was seen by the AICP as the second most frequent cause of poverty, illness being the first. Hopkins went into the tenements of the largely immigrant population of the Lower East Side and saw firsthand the degrading effects of poverty, a condition he agreed was caused largely by unemployment. During this phase of his career, he began to develop a set of convictions concerning poverty and unemployment that came to define the relief policies he later proposed to the Roosevelt administration in the midst of the Great Depression, according to which those who wanted to work and, for whatever reason, could not find employment would be provided jobs by the government; those unable to work would be provided government assistance.

In 1915, Hopkins and an AICP colleague, William Matthews, worked creatively to try to solve the problem of increasing unemployment in New York City. When they learned that the Bronx Zoological Park had received a generous donation of land but could not afford to develop it for use, Hopkins and Matthews proposed a solution by devising what was likely the first work relief program in New York. The two social workers offered to provide unemployed men to clear the land, and, moreover, raise enough money from private sources to pay their wages if the Bronx Zoo would provide the staff to supervise the work. This Bronx Zoo project (even though privately funded) provided a loose prototype for future public work programs.

Another main cause of poverty during this period was single motherhood. The New York state legislature, encouraged by social workers and progressive reformers, addressed that issue by passing the 1915 Mothers’ Assistance Act, which allocated local public funds to support poor but deserving single mothers. New York Mayor John Purroy Mitchel appointed Hopkins as head of the Board of Child Welfare (BCW), the agency established to administer this program. From 1915 to 1917 Hopkins administered what was called the widows’ pension to women considered worthy of help. This work reflected some of the most important political issues of the era, especially the value placed on home life that had been articulated at the 1909 White House Conference on Children—no child should be removed from the home for reasons of poverty alone. Furthermore, the enabling legislation that allotted money for such programs established the legitimacy of public outdoor relief, that is, using state money to assist the needy outside of institutions. This experience reinforced Hopkins’s belief that it was the responsibility of the government, through agencies such as the BCW, to devise effective, state-funded programs to help the deserving needy.
WORLD WAR I AND THE 1920s
With America’s entrance into World War I, Hopkins (ineligible for the draft because of poor eyesight) joined the American Red Cross, first in New Orleans (Gulf Division) working in the Civilian Relief Division. Also called Home Service, this division was central to the Red Cross because it aided families of servicemen, as well as wounded and demobilized soldiers and sailors. During this time, because the South lacked both an established network of trained social workers and an integrated group of agencies, Hopkins had the opportunity to create an organization from the ground up. He consequently built Civilian Relief into a smoothly operating service agency for military families experiencing hardships because of the war. To accomplish this, Hopkins initiated an array of educational programs in order to train social workers in the South. Hopkins and his staff of about two hundred workers served approximately ten to fifteen thousand families each month. To further professionalize the work he and his colleagues were engaged in, he joined with other social workers to draft the charter for the American Association of Social Workers in June of 1920. When the Red Cross Gulf Division merged with the Southwestern Division after the war, Hopkins went to Atlanta as general manager in 1921. Through his work in the American Red Cross, Hopkins became nationally known and entered into the upper ranks of the social work profession.

In 1922, Hopkins returned to New York City with his family. He worked for the AICP until 1923 when he took a job as general director of the New York Tuberculosis Association and directed his energies toward public health issues. For him, illness resulting from an unfriendly and unhealthy environment was merely another form of social injustice and a preventable cause of poverty. During his tenure with the Tuberculosis Association, Hopkins expanded the agency by absorbing the New York Heart Association. True to his liberal, progressive social work background, he cared little for the bottom line and was often criticized for his free-spending style. When he joined the association it had a surplus of $90,000; when he left it seven years later, it carried a deficit of $40,000. Still, everyone close to the association was delighted with Hopkins’s work there.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION YEARS
With the onset of the Great Depression, Hopkins drew on his previous experiences to address the problems brought about by the high levels of unemployment. The crisis reinforced his belief that public works programs, federally funded and rationally planned, could be used to mitigate the effects of widespread unemployment. In 1931, New York State governor Franklin D. Roosevelt called on Hopkins to run the first state relief organization, the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA), which provided both direct relief and work relief to the state’s unemployed. The TERA was the first instance of a state accepting responsibility for citizens suffering from the effects of the Depression.

In 1933, President Roosevelt named Hopkins as federal relief administrator. Convinced that jobs were the antidote to poverty, Hopkins used his growing influence with the president to push for government-sponsored jobs programs that would put money immediately into the pockets of newly-employed workers. These programs included the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The progressive-era notion that the industrial system lay at the heart of the economic ills threatening the nation shaped Hopkins’s early New Deal policies and programs. With an original allocation of $500 million, the FERA provided the states with matching grants, one federal dollar for every three they raised, in order to provide relief for the unemployed. While direct relief (known as the dole) proved crucial for the survival of many families, recipients also received FERA jobs in exchange for needs-based relief payments. For Hopkins the important element of a jobs program was that it would ensure that American workers could retain their dignity as the breadwinners. Under the more radical and short-lived Civil Works Administration (CWA), the unemployed got a job and did not have to undergo any investigation to ascertain need. Under this program, one did not have to be on relief to get a job.
and wages were based not on need but on the work performed. The CWA reflected Hopkins’s firm conviction that most people simply wanted to work and that jobs were always the best antidote to poverty. The issues that shaped relief policy during the First New Deal continued to define the much debated relationship between relief and recovery and between citizens and the government that plagued the administration for the next several years. Much of this debate had to do with the widespread fear that continued government relief, even in the form of jobs, would foster dependency.

Early in 1934, Harry Hopkins began formulating a new program for the nation’s unemployed that emphasized the importance of work, not only as a relief measure but as an integral part of the national recovery effort. The unemployed needed the opportunity to work for wages and industry needed consumer dollars in order to survive. Hopkins became convinced that a permanent national program of employment assurance, working in concert with unemployment insurance, would not only lead to economic recovery for the nation, but would ensure real security for American families and preserve the nation’s democratic values. Hopkins and other New Deal liberals believed that underconsumption was retarding the nation’s economic recovery. The solution lay in cooperation between the government and private industry to insure that the American worker earned a sufficient wage to afford a decent standard of living.

In late 1934, Roosevelt named Hopkins to the cabinet-level committee for economic security directed to write legislation that would protect American citizens from the vagaries of life in a modern industrial society. The Social Security Act, passed in August 1935, laid the foundations for the American welfare system by enacting legislation that established old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent children. This legislation built the foundation of the American welfare system that defined American social policy until 1996. However, the act contained no permanent program for unemployment. Instead, with the president’s vigorous encouragement, Congress passed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, which gave Roosevelt the broad authority to create the National Emergency Council on May 6, 1935, out of which emerged the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Roosevelt named Hopkins as WPA director, with the mandate to find government-funded jobs for the vast army of unemployed workers on relief. Despite critics who castigated the WPA and its director as being either too liberal or too political, the WPA was enormously successful. In 1938, Hopkins presented to Roosevelt a report that listed an impressive array of 158,000 projects undertaken by approximately five million WPA workers earning an average of $52 a month. Although 80 percent of WPA funds were spent on construction projects, including roads, bridges, parks, playgrounds, air landing fields, and public buildings, there were also numerous non-construction jobs available. Sewing, educational, health, and clerical projects abounded; WPA workers provided disaster relief, did scientific research, restored historic sites, and engaged in conservation programs. Over the course of seven years, the WPA generated more than three million jobs each year, at a total cost of $10.7 billion.

Despite the overwhelming number of unemployed men seeking relief, women formed a critical portion of the unemployed in 1935. Therefore, Hopkins, with the wholehearted support of Eleanor Roosevelt, established a Women’s and Professional Division within the WPA, headed by Ellen Woodward. In addition, Hopkins extended aid to the artistic community and received a great deal of criticism when he developed the WPA Federal Arts Project, known as Federal One. This program had roots in FERA and CWA programs to help the country’s thousands of unemployed artists, musicians, actors, and writers. The Federal Music Project provided work for musicians under the directorship of Nikolai Sokoloff. The Federal Theatre Project, under the direction of former Grinnellian Hallie Flanagan, brought live theater to about a million people each month in forty cities and twenty-two states. Holger Cahill directed the Federal Artists’ Project, which provided work for thousands of unemployed muralists, easel painters, sculptors, and art teachers. The main program of the Federal Writers’ Project, under the leadership of Henry Alsberg, was the production of the American Guide series, which included volumes providing detailed information on various states.
In late 1938, Roosevelt appointed Hopkins as Secretary of Commerce, thinking that this would set him up as a viable liberal candidate for president in 1940. However, the public perception of Hopkins’s tax and spend and elect policy proved to be too much of a political liability. In addition, his increasingly poor health kept him out of the presidential race.

AFTER THE DEPRESSION

During World War II, Hopkins acted as Roosevelt’s unofficial assistant and advisor. In 1941, at the president’s request, Hopkins traveled to England and Russia on diplomatic missions to ascertain the allies’ defense needs. On his return, Roosevelt directed Hopkins to oversee the massive buildup of war production after the passage of the legislation establishing the Lend-Lease plan. After Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, Hopkins became a central figure in the nation’s mobilization and a trusted confidante to the president. The worldwide attention that Hopkins received as Roosevelt’s wartime advisor and emissary to Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, as administrator of Lend-Lease and mastermind of war production, and as the shadowy figure behind Roosevelt at the war conferences has somewhat subsumed his role as an architect of the American welfare system. Yet Hopkins always took great pride that he was able to marshal the resources of the federal government to champion the rights of the poorest one-third of the nation.

Hopkins died in early 1946 as a result of long-term digestive illness and complications relating to stomach cancer.

See Also: CIVIL WORKS ADMINISTRATION (CWA); FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (FERA); WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION (WPA).

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JUNE HOPKINS

HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE (HUAC)

Between 1938 and 1968, the House of Representatives maintained a committee with a remit to investigate “subversive and un-American propaganda,” a mission that it often and controversially pursued with indiscriminate enthusiasm. Samuel Dickstein, a New York congressman of Russian Jewish descent, had long been concerned about the behavior of fascistic and anti-Semitic groups during the Depression, and in January 1937 he introduced a resolution in the House calling for an investigation of organizations promoting “un-American propaganda.” The resolution was tabled, but soon after, Texas Democrat Martin Dies introduced a similar motion. The anti-labor Texan’s targets were on the left, but the two congressmen cooperated and secured a majority for the proposal in May 1938, with the tacit support of the House leadership and Vice President John Nance Garner, and HUAC was established as a temporary special committee. Contradicting Dickstein’s original intent, HUAC focused less on Nazi groups and more on Communists, who were said to have penetrated New Deal agencies. Dies became the committee chair, and Dickstein was excluded.

HUAC was the product of the conservative coalition of Republicans and rural and southern Democrats who had turned against the New Deal and had become the dominant political force in the lower House. The committee won the blessings of radio priest Father Charles Coughlin, patriotic groups such as the Paul Reveres, right-wing columnists such as George Sokolsky, and anticommunist leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). It was largely guided by its head of research, Dr. J. B. Matthews, who, after a career as a prominent fellow traveller (a term mainly applied to intellectuals sympathetic to the Communist cause but not party members), had turned on his former associates.
with an apostate’s zeal. With the American Communist Party reaching its heyday, war looming in Europe, and fears growing of fifth column activities in the United States, HUAC secured broad public approval.

Under Dies, HUAC was a vehicle for attacking the New Deal and its labor and popular front allies, some of which were Communist fronts. It paid some attention to fascist groups such as the German-American Bund, but its principal targets were New Deal agencies such as the Works Progress Administration (especially its suspect Federal Theater Project), New Deal allies such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and such popular front groups as the American League for Peace and Democracy. HUAC initially relied on voluntary witnesses, often drawn from anticommunist groups eager to denounce the left. John P. Frey of the AFL testified that Communists were operating through the CIO, and Walter Steele, head of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, which represented over a hundred patriotic organizations, named hundreds of other organizations as subject to communist influence. Early on, HUAC acquired a reputation for biased proceedings. One target in 1938 was the CIO-Democratic Party alliance in Michigan, which was identified with the celebrated 1937 sit-down strikes at General Motors in Flint. The strikers had been afforded the protection of the National Guard by the New Deal governor Frank Murphy, who was running for re-election in the fall of 1938. In October HUAC visited Detroit as part of a series of hearings into the labor movement. Witnesses attributed the sit-down strikes to Communists, whom they recklessly linked to Murphy. A furious Franklin Roosevelt made his first public assault on HUAC, but Murphy, a major symbol of the New Deal, lost re-election, apparently the victim of red-baiting.

With the midterm elections over, HUAC became a bit less energetic. Criticized for its preoccupation with Communist and front groups, it made some effort to investigate anti-Semitic and Nazi groups in 1939 and 1940, particularly after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the outbreak of war in Europe. But resident aliens and the Communist Party and its alleged New Deal links remained favorite targets, and Dies relished harassing the Roosevelt administration. With Dies warning of subversion in the defense industries as German armies swept across Europe, the committee rose in public estimation and its appropriation was increased. But beginning in 1941, when the United States entered the war as an ally of the Soviet Union and American communists became enthusiastic supporters of the war effort, the “little red scare” faded. Thereafter, HUAC rarely held public hearings, and its activities consisted of little more than the cavortings of the chairman, who mostly used his office to release the names of federal employees he thought should be dismissed for their alleged front associations. HUAC might have redeemed itself in 1943 when it investigated the internment of Japanese Americans, but it used the occasion to encourage scare stories about Japanese subversion. By that time HUAC was being accused of hindering the war effort and its public support had diminished; in 1944 Martin Dies decided not to seek re-election to Congress. In January 1945, in a skilful parliamentary maneuver, Representative John Rankin of Mississippi secured a resolution making HUAC a permanent committee. It would re-emerge powerfully in the Cold War era.

See Also: ANTICOMMUNISM; COMMUNIST PARTY.

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M. J. Heale
The devastating effects of the Great Depression on both the U.S. home-building industry and the homeowner were immediately visible. Residential home building and home repair came to a near standstill, contributing to unemployment in thousands of related industries ranging from lumber to real estate. Historian Kenneth Jackson calculated that between 1928 and 1933 new home construction dropped 95 percent and expenditures on home maintenance fell 90 percent. By early 1933 half of the nation’s homeowners were in default on their mortgages.

In his famous oral history of the Great Depression, *Hard Times* (1970), Studs Terkel recounted how Americans blamed themselves or other family members for the humiliation of repossession. The nation’s foremost symbol of individualism and security was revealed to be just another commodity subject to seizure. In a typical account, Slim Collier recalled how his father, a tool and die maker, responded to the loss of his real estate with “anger and frustration [that] colored my whole life.” A decade earlier, local bankers and businessmen probably applauded the real estate investments made by Collier’s father as a sound strategy to improve his economic and class standings.

Families who could not afford to pay their mortgages or rents had few options. In order to avoid the public humiliation of eviction, most moved in with other family members or friends before legal proceedings were instituted. In both rural and urban areas, some families remained as squatters in their own houses or apartments or in homes vacated by others who had been evicted by banks or landlords. A small minority sought shelter or housing assistance from religious or private charitable organizations. Homeless families gathered in makeshift communities called Hoovervilles, devoid of safe drinking water and sanitation facilities. Automobiles, railroad cars, grain bins, barns, sheds, and shacks also provided shelter for members of the peaceful army of the dispossessed.

The devastation of the home-building industry and the dissolution of the American Dream of home ownership destroyed any vestiges of a laissez-faire approach to the housing market. Seemingly moved by the plight of the millions of families who suffered the social and economic indignities of eviction, deferred ordinary home maintenance, or abandoned hope of purchasing a home, Congress and the administrations of Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt passed a plethora of housing bills. Both administrations and Congress considered the revitalization of the home construction, real estate, and home finance sectors of the economy to be paramount in solving the housing problems faced by ordinary Americans.

Seeking to maintain the status quo, the 1931 President’s National Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership downplayed calls for the creation of a federally financed public housing program. Instead, it promoted housing legislation and policy that encouraged suburban growth and urban decline—trends that had emerged a decade earlier with the rise of automobile ownership and road construction. The first piece of housing legislation supported by President Hoover, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (1932), increased the amount of capital available to banks to lend to home builders. The Emergency Relief and Reconstruction Act, passed in 1932 with support of Hoover, authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to offer loans to limited-dividend housing corporations for the construction of urban housing. The only project instituted under the program was New York City’s Knickerbocker Village—New York was the only state that had the necessary enabling legislation.

Under President Roosevelt’s New Deal, the number, scope, and effectiveness of federal housing programs increased dramatically. As historian Gail Radford observed in 1996, under Roosevelt, a “bifurcated” federal housing policy emerged that . . . provided broad political and financial support for housing agencies that aided upper- and middle-income families, such as the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), established in April 1933, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), created in June 1933. By contrast, programs that assisted families who could not afford to purchase or rent a home on the private market, such as those created under the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works Administration (PWA) in 1933.
This dark hallway in a Chicago rooming house was typical of the living conditions facing many poor urban Americans during the Depression. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION
and the United States Housing Authority (USHA) in 1937, were poorly funded and subject to political attack.

The HOLC and the FHA did not directly spur economic recovery, but they did help to preserve the economic and social value of home ownership among wage-earning families. According to one estimate, the HOLC refinanced approximately one-tenth of the nation’s nonfarm residences between 1933 and 1935. At the same time, the policies adopted by these agencies supported informal practices of racial and social class residential segregation and urban divestment. Through its sale of affordable home mortgage insurance and its creation of minimal construction standards, the FHA encouraged the growth of outlying suburban areas, which were usually segregated by race and class, and discouraged investment in older, urban neighborhoods where greater racial, ethnic and religious diversity often existed.

Ironically perhaps, the New Deal agencies that helped to preserve the commercial housing market, such as the FHA, are less celebrated than two other Roosevelt administration initiatives that frequently are portrayed as political failures—the federally subsidized, low-income public housing program and the model community programs. In 1933 and 1934 the PWA’s Division of Housing offered low-interest loans to several limited-dividend housing corporations for the construction of urban housing.
Catherine Bauer, author of the classic 1934 study *Modern Housing*, regarded Philadelphia’s PWA-financed Carl Mackley Houses as a model community, partly because of the way architects Alfred Katsner and Oscar Stonorov used architectural design and community planning to foster resident interaction. The optimism Bauer and other reformers expressed in the early days of the public housing movement began to erode when the PWA discontinued the loan program in 1934 and began to build public housing directly. Although a few PWA-built public housing developments, such as Atlanta’s Techwood Homes, featured sleek international-style architecture, civic art, and community facilities, inadequate funding resulted in the elimination from most developments of the amenities advocated by reform-minded planners.

The USHA inherited the public housing program from the PWA in 1937 upon the passage of the United States Housing Act, commonly known as the Wagner-Steagall Act. The USHA provided long-term, low-interest loans to local public housing authorities for the construction of public housing developments, and then it subsidized their operation. Strict per-unit construction cost limits inserted into the Wagner-Steagall Act by the political allies of the home-building, real estate, and banking sectors resulted in housing that was frequently inferior in terms of location and appear-
ance, and its inhabitants were economically and socially stigmatized.

In 1937 the Farm Security Administration was assigned responsibility for the Greenbelt Town and Subsistence Homestead programs started three years earlier. Originally under the direction of Roosevelt braintrustee Rexford G. Tugwell, the three Greenbelt towns—Greenbelt, Maryland; Green- dale, Wisconsin; and Greenhills, Ohio—demonstrated the social and economic value of comprehensive community planning and the merit of alternatives to commercial housing. Subsistence Homesteads such as Arthurdale, West Virginia, which combined subsistence agriculture and industrial labor shared at least two characteristics with the low-income, public housing program: Both were woefully underfunded, and both were highly vulnerable to political attack. Neither the low-income public housing developments nor the experimental communities built under the New Deal excited sufficient interest to muster the political and economic power necessary to bring about a fundamental shift in patterns of housing development and ownership.

The Great Depression threatened the American Dream of homeownership, practically extinguished the demand for new residential home building, and dramatically curtailed home improvements. Unwilling to accept the political consequences of a further reduction in housing standards, Congress and Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt assembled the funds necessary to shore up the declining private fortunes of the home-building industry and validate the sanctity of home ownership. But the United States’s housing woes did not end with the Great Depression: mobilization for World War II only worsened the problem wage-earning families in rural and urban areas encountered during the Depression—a scarcity of affordable housing. Despite massive federal government intervention, the United States remained one-third poorly housed throughout the Great Depression.

See Also: BAUER, CATHERINE; CITIES AND SUBURBS; FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION (FHA); FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FNMA); FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION (FSLIC); GREENBELT TOWNS; HOMELESSNESS; REGIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA.

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Kristin M. Szyliwian

HOUSTON, CHARLES

Charles Hamilton Houston (1895–1950), law professor, litigator, and civil rights legal strategist,
played a principal role in conceptualizing, defining and setting the pace of the legal phase of the African-American struggle against racial discrimination and segregation in education from the 1930s to 1950. His work was pivotal in the education of African-American lawyers; the development of a legal strategy to destroy the constitutional underpinnings of racial segregation; the litigation of suits challenging racial discrimination in education, employment, and housing; and the incorporation of an activist philosophy of social engineering into the jurisprudential matrix of the United States.

Born Charles Hamilton Houston in Washington, D.C., on September 3, 1895, to William LePre Houston, a lawyer, and Mary Ethel Hamilton Houston, a hairdresser and former teacher, Houston attended racially segregated public schools until his graduation from M Street High School in 1911. He graduated with honors from Amherst College in Massachusetts in 1915. After teaching briefly at Howard University and serving as an officer in the segregated armed forces during World War I, Houston attended Harvard Law School. There he became the first African-American editor of the Harvard Law Review (in 1921) and earned both his LL.B. with honors (1922) and the Doctorate in Juridical Science (1923). He was admitted to the District of Columbia bar in 1924 and joined his father to form a law practice, Houston and Houston.

During the Great Depression and the New Deal era, Houston practiced and taught law. As the chief academic officer and Vice Dean of Howard University’s Law School, Houston not only instituted new procedures and standards, but also reallocated funds to satisfy the requirements for the law school’s approval by the American Bar Association and accreditation by the Association of American Law Schools. As a professor of law, Houston introduced to Howard’s students a non-traditional philosophy of law he called social engineering. The principal concepts of Houston’s philosophy of social engineering were two: first, the propriety of creative and strategic use of the legal system by lawyers to bring about just results and equal protection of the law; second, the duty of lawyers in the United States to use law as an instrument of social change, democratic advancement, and racial justice. Beyond that, he challenged African-American lawyers to serve as interpreters and proponents of the race’s rights and aspirations. Practicing lawyers and Howard’s students, among them Thurgood Marshall and Oliver Hill, were further challenged to work for African Americans’ full citizenship rights and equality under the law.

As the first salaried special counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from 1934 to 1950, Houston conceptualized and implemented, with Thurgood Marshall as his assistant special counsel, a protracted litigation campaign to have racial segregation in public education declared illegal. Taking into account institutionalized racism and the Supreme Court’s reliance upon precedent, the campaign’s scores of skilled and committed lawyers affiliated nationally and locally with the NAACP and its separately incorporated legal defense and educational fund focused on gradually but systematically invalidating the controlling precedent for racial segregation—the “separate but equal” doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)—and on establishing new precedents for interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause. These lawyers included, but were not limited to Marshall, Hill, Robert Carter, William Hastie, Z. Alexander Looby, James Nabrit, Constance Baker Motley, Conrad Pearson, Louis Redding and Arthur Shores. With Houston’s direction during the latter 1930s and his advice to Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, and cooperating attorneys throughout the 1940s, test cases were argued until adequate precedents had been established to launch in 1950 a direct attack on the legality of racially segregated schools in the states and the District of Columbia. This final phase of the litigation campaign culminated in the 1954 Brown v. Board and Bolling v. Sharpe rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, that declared racially segregated public schools illegal.

Although serving as a consultant-legal counsel to the NAACP and its Legal Defense Fund after returning to private practice in 1940, Houston focused his practice on racial discrimination in employment and housing. With Joseph Waddy, Spottswood Robinson III and other attorneys, Houston won
precedent-setting cases before the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the duty of fair representation of workers and African Americans seeking to purchase homes. In 1944, efforts to protect African American railroad workers against discriminatory treatment and racially-motivated violence culminated in two cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, William Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad and Tom Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen. Agreeing with Charles Houston’s argument, Supreme Court justices handed down an opinion in Steele and Tunstall that established the duty of statutory bargaining agents to represent fairly and impartially all workers whose interest by statute they were designated to represent in negotiations with employers. In Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge, Houston successfully argued against judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants to purchase agreements in the District of Columbia and in 1948 the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited court enforcement of covenants to housing contracts that restricted by race the sale of homes.

On April 20, 1950, Charles Houston succumbed to a heart attack in Washington, D.C. Although best known as Thurgood Marshall’s mentor-teacher, Houston’s lasting legacy includes his transformation of Howard University’s law school during the Great Depression and his training of civil rights lawyers, his articulation of a jurisprudence of social engineering, and his contributions as legal architect and strategist of the legal phase of the early civil rights movement.

See Also: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES; HOWARD UNIVERSITY; NATURAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP); RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS.

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Howard University was founded in 1867 by an act of Congress and was named for General Oliver Otis Howard, former head of the Freedmen’s Bureau. Howard’s leadership was exclusively white until 1926, when Reverend Mordecai Johnson became its first black president. Virtually coinciding with Johnson’s arrival was a pledge by Congress to provide an annual appropriation to support the university’s endowment. Congress’s financial support allowed Johnson to implement his plan to improve the academic quality of the school. (When Johnson arrived, only the medical and dental schools—out of ten professional and graduate schools—were accredited.) Johnson made his first move with the law school. He hired Charles Houston as the new dean and gave him the mandate to secure accreditation. Houston, who would become the first legal counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and one of the architects of the NAACP’s civil rights legal strategies, hired William Hastie and James Nabrit, among others. In 1931, Howard’s law school was accredited and, more importantly, became nationally recognized for its leadership in civil rights law. Civil rights pioneers Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter graduated in 1933 and 1940, respectively. Furthermore, Nabrit, who participated in virtually every civil rights brief from 1927 to 1954, created the nation’s first civil rights law class in 1938.

Howard’s academic prominence was not limited to the law school. Scientists like zoologist Ernest Everet Just, chemist Percy Julian, anthropologist Montague Cobb, and the medical school’s Charles
Drew were all leaders in their disciplines. Alain Locke, whose anthology *The New Negro* gave form to the Harlem Renaissance, taught philosophy at Howard. Poet and literary critic Sterling Brown was also on the faculty, as were pioneering historians Charles H. Wesley and Rayford Logan, actor Todd Duncan, economist Abram Harris, political scientist Ralph Bunche, sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, and education specialists Dorothy Porter Wesley, Charles Thompson, and Doxey Wilkerson.

Many leading education philanthropists added to the government’s support, thus providing financial security for Howard throughout the Great Depression. With its concentration of academic talent, Johnson’s accreditation and building campaign, and secure finances, Howard was the most successful black academic center in the country. Fisk University in Tennessee and Atlanta University in Georgia were Howard’s only competitors, but their resources paled in comparison.

This privileged position, however, did not translate into a peaceful existence. During the 1930s Howard undergraduates led marches against segregation in the House of Representatives’ dining room, protested a national crime conference that ignored lynching, held peace rallies, and helped lead economic boycotts of local white merchants who refused to hire black workers. Faculty members arranged conferences that attacked New Deal policies, led community pickets, and organized a teachers’ union that aligned itself with national labor causes and protested local segregation policies. Even Mordecai Johnson’s actions occasionally inspired calls for his ouster: Because he thought the economic experiment in the Soviet Union was worth further study and because he defended the freedom of speech of even his most radical faculty, several congressmen were convinced that Johnson was a Communist, that he supported Communist teachings on campus, and that he harbored Communists. Federal investigations into Howard’s affairs and teaching practices, however, failed to turn up sufficient evidence to fire Johnson or end financial support for the university.

When Howard attained academic excellence in the late 1920s it became the seed ground for several generations of intellectual and political activists. Although its popularity among federal officials was not unanimous during the Depression, it enjoyed public support from such prominent figures as Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. This support continued even despite strong faculty criticism of the New Deal. It is likely that Roosevelt believed that the symbolic importance of a national Negro university far outweighed the significance of any critiques that came from its campus.

See Also: AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; BUNCHE, RALPH; EDUCATION; HOUSTON, CHARLES.

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**HOWE, LOUIS McHENRY**

Louis McHenry Howe (1871–1936) was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s close friend and chief political aide from 1912 until his death at the end of the president’s first term. Born in Indianapolis, Howe grew up in Saratoga Springs, New York. After high school he worked for his family’s weekly newspaper and part-time for New York City papers during the Saratoga horse racing season and the Albany legislative session. He wrote speeches and ran campaigns for various upstate Democratic politicians. When Roosevelt arrived in Albany as a state senator in 1911, both he and Howe were identified with the anti-Tammany Democratic League’s commitment to conservation of resources and clean government.
Desperately ill during his 1912 state senate re-election bid, Roosevelt hired Howe to run his campaign. They won. Roosevelt soon learned that the country newsman was a skilled tactician, building networks, writing speeches, and planting favorable news stories. Roosevelt the public figure and Howe the private manipulator complemented each other. In 1913 Roosevelt became assistant secretary of the Navy and Howe became his chief aide. His principal assignment was to manage patronage and influence to make his boss the state’s chief representative in the Wilson administration. They never displaced Tammany, but in 1920 Roosevelt was nominated for vice president on a ticket headed by Ohio’s Governor James Cox. They lost, and Roosevelt returned to a business career.

When Roosevelt fell victim to polio in 1921 Howe shared responsibility for his care with Eleanor Roosevelt and moved into the Roosevelt’s New York City house. While Roosevelt concentrated on regaining the use of his paralyzed legs, Howe focused on rebuilding his boss’s political strength in New York and reassuring Roosevelt that he could still be a major national figure. Roosevelt relied heavily on Howe, but made his own major decisions. In 1928, as Alfred E. Smith sought the presidency, he allowed himself to be drafted for governor, a move that Howe strongly opposed. He won the gubernship; Smith lost the presidency.

Roosevelt, Howe, and James A. Farley managed Roosevelt’s successful 1932 campaign for the
presidency, using a team of scholars—a brain trust they had assembled during Roosevelt's governorship—to develop issues and legislation. They were pioneering an approach that later, in Washington, would create a substantial network of staff and special offices—a fourth branch of government. Howe went to Washington as secretary to the president and lived in the White House with unlimited personal access to his old friend. He had helped to build the brain trust, but he had to fight for power with its members. He died on April 16, 1936. Howe is buried in Fall River, Massachusetts, where his grave is marked by a monument that is a smaller copy of Roosevelt's at Hyde Park.

See Also: DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ELECTION OF 1928; ELECTION OF 1932; ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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HUGHES, CHARLES EVANS

Jurist and statesman Charles Evans Hughes (April 11, 1862–August 27, 1948) was born in Glen Falls, New York, the only child of David Charles Hughes, an evangelical minister, and Mary Catherine Connelly, a schoolteacher. His father’s calling carried the family to a number of New York and New Jersey communities during Charles’s youth. A precocious child, he studied at home until age nine, attended three years of public school in Newark and another year in Manhattan before entering college at Colgate (then Madison University). After two years at Colgate, he transferred to Brown University, finishing third in his class.

After graduating first in his Columbia law class, Hughes passed the New York bar with a record high score and joined a New York firm in 1884. He became a partner three years later and married the daughter of the firm’s senior partner the next year. Overcome by work and poor health, he left private practice briefly for a teaching position at Cornell Law School, but he soon returned to the firm, becoming a prominent figure in commercial law.

Hughes would also become active in public service and politics. As counsel to committees of the New York legislature, he led inquiries into corruption and mismanagement of the state’s gas, electric, and insurance industries. A reluctant but winning candidate for governor on the Republican ticket in 1906 and 1908, he pushed successfully for creation of two utility regulatory commissions and the first significant workman’s compensation program in the nation.

Although Theodore Roosevelt had backed Hughes in his two gubernatorial races, the future justice’s distaste for the give and take of politics caused strains in their relationship. In 1910, however, President William Howard Taft appointed Hughes to a seat on the United States Supreme Court, where he served with distinction until resigning in 1916 to make a losing bid for the White House against President Woodrow Wilson. Following the election, he returned to private practice in New York, then served as secretary of state in the Warren Harding administration.

In 1930, President Herbert Hoover brought Hughes back to the Supreme Court, this time as chief justice. Hughes held the Court’s center seat during one of the most tumultuous periods in its—and the nation’s—history. Although never as committed to the laissez faire philosophy of the Court’s “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse,” which critics had dubbed the most conservative justices of the period, Hughes wrote or joined a number of decisions rejecting New Deal programs and state legislation designed to pull the country out of the depths of the Depression. He spoke for the Court, for example, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), invalidating provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). But he also authored Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell (1934),
substantially narrowing the scope of the contract clause as a restriction on state power. And when the Court began dismantling its laissez faire precedents during the 1937 court-packing episode, Hughes wrote the first two opinions signaling an end to that era: *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish* (1937), upholding a state minimum wage law for women virtually identical to one the Court had struck down the previous year; and *National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin* (1937), upholding federal regulation of labor-management relations. Chief Justice Hughes retired from the Court in 1941 and died at age eight-six in 1948.

See Also: BLACK, HUGO; DOUGLAS, WILLIAM O.; FRANKFURTER, FELIX; HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, JR.; SUPREME COURT; SUPREME COURT “PACKING” CONTROVERSY.

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HUGHES, LANGSTON

Langston Hughes (February 1, 1902–May 22, 1967), poet, dramatist, fiction writer, journalist, and lyricist, was perhaps the most versatile of African-American writers and, especially as a poet, the most beloved. Born in Joplin, Missouri, he grew up in Lawrence, Kansas, and Cleveland, Ohio, where he attended high school from 1916 to 1920. In Kansas, his maternal grandmother, an ardent abolitionist whose first husband had died at Harpers Ferry in 1859 as a member of John Brown’s band, taught Hughes to revere the cause of social justice. In high school, Hughes was further influenced by his classmates, many of whom were the children of immigrants from eastern Europe. His first books, *The Weary Blues* (1926) and *Fine Clothes to the Jew* (1927), were volumes of poetry that reflected both his lively social conscience and his commitment to the vernacular culture of black America, especially its music. A landmark essay, “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain” (published in the June 23, 1926, issue of *The Nation*), in which Hughes called on younger blacks to be proud of their ethnic heritage even as they insisted on artistic freedom, helped establish him as a key figure of the flourishing Harlem Renaissance. By 1930, however, Hughes began to sense the coming economic disaster. “New York began to be not so pleasant that winter,” he would write in his 1940 autobiography, *The Big Sea*. “People were sleeping in subways or on newspapers in office doors, because they had no homes. And in every block a beggar appeared.”

In 1931 and 1932 Hughes toured the South and the West by car, consciously trying to take his poetry to the people; he also publicly protested the treatment of the Scottsboro Boys. In 1932, he went to the Soviet Union to help make a film about race relations in the United States; when that venture collapsed, he stayed on for a year. About this time, Hughes, although never a Communist, wrote his most radical poems, including “Good Morning Revolution,” “Goodbye Christ,” and “One more ‘S’ in the U.S.A.” (to make it Soviet). In 1933 and 1934, living in Carmel, California, he wrote the often bitter short stories that comprise *The Ways of White Folks* (1934). While there, he also worked on a play (never produced) about labor unrest in agricultural California. In 1935, his tragedy *Mulatto* opened on Broadway, but Hughes saw little of its profits because of the hostility of its producer, a white man. Disillusioned, he wrote “Let America Be America Again,” a long poem intended as an anthem for the nation during the Depression.

In 1937, he spent three months in Spain as a war correspondent for the *Baltimore Afro-American* newspaper. Returning to America, he founded the Harlem Suitcase Theatre. Its first production, *Don’t You Want to Be Free?* (1938), was a loosely constructed play—music that culminates in a rousing call for the unity of black and white workers. That year, 1938, the Communist International Workers Order published *A New Song*, a collection of Hughes’s radical poems. However, he soon an-
gered the left by working on a Hollywood film, *Way Down South* (1939), that employed many movie stereotypes about black folk in Dixie. Although Hughes pleaded truthfully that he was destitute, certain critics lambasted him. A greater threat came from the right. In 1940, just before a gala book luncheon in California to mark the appearance of *The Big Sea*, supporters of an evangelist attacked in Hughes’s “Goodbye Christ” forced its organizers to cancel the event. Retreating, Hughes issued a statement renouncing the poem. His role as a major literary commentator on the ills of capitalism in America was over, just as the Depression itself approached its end.

*See Also:* AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; LITERATURE; WRIGHT, RICHARD.

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*ARNOLD RAMPERSAD*

**HULL, CORDELL**

Cordell Hull (October 2, 1871–July 23, 1955) was the longest serving secretary of state in U.S. history. Hull was born in a rented log cabin in Overton County, Tennessee, in the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains. He was the third of five sons born to William and Elizabeth Riley Hull. Of humble background, Hull was educated by his mother and by an itinerate tutor who would spend two to three months during the winter teaching Hull and other neighborhood children. At fourteen, Hull enrolled at the Montvale Institute in Celina, Tennessee. This was followed by a stint in university and eventually law school, which Hull finished in 1891.

Hull’s association with politics began at the age of nineteen when he was elected chairman of the Democratic Party for his county. At twenty-one, Hull entered the state legislature. He then served for a time as a judge, and in 1906 was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Hull kept this seat until 1920, when, along with many of his fellow Democrats, he fell victim to the anti-Wilsonian sentiment that followed World War I and Wilson’s drive to involve the United States in the League of Nations. Without a place in Congress, Hull took up the chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee, a post that he kept until 1924. This gave Hull his first real national exposure, which he used to regain his congressional seat in the 1922 election. For a time, Hull entertained the hope that he might become his party’s nominee for president in the 1928 election, but he eventually dropped the idea, resolving instead to run successfully for the Senate two years later.
Hull enjoyed a good reputation among his congressional colleagues, and was widely regarded as a moderate, cautious, and hardworking Democrat who had a knack for bringing antagonists together in a spirit of cooperation. With the exception of his persistent advocacy of free trade, Hull rarely took a stand on controversial issues and in general sought to avoid confrontation. Hull’s critics have argued that these characteristics meant that Hull left no real mark as a legislator, and much the same charge was laid against him as secretary of state. But Hull’s moderation (particularly his moderate internationalism) and the broad public and party support he enjoyed made him a political asset. Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized this, and when he decided to run for president in 1932, he sought Hull’s support. Hull campaigned vigorously for Roosevelt, and was rewarded for his loyalty with a seat in the cabinet as secretary of state, a post he would retain until November 1944.

Hull’s memoirs, published in 1948, are littered with references to his frustration over Roosevelt’s tendency to act as his own secretary of state, and there is no question that on a wide range of issues, Roosevelt often chose to ignore or bypass Hull. This tendency became even more pronounced during World War II. Hull played little role, for example, in the intimate and almost continuous communication between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt. Hull also remained largely outside the summit diplomacy that became the hallmark of the Grand Alliance led by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. But in other areas, Hull did have an impact. During the 1930s, for example, Hull played a significant role in the development of the Good Neighbor Policy, and he is largely responsible for the passage of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which led to a significant expansion of U.S. trade in the mid to late 1930s. During the war, Hull also became intimately involved in the negotiation of the 1942 Lend-Lease Consideration Agreement, which was designed to obtain trade and other economic concessions from the British as a quid pro quo for Lend-Lease aide, and later he was involved in postwar planning and preparation. With Roosevelt’s encouragement, Hull helped engineer U.S. commitment to postwar internationalism and the establishment of the United Nations through his effective involvement in the 1943 Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, and the 1945 San Francisco Conference, where the United Nations was officially born. In recognition of his key role in the establishment of the UN, Hull was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace in 1945.

See Also: GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY; ISOLATIONISM.

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HUMOR

Sigmund Freud’s astute observation about the design of humor broadly refracted the tone of laughter throughout the Great Depression: “Humour is not resigned, it is rebellious. It signifies the triumph not only of the ego, but also of the pleasure principle, which is strong enough to assert itself here in the face of the adverse real circumstances.”

From the earliest settlements in the seventeenth century, humor has been axial in American culture, a rebellious, rallying, and ribald dynamic. Pinpointing its enduring relevance, Constance
Rourke noted in *American Humor: A Study of the National Character* (1931) that “Humor has been a fashioning instrument in America, cleaving its way through the national life, holding tenaciously to the spread elements of that life. . . .” Its ultimate objective, Rourke asserted, was uniting “the unconscious objective of a disunited people . . . and the rounded completion of an American type.”

Salient motifs of humor, a melange of resistance and rebellion, irony and nonsense, coursed through the travails of the Great Depression, as they had during previous domestic crises. The articulation of humor mirrored and uplifted people in their attempt to cope with events that were confusing, contradictory, and seemingly incessant: “We’ll hold the distinction of being the only country in the history of the world that ever went to the poor house in an automobile,” offered Will Rogers, the popular crackerbarrel wit in the early decades of the twentieth century.

The comical is often a spirited interplay with incongruity. Initially, the stock market convulsion and swift economic decline recorded instant disbelief. Theatrical comedian Ed Wynn, playing the classic fool in Richard Rodgers and Lorenz Hart’s *Simple Simon* (1930), would lay flat on his back on the stage and insist that business was looking up. As financial adversity mounted, the urge to retaliate against the power elite, the Wall Street bankers, investment brokers, and corporate managers, assumed robust comic proportions. Will Rogers cracked that “every international banker ought to have printed over his office door, ‘Alive today by the grace of a nation that has a sense of humor.’”

At the same time, distrust of political and economic institutions loomed large. The memorable song, “Whatever It Is, I’m Against It,” rendered by Groucho Marx in *Horse Feathers* (1932), summed up the pervasive, anarchistic feeling that nothing was going right and everything deserved condemnation. Several films spoofed the state outright. The public’s rebellious resentments could be scene in the Marx Brothers’ *Duck Soup* (1933) and W. C. Fields’s *Million Dollar Legs* (1932), both set in fictitious countries beset with chaotic economic conditions and corrupt politicians. As the president of “Freedonia,” Groucho Marx sings “If you think this country’s bad off now, wait till I get through with it,” while W. C. Fields, head of “Klopopstockia,” manages to remain in office as long as he triumphs at arm wrestling.

Virtually every major segment of media, including the stage, novels, magazines, cinema, and radio, sought in humor a means of expressing people’s desire to escape from the economic distress while grappling with its tangled meaning. Reaching the largest audience throughout the decade was the comic film. Across the regions, an astonishing sixty to seventy-five million persons, approximately 61 percent of the population, went to the movie theaters each week.

Several themes infused the early films. The comedy of pathos, of irony and frustration, in the early years gave way to the humor of aggression and an expression of hope later in the decade. The major film figures of the 1920s were small, wiry, and resilient. Against the antagonistic environs of the modern city, Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, Harold Lloyd, and Harry Langston survived with classical, comedic dignity. The Great Depression forced a shift from the comedy of individual poignancy to the comedy of resilience and retaliation. W. C. Fields, the Marx Brothers, Mae West, Carol Lombard—as well as the radio comedians, Fred Allen, Jack Benny, George Burns, and Gracie Allen—used their comedy as a buffer against the economic harshness. On occasion, their routines plunged deep into working-class hostility.

A prominent cinematic take-off of the theatrical comedy of manners was the screwball comedy: In addition to *Duck Soup, Horse Feathers,* and *Million Dollar Legs,* these include *Bringing up Baby* (1938), *It Happened One Night* (1934), *My Man Godfrey* (1936), and *You Can’t Take It with You* (1938). This farcical leitmotif satirized the harsh realities of economic plight and lampooned the upper class, their negative impact and banal life style. Invoking the homeless in *My Man Godfrey* (1936)—particularly “the forgotten man” emphasized in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s speech—was a scene of men in a Hooverville shelter by a city dump that dramatically contrasted the woeful condition of the unemployed against the asinine game of a scavenger hunt of the wealthy elite.
Concomitantly, the application of the “Production Code” in 1934 that promulgated “the moral importance of entertainment” altered the language and plot of comedy films. Escewing the amoral, dark, and surreal comedy that had formed the keystone of farcical routines early in the 1930s, the Production Code led to a rollicking, subversive sexual humor, an imaginative comedy that suggested but never exposed sexual antics. Mae West, whose comedic fare had incited the Code, wrote, directed, and starred in films where her sexual innuendoes became repeatable rejoinders: *Night after Night* (1932), *She Done Him Wrong* (1933), and *My Little Chickadee* (1940). Entering a speakeasy in *Night after Night*, for example, West replies to a hatcheck girl who exclaims, “Goodness, what lovely diamonds,” that “Goodness had nothin’ do with it, dearie.”

Additionally, radio comedy was a coalescing comedic force that extended through the difficult times of World War II. The most popular shows featured Jack Benny, *Amos ‘n Andy* (Freeman Gosden and Charles Correll), Fred Allen, George Burns and Gracie Allen, *Fibber McGee and Molly* (Jim and Marian Jordan), Eddie Cantor, Bob Hope, and Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy, plus a comedy panel, audience-participation program, *Can You Top This?*

Writers, poets, novelists, and essayists fashioned comic plots that directly or obliquely spanned the economic rupturing: James Thurber, E. B. White, S. J. Perelman, Langston Hughes, H. L. Mencken, and Stephen Leacock. Cartoonists in the preeminent literary magazine, *The New Yorker*, offered sharp social criticism together with a sardonic look at the crumbling conditions, as well as changes in social mores shaped by the Depression.

In sum, the vast resource of rebellious humor was in full play as the populace confronted the enormous distress and mystery engendered by the Great Depression.

See Also: COMMUNICATIONS AND THE PRESS; HOLLYWOOD AND THE FILM INDUSTRY; LEISURE; MARX BROTHERS; RADIO; ROGERS, WILL; WEST, MAE.

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JOSEPH BOSKIN

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**HUNDRED DAYS**

On March 4, 1933, Franklin Roosevelt returned to the White House after his inaugural, and Mrs. Roosevelt served hot dogs for the lunch guests. The president then reviewed the inauguration parade, giving pride of place on the stand to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson and the surviving members of the Wilson administration. While the band played the “Franklin D. Roosevelt Inauguration March,” composed by the new secretary of the treasury, William Woodin, the incoming attorney general, Homer Cummings, studied the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. He decided that it could be used to close the banks and to halt the shipment of gold out of the country. Holdover Republican officials closeted with Roosevelt’s advisers worked round the clock to find some method of reopening the nation’s banks. The country’s banking system had come to a halt when the governors of New York and Illinois had bowed to the inevitable and closed their state’s banks in the early morning of inauguration day. On Sunday evening, Roosevelt signed proclamations closing the banks and called Congress into special session. By early Tuesday morning Woodin and Ray Moley had agreed that they...
should implement the plans outlined by departing Republican officials for reopening and reorganizing the banks, that they should make a “tremendous gesture” for economy in government, and that Roosevelt should make a “man to man appeal” for public confidence.

REOPENING THE BANKS

By the time Congress came into session on Thursday, March 9, the chairman of the House Banking Committee only had one copy of the bill that had finally been drafted at 3:00 that morning. He “came down the center aisle of the House waving this thing. ‘Here is this bill, let’s pass it.’” And the House passed it in forty minutes. The Senate was more deliberate but had still passed it by 8:30 that evening. Two days later the House voted to give the president the power he asked for to cut and to reform veterans’ benefits and to cut federal salaries. On Sunday Roosevelt gave his first fireside chat explaining the banking crisis and how banks would reopen. The next day the first ones did.

Roosevelt had not originally intended that Congress should stay in session past the ten days that it took to reopen the banks. But by the time Congress assembled he had been persuaded to take advantage of Congress’s presence and ask for farm legislation and unemployment relief. The opportunity to develop recovery and reform legislation as quickly as possible was irresistible. By the time Congress finally adjourned on June 16, the first one hundred days of the Roosevelt administration had produced sixteen major pieces of legislation. The cantankerous Congress, which had been gridlocked in bitter recrimination with the outgoing president, responded enthusiastically to the appeals of the new president. The politicians laid aside previous divisions, discarded long-held principles, and both grasped for themselves and gave to the executive vast, often unspecified powers, unheard of in peacetime. The federal government was given the power to decide which banks should reopen, to regulate the stock exchange, to determine the gold value of the dollar, to prescribe minimum wages and prices, to pay farmers not to produce, to pay money to the unemployed, to plan and regenerate a whole river basin across six states, to spend billions of dollars on public works, and to underwrite credit for bankers, homeowners, and farmers.

These first “Hundred Days” of the New Deal have served as a model for future presidents of bold leadership and executive legislative harmony. Jimmy Carter’s adviser Stuart Eizenstat noted that since Roosevelt “the first hundred days of an administration have been closely watched as a sign of what can be expected over the course of the entire administration.” Richard Nixon, conscious that the “dam against criticism” would come crashing down after a hundred days, created a “100 days group” that would push departments to bring in legislative proposals by the twelve-week deadline so that a “First Quarter Report” could be produced to show that the administration had met the hundred-day “test.” But Arthur Schlesinger warned of the hundred-day “trap.” “Roosevelt’s 100 days was,” he said “a unique episode which grew out of a unique crisis.” What were the particular circumstances that enabled Roosevelt, but not subsequent presidents, to exercise such bold leadership and to command such congressional support?

ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CONSTITUENCY PRESSURE

The unprecedented scale of the economic catastrophe faced by the United States led many to equate the position with war and to turn to the model of 1917, when the federal government had exercised vast emergency powers to mobilize men and resources to fight a European war. The passage in Roosevelt’s inaugural address that drew the most sustained applause was his promise that if Congress did not act, he would ask Congress for “broad executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.” Roosevelt and his advisers turned to old wartime statutes to handle the new crisis. They consciously modeled new action agencies, such as the National Recovery Administration (NRA), on wartime predecessors. They used the emergency as the constitutional rationale for bold new powers. Men and women who had had their first taste of public life running those wartime agencies returned to Washington in 1933 from private life to sign on for the duration.
This need for action in an emergency and the willingness to contemplate dictatorial powers for a president certainly infused Congress in the first days of the Roosevelt administration. Republican minority leader Bertrand Snell said of the banking bill, “The house is burning down and the president of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire. And to me, at this time, there is only one way to answer that question and that is to give the president what he demands and says is necessary to meet the situation.”

But more conventional politics also assisted the president. The Democrats enjoyed healthy majorities in both houses of Congress: 311 to 116 in the House, 60 to 35 in the Senate. They also confronted a Republican opposition that was split between a progressive wing prepared to support many New Deal measures, particularly those assisting farmers, and a stand-pat conservative faction for whom the New Deal was anathema. Many members of Congress had been elected for the first time in 1932, but congressional leadership was in the hands of skilled and experienced southern Democrats. They were loyal party men, particularly comfortable with measures, such as financial regulation, that they could interpret as the legacy of Wilsonian reform. They were anxious to build a legislative record, and they were personally friendly to Roosevelt, whose nomination most of them had supported in opposition to the hated Al Smith. From his time in Washington under Wilson to his stays at Warm Springs, Roosevelt had, in turn, established a warm and personal rapport with these congressmen, and he never underestimated their almost limitless susceptibility to presidential flattery. In addition, the traditional patronage available to any new administration was vastly increased by the proliferation of emergency agencies. The prospect of these jobs kept many congressmen in line, especially since most of them were not filled until the end of the Hundred Days.

But constituency pressure pushed Congress into line with the legislation of the Hundred Days. The desperate unemployed and farmers and homeowners threatened with eviction demanded help. Roosevelt quickly demonstrated his ability to inspire ordinary Americans. He cultivated the press. He held the first of 377 press conferences on March 8. The relaxed and informal gathering in his office was in stark contrast to the suspicion and distance created by Herbert Hoover. As one journalist noted, “in that first sitting . . . the new president gave the correspondents more sensational news than some of his predecessors had handed out in four years.”

The hardboiled newsmen were bowled over and spontaneously applauded. Roosevelt’s first fireside chat on March 12 even more effectively spoke over the heads of Washington politicians directly to the American people. The president took great care to make his case to an audience he envisaged sitting round the fireside. His preparations were meticulous: the right angle of the microphone, a false tooth to close a gap in his two lower front teeth, the speed of delivery (about one hundred words a minute), and the language (over three quarters of the words were among the thousand most commonly used). The people responded: Over 450,000 wrote to the White House in the first week.

Congress however was not browbeaten into blanket submission to Roosevelt. In the first place, there was no presidential masterplan for the Hundred Days. Much was piecemeal and opportunistic: seeking the repeal of prohibition, for example, to soften the unpopularity of the Economy Act. Much was inserted by Congress: inflationary measures in the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the federal insurance of bank deposits. The great National Industrial Recovery Act was prompted by the likely passage of the Black thirty-hour bill, which Roosevelt considered unworkable. Roosevelt set his advisers on the task of pulling together existing recovery proposals into an administration proposal. The great recovery measures in agriculture and industry were largely enabling measures: The farm act and the recovery act laid out sometimes contradictory policy options. Which options would be adopted would depend on the administrators. Other more presidentially inspired measures, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), were hurried onto the statute book to take advantage of the favorable political climate.

The passage of legislation was certainly helped by the relative weakness of organized interest groups. Labor was enfeebled, farmers were divided,
and businessmen, especially bankers, were discredited. Roosevelt faced down the veterans’ lobby with Republican support. It is difficult to think that a regional authority like the TVA could have been created if the individual southern states had not been in such a weak position. Nevertheless, the vast powers given to the federal government were circumscribed. The federal government simply lacked the “state capacity” to implement coercive centralized measures; it lacked both the bureaucracy and the information to drive through top-down programs. Bankers would have to provide advice on which banks could be reopened; farmers would have to administer the production control programs; businessmen would have to staff the NRA code authorities; and the states would have to administer the relief program.

Some of the prominent figures in the Hundred Days—Harry Hopkins, Henry Wallace, and Harold Ickes—would still be central figures in the Roosevelt government when the president died in 1945. Others who survived, like Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Frances Perkins, played a relatively minor role in the early months of the New Deal. By contrast, some key players in the Hundred Days would quickly pass from the stage or from the good graces of the administration:Brains Truster Ray Moley; the advocate of rigid economy Lewis Douglas; the protege of Bernard Baruch Hugh Johnson; the Wilsonian warhorse Daniel Roper—all were influential in 1933 but played little role afterwards.

In a similar vein, the Hundred Days bought relief for the unemployed, the protection of labor standards, farm price supports, liberalized credit for homeowners and farmers, public works spending, securities regulation, and the TVA. But they also bought measures designed to slash government spending, to increase the tax burden through regressive excise taxes, and to foster business-government cooperation. It was unclear at the end of the Hundred Days whether the former or the latter would be the force of the New Deal future.

See Also: FIRESIDE CHATS; NEW DEAL; ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D.

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**HUNGER MARCHES**

When the Great Depression began, the Communist International called for unified protests by the unemployed on a single day. In the United States, the Communist Party and allied organizations publicized International Unemployment Day in their newspapers, in leaflets, and in preparatory demonstrations and meetings. Hundreds of thousands of unemployed people turned out in cities across the country on March 6, 1930, for militant protests for “Work or Wages,” to which the police responded harshly. The Communist movement then organized Unemployed Councils, neighborhood organizations of the unemployed that fought evictions and put pressure on governmental authorities to provide assistance. Major protests were often dubbed “hunger marches.”

In 1931 there were local hunger marches and marches on state capitols in about a dozen states, often with marchers converging from different parts of the state to demand relief and unemployment insurance. The first national hunger march took place on December 7, 1931, timed to coincide with the opening of Congress. The demands of the march included unemployment insurance and a social insurance system to cover maternity care, illnesses, accidents, and old age. There were local demonstrations and conferences to select 1,670 delegates who converged on Washington from four separate columns. The marchers were unsuccessful in their attempts to address Congress or meet with the president, but they held mass meetings on their return homeward and brought public attention to the plight of the jobless.

The most famous of the hunger marches was the March 7, 1932, Ford Hunger March. Three thousand marchers gathered in Detroit with the...
goal of presenting demands at the Ford employment office in the suburb of Dearborn, a company town where Ford’s main complex was located. Police used tear gas to stop the marchers from entering Dearborn. In response, some marchers threw stones. When the marchers reached the plant, the police opened fired, killing five. Authorities initially blamed Communists for what they called a riot, sought to arrest Communist leader William Z. Foster, and launched raids against left-wing organizations reminiscent of the hysteria following the Chicago Haymarket bombing of 1886. The massive funeral march of thirty thousand and the growth of left-wing organizations after the march indicated that repression would not break up the movement. Even within the company town of Dearborn, the Unemployed Council developed a significant base.

The second national hunger march in December 1932 had about twice as many delegates (3,200) as the first march. Delegations this time were able to meet with the presiding officers of the House and the Senate to present demands for cash winter relief, unemployment insurance, an end to military spending, and the taxing of corporations. Some members of Congress visited the hunger marchers’ encampment.

Three months later, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal established federal support for state relief efforts and jobs programs for the unemployed, but the organizations of the unemployed continued their activity. They provided sustained grassroots and leftward pressure on the administration. The hunger march tactic was still employed and a combination of repressive measures against demonstrators, as well as concessions by the authorities, likewise continued.

Hunger marches were interracial events both in their composition and their attention to the issue of racial injustice. Marchers emphasized the higher rate of black unemployment, racial discrimination in relief programs, and the heavier repression of the African-American unemployed. Delegations of hunger marches conducted street meetings to explain the Scottsboro case and marchers protested segregated eating and sleeping facilities on the route to the nation’s capital. African Americans were prominent in the leadership of the movement.

Although the Communist-led Unemployed Councils were the principal organizers of hunger marches, Socialists and followers of A. J. Muste also created substantial organizations of the unemployed. The Socialists emphasized lobbying, hearings, and conferences, while the Musteites focused on self-help groups, but both movements also conducted demonstrations and helped individuals with their grievances. The three unemployed movements united in 1935 into one organization, the Workers Alliance, which lobbied for relief funds and unemployment insurance, negotiated with relief agencies and the Works Progress Administration on behalf of recipients and relief workers, conducted public demonstrations, and supported trade unions.

In conducting hunger marches, fighting against evictions, helping to solve grievances, and speaking out for racial equality, activists in the unemployed movement developed as class-conscious workers while they helped to inspire a new moral vision of caring among a large section of the public. Many of these class-conscious workers went on to lead unionization campaigns, helped along by the sympathetic public opinion and worker hopefulness that the unemployed movement did so much to develop.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; UNEMPLOYED COUNCILS.

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Zora Neale Hurston (January 7, 1891–January 28, 1960) was a folklorist, fiction writer, playwright, and essayist. She was a central figure in the African-American cultural movement known as the Harlem Renaissance. Her gravestone in Fort Pierce, Florida, bears an inscription coined by the writer Alice Walker, “A Genius of the South.” The epitaph sums up not only the formidable nature of Hurston’s accomplishments, but also the symbolic importance that she and her work claim in the annals of African-American cultural history.

More myths have circulated about Zora Neale Hurston than perhaps any other African-American woman writer. Recently, scholars have revealed her birthplace as Notasulga, Alabama, but for years historians and biographers believed that Hurston was born in Eatonville, Florida, the country’s first incorporated all-black town. Hurston spent most of her childhood in Eatonville, whence she drew much of her literary inspiration. Hurston contributed to the illusions that continue to dominate popular stories about her life by fabricating details of her personal history, such as her date of birth, which was misidentified for many years as 1901. In Wrapped in Rainbows: The Life of Zora Neale Hurston (2002), author Valerie Boyd speculates that Hurston began revising her birth date in 1917, when she subtracted ten years in order to qualify for free schooling.

Hurston attended Howard University in Washington, D.C., sporadically between 1919 and 1925, and published her first short story, “John Redding Goes to Sea,” in Stylus, the university literary magazine. By 1925, the Harlem Renaissance was in full swing, and Hurston moved to New York, where she collected prizes for her fiction and drama, and studied anthropology with Franz Boas at Columbia University. Hurston graduated from Barnard College with a bachelor’s degree in 1928.

The Great Depression was particularly disastrous for African-Americans, and the economic devastation caused by the Depression extinguished the better part of the Harlem Renaissance. Zora Neale Hurston thrived in the 1930s, however, finding success in the literary arena and beyond. During the 1930s, she did anthropological fieldwork in Haiti, Jamaica, the Bahamas, South Carolina, and the Florida Everglades. Her books on folklore, Mules and Men (1935) and Tell My Horse (1938), reflect the depth and breadth of her research. Hurston’s father inspired her first book, Jonah’s Gourd Vine (1934), a novel. She wrote her second and most influential novel, Their Eyes Were Watching God (1937), in Haiti in seven weeks. The novel is a lyrical exploration of a black woman’s search for romantic love and self-definition. Her third novel, Moses, Man of the Mountain (1939), is a retelling of the biblical story of Exodus. Hurston’s final novel, Seraph on the Suwanee (1948), breaks convention with its focus on white characters. Her final pub-
lished work was *Dust Tracks on the Road* (1942), an autobiography whose inconsistencies have led many critics to treat it more like fiction than fact. Hurston’s productivity did not result in financial security, however, and she would always scramble for work to support her creative ambitions. She died in 1960 of hypertensive heart disease in Fort Pierce, Florida.

**See Also:** AFRICAN AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; LITERATURE.

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Emily Bernard
The year 1932 was probably the most desperate faced by the American people since the end of the Civil War. With the nation mired in an economic depression for which there was no end in sight, unemployment growing to ever more unprecedented levels, and a government that seemed totally unable to make any effective response to the disaster, it was a bleak time indeed.

Rarely has the mood of a year been so accurately reflected in a feature film as the hopelessness of 1932 was in director Mervyn LeRoy's *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang*. Based on the story of a man, Robert Elliot Burns, who had escaped from a Georgia chain gang, the movie is a forceful expose of the brutal conditions on southern chain gangs. Screenings were banned in Georgia, and the state unsuccessfully sued Warner Brothers for libel. But this powerful film turned out to be much more: a mirror held up to a nation’s outlook at the depth of the Great Depression. In it, a veteran of World War I with great ambition, James Allen (Paul Muni), returns from the war and finds an ungrateful nation and no suitable work. He drifts around the country and is wrongly arrested in a robbery in a southern state that is not named. Put on a chain gang, Allen is harshly treated. Eventually, with the assistance of a black prisoner, Allen escapes from the hell of lashings and total dehumanization.

During the prosperous 1920s, Allen James, as he now calls himself, achieves great success as an architect—the sort of “man’s job,” building something, that he had originally said he wanted. He becomes a pillar of the community, but he is betrayed by an evil woman who learns his secret, blackmauls him into marrying her, cheats on him, and finally exposes him.

Jim voluntarily returns to the state where he experienced a living hell because the authorities assure him he’ll only have to do a few months of “easy time.” Instead, the state authorities send him back to the chain gang. In a memorable statement reflective of widespread public attitudes toward government in the last year of the Herbert Hoover administration, Allen complains bitterly, “The state’s promise didn’t mean anything. It was all lies!”

The protagonist escapes again, but this time, as a hunted man, he has to subsist in ways similar to those to which many Depression victims resorted. In the unforgettable closing scene, Muni’s character, hovering in the shadows and seeming animalistic, answers the question “How do you live?” with a desperate, hopeless: “I steal!” Such a situation was all too understandable in much of America in 1932.
ICKES, HAROLD

Harold LeClaire Ickes (March 15, 1874–February 3, 1952) was a political activist, social reformer, author, and New Deal administrator who actively sought to help minorities, preserve America’s natural resources, use the federal government to promote the general welfare, and loyally promoted and supported Franklin D. Roosevelt and what he stood for in his New Deal.

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

Born on a farm in Frankstown Township near Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, Harold Ickes was the son of Jesse Boone Williams and Matilda McCune Ickes. Raised by his aunt and uncle after his mother’s death when he was sixteen years old, Ickes graduated from Englewood high school at the top of his class. From there, he went to the University of Chicago, where he received his undergraduate degree in 1897. During his college days, Ickes made money teaching English to immigrants.

Ickes started his career as a newspaper reporter in Chicago, where in 1900 he covered the Democratic and Republican conventions for the Chicago Record. Never totally satisfied with this life, he returned to the University of Chicago in 1904, and in 1907 he received his law degree. Even before completing his legal studies, Ickes’s political inclinations began to take shape. He started working in political campaigns, and managed John Harlan’s 1903 mayoralty race. Working with Donald Richberg as a partner in their Chicago law firm, Ickes became more and more involved in progressive politics. By 1911, Ickes was well-known in Chicago circles as a reformer. This reputation contributed to his marriage to a college classmate and the daughter of a wealthy manufacturer of gas fixtures, Anna Wilmarth Thompson. Anna herself was politically active, eventually serving several terms in the Illinois General Assembly. She and Ickes had a son who would be raised by his father after Anna died in a car accident in 1935. Ickes later would remarry and have two more children.

Ickes continued his political career by serving as the Cook County campaign manager for Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party in 1912. In 1916, Ickes supported Charles Evans Hughes for the presidency. During World War I, Ickes went abroad and served in the YMCA. In 1920, he attended the Republican national convention as a delegate who worked against the nomination of Warren G. Harding.

During the 1920s Ickes took on a number of legal cases (some gratis) involving civil liberties, anti-utility campaigns, and municipal reform. He also worked at Hull House, a Chicago settlement house run by Jane Addams, helping immigrants obtain citizenship. A reformer by nature, Ickes was appalled by the policies of Chicago mayor “Big” Bill Thompson, and consistently spoke out against him. He had a similar dislike for Samuel Insull, the municipal utilities emperor of the 1920s.

NEW DEAL ADMINISTRATOR

As the 1932 presidential election approached, Ickes became more interested in the reform programs of New York governor Franklin D. Roosevelt. Heading a Western Independent Republican committee for Roosevelt, Ickes worked to secure his victory against Herbert Hoover. Having been a tireless reformer and a strong advocate for minorities, Ickes thought that the president-elect might reward him with a position in his administration, perhaps commissioner of Indian affairs.

Ickes openly campaigned for the secretaryship of the Department of the Interior after Roosevelt in-
Franklin D. Roosevelt (seated, third from right) in August 1933 with (left to right) Paul Malone, Louis McHenry Howe, Harold Ickes, Robert Fechner, Henry Wallace, and Rexford Tugwell at a Civilian Conservation Corps camp in the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

invited him to attend a conference in February 1933 to discuss general economic problems. Given Ickes’s background, his commitment to conservation, and his deep-seated feelings for Native Americans and other minorities, his decision to seek the Interior position made sense. Roosevelt agreed and Ickes was appointed secretary of the Interior. Ickes would serve in this capacity throughout the entire Roosevelt presidency and into the administration of Harry Truman.

In terms of personality, Ickes was a difficult individual. Describing himself as a curmudgeon, he was moody, short-tempered, stubborn, and always concerned that people were trying to take things from him. But Ickes was also an emotionally driven man who wanted very much to help others and who believed that the federal government should do its part in promoting the welfare of Americans. Personally honest, Ickes took his Interior department responsibilities seriously. He spent taxpayers’ monies wisely for projects benefiting the general welfare. Nicknamed Honest Harold, Irascible Harold, and Harold the Curmudgeon, Ickes went to work in 1933 determined to make a difference. He took charge of a department that had more than thirty thousand employees and controlled the National Park Service, America’s public lands and abundant natural resources, and all territories, in-
cluding Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska. In addition, the secretary of the Interior was responsible for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the U.S. Geological Survey. With all of this already on his plate, Ickes took on more.

Working with Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace and other New Dealers, Ickes helped set up the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which was designed to put young men to work under the jurisdiction of the War Department. Ickes’s most important appointment came when Roosevelt placed him in charge of the Public Works Administration (PWA). Created by the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, the PWA expended over $5 billion on sewage systems, bridges, highways, dams, and other major projects. In projects involving electrical power and dams, the PWA completed the Boulder Dam and built the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams. Under Ickes’s direction, the PWA also helped local governments develop their own utility systems, despite the protests of private utility companies. Ickes’s PWA even delved into low-cost housing projects. All of the PWA’s work was completed slowly and methodically, but it was also completed with a minimum of administrative costs and no corruption. “Honest Harold” proved himself a good agency administrator who got things done.

Given Ickes’s personality and Roosevelt’s inclination to let subordinates step over one another, it was inevitable that conflicts would develop. Ickes clashed especially with Harry Hopkins, who headed the Civil Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration, as well as with Henry Wallace in the Department of Agriculture. Other conflicts arose, many of them stemming from Ickes’s fear that people were encroaching on his turf, although in most cases, no such activity was occurring.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSERVATION

Other accomplishments by Ickes stand out. He was committed to helping black Americans by demanding that they be given equal pay for government jobs and by permitting no discrimination in hiring. Working with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Ickes tried hard to implement these policies in whatever agency he directed. In 1939 he helped Eleanor Roosevelt arrange for the black contralto Marian Anderson to sing at the Lincoln Memorial after the Daughters of the American Revolution denied her the use of Constitution Hall.

Ickes was also committed to helping Native Americans. Living in deplorable conditions on reservations, as evidenced by the Meriam Report of the 1920s, and disinheritied of their lands under the assimilationist policies of the Dawes Act of 1887, Indians were burdened by many injustices, and Ickes worked to correct them. Fully supporting the Wheeler-Howard Act, which unraveled the Dawes allotment provisions, Ickes appointed John Collier to head the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Collier’s commitment to the Indian New Deal was so strong that he worked hard to implement all the provisions of the Wheeler-Howard Act and, in so doing, he began to lay the groundwork for later Indian self-determination policies of the 1980s and 1990s.

Finally, Ickes’s commitment to conservation was genuine. During his tenure in the Department of the Interior, the Soil Conservation Service was set up, the idea of wilderness areas in the National Park System was developed, and several major national parks were established. In some respects, Ickes’s commitment to conservation explained his attacks on big business and the wealthy. He railed against businessmen and wealthy individuals for only thinking about themselves, for not caring about protecting and preserving America’s natural wealth, and for refusing to help those in need.

As World War II approached, Ickes turned his attention more and more to what was happening in the world. A midwestern isolationist almost by nature, Ickes underwent a transformation in the 1930s. He was one of the first New Dealers to openly condemn Nazism and fascism. His attacks were so noteworthy that even Nazi leaders came to know who Ickes was. In addition, Ickes was the first New Dealer to realize the importance of maintaining presidential leadership as world politics became increasingly tense. He strongly supported Roosevelt’s bid for a third term in 1940, while he himself considered running for the mayoralty of Chicago.
AFTER THE DEPRESSION
As the United States was drawn into world conflict, Ickes was named the head of the Petroleum Administration. During the war, Ickes held sixteen separate positions within the Roosevelt administration. He was the virtual czar of the production and distribution of petroleum products in the United States. A pragmatist by nature, Ickes put aside his former ideas and hostilities towards petroleum industry executives and worked so well with industry representatives that they tried to convince Roosevelt not to transfer Ickes to any other department or agency.

With Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, and the end of the war, Ickes stayed on as secretary of the Interior under President Harry Truman. Within one year, however, Ickes resigned in protest over what he considered to be a political appointment of Edwin Pauley as undersecretary of the Navy. Just as Ickes’s personal views changed, his views on America’s relationships with its former allies transformed. By 1945 and 1946, the one-time friend and ally of the Soviet Union began to openly distrust and criticize Joseph Stalin and his policies. Ickes strongly supported the United Nations and stood solidly behind Truman during the Korean War.

After his 1946 resignation, Ickes returned to journalism. He wrote columns for the New Republic and the New York Post, and even started publishing his memoirs in the Saturday Evening Post. Still working prodigiously, Ickes died on February 3, 1952, in Washington, D.C. His massive three-volume Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes was published shortly after his death.

Harold Ickes was probably the most accomplished secretary of the Interior in American history. He was a reformer, a man of deep convictions, and a highly capable administrator. His honesty, hard work, and drivenness were reflected in everything he did. Given his irascible personality, it is not surprising that he frequently clashed with others. But this was a small issue when one considers the magnitude of his accomplishments in the PWA, conservation, civil liberties, World War II, and other areas of American life.

See Also: Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC); Indian New Deal; Public Works Administration (PWA).

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MICHAEL V. NAMORATO

ILAGU. See INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION.

ILD. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE.

ILGWU. See INTERNATIONAL LADIES’ GARMENT WORKERS’ UNION.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The Great Depression and the New Deal had a paradoxical effect on the distribution of income in the United States. On one level, even though the incomes of the rich declined precipitously as the economy fell apart, the Depression exacerbated economic inequality by increasing the numbers of the poor; the New Deal and economic recovery in the late 1930s only slightly mitigated this rising inequality. But although the reforms of the New Deal did not greatly reduce economic inequality—either by lowering unemployment or by creating a more progressive tax system—they did create the political architecture that would permit the reduction of economic inequality during World War II and the postwar era. In addition, the very wealthiest fraction of the American population lost their control over the national income during the Depression.
and World War II, a loss from which they never completely recovered. In 1915, the top .01 percent of the population earned incomes 400 times the national average. In 1970, they earned 50 times the average income, and by 1998 they still had not regained the control of the pre-World War I era, earning “only” 250 times the average income.

During World War II the United States saw truly progressive income taxes for the first time. This economic redistribution through the tax system was one feature among many (including steady increases in the minimum wage, high levels of unionization, and low unemployment) that would lead to the remarkably equal distribution of economic growth during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. While the New Deal did not directly create this progressive tax system, the political and intellectual framework that was built during the 1930s made the progressive tax system and the liberal political economy of the postwar period possible.

Income distribution in the United States was becoming steadily more unequal during the early years of the twentieth century. During the 1920s, income inequality widened rapidly, and during the early years of the Depression, the distribution of incomes became more dispersed as poverty spread, reaching its peak for the century. But in the late 1930s income inequality began to decline, and during World War II it narrowed rapidly. After the war, the distribution of incomes remained fairly stable, though it continued to narrow slightly throughout the postwar economic expansion. In the mid-1970s, income inequality began to expand once again, a trend that accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Clearly, something happened during the 1930s and 1940s that created a stable political economy of equally distributed economic growth. The questions concern what and when these changes took place.

Throughout the twentieth century, there have been two distinct tax systems in the United States. The first and older one is a regressive system of sales taxes (and, later, payroll taxes) that fall equally on everyone in society regardless of income, and thus penalize the poor more heavily. The second, newer system is progressive taxation that seeks to tax wealthier people at a higher rate than poor people in order to collect an adequate revenue base for the government. Prior to the New Deal, the federal taxation system was heavily skewed towards regressive taxes on “sin” or “luxury” products. This did not change in the early years of the New Deal, when early federal expenditures, such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, were funded out of sales taxes and deficit spending.

Early in the Great Depression, populists and liberal reformers began to call for tax reform and a reduction of economic inequality. Louisiana governor Huey Long started a network of “Share Our Wealth” clubs, which sought to tax the rich and redistribute the income in a plan dubbed “Every Man a King.” Long’s staff claimed that there were 27,000 such clubs in the South. The Townsend movement’s calls for monthly old-age pensions, the radical writer Upton Sinclair’s EPIC campaign against poverty in California, Father Charles Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice, and the new strength of the Farmer-Labor Party in the Midwest all created rising political pressure on Roosevelt for a program that seemed to address the maldistribution of income.

Historians and political writers, at the time and since, have pointed out that these various proposals lacked economic sense and wherewithal. Even if all of Long’s proposed taxes were enacted, the income produced would not have been adequate to provide the riches he promised it would purchase for ordinary people. But the importance of these movements is not their blueprints for social policy. It was that they mobilized millions of people around the issue of income distribution, and so helped to bring about major changes in the tax system.

In the Revenue Act of 1935 (otherwise known as the “wealth tax”), President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought to meet these populist critics. The law boosted the top personal income tax rate from 63 to 79 percent, expanded estate taxes, and increased the corporate income tax to fall more heavily on large corporations. Even though the law in reality affected a very small number of people, and did not dramatically expand the federal government’s revenues, the wealth tax generated tremendous opposition from business to Roosevelt and the New Deal. The law coincided with the Wagner Act
and the legislation creating Social Security and the Works Progress Administration. Taken together, even though the immediate fiscal effect of the tax law was small, it seemed to promise a new day in government, and businessmen were frightened. As one Congressman said of the Revenue Act of 1935, “This is a hell raiser, not a revenue raiser.” In some ways, the anti-tax politics that would characterize so much business mobilization against liberalism throughout the rest of the twentieth century began in the crusade against the wealth tax of 1935.

The question of economic distribution was also addressed in one of the great failed initiatives of the New Deal, the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC). This congressional committee was established late in the 1930s, purportedly to study issues of monopoly and economic power. The committee produced many excellent surveys of the state of industry in the late 1930s, a boon to later historians. However, whatever legislative impact the TNEC might have had was scuttled by the war, and the committee quietly fizzled to a close.

During World War II, the personal income tax was applied to the general population for the first time, becoming, as historian Mark Leff puts it, no longer “an indicator of affluence” but instead “a token of citizenship.” The withholding system was established during the war. Prior to the war, the income tax had affected at most 5 percent of the population, but during the war, 74 percent of Americans began to pay tax. After the war, Congress brought back some exemptions and lowered tax rates slightly, but the basics of the system were in place. This system, along with the strength of labor unions, the full employment policies of the postwar period, and other interventions in social policy, such as increasing Social Security payments and steadily raising the minimum wage, contributed to the relatively more egalitarian—albeit still skewed—economic growth of the postwar period.

The dramatic arguments over income distribution and economic power during the 1930s cast a long symbolic shadow. The memory of the time when a president railed against “economic royalists” would long survive in the hearts and minds of businessmen, helping to fuel their ultimate reaction against liberalism and the New Deal. But the tax policies of the New Deal era are of more than symbolic importance. Although the postwar liberal system did not come about during the New Deal, the philosophy of the New Deal created its intellectual framework and political architecture. Roosevelt’s willingness to change the tax system in response to mass political pressure and to levy taxes on the incomes of the rich helped make it possible to use the progressive income tax more broadly as the basis for federal revenues and social wealth.

See Also: TAXATION; TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (TNEC).

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INDIAN NEW DEAL

The Indian New Deal was preceded by over a decade of reform agitation, an important investigation of field administration from 1926 to 1927, and several moderate changes during the Herbert Hoover administration. Before Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933, Harold L. Ickes, a Chicago attorney, sought to become Indian commissioner, but the president-elect named Ickes secretary of the interior instead. This left John Collier, an Indian reformer, Nathan Margold, a New York attorney, and Lewis Meriam, an Institute for Government Research employee, as leading candidates for commissioner. Margold became a solicitor in the Department of the Interior and Meriam withdrew. In a showdown meeting in April 1933, Roosevelt chose Collier over Edgar Meritt, former assistant Indian commissioner.

The appointment was unorthodox, but promising. Twelve years of Indian reform work gave Col-
lier a deep understanding of Indian affairs, a strong belief in cultural pluralism, and a commitment to improve the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA). In addition, he hoped to achieve Indian self-support and self-government.

The first months of the Collier commissionership mostly dealt with organizing Indian Emergency Conservation Work. This flexible program operated as a special branch of the national emergency agency popularly known as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The Indian CCC started field operations in July 1933, and for the next nine years it provided jobs for many enrollees and greatly improved reservation forests, grazing lands, and farms. One of the key factors in Collier’s commissionership was his ability to supplement his regular OIA budget with money from the Indian CCC, the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Works Progress Administration, and other New Deal programs.

In late 1933, Collier turned to drafting legislation for a complete overhaul of Indian administration. The Indian Reorganization Bill, introduced in mid-February 1934, centered on restoring tribal governments, ending land allotment, consolidating checkerboard lands, protecting Indian cultural heritages, and creating a special Indian court. The Indian Reorganization Act of June 1934 did not contain an effective land program or a special Indian court, but it banned allotment, endorsed tribal governments, and authorized revolving loan money and several other benefits. Laurence M. Hauptman considers the measure, “the most important and far-reaching ... legislation affecting Native Americans in the twentieth century.”

With the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, the OIA initiated a two-year campaign to persuade Indian groups to approve it, a first step in creating tribal governments and corporations. The canvassing tactics appeared more like “guided democracy.” Collier and his spokesmen often reminded Indians that without an Indian Reorganization Act government, they would never enjoy the economic benefits promised by the legislation. He also tried to create a bandwagon effect by scheduling early elections on those reservations believed to favor the Act. This partially worked, but in June 1935 Collier experienced a crushing defeat when the large Navajo Nation rejected the Indian Reorganization Act despite an all-out effort to win approval. J. C. Morgan, a bilingual mission worker and dedicated advocate of assimilation, took advantage of the Navajos’ hostility to recent livestock reductions to narrowly defeat the proposal. According to historian Lawrence C. Kelly, 263 tribes and bands voted on the Indian Reorganization Act; 174 approved it and 73 opposed it.

For tribes that approved the Act, the OIA moved to form tribal governments by drafting constitutions, bylaws, and chartering corporations. In 1935 Collier established the Indian Organization Division (IOD) to assist the process. The new agency dispatched field workers to help superintendents and tribal leaders in forming the new governments. The IOD workers relied on a “model constitution” to serve as a guide. Although this could be modified to suit local needs and preferences, some observers have complained that the constitutions ignored Indian traditions and imposed white forms of government, that the new governments too closely resembled the model constitution, and that the focus was always on creating tribal governments even if Indians were accustomed to local units such as bands or communities. Once the tribes completed a constitution and it received the secretary of interior’s endorsement, another referendum had to approve it. Out of the 174 tribes and bands that voted for the Indian Reorganization Act, 92 drafted constitutions, and 71 then formed business corporations that qualified them for revolving loans. Although a minority of Indians came under the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier tended to treat all as if they had come under it.

The natives of Alaska and the Indians of Oklahoma had largely been excluded from the Indian Reorganization Act, but both areas later received their own legislation. The Alaskan Reorganization Act of May 1, 1936, and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of June 26, 1936, resembled the Indian Reorganization Act, but each was designed to fit the situation in its area.

In terms of improving the OIA’s regular services, the Indian New Deal made some progress
but fell short of a major breakthrough. Health care offers one key example. Because of the Depression, Collier was able to hire younger and better trained doctors and nurses, and the emergency programs built eleven new and well-equipped hospitals. One major victory was the use of sulfanilamide against trachoma in 1939. The incidence of this dreaded eye disease dropped from 30 percent in 1939 to 5 percent by 1943. The OIA, however, never received the funds needed for a successful campaign against tuberculosis, the Indians’ most serious health problem.

Indian education also improved, but fell short of Collier’s hopes. His basic goals included improving existing schools, closing some boarding schools, developing day schools, and, above all, teaching Indian children to appreciate their own tribal heritages. Unfortunately, virtually all the Indian Service teachers were white and had little understanding of such goals or a desire to learn. Indian students, however, benefited from nearly a hundred new day schools, mostly built with PWA funds, and these often doubled as community centers.

White and Indian opposition to the Indian New Deal arose early and became serious by 1937. Several witnesses at the Indian Reorganization Bill hearings in 1934 charged that Collier’s cultural pluralism was retrogressive and would isolate Indians from society. Others testified that his ideas were un-American and communistic. The Indian critics formed the American Indian Federation (AIF) in Gallup, New Mexico, in August 1934. Joseph Bruner, a Creek, headed the group, but Alice Lee Jemison, a Seneca, acted as the AIF’s Washington lobbyist and most effective opponent of the Indian New Deal. The AIF membership was diverse, but all demanded Collier’s resignation and the repeal of the Indian Reorganization Act. The AIF cooperated closely with the Indian Rights Association, an old-line and conservative reform organization in Philadelphia. More importantly, members of the House and Senate Indian Affairs Committees welcomed Jemison and other AIF spokesmen to testify against the Collier administration after 1934. Bills were introduced in 1937 and 1939 to repeal the Indian Reorganization Act, the centerpiece of the Indian New Deal. Although these attempts failed, Collier’s critics forced him into a defensive posture. Only Secretary Ickes’s support allowed Collier to continue.

The economic revival around 1940 tended to offset the growing problems that the Indian New Deal faced. Initially, the economic upturn mainly benefited Indian CCC enrollees who found good jobs in the private sector. Special arrangements in 1941 between the OIA, the states, and the U.S. Department of Education established national defense training programs for CCC workers. These included welding, sheet metal work, carpentry, radio operation and repair, and other skills. Hundreds of enrollees completed the training and found outside jobs.

World War II brought major changes for Indians and further weakened the Indian New Deal. The exodus of Indians from reservations greatly intensified. An OIA survey, for example, reported that 46,000 Indians found off-reservation employment in 1943 and earned a total of over $40 million. The agency later estimated that 24,521 Indian men and women served in the military. The migration of Indians during the war unquestionably played a major role in the postwar movement to cities.

The war, however, had devastating effects on the New Deal programs. Although Collier desperately tried and failed to make his agency relevant to the war, the OIA was moved to Chicago. Serious budget cuts, the disbanding of emergency programs, and shortages of doctors, nurses, teachers, and other personnel hampered operations. Collier’s problems with congressional opponents continued, and in June 1943 the Senate Indian Affairs Committee released Partial Report 310, which contained a scathing attack on the Collier administration. Worn down and frustrated, Collier resigned on January 19, 1945.

Scholars have studied the Indian New Deal extensively but thus far no real consensus has emerged. Clearly Collier’s ability to secure emergency funds not only helped Indians survive the Depression, but government jobs provided many Indians with work skills that they used in outside employment during World War II. Accomplishments relating to gains in self-government, the preservation of Indian cultural heritages, and the achieving of self-support are less clear cut. Some
Indians actively hated Collier. The Navajos, for example, never forgave him for livestock reductions aimed at checking overgrazing. Perhaps evaluation of the Indian New Deal requires looking at each reservation and evaluating such factors as the availability of resources, the competence of tribal leaders, and the role played by the superintendent and his staff.

See Also: COLLIER, JOHN; INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1934; NATIVE AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1934

The Indian Reorganization Act represented a basic shift in federal Indian policy. It overturned forced assimilation, revived tribal governance, and ended land allotment. The act grew out of a dozen years of criticism of federal Indian administration, especially the agitation of reformer John Collier, who became Indian commissioner in 1933.

Felix S. Cohen and Marvin Siegel, assistant solicitors, and Ward Shepard, a land management expert, started drafting the reorganization bill in late 1933. Commissioner Collier and his top assistants oversaw the process. Indians played no role in writing the measure. The lengthy draft bill contained four titles. The first permitted tribes to organize reservation governments and to form business corporations. Title II called for educational loans and scholarships and strongly endorsed preservation of Indian heritages. Title III ended further allotment, outlined a complex program for land consolidation on checker-boarded reservations, gave the secretary of the interior extraordinary authority to implement consolidation, and provided for some acquisition. Title IV established a special Indian court with original jurisdiction over cases involving Indians or tribes.

The bill faced serious opposition after congressional hearings opened in mid-February 1934. Opponents during House sessions complained it would isolate Indians and condemned the arbitrary powers associated with land consolidation. In the midst of the hearings, Collier conducted ten generally successful Indian congresses to explain the bill to tribal representatives, answer questions, and gain delegates’ support. When Collier returned to Washington, Burton K. Wheeler, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, severely attacked the bill on various grounds and threatened to stall passage. Only the last minute intervention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and a “summit” between Assistant Indian Commissioner William F. Zimmerman, Jr., and Wheeler overcame the latter’s objections. Essentially, the Montana senator rewrote the bill to suit his own beliefs.

The final act of June 18, 1934, differed greatly from the original bill in substance and form. The special Indian court and involuntary land consolidation were entirely omitted. Provisions such as tribal governance, business corporations, a ban on further allotment, land acquisition, educational benefits, and Indian hiring preference remained, but in highly abbreviated form. Despite its major revisions, the Indian Reorganization Act became the centerpiece of Collier’s administration.

Subsequently, 174 tribes with an adult population of 132,425 approved the Indian Reorganization Act in referenda, but only 92 tribes later drafted constitutions. Seventy-three tribes with 78,415 members rejected it. Approximately 103,000 Indians came under the Act and 113,000 did not. Despite this, after 1934 Collier habitually acted as if all tribes had approved the law. Some reservations later came under the Indian Reorganization Act by
special legislation, but far more simply utilized governments that operated without a written constitution.

Placed in its best light, the Indian Reorganization Act strengthened tribal governments during the New Deal and helped preserve Indian cultures. It also served as an important model for Indians of the 1970s and 1980s who demanded stronger tribal sovereignty. In this sense, Collier planted the seeds that later generations of Indians harvested.

See Also: COLLIER, JOHN; INDIAN NEW DEAL; NATIVE AMERICANS, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON; WHEELE, BURTON K.

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INDIVIDUALISM

Individualism as the free, unfettered expression and development of the self in life’s social arenas—the political, cultural, and economic—is one of the few consistent American ideals, tracing a bright line through the course of the nation’s history. Whereas European observers such as Alexis de Tocqueville tended to see American individualism as a dangerous centrifugal social force, Americans have generally embraced the individual as a self-contained, value-creating, contract-making actor whose preservation and encouragement were consistent with the needs of society and the community. Disagreements have emerged primarily about how best the individual may be reconciled with and included in society.

In the early part of the nation’s history, a narrow brand of communitarian Reformed Protestantism gave shape to American individualism. But during the twentieth century the reconciliation of the individual with the needs of the community was increasingly based on a vision of society as a voluntary collection of individuals seeking their own advantage in the marketplace, with government acting primarily as a guarantor of individual rights. Ideally, through the function of the free market, individuals are automatically attracted to work that is useful, producing a product or service that others need. Acting through the free market individuals are able to find that work for which they are best suited, and which will provide the maximum opportunity for individual self expression and development. Relying on their own efforts, individuals are free to improve their social and economic standing, improving the fortunes of the groups to which they belong in the process.

Through work that is at once free and of service to others, society forms as a network of bridges of self-interest between individuals, creating intricate interdependencies. As Emile Durkheim famously observed, work may be the tie that binds societies together. Individualism has emerged as a public issue primarily when Americans have lost faith in the automatic function of the free market to support the individual, the Great Depression being a key example.

The massive unemployment of the Great Depression appeared to many to challenge the ideal of work-based free market individualism. However, unemployment compounded work and marketplace failures that had been festering for decades. Since the turn of the century, modern jobs that required little skill and offered few opportunities for creativity had eroded the hope that work could be the avenue for self expression and craftsmanship. The jobs that still existed offered little chance for pleasure and satisfaction. The rise of corporations, advertising, and mass society further complicated a
simplistic faith in individualism. Concentrations of wealth and political power appeared to be limiting social mobility, casting serious doubts on one of the nation’s other precious ideals: an egalitarian, classless society of individuals.

Even the strongest supporter of the traditional idea of American individualism, Herbert Hoover, saw the need to find new ways to preserve individualism in an era of giant bureaucracies, corporations, and standardization. Hoover sought to redepoly large-scale organization in the service of “self-help,” “spiritual development,” and the individual through “purposeful planning” and his “association idea,” a strategy largely dependent on government encouragement of business voluntarism.

Others, however, veering to the political left, sought to reenergize the Progressive movement’s corporate ideal, emphasizing the need for community and the importance of solidarity and state action to assure the “public interest.” Arguing for a planned society, such critics of excessive individualism as John Dewey, Lewis Mumford, Robert Lynd, and George Soule sought to counter the Depression’s threats to both the individual and the community. Turning increasingly to the state to regulate the free market, leaders such as Henry Wallace (Roosevelt’s secretary of agriculture and third-term vice president) emphasized “cooperative achievement” and “organic” communities, and stressed the need for increasing cooperation in American life.

Such critics hoped that by becoming more cooperative in its economic life, the United States could redeem the individual, establishing a new cultural and political foundation for free associations, replacing the failing work-based free market individualism. Social scientists, socialists, and Marxists proposed to free Americans from excessive concerns about economic matters, liberating them in life’s more important venues—the cultural, communal, and, as Hoover had hoped, the spiritual.

Still others supported a more practical, traditional remedy. One of the most important political issues of the Great Depression was legislated work-sharing. The Black-Connery bill of 1933, limiting hours of work to thirty a week, attracted critics of work-based free market individualism, who, stopping short of the cooperationists’ remedy, saw in steadily increasing leisure the best way to reestablish individualism outside the economy. Seeking, in the words of Richard Pells in his *Radical Visions and American Dreams*, “to liberate the American people from the bondage of economic anxiety—to shift their attention from material to moral and existential concerns” people such as William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, “liberation capitalists” such as W. K. Kellogg, and progressive reformers such as Stuart Chase proposed that a shorter workweek would provide time for alternate, free forms of association. Through increased leisure, the family, the community, churches, voluntary groups, and local governments would flourish as never before. These, instead of work and the market, would become the new media for individual growth and expression.

Roosevelt was lukewarm to the new cooperationist schemes and to work-sharing. Such measures as the National Recovery Administration and Social Security were primarily designed to provide industrial stabilization and a safety net for a free-swinging economy. Instead, Roosevelt attempted to redeem work-based free market individualism by marshaling government in support of perpetual economic growth and work-creation, employing the now familiar New Deal reform strategies: public works, liberal monetary policy, deficit spending, and direct expansion of government jobs.

With Roosevelt, leaders of the women’s movement and the emerging civil rights struggle reaffirmed the importance of work-based free market individualism. The Harlem Renaissance matured and began to recognize the importance of the individual’s struggle with society. Similarly, the nascent civil rights movement began to direct its efforts toward gaining equality through the marketplace, with jobs becoming a primary arena for struggle. Advancing beyond the suffrage victories of the previous decade, American women also began to make inroads into the workforce, and, like African Americans, they began to look for independence and individual liberation through work. African Americans and women turned to the government to open free and equal access to jobs, and thus extend the ideal of work-based individualism to previously excluded groups.
The rise of authoritarian, repressive regimes in Europe and the coming of World War II curtailed cooperationist talk in the United States. Work-based free market individualism entered the 1940s vigorous and growing, made stronger by the challenges offered to it during the Great Depression.

See Also: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; ORGANIZED LABOR; WORK ETHIC.

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INDUSTRY, EFFECTS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON

From a low point of recession in 1921 to its cyclical peak in 1929, the index of U.S. manufacturing production increased from fifty-four to one hundred. Within the overall upswing, the main expansion occurred during the 1922 to 1923 and 1928 to 1929 periods, and it was most pronounced in the automobile, electrical goods, and (to 1926) construction industries. Each of these sectors was associated with the expansion of “blocs” of interrelated activities, such as the rubber, paint, glass, steel, lumber, and engineering firms that supported the growth of the automotive industry. The other aspect of structural change in the 1920s was the performance of “sick” industries, notably cotton and woolen textiles, coal mining, and railroads. Their mature status was reflected, respectively, in relocation to the South in search of cheaper labor, the exhaustion of mineral resources in older mining districts, and the competitive challenge from automobiles and trucks. Other notable features of American manufacturing during the 1920s included relatively stable prices after 1922, modest wage increases, substantial growth in productivity, and rising levels of investment. Consequently, the expansion of production was achieved with limited growth of the industrial workforce; new employment was generated in the service sector.

Although certain trends continued into the 1930s, the favorable environment was transformed by the economic collapse of 1929 to 1932, which ushered in a difficult decade for manufacturers. The index of industrial production in the United States fell from one hundred in 1929 to fifty-five in 1932, a steeper contraction than in most other industrial economies, since elsewhere rates of growth had been modest during the 1920s.

During 1930 President Herbert Hoover encouraged industrialists to maintain wages and hours of work and to proceed with investment plans on the assumption that the recession would be brief. By mid-1931, however, retrenchment was gathering pace: consumers postponed the replacement of durable goods, such as automobiles, and, with the real value of debt increasing, they retreated from buying on credit. Simultaneously, the crisis of confidence in financial institutions and declining sales and profits undermined business confidence and new investment. Private investment fell from $16.2 billion in 1929 to only $1.4 billion in 1933, a level that was not sufficient to maintain existing productive capacity as firms abandoned plans for new factories and had no reason to replace idle equipment. Profits, though difficult to chart fully, dwindled: net profits of 488 leading industrial corporations had fallen from $3,174 million in 1929 to $662.2 million by 1932. Many firms posted losses or were forced into closure. Employment in manufacturing de-
clined to 67 percent of its 1929 level by 1933. Such conditions broke the characteristic pattern of frequent bouts of short-term unemployment among industrial workers. Factory payrolls fell more than employment as employers and workers both accepted the adoption of short-term work or “share-the-work” programs. Indeed, there was a vigorous public debate about the threat of technological unemployment, particularly automation, in the 1930s. Senator Robert Wagner, for instance, supported a “technotax” on innovations as a means to finance relief; unions advocated a thirty-hour workweek; and industrialists and scientists were forced to defend technology as a source of growth rather than instability.

In this context of falling prices and profits, some industrialists and trade associations embraced notions of cooperation as a route to higher prices or stability. The Cotton Textile Institute influenced the development in the National Recovery Administration (NRA) of codes that were designed to raise prices and wages and to standardize trade practices in order to end “destructive” competition. Although the scale of the crisis, plus New Deal pressure, resulted in the establishment of hundreds of NRA codes, many firms opposed such intervention, especially in industrial relations. Some analysts attribute significant increases in wages and prices to NRA intervention, which, in effect, offset a potential stimulus to employment and production from an increase in the supply of money between 1933 and 1935. If this was the case, the defensive strategy of the codes achieved its narrow aims for business and workers, but delayed the revival of output and employment. In some cases the price data underlying this analysis may overstate actual prices since competitive pressures ensured extensive discounting. When the NRA came to an end in 1935, the oil and coal industries still sought federal backing for controls over their production, but most manufacturers welcomed the end of the codes.

Although a brief revival of industrial production had occurred during the second quarter of 1933 as demand rose in anticipation of higher prices with the imminent introduction of the NRA, sustained expansion only came between 1934 and 1937 when U.S. growth compared favorably to other economies. Real wages in manufacturing tended to rise, despite the persistence of high rates of unemployment. To some degree, wage rates did not reflect the full impact of economic trends because fluctuations in the number of hours worked were a significant part of adjustments during the 1930s. Another possible influence was the effect of “internal” labor markets in which the wages of people who were working were set without full reference to the availability of unemployed workers. The expansion of union organizing compelled some employers to concede higher wages after 1935, either in the hope of deterring the entry of unions or as a consequence of increased bargaining power, though the latter was achieved very unevenly in the face of aggressive resistance from many employers.

Trends in industrial production after 1933 can, on one level, be explained in terms of the severity of the slump between 1929 and 1933. Following the expansion of industrial investment in the late 1920s, the downturn left underutilized capacity during the 1930s that deterred new investment. Key growth industries, notably construction and automobile manufacturing, were particularly susceptible to the declines in consumer confidence and incomes. The falls in profitability were especially marked in the steel, oil, machinery, and automobile sectors. Michael Bernstein’s analysis of U.S. manufacturing highlights the contrasting experiences of the different sectors. Cyclical trends are a central factor in the fluctuations of industrial output and employment: the steepest contractions in production in the early 1930s occurred in the iron and steel, coke, lumber, and cement industries, with a major factor being their dependence on the depressed construction industry.

The automobile industry illustrates the difficulties faced by manufacturers of durable goods, especially where production involved high capital costs. Given the geographical distribution of manufacturing activity, the loss of industrial jobs was concentrated in the northeastern and midwestern states. The flip side was less steep falls in the production of the nondurable products that consumers purchased regularly, such as food, textiles, clothing, footwear, and tobacco. As a result, employment in these industries did not fall so dramatically. The
distinction should not be overstated since both textiles and footwear, though large employers, were already less dynamic in the 1920s, and sales of radios, a recent addition to the list of consumer durables, continued to expand throughout the 1930s. The contrasting fortunes of "heavy" industries, such as steelmaking, and "light" industries, such as food processing, were reflected in larger increases in rates of unemployment among men than among women in manufacturing. A further group of industries achieved impressive increases in production during the 1930s, notably chemicals, tobacco products, and paper products. The chemical and petroleum manufacturers combined new product innovations, such as artificial fibres and improvements in the cracking of oil, with capital and labor-saving innovations in production. Firms in the paper business developed new applications in packaging, a successful strategy also adopted by the glass and canning industries. Although a growing demand for cigarettes enabled the tobacco industry to increase its output rapidly, sustained productivity growth ensured that its workforce changed little.

A rise in the real incomes of employed people during the 1930s shifted effective demand for goods and services towards more affluent consumers, which may have delayed the recovery in terms of employment. This trend was reflected in an increase in sales of luxury goods, such as high-priced cars, refrigerators, and fashionable clothing, as well as in an increase in the purchases of services. More broadly, the largest industries in terms of employment, such as textiles and leatherworking, were in long-term decline, creating structural employment as their workers struggled to find alternative jobs. Durable goods producers, such as automotive manufacturers and steelmakers, remained depressed and offered few employment opportunities until the impact of rearmament and war could be felt. Finally, the most innovative sectors, including chemicals and petroleum, accounted for a relatively small share of the workforce. This, combined with their increasing labor productivity, prevented these more vigorous industries from providing sufficient new employment to counter the loss of dynamism elsewhere.

When recovery stalled during the 1937 to 1938 recession, New Deal liberals came to regard the weakness of investment, the persistence of high rates of unemployment, and rising prices as symptoms of monopolistic practices or even of a politically-motivated investment strike by corporate interests. As a result, the NRA phase of support for regulating prices and trade practices was replaced beginning in 1938 with an antitrust campaign, led by Thurman Arnold at the Department of Justice, that was intended to promote more competitive behavior as a route to recovery.

Manufacturing output and employment were transformed by rearmament and the switch to a war economy from 1941. Military demands stimulated the metalworking trades, vehicle production, aircraft manufacturing, and the chemical and petroleum industries, and also supplied a general stimulus to the production of raw materials. Although civilian consumption was restricted during the war, pent-up demand and increased savings were the foundations for renewed prosperity during the 1950s based on automobiles, electrical goods, and housing, as in the 1920s. In the longer run, industrial restructuring gained momentum, but from the mid-1950s services displaced manufacturing as the largest source of employment.

See Also: NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (NRA).

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INSULL, SAMUEL

Both before and after the stock market crash in 1929, Wall Street had no more potent symbol than Samuel Insull (November 11, 1859–July 16, 1938). He was the utilities magnate who either made fortunes or stole them. By the time of Insull’s death on a Paris subway platform in 1938, most Americans had come to see him only as a thief.

Before October 1929, few American businessmen were more respected than Insull, who had a bit of Horatio Alger about him. Born in 1859 to a London family of modest means, Insull was twenty-one years old when he left England for a job in America. He came to work as Thomas Edison’s personal secretary, a position that led him to a career in generating and selling electricity. In 1891, Edison’s electrical holdings were folded into a new company, General Electric, with Insull named as a vice president. Soon dissatisfied with his position, Insull left the company to try his hand at running an electrical utility in Chicago. His efforts led to the creation of Commonwealth Edison, a model utility that quickly won over commercial and residential customers.

Insull preached what historian Harold Platt has called the “gospel of consumption,” spreading the virtues of Commonwealth Edison through aggressive advertising and promotion. “Give Something Electrical,” urged one Christmas ad campaign. Curious shoppers could visit a Commonwealth Edison “Electric Shop” to behold new appliances, or they could travel to the suburb of River Forest and see a model electric home. Samuel Insull had seen the future, and it was electric. Insull’s ambition was to wire the entire United States. By late 1929, the companies he controlled generated one-eighth of all the electricity consumed nationwide. It was an activity that affected one million investors and forty-one million customers.

Insull raised money through the creation of holding companies. These were, in effect, corporate shells that allowed Insull to issue ever more stock. Investors bought the stock on Insull’s reputation, and Insull used the proceeds to buy more utilities. The strategy worked until the great bear market of October 1929. Stock in four Insull holding companies declined $150 million in value by 1931. Small investors were especially hurt, and anyone who lost heavily in the crash was likely to hold Insull responsible for chasing the bull out of the market. The worsening Depression only furthered that view. Newspapers that had once viewed Insull as a genius now portrayed him as a pariah. During the 1932 presidential election, Democratic candidate Franklin Roosevelt lashed out at “the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter, the Ishmael or Insull.” In response, Insull fled the country, a move that only guaranteed more bad publicity. When he was extradited from Turkey two years later, Insull became a page-one story that simply would not go away.

The onetime protege of Edison was indicted for embezzlement, larceny, and mail fraud. Despite three separate trials Insull was never convicted, perhaps because Americans realized no one person could have caused such an economic calamity. Now stripped of one reputation and saddled with another, Insull retired to Paris, where he died in July 1938.

See Also: STOCK MARKET CRASH (1929).

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DOUGLAS BUKOWSKI

INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

Any analysis of the Great Depression must start with World War I. This conflict had a dramatic economic impact, which went far beyond the massive military casualties. It embraced non-belligerents as well as those directly involved in the conflict. The war encouraged but also grossly distorted economic effort.
WORLD WAR I: THE PROBLEM OF INDEBTEDNESS

All wars are inflationary and World War I was no exception. Everywhere farm and factory prices rose inexorably and continued their upward course even after the conflict ended in 1918. For most countries the postwar depression of 1920 and 1921 was the sharp deflationary shock, which brought to an end war-induced price increases. In Germany, however, hyperinflation continued and currency stability was not achieved until 1924, and then only with the assistance of U.S. bankers.

War needs radically altered international indebtedness. In order to pursue the conflict with full vigor, the British and French governments borrowed extensively from U.S. private lenders and also, after America had joined the conflict in April 1917, from the federal government. Once the war was over, Washington insisted upon repayment of the debt even though the economies of both Allied nations had been seriously weakened by four years of conflict. For other stricken European countries, international indebtedness continued to rise after 1918. Desperately short of foodstuffs and raw materials, these countries had to contract postwar relief loans from the U.S. government and use the dollars they received to purchase American products.

The British and the French did not worry unduly as they ran up a large war debt bill because they assumed that a vanquished Germany would meet the costs of the war. In 1921 a reparations total was agreed upon by the non-U.S. allies and imposed upon Germany. The Germans viewed the reparations bill as outrageous and the sum far too large for them to pay. The victors were convinced that Germany could pay if its exports were competitive and the foreign currency they earned was transferred to the Allies. However, the prospect of maintaining a low-wage, high-tax economy for many decades after the hardships of war and postwar turmoil had no appeal to Germans.

The United States did not take part in the reparations negotiations and did not seek payment from Germany. Reparations were paid principally to Britain and France, which had begun payment of their war debts to the United States. One problem was that neither of the two recipients could be confident of regular payments while hyperinflation consumed Germany. Eventually the fear of mounting economic instability became so great that American intervention to stabilize the German currency was proposed. The intervention was not governmental because Washington did not want to enter any negotiations in which concessions on war debts might be demanded. American bankers produced the Dawes Plan, which in 1924 brought the frightening hyperinflation to an end and gave a New World stamp of approval to Germany. To support the Dawes Plan, the Federal Reserve (Fed) resolved to keep U.S. interest rates low, thus making Germany, where rates were high, attractive to the American investor. Soon Germany became the world’s leading international borrower and American citizens very willing lenders.

The war created a new group of indebted nations and transformed the United States, the world’s leading debtor nation in 1914, into the status of leading creditor nation four years later. During the 1920s the United States assumed the role of leading international lender.

WORLD WAR I: PRIMARY PRODUCTS

High war prices encouraged the producers of foodstuffs and raw materials to expand output. Indeed, many countries were prepared to go into debt to fund roads, which would open up new areas of production, and docks that were vital to an expanded export trade. The United States was the only source of funds for virtually all borrowers. However, the depression of 1920–1921, which reduced prices savagely and suddenly, had a devastating effect on primary producers, virtually all of whom were in debt. Moreover, once European agriculture recovered from the war, surpluses in internationally traded commodities such as wheat began to appear. European countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, protected their exposed farmers with high import duties. As stocks of coffee, cotton, and sugar mounted, exporters of these products found it difficult to pay for the imports of manufactured goods they wished to consume. Indeed, some found it difficult to fund the interest on the debt that they had run up when times were good and prices high. It was tempting, but not realistic, to
view such problems as temporary and to borrow, usually from the United States, to meet bills and pay for imports. There is some evidence to suggest that American international lending, which was poorly regulated, became more unsound as the twenties progressed. Many U.S. banks, new and enthusiastic entrants to this profitable business, were as devoid of good judgement as were the eager borrowers. By 1928 many primary product producers had become dependent upon a steady stream of American funding.

THE GOLD STANDARD

Many countries had temporarily abandoned the gold standard during the war, and there was a widespread conviction that this discipline should be embraced again as soon as possible. In part this belief was connected to the pre-1914 era view that the gold standard had ensured stability. Moreover, the devastating hyperinflations in central Europe seemed to indicate that a rigid discipline was needed if the worst excesses of economic mismanagement were to be avoided. Indeed the return to gold was seen as an essential prerequisite for the restoration of normality to war devastated economies.

Contemporaries debated about how soon their economies could return to gold and at what exchange rate, but never questioned if this move was wise in a world so different from the one before August 1914. The choice of exchange rate was crucial. The wrong rate would lead to formidable problems if it proved difficult to defend during an economic crisis, as devaluation was not an option. Gold standard countries that came under pressure had to deflate in order to make their exports more competitive through cost reductions, which inevitably caused rising unemployment and wage cuts.

Nations returned to gold not in an orderly, but in a piecemeal, fashion and many had slender gold reserves. Moreover they returned at different exchange rates. For example, Britain returned in 1925 at the exchange rate that had been in force in 1914: £1 = $4.86. This rate would be difficult to defend given Britain’s reduced economic circumstances. On the other hand, the French franc that went back on gold in 1926 was worth only one-fifth of the 1914 franc. Thus the low value franc made it far easier for the French to penetrate export markets than British business, which was handicapped by an overvalued currency. Far from being a source of strength, the gold standard during the twenties did not provide the means to avoid economic catastrophe; it gave weaker economies no protection once crisis came.

THE FIRST SHOCK: 1928–1930

In early 1928 the Fed moved to curb growing stock market speculation by introducing a tight money policy. As interest rates rose, Fed officials believed that borrowing for speculative purposes would become too expensive and the furious buying would fade away. This strategy was a complete failure. It did, however, have serious repercussions for international lending because it altered the relationship between U.S. interest rates and those in the rest of the world. Since 1924 the Fed had kept rates low in order to encourage U.S. money to flow overseas, and many economies had become highly dependent on the continuation of the flow. However, borrowers began to see that much of the international capital was short term and highly volatile. Indeed the term “hot money” had been coined to describe its chief characteristic. Responding to higher interest rates, U.S. savers decided that the domestic opportunities had become so attractive that money which previously would have been sent overseas remained at home. But the United States was the world’s leading international investor during the 1920s, with central Europe and Latin America being especially favored. How could international borrowers entice Americans to send more capital to them?

An obvious response for the borrowing countries was to raise interest rates themselves and preserve their relative appeal to the international investor. Many did just that, but the imposition of even higher rates of interest was not without its cost. For countries moving into recession, the imposition of a restrictive monetary policy would accelerate the economic decline. For example, in Germany the economy had reached a peak in 1927 and had already begun to contract when the supply of U.S. capital, on which rising German living standards relied, became less certain. All countries try-
ing to attract international capital had to reject economic plans that would cause a budget deficit. International lenders became alarmed when policies they judged imprudent were introduced, but with tax receipts falling and legitimate claims for relief rising, maintaining a balanced budget was very difficult. Unfortunately, the gold standard restricted the freedom of nations to implement expansive economic policies that might counteract the effect of severe depressions.

After the Stock Market Crash in October 1929, the Fed reduced interest rates, and for a short while international lending recovered. However, this revival was a false dawn. In the middle of 1929 the U.S. economy had reached a cyclical peak and began to contract rapidly. At the same time there was a sharp fall in international foodstuff and raw material prices, which was serious for primary product nations as it lowered the value of their exports relative to imports and quickly led to balance of payments deficits. Most primary producing countries were in debt and deflation increased the real burden. In other words, more pounds of coffee or tons of copper had to be exported to pay off interest charges on the debts already accumulated. Nor was there any easy way to check falling prices. In fact, sometimes the response of producers to deflation was to produce more, which only compounded the problem.

As the economies of major industrial powers, such as Germany, Great Britain and the United States, deteriorated, their purchases of imports declined. Primary product countries now faced a two-fold problem. First their exports could not find markets even at very low prices; second, it was becoming increasingly difficult to attract foreign capital. In these circumstances nations were forced to cut imports. Countries reacted by increasingly desperate measures, such as the introduction of tariffs and quotas and the production of import substitutes. As one country’s imports are another’s exports, this move only shifted the problem and invited retaliatory action.

The use of tariff increases was not confined to debtor nations. In 1930 Congress approved and, in spite of the appeals of hundreds of economists, President Hoover refused to veto the Hawley-Smoot tariff. The decision to raise duties on U.S. imports was one of narrow self-interest; policy makers failed to understand the need for debtor countries to earn dollars by selling goods to the United States. Although Hawley-Smoot invited and received retaliation, it would be a mistake to view this legislation as playing more than a minor role in reducing international trade. Growing depression and contracting income explain the decline in the purchase of internationally traded goods.

**THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: 1931**

After two years of depression, financial institutions in many countries were in a highly vulnerable position. Moreover, such was the intensity of the economic collapse that new international lending had virtually ceased.

The failure of Austria’s largest bank, the Credit Anstalt, in the spring of 1931, rang alarm bells. The Austrian government had conscientiously followed the rules of the gold standard but had not been able to fight off the crisis. Calls for help to the international financial community had generated only modest assistance. In July 1931, a crisis of confidence enveloped the German banking system. Since the first signs of depression, the German government had been rigorously deflating the economy, doing so at enormous social cost as unemployment mounted and serious political unrest began to attract international attention. German banks had a large amount of foreign debt, about forty percent of which was American. To ease the strain on German banks, President Hoover unilaterally proposed a moratorium on all inter-governmental debts.

The Hoover Moratorium suspended war debts and reparations payments for one year but expected the repayment of private debts to U.S. citizens to continue. The Germans were delighted with this initiative, but the French, who had not been consulted, were furious, suspecting that this action spelled the end of reparations payments. Unfortunately the Moratorium did not halt the assault on the banking system. As the uncertainty increased, those Germans and Americans who could shift their money out of marks into gold or currencies less at risk of devaluation did so quickly, thus mak-
ing the threat of devaluation even more likely. Who could help Germany?

The United States felt that with the Hoover Moratorium it had done enough. Great Britain, low on gold reserves, could offer no more than minor assistance. France had accumulated a massive gold stock but insisted on attaching political conditions to assistance that Germany found unacceptable. In the summer of 1931, Germany introduced exchange controls and froze foreign-owned credits, making it impossible for U.S. citizens to withdraw their capital. This action was a stark warning to holders of foreign currency everywhere. The mark was not devalued, but severe deflation and import controls became even more draconian. As a result, unemployment rose, farm income plummeted, and Communists battled for political control with fascists.

As the crisis gathered pace in Germany, investors became increasingly anxious about sterling, widely considered overvalued. Britain’s highly publicized budget and balance of payments deficits intensified anxieties, as did the presence of a new Labour government. The orthodox deflationary policies imposed by the country’s first socialist government were in vain. The Bank of England did not have sufficient reserves to withstand the persistent selling of sterling, and in September 1931 Britain devalued the pound and became the first major country to leave the gold standard. Virtually all the countries that had strong trading links with Britain quickly followed London’s example and cut their links with gold. Investors everywhere saw this action as a warning that no currency was safe from devaluation. It is important to remember that Britain was forced to abandon gold and did not take this action as part of a measured policy initiative. It is also significant that Britain, and the other economies that cut themselves free from the shackles of the gold standard, soon showed signs of a rapid recovery from the Depression.

The reaction of many countries that had close trading links with Britain was to abandon gold and devalue their currencies, too. However, once devalued, sterling was considered safe. Speculators turned away from London and made an assessment of the next most vulnerable currency. They quickly concluded that it was the U.S. dollar.

Once the speculators began to attack the dollar, the Fed moved quickly to protect the external value of the currency by instituting a tight money policy. Raising interest rates was the appropriate course of action for a defense of the currency, but unfortunately it was exactly the wrong policy for the beleaguered banking system. However, the Fed wanted to send a strong signal to speculators that defending the dollar was a priority. Sadly, at the same time an already serious depression was made even worse by a cluster of bank failures which required an easy money policy if the Fed was to render central bank assistance to distressed bankers and depositors. After a while speculation eased but returned with a vengeance during the winter of 1932 and 1933. Again the Fed raised interest rates to defend the dollar, and by March 1933 virtually every state had closed its banks.

**THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE TRANSMISSION OF THE DEPRESSION**

The gold standard, which was held in awe, was supposed to guarantee stability. It imposed a set of rules on participating economies, and the adjustments required to maintain equilibrium were supposed to minimize economic fluctuations. But the gold standard did not work in that way. During the 1920s, France and the United States acquired the bulk of the world’s gold stock but chose to sterilize it rather than let it increase the money supply. The latter course of action would have introduced inflationary pressures, made their exports more expensive, and eventually have led to a loss of gold that would have benefitted the nations which received it. Apart from France and the United States, many gold standard countries lived on the margin with inadequate reserves. Once these countries began losing gold they had limited choices. They were forced to deflate their economies, so that their exports became more competitive, and cut back on imports in order to reduce gold losses. But deflationary policies raised unemployment, increased business failures, and lessened the demand for someone else’s exports. International borrowing, which had been a useful way of avoiding the full rigors of deflation in the past, was not a possibility after the middle of 1930 when nervous investors began to repatriate their funds—and with great
speed once the first payment defaults added to the anxiety. Even in robust democracies such as Great Britain, deflation imposed evident strains. In other nations, breaking the backs of the people was eventually viewed as a cure worse than the disease. Default, or devaluation, seemed preferable. Even during this deflationary spiral, many policy makers and members of the public associated devaluation with damaging inflation. Reducing the external value of the currency was a weapon of last resort in societies with recent experience of destabilizing price rises. Devaluation had also the disadvantage of antagonizing international investors, but this disincentive was no longer powerful once there was no international capital to attract. Countries that devalued gained a competitive advantage for their exports, but in doing so they put an even greater strain on nations that strove to maintain the external value of their currencies. Sometimes competitive, or “beggar-thy-neighbor,” devaluations took place with countries striving to stay ahead of the game. Those who declined to devalue, responded with increased tariffs and quotas or the imposition of exchange controls.

The depression was transmitted through foreign trade, and the United States was at the heart of the contraction. The supply of dollars to the rest of the world, which resulted both from American overseas lending and payment for U.S. imports, fell drastically from $7.4 billion in 1929 to $2.4 billion in 1932. The growing shortage of dollars became a serious problem. Once Debtor countries used up their meagre reserves, they had to take steps to cut their imports. Unfortunately, in doing so they helped to export the Depression. Primary producing nations found that the prices of their exports fell far more steeply than the prices of the manufactured goods that they wished to import. In Europe, the inter-related war debts and reparations were fundamentally destabilizing. Unfortunately, the gold standard functioned as a mechanism for spreading the Depression rather than containing it.

In April 1933, Roosevelt, who was less committed to orthodoxy than Hoover, devalued the dollar and the U.S. abandoned the gold standard. The president was clearly signalling his intention to put domestic recovery to the fore. The aim of devaluation was to stimulate the U.S. economy and it was an essential prerequisite for New Deal policies designed to raise export-oriented farm prices. Indeed, the devaluation of the dollar was welcomed by farmers who also hoped that some beneficial inflation of farm prices would follow.

In 1931, forty-seven countries embraced the gold standard. By late 1933 only a small rump comprising, principally, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland still clung to the old orthodoxy. To remain competitive the “gold bloc” nations had to resort to savage deflation, which imposed serious social costs on their populations. As their economies declined their currencies came under severe speculative pressure, to which the orthodox solution was even more deflation and protection. However, raising tariff barriers was not a solution since countries that had already devalued their currencies also used tariffs as a retaliatory device.

By 1936, Germany no longer paid reparations, and Britain and France ignored their war debt payments to the United States. In that year, 77 percent of Latin American loans were in default—for Chile and Peru the figure was 100 percent. September 1936 also marked the demise of the gold standard as France, the Netherlands and Switzerland were forced to concede that the cost of staying on gold far outweighed any possible advantages. With this round of devaluations, the governments of these countries had more freedom to address the formidable economic problems that loyalty to the gold standard had intensified.

As Eichengreen shows, the countries that followed Britain off gold in 1931 managed to avoid the worst effects of the Depression. However, although devaluation presented policy makers with the opportunity to implement vigorous recovery policies, few nations embraced expansionary fiscal and monetary initiatives. Caution prevailed, and although the abandonment of the gold standard, together with devaluation, was essential for economic recovery, the subsequent expansion was often disappointingly weak.

During World War II, commentators became convinced that the selfish economic nationalism that characterized the 1930s had played a key role
in exacerbating the international tensions that ultimately led to armed conflict. War debts and reparations, inadequate international co-operation and the absence of international institutions that could assist economies in trouble all helped to make the prewar decade so troubled. The Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) sought to correct the deficiencies of the 1930s by setting up two new institutions. They were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which became known as the World Bank. These institutions were designed to provide an effective structure for international co-operation and to render unnecessary the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that proved so destabilizing before 1939.

See Also: AFRICA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; ASIA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; CANADA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; EUROPE, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; GOLD STANDARD; LATIN AMERICA, GREAT DEPRESSION IN; MEXICO, GREAT DEPRESSION IN.

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PETER FEARON

INTERNATIONAL LABOR DEFENSE (ILD)

The International Labor Defense (ILD), founded in 1925 for the purpose of providing free legal services and support for “labor and political prisoners” and their families, was the legal arm of the Communist Party and was closely associated with the International Red Aid (an organization founded by Comintern in Moscow in 1922 to provide relief for martyrs of the revolution). The ILD attracted a significant following during the 1930s due to its spirited defense of numerous poor and working-class defendants, immigrants, and blacks, contributing considerably to the Communist Party’s reputation as a militant proponent of workers’ rights and a champion of oppressed black Americans.

James P. Cannon, an influential Communist Party member, led the drive to create the ILD, and was at its helm until he was expelled from the Communist Party in 1928. Membership in the ILD was open, but Communists generally held positions of leadership. National directors during the 1930s included J. Louis Engdahl, who succeeded Cannon; William L. Patterson, a prominent African-American party member; and Anna Damon.

Shortly after its founding the organization became engaged in the failed campaign to save the lives of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, two Italian immigrants and anarchists convicted and sentenced to die for a 1927 robbery and murder. The ILD went on to agitate for the release of labor activists Tom Mooney and Warren Billings, who were unjustly confined for a 1916 bombing in San Francisco.

During the 1930s the ILD began to direct more of its activities toward African Americans. As part of its constitution, the ILD made special concessions to “the defense of the Negro people;” however, it was subsequent to 1928 and the mandates of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (the international Communist body headquartered in Moscow) that it began to concentrate on cases of racial injustice. Its efforts included the successful nationwide campaign to free Angelo Herndon, a young black organizer imprisoned in Georgia for leading a hun-
ger march in Atlanta in 1932, and numerous other less celebrated cases of southern racial repression.

Unquestionably, it was the struggle surrounding the “Scottsboro Boys,” nine black youths wrongfully condemned for the rape of two white women on an Alabama freight car in 1931, that propelled the ILD and the Communist Party into the forefront of American consciousness. The organization mounted an aggressive legal defense bolstered by its hallmark strategy of “mass pressure”: massive publicity, demonstrations, rallies, and speaking tours. Largely through its efforts, the ILD transformed a local miscarriage of justice into a national and international indictment of racism.

In 1937, the ILD selected its first non-Communist head, Vito Marcantonio. Under his leadership, the organization continued its vigorous defense of targeted groups and initiated an attack on debt peonage in the South. The ILD began to lose momentum in the next decade and merged with the Civil Rights Congress in 1946.

See Also: COMMUNIST PARTY; HERNDON, ANGELO, CASE; SCOTTSBORO CASE.

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Gwen Moore

INTERNATIONAL LADIES’ GARMENT WORKERS’ UNION (ILGWU)

Two dramatic strikes in the pre-World War I period contributed to making the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) one of the largest and most successful unions in the nation at the end of the war. The famous 1909 “uprising of the 20,000” New York City shirtwaist makers and the 1910 cloakmakers’ strike that established the “Protocol of Peace” gave the ILGWU a solid base and stable membership through the teens. The Protocol limited homework and inside subcontracting or sweating, and established a six-day, 54-hour workweek. During this period of strength the union also developed an extensive education program, health insurance, and unemployment insurance for its members.

Following World War I, conflict broke out between radicals and moderates within the ILGWU. The union was wracked with dissent and factionalism for the first half of the 1920s. In 1926, some 35,000 cloakmakers led by the Communist faction went on strike over the issue of job security. The strikers lost; manufacturers would not negotiate with the radicals, while the radicals were accused of refusing to support compromise agreements that would have ended the strike. As a result of the defeat, most of the Communists were driven out of the union by the end of the decade. By then the Depression was settling into the garment trades. By 1933 union membership had dropped to 40,000, down from almost 100,000 in 1920. The ILGWU lost over 3,300 members in 1930 alone.

Benjamin Schlesinger, a moderate, was elected ILGWU president in 1928 on a campaign to stabilize the union’s finances and increase membership. David Dubinsky followed Schlesinger into the presidency with the latter’s death in 1932. Meanwhile, shifts were also occurring within the industry. With the growth of the readymade dress industry in the 1920s, female dressmakers were replacing male cloakmakers. With the coming of the Depression employers began replacing male workers with female workers. The percentage of women workers in the garment trades increased from 64 percent in 1925 to 74 percent in 1935.

Confronted with a growing number of female workers in the garment trades, the ILGWU began aggressively organizing women, often taking advantage of campaigns initiated by the women themselves. The success of female dressmakers in their strike against the nonunion dress industry in
Members of Local 89 of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union in New York make uniforms for the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps in 1943. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, FSA/OWI COLLECTION
Philadelphia spurred on organizing efforts, and membership began to climb after 1933. Even though many of the union’s social programs had been cut back (financial difficulties even led to the suspension of the union newspaper *Justice*), the ILGWU continued to maintain its Education Department, the Union Health Center in New York, and its unemployment insurance services in Cleveland, Ohio.

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election and the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act offered new opportunities for the ILGWU. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) established codes for each industry and gave the workers the right to organize under Section 7a. Although workers in many of the heavily industrialized occupations found the NRA to be of limited value, garment workers were well positioned to take advantage of the new law. Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers union was on the NRA board to set codes, and Dubinsky served as a labor advisor to the NRA. Using Section 7a the ILGWU extended its organizing efforts. In the summer of 1933 the ILGWU called a general strike of dressmakers in the Northeast; 60,000 workers walked out. The union won the strike and enforced the new NRA code. By the end of 1934 union membership had climbed to over 200,000. The ILGWU also campaigned for shorter hours and a voice in setting job conditions. The union had fought against the piece rate system in the prewar years, but with the coming of the Depression, manufacturers began using hourly rates and firing slower workers. Piecework allowed for more widely distributed work and employers were less likely to lay off older and less efficient workers, but the concern was the rates. The union won a voice in setting standard piece rates. The national codes established a 35-hour workweek.

Although Dubinsky was loyal to the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and close to its president, William Green, most ILGWU officials supported industrial organizing. In 1935 Dubinsky served on the AFL Committee for Industrial Organizations (CIO). When the CIO unions were suspended from the AFL, Dubinsky resigned from the AFL executive committee and withdrew his union from the AFL. The ILGWU did not join the CIO, but remained independent until 1940, when it rejoined the AFL.

While the union retained its membership base and won a voice in setting rates and hours, it faced the continuing challenge of runaway shops. For many years, New York had been the center of the trade. For manufacturers the city offered a huge pool of capable labor, was close to the fashion industry, and had extensive networks of external economies. Yet New York was also the center of union activity and had extensive radical networks and reinforcing institutions. In the pre-Depression years, moving a shop entailed the necessity of locating new space and a willing and capable labor force. With the coming of the Depression manufacturers could move at significantly less cost. Empty factories begged for occupation, particularly in the depressed old textile centers, such as Fall River or New Bedford, Massachusetts. These were places with an abundance of unemployed women familiar with industrial work and piece work, and city leaders were more than willing to encourage the movement of manufacturers into their empty textile mills. Garments were a low capital-intensive industry. Manufacturers could load bolts of cloth and sewing machines in trucks and drive into New England, unload them into an abandoned textile mill, hire workers as learners, and begin work. The union tried to follow these plants but it was a difficult and frustrating task at best. The ILGWU approached the problem of runaway shops with a dual campaign of publicizing the union label and the urging of the passage of a minimum wage. The industry was also expanding on the West Coast. In the 1920s Jewish and Italian women made up the heart of the West Coast garment workers, but with the coming of the Depression, employers turned more and more to the larger pool of Hispanic and Asian women who were desperate to find work at any wage. Although the ILGWU maintained a non-discrimination policy, the new, more conservative, leadership that had taken over following the purge of radicals in the late 1920s held tight control over the union. This discouraged more aggressive organizing of minority women.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION (ILA)

For several decades after its founding in 1895, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) functioned mainly as a collection of local unions and regional federations. The ILA faced a sharp challenge from One Big Union advocates during the era of World War I; it suffered major losses during the “lean years” of the 1920s; and in 1937 the union’s rebellious Pacific Coast District split off to form the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU). But in the face of persistent charges that it was corrupt, undemocratic, and “in no real sense of the word a labor union at all,” the ILA survived and in some locations thrived.

The ILA’s origins can be traced to the founding of local unions of lumber handlers and tugboatmen on the Great Lakes in the 1870s. A number of these unions combined to form the National Longshoremen’s Association of the United States in 1892. Following the affiliation of Canadian locals, the organization changed its name to the International Longshoremen’s Association, and it received a charter from the American Federation of Labor in 1896.

By the turn of the century, the ILA had thousands of members on the Great Lakes. But New York, home to one third of the nation’s longshoremen, remained the key to the union’s future. The ILA signed its first port-wide agreement in New York in 1916. Although union members were granted preference in employment, the contract did not address the vast surplus of labor that was the hallmark of the port.

Between 1916 and 1945, the hourly wage on the New York waterfront increased from 40 cents to $1.45. But there were no authorized strikes until 1948. There was also no democratic procedure within the union and no effective advocacy of the members’ interests. To many observers, it appeared that the ILA’s principal function was to “keep the lid on.”

The man who warmed to that task was the colorful Joseph P. Ryan, who emerged as the union’s central figure during the 1920s and eventually became its “president for life.” On his watch the ILA began the rapid descent into “gangsterism” that was so vividly portrayed in Elia Kazan’s film On the Waterfront (1954). New York’s longshoremen remained more or less quiescent in the 1930s, in part because of organized crime’s ominous presence in and around the union, but also because the dockworkers were enmeshed in a cultural network that offered few openings to the forces of change. In Irish-American neighborhoods such as Chelsea, family, ethnicity, and faith were the foundation stones of daily life, and outsiders were unwelcome.

But it was different on the West Coast, where the union’s Pacific Coast District called a walkout in May 1934 that mobilized longshoremen from San Diego in the south to Vancouver, British Columbia, in the north. The legendary “Big Strike,” which lasted for eighty-three days, spread to other seafaring crafts and eventually triggered a four-day general strike in the San Francisco Bay area. The walkout also ushered in a “Pentecostal” era of union militancy among West Coast dockworkers that eventually propelled them out of the ILA and the AFL and into the welcoming arms of the Committee for Industrial Organization (later called the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO). Led by Australian immigrant Harry Bridges—“Red Harry” to his friends, as well as his enemies—the ILWU confidently set out to topple the ILA by at-
tacking its New York stronghold and the strategic southern port of New Orleans.

Joe Ryan’s “goons” easily repelled Bridges’s men in New York, making New Orleans all the more important to the ILWU’s, and the ILA’s, future. In the Crescent City, race would play a critical role, because black longshoremen outnumbered whites by a three-to-one margin and were determined to defend their turf against white encroachment. In an election conducted by the National Labor Relations Board in 1938, New Orleans longshoremen voted overwhelmingly for the ILA in a bitter contest with the ILWU. In a competitive labor market, they believed that racially separate unionism would serve their interests better than the racial egalitarianism of the ILWU. Even in the midst of the post-World War II civil rights revolution that demolished de jure segregation, black longshoremen in New Orleans and other southern ports clung to their “separate but equal” organizations, until a federal court compelled them to merge with white ILA locals in the early 1980s.

Meanwhile, in New York, Catholic “labor priests” developed close ties with rank-and-file insurgents at the end of World War II, and for the next decade the waterfront became a hotbed of conflict. A wave of wildcat strikes helped bring down the Ryan regime and nearly destroyed the union in the nation’s largest port. But the ILA survived and adapted—unevenly—to the new rights-conscious environment and to the mechanization of cargo handling.

See Also: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR (AFL); BRIDGES, HARRY; CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO); ORGANIZED LABOR; SAN FRANCISCO GENERAL STRIKE (1934).

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BRUCE NELSON

ISOLATIONISM

U.S. isolationism has traditionally involved opposition to participation in war outside the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Europe; avoidance of binding military alliances; and refusal to participate in organizations of collective security. Above all, the isolationist desires to maintain the United States’s freedom of action. Such people differ from pacifists, who withhold support for any conflict and renounce any war. Proponents of the isolationist position usually consider the label perjorative: As most oppose isolating the United States from either the world’s culture or its commerce, they have long preferred such terms as “neutralist,” “nationalist,” “non-interventionist,” or “anti-interventionist.”

By the above definition, U.S. foreign policy was isolationist until the twentieth century. Only when President Woodrow Wilson sought entry into the League of Nations in 1919 did isolationism emerge as a distinctive political position. Moreover, only in the 1930s, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought discretionary power to aid victims of aggression, was the general isolationist consensus threatened. Opponents of Roosevelt’s policies fought so successfully that the years 1934 to 1937 marked the high tide of isolationist legislation.

In April 1934 Roosevelt signed the Johnson Debt Default Act, introduced by Senator Hiram Johnson (R-Calif.), who had been prominent in the fight against the League of Nations. The Senate passed the measure without a recorded vote, the House without dissent. The bill prohibited private loans to nations in default of obligations contracted during World War I to the U.S. Government.

In January 1935 the Senate turned down Roosevelt’s bid for U.S. entry into the World Court by seven votes. Founded in 1921, the Permanent Court of International Justice (as the court was formally called) was closely tied to the League of Nations. The League Assembly and Council had to approve
all nominations; the World Court’s budget was underwritten by the League; the League Covenant required the court to give “an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor by the Assembly.” Contrary to myth, Roosevelt’s defeat did not result from unscrupulous propaganda fostered by publisher William Randolph Hearst and radio priest Charles E. Coughlin. Rather it was due to Congress’s hostile predisposition and Roosevelt’s own lack of leadership.

In the spring of 1935, however, investigators for the Senate’s Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry began to collect material concerning U.S. entry into World War I. During this time such revisionist works as journalist Walter Millis’s *Road to War: America, 1914–1917* (1935) portrayed the Great War as a futile crusade. Munitions committee chairman Gerald P. Nye (R-N.Dak.), together with his committee colleague Senator Bennett Champ Clark (D-Mo.), introduced bills for an impartial arms embargo against belligerents, a prohibition on loans to belligerents, and denial of passports to Americans wishing to enter war zones. When the Roosevelt administration, which was opposed to mandatory isolation, countered with a bill that would permit discriminatory embargoes, its proposal found little response.

In August 19, 1935, as Italy was poised to invade Ethiopia, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a joint resolution. “Arms, ammunition and implements of war” could not be sent to belligerents once the president declared that a state of war existed. (Roosevelt later defined “implements of war” to include airplanes, various chemicals, and armored vehicles, but not such items as cotton, oil, scrap iron, and trucks). Submarines of belligerent nations could not use U.S. ports. The president possessed discretionary authority to proclaim that Americans traveling on ships registered in belligerent nations did so at their own risk. Though the administration deplored the fact that its hands were being tied, it permitted the bill to pass, although it did secure an amendment limiting its term to six months. The legislation passed the Senate 77 to 2 and the House without a recorded vote.

When Roosevelt signed the bill on August 31, he warned that “the inflexible provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out” (Cole 1983, p. 178). He did not, however, want to jeopardize pending New Deal legislation, such as the regulation of the coal industry, over foreign policy matters. In addition, he thought the bill would probably injure the aggressor Italy far more than it would injure its victim. On October 6, three days after fighting broke out in East Africa, Roosevelt invoked the new bill. No munitions could be sold to either side.

Because the neutrality law was due to expire in February 1936, that month Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1936. The House voted 353 to 27; the Senate took no roll call. The act was almost identical to the 1935 law, with the addition of one feature: it forbade the United States to lend money to belligerent nations, though exceptions were made for wars in Latin America. It did not, as Roosevelt had hoped, prohibit any trade with the belligerents beyond peacetime levels. Like the previous act, the new one was temporary, scheduled to expire on May 1, 1937.

This measure imposed more restrictions upon a president already opposed to mandatory legislation. Yet the president signed it without comment. Roosevelt feared that a fight would risk further stripping of his power, produce debate that could only comfort Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, and risk votes in the impending presidential race.

In July 1936 rebel forces in Spanish Morocco led by General Francisco Franco attacked the Spanish Republic, triggering a civil war that would last almost three years. Within a month the U.S. government announced a “moral embargo” on arms shipments to either side, but not until January 1937, on Roosevelt’s recommendation, did Congress pass a nondiscriminatory arms embargo, with the Senate voting 81 to 0 and the House 406 to 1.

On May 1, 1937, the Neutrality Act of 1936 would expire. In return for sections forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent ships and prohibiting the arming of U.S. merchantmen, anti-interventionists accepted discretionary authority on cash-and-carry, a scheme by which nations at war could collect goods in U.S. ports and pay for them on the spot. The cash-and-carry provision would remain in force until May 1, 1939. The president
could also ban shipment on U.S. vessels of commodities that he might specify, close U.S. ports to belligerent warships, and declare U.S. territorial waters off-limits to belligerent submarines and merchantmen. The measure kept the arms embargo and loan prohibition of the old law, and it applied to civil wars as well as international ones. On April 29, 1937, the new bill was passed, and was signed by the president a day later. Roosevelt offered no objection, undoubtedly because he realized that cash-and-carry favored Britain and France, two major sea powers, rather than the inland nations of Germany and Italy. Engaged in a dispute over enlarging the Supreme Court, which had struck down much New Deal legislation, Roosevelt sought no additional conflict. By remaining aloof from debate while quietly backing the congressional moderates, he was able to maintain some flexibility.

In January 1938, in the wake of a crisis in which Japanese forces in China sunk a gunboat, the Panay, the House considered the Ludlow Amendment. Congressman Louis Ludlow (D-Ind.) sought an amendment to the U.S. Constitution by which Congress’s power to declare war would be restricted to cases of actual or imminent invasion of the United States or its territories or attack by a non-American nation on a state in the Western Hemisphere. In any other case, Congress must allow voters to choose, by means of a national referendum, whether they wished to go to war. On January 10, 1938, the House voted 209 to 188 to return the proposed amendment to committee. Just before the vote, House Speaker William Bankhead (D-Ala.) read a public letter from Roosevelt that claimed that the amendment would “cripple” the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy and encourage other nations to “violate American rights with impunity.”

Meanwhile, Roosevelt sought to revise the 1937 Neutrality Act. As the cash-and-carry provision of this law was scheduled to expire on May 1, 1939, the administration sought a new bill that would retain cash-and-carry while repealing the arms embargo. At the end of June the House, by a vote of 200 to 188, passed an amended bill that included cash-and-carry but also added an arms embargo introduced by Congressman John Vorys (R-Ohio). Because the Senate did not act, most of the 1937 law, including the arms embargo, remained in effect.

Once Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, isolationism declined. As the United States emerged from the Depression, Roosevelt defeated his foes on one issue after another. In November 1939 Congress voted for military sales to Britain and France on a cash-and-carry basis. In September 1940 it adopted military conscription, and supported extending the terms of army draftees less than a year later. In November 1941 it authorized the arming of U.S. merchant vessels and permitted them to carry cargoes to belligerent ports. Acting on his own authority, Roosevelt occupied Greenland and Iceland, froze Japanese asserts, issued a set of war aims with Britain, and entered into an undeclared naval war with Germany. Isolationism was over well before Pearl Harbor.

See Also: ETHIOPIAN WAR; HULL, CORDELL; SPANISH CIVIL WAR; WORLD COURT.

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JUSTUS D. DOENECKE
JACKSON, ROBERT

Robert H. Jackson (1892–1954) served as U.S. solicitor general from 1938 to 1940, as attorney general in 1940 and 1941, and as associate justice of the Supreme Court from 1941 to 1954. Raised in upstate New York, Jackson studied law with a local attorney active in the Democratic Party. While developing a successful law practice, Jackson advised Franklin Roosevelt during his service as New York’s governor.

Jackson came to Washington with the Roosevelt administration, working first as general counsel to the Internal Revenue Service and then in the Department of Justice, where he helped develop the legal arguments used to defend the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, regarded by many as one of the New Deal’s key statutes. Jackson’s foremost contribution was as Roosevelt’s legal adviser; in that capacity he made a major speech describing the obstacle the Supreme Court posed to the New Deal, and he drafted the legal opinion defending the president’s power to lend U.S. ships to Great Britain early in World War II when the United States was still technically a neutral party.

As associate justice, Jackson wrote opinions that defined one part of the New Deal’s constitutional revolution. *Wickard v. Filburn* (1942) crystalized the new doctrine that the Constitution’s grant of power to regulate interstate commerce allowed Congress to regulate seemingly local activities (such as raising wheat for consumption on the farm).

Jackson’s nationalism led him to support civil liberties, as in *Edwards v. California* (1941), where the majority struck down as interfering with interstate commerce a California law barring “Okies” (poor emigrants from Oklahoma) from entering the state. His affirmation of principles of free expression in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett* (1943) remains one of the most eloquent in the reports: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.” Later in his career on the Court, Jackson, who also served as chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg war crimes trials, became skeptical about toleration of subversive speech.

Jackson believed that Roosevelt had promised to make him chief justice of the Supreme Court when the position became available, but the appointment fell instead to President Harry Truman, who did not feel obliged to honor Roosevelt’s promise. Jackson suspected that Justice Hugo Black had poisoned Truman’s mind against the appointment, and relations between the two New Dealers...
on the Court were permanently soured. Having rejected his doctor’s advice that he should retire after his first heart attack in early 1954, Jackson returned to the bench and suffered a fatal heart attack in the fall. He died on October 9, 1954.

See Also: SUPREME COURT.

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MARK TUSHNET

JAZZ

When Joseph “King” Oliver died in the spring of 1938, his protégé, Louis Armstrong, and other bandleaders, such as Cab Calloway and Earl Hines, claimed at his funeral that Oliver was the true “king of swing.” Others who wore the title, and swing musicians in general, they insinuated, owed a great debt to the leader of the Creole Jazz Band. This was a way of suggesting that the music of the big band era, known as swing since the 1930s, was an outgrowth of early forms of jazz. This idea contrasts with the fans’ notion that swing music, like New Orleans jazz or Dixieland, is a discrete and separate entity from bebop.

Scholars disagree on how to define jazz and swing, but many assert that the earlier bands of James Reese Europe, Fletcher Henderson, and Duke Ellington, as well as Oliver, were fundamental to swing’s evolution. On the eve of World War I, James Europe’s orchestra performed at New York City’s Carnegie Hall—one full decade before Paul Whiteman and a generation before the jazz concerts of the late 1920s were staged in this hall. James Europe’s music grew out of ragtime and popular dance music, as did Henderson’s and Ellington’s. Don Redman, Henderson’s arranger, is often credited with having the reed or brass sections perform passages in call-and-response sequences, but Ferdinand “Jelly Roll” Morton also used this distinctive voicing and organization. Besides employing the rhythms of ragtime and the harmonies of blues and popular dance music, Ellington’s compositions and arrangements contained unusual harmonies and unique combinations of instruments.

These outfits, and southwestern orchestras such as those of Alphonso Trent, Bennie Moten, and the Oklahoma City Blue Devils, grew in size from six to eight to twelve and thirteen or more musicians in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the rhythm section, the string bass replaced the tuba and the guitar was used instead of banjo, and lighter more flexible rhythms were played in 4/4 instead of 2/4. Swing bands also alternated ensemble passages with improvised sections by “hot” soloists, while other band members “ riffed” or played highly rhythmic motifs in the background. These exciting new sounds buoyed dancers and musicians alike, sending them into climactic moments when music, musicians, and dancers melded for an evening into a symphony of sound and movement. New jitterbug dances, such as the Lindy Hop and the Big Apple, illustrated these distinctive rhythms with not only new steps, but also highly acrobatic moves in which one partner propelled the other up and away from the floor in what were known as air steps.

These changes occurred gradually, however, and in the 1930s, there were still many bands, African-American and white swing orchestras, that included New Orleans styles, songs, and collective improvisation. Nonetheless, as evident from the 1932 recordings by Fletcher Henderson and Bennie Moten, as well as others, musicians perfected the swing idiom and arrangements in songs such as “King Porter Stomp” and “Moten Swing.” By the mid and late 1930s, bands led by Benny Goodman, Artie Shaw, Glenn Miller, and the Dorsey brothers also thrilled jitterbug dancers, as well as radio listeners from coast to coast. The white bands often utilized African-American arrangers—Fletcher Henderson, Sy Oliver, and Eddie Durham—to write the more soulful aspects of swing arrangements.

In several respects, swing bands contained within them the seeds of future developments in music and culture for decades to come. Most if not
all of the contemporary dance music in the United States stemmed from this tradition. The enhanced role of the drummers, of long drum solos, of melodies that were basically riffs, and of the incessant dance beat foreshadowed the rhythm and blues of the 1940s, which came to be known as rock and roll in the 1950s. Drummers who were leaders also contributed to these developments; Chick Webb in the 1930s was one of the first to bring drums front and center, a role popularized by Gene Krupa and leading to Max Roach and Art Blakey, among others. In another respect, the small combos within the big bands, Count Basie’s Kansas City combos, for example, or Goodman’s Quartet, presaged bebop bands, such as those led by Charlie “Bird” Parker and Dizzy Gillespie, and progressive jazz ensembles, such as the Modern Jazz Quartet. Even the fusion of European classical music with jazz, as in the compositions, arrangements, and playing of band leaders Artie Shaw and Eddie South, were comparable to Third Stream developments in the 1950s.

In the midst of the Depression, U.S. workers and unemployed men and women danced, socialized, and wooed to hits of the swing era—“One O’Clock Jump,” “Mood Indigo,” and “In the Mood.” Notably during the swing decade, blues moved to the forefront—not the country blues of Blind Lemon Johnson or city blues of Ma Rainey, but the urban versions of this music played by El-
Fats Waller, a popular Depression-era jazz pianist and songwriter, in 1938.

By the late 1930s, guitarists Eddie Durham, Charlie Christian, and T-Bone Walker electrified the instrument and amplified the sound, integrating the guitar with large orchestras and using it to solo like a saxophone or trumpet. Their efforts and the combos of Nat “King” Cole, Slim Gaillard and Slam Stewart, Stuff Smith, and Louis Jordan led to rock and roll and the music of Muddy Waters, Chuck Berry, and eventually Elvis Presley and the British rock bands. Electrification of the guitar in the 1930s also presaged fusion with the electric piano, bass, and other instruments in the 1970s.

Along with blues and jazz dancing, a distinctive way of speaking, swing slang or jive talk, accompanied the music and was even adopted in articles about the music and musicians. Some attributed this slang to Louis Armstrong’s influence, but the jazz world, the underworld, and entertainment circles have always had their distinctive argots. These merged in the swing band milieu, and expressions such as “Hit that jive, jack” and “Let’s get racy with Count Basie” punctuated the repartee and banter of not only musicians, but dancers, listeners, writers, and others in the “hip” crowd and became part of common parlance. Even the humor of, for example, “Nagasaki,” “Flat Foot Floogie,” and “Is You Is or Is You Ain’t My Baby?” was to be found in rock and roll songs of subsequent decades.

The social aspects of swing bands were as important as the music, as they provided staging grounds for assaults on racial segregation. In jam sessions, white musicians and black musicians performed together on the bandstand, a practice that was illegal in the South because it meant racial integration. Bandleaders such as Benny Carter hired white musicians, and Benny Goodman and Artie Shaw hired black musicians, a practice that was a frontal assault on segregation. Integrated bands traveling in the South encountered threats of arrest or violence when they defied the law by demanding equal rights for all band members. Up north, Billie Holiday, Oran “Hot Lips” Page, and others fought back in nightclubs and bars when whites attacked them. Thus, in a social sense as well as in the music, dance, and language, swing prepared the ground for future developments in subsequent decades of the twentieth century.

See Also: ARMSTRONG, LOUIS; BIG BAND MUSIC; ELLINGTON, DUKE; GOODMAN, BENNY; HOLIDAY, BILLIE; MUSIC.

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JOHNSON, HUGH

Hugh Johnson (August 5, 1882–April 15, 1942), head of the New Deal’s National Recovery Administration (NRA), was born in Kansas and raised in Kansas and Oklahoma. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1903 and was commissioned in the cavalry. In the early stage of his military career, Johnson served with the First Cavalry Regiment in Texas, the Philippines, and California. During these years the essential elements of his personality emerged. A heavy drinker, he was pugnacious and ready to harshly criticize the transgressor of even the most minor army regulation. This gruff side later led a pundit to dub him “Old Iron Pants.” Yet Johnson also had a sentimental side, and his quick mind for wisecracks and ability to tell good stories made him popular with messmates. From 1914 to 1916 he attended the University of California Law School, and immediately upon graduation he joined the Punitive Expedition in Mexico that was chasing Pancho Villa, serving as judge advocate.

During World War I, Johnson rose to the temporary rank of brigadier general while playing a major role in the mobilization of the nation’s manpower and industry. Initially he was the principal assistant for Major General Enoch H. Crowder, head of the Judge Advocate General’s Department and the Provost Marshal General’s Office. In this capacity Johnson helped formulate and implement the selective service system. Transferred to the War Department General Staff in 1918, Johnson spearheaded the restructuring of the army supply organization to end the inter-bureau competition that had made a mess of procurement. He also represented the army on the War Industries Board (WIB), which was mobilizing the nation’s industries for war through a program of industrial self-government. Through his stint with the WIB, Johnson acquired considerable knowledge of American industry and became good friends with many of the businessmen serving with the WIB, including Bernard M. Baruch, its chairman, and George N. Peek.

Disappointed by his failure to serve in France and anxious to make some “real” money, Johnson resigned his commission in 1919 and joined with Peek to take over the management of the struggling Moline Plow Company. Their efforts to turn Moline Plow into a profitable concern failed, and after an acrimonious break with Peek, Johnson supervised the company’s liquidation during the late 1920s. In the meantime, Johnson became an associate of Baruch, a figure of great influence as a result of his success on Wall Street and his twin roles as a political strategist and publicist on national issues. Among other things, Johnson helped Baruch publicize the need for ongoing planning for economic mobilization and was an investigator on business and economic conditions. At Baruch’s request, fueled by a sizable campaign contribution, Johnson was admitted to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “brains trust,” an informal group of academicians who served as speechwriters and thinkers in his 1932 presidential race. As Baruch’s man, Johnson saw that Baruch’s views on recovery from the Depression were heard.

In 1933 Johnson emerged as a key figure in Roosevelt’s New Deal. During the spring he participated in the drafting of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), an ambitious attempt to stimulate recovery through industrial self-government and public works spending that Roosevelt approved on June 16. Impressed with his vigor, knowledge of the industrial sector, and experience with the WIB, Roosevelt wanted Johnson to administer the act. However, after hearing from Baruch
that Johnson was too impulsive to be “a number-one man,” Roosevelt restricted him to the administration of the agency to implement industrial self-government, the NRA, and the president placed public works in a separate agency, the Public Works Administration.

Johnson’s initial task was the drafting of the “fair codes of competition” that were at the heart of industrial self-government. Designed to minimize the cutthroat competition that many argued had weakened American industry and to bring a degree of social justice to labor, the codes were to include provisions for production, price, and marketing agreements; minimum wages; maximum hours; and the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. In each of the nation’s industries, businessmen and labor representatives would draft a code that had the force of law once it received the president’s signature. Through the codes, predatory practices would be extinguished and labor standards improved, increasing stability, employment, and investor confidence, and encouraging general economic progress and social harmony.

At the outset, Johnson concentrated on codes for the nation’s largest industries, such as cotton textiles, steel, petroleum, automobiles, and coal. Fearing constitutional problems, Johnson eschewed the coercive features of NIRA, which included federal licensing of business and presidential authority to impose codes. Moreover, convinced that NRA could succeed only if he worked with business, Johnson generally relied on the voluntary cooperation of business and regularly made concessions to the dominant elements in an industry to get it codified. These actions often led to codes that included restrictive economic policies and gave short shrift to the aspirations of workers. When code drafting stalled, Johnson instituted a voluntary blanket code for all industries covering minimum wages and maximum hours that was to be in effect until the end of 1933 or until an employer’s specific industry was codified. Employers who abided by the code would display the emblem of the NRA, the “Blue Eagle,” in their windows or on their products.

Through the fall of 1933 Johnson presided over a massive publicity campaign to enlist public support for NRA. Marked by giant rallies and parades, the campaign made Johnson the nation’s number-one Depression fighter, a status Time magazine confirmed by naming him its “Man of the Year” for 1933. Next to Roosevelt, he was the most talked-about man in Washington. His pithy quotes, tough talk, gravel voice, rugged looks, and military demeanor made him good copy for reporters. For weeks Johnson worked at a non-stop pace, at one moment bargaining with business and labor leaders to finalize a code and the next moment flying across the country to give a speech. Through a mixture of cajolery, pleas to patriotism, bluster, and horse-trading, he broke the logjam in code drafting. Eventually more than five hundred codes, covering twenty-two million workers, were implemented.

By 1934 Johnson and NRA were engulfed in controversy. Many complained that price-control devices in codes were hindering recovery by raising prices faster than wages. Labor leaders argued that business was undermining the right of workers to form unions by herding them into company unions. “Chiseling,” or the refusal to abide by code provisions, was widespread. In response Johnson agreed to limit price-fixing arrangements, rushed into labor disputes to avert or end strikes, and threatened to “crack down” on “chiselers.”

Under the stress of running NRA, Johnson made contradictory statements, lost his temper, branded criticism of NRA as “treason,” and feuded with detractors. His self-control sapped by overwork, he drank too much, slept too little, and at times appeared on the verge of exhaustion. He permitted his secretary to become a power in NRA, and many speculated that there was something improper about their relationship because she always seemed to be at his side. Unwilling to delegate authority, he tended to run a one-man show and put off bureaucratizing the organization of NRA, resulting in low morale and administrative chaos. By the late summer of 1934 Roosevelt concluded that Johnson had outlasted his usefulness, and at the president’s request Johnson resigned in September. Eight months later the U.S. Supreme Court declared NRA unconstitutional.

In March 1935 Johnson became a syndicated columnist for the Scipps-Howard newspaper chain. Still loyal to the president, he spoke out against Fa-
ther Charles Coughlin and Senator Huey P. Long, two of Roosevelt’s most vocal critics, and in June he became temporary director of the newly created Works Progress Administration (WPA) program in New York City. A massive federal public works program, WPA was intended to provide emergency public employment, and in his brief tenure as its head Johnson got WPA off to a flying start in New York City, hiring more than two hundred thousand people before he left the position in October 1935.

Over the next years Johnson turned against Roosevelt and the New Deal. In his columns and speeches he questioned the failure to balance the budget, charged that anti-business elements had too much influence on policy, and warned that Roosevelt was concentrating too much power in the White House. As war loomed in the late 1930s Johnson became an outspoken isolationist, and in 1940 he supported Wendell Willkie, the Republican Party candidate for the presidency. Johnson’s isolationism and attacks on Roosevelt soured his relationship with the White House and cost him many readers, prompting Scripps-Howard to drop his column in 1941. After his column was picked up by King Features Syndicate, Johnson continued to be unrelenting in his criticism of Roosevelt and his policies until the United States entered World War II in December 1941. Despite failing health brought on by his drinking, Johnson continued with his column until his death.

Johnson’s place in history rests on his leadership of NRA. Under his direction it provided a temporary psychological stimulus and brought several social innovations, like labor’s right to organize, to the national scene. But ultimately NRA failed to spur recovery, floundering on its inability to get the various segments of the economy to look beyond self-interest and exhibit a concern for the national welfare. Johnson contributed to the failure of NRA. He was a poor administrator, was too pro-business, and let code-making become an end in itself. His personal excesses compounded these weaknesses. Yet for all of his failings, Johnson’s frenzied direction of NRA and colorful style made him one of the most influential and memorable figures of the early New Deal era.

See Also: NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (NRA); NEW DEAL.

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JOHN KENNEDY OHL

JOHNSON, LYNDON B.

Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908–1973) was a congressional aide, director of the Texas National Youth Administration, U.S. congressman, U.S. senator, vice president, and president of the United States. Reared by his politically active parents for a career of public service, Johnson learned early the importance of choosing powerful mentors such as Sam Rayburn and Franklin Roosevelt. His political legacy is mixed: as president, Johnson enacted far-reaching civil rights legislation while also further miring the nation in the Vietnam War. Johnson’s political style was pragmatic and activist, for he was committed to a reform agenda rooted in New Deal economic liberalism.

After graduating from college, Johnson taught briefly in a Mexican-American school in Cotulla, Texas, where he observed firsthand the viciousness of poverty and segregation. In 1931 his father
helped him gain a post as secretary to Congressman Richard Kleberg, a Democrat from south Texas. Since Kleberg cared little about the daily duties of his office, many of the responsibilities of managing legislation and constituent concerns fell to Johnson, who handled them with aplomb. Further recognition of his political acumen came with his leadership of the “little congress,” an important behind-the-scenes organization of congressional aides and Johnson’s growing list of older, more powerful political confidants. In 1935 he was a rising star in the Democratic Party and was tapped by President Roosevelt to become the director of the National Youth Administration in Texas. In that position, Johnson oversaw a successful jobs program that included the construction of countless state roadside parks; a student aid program that funded high school, college, and graduate students; and an employment referral service. During his tenure, Johnson ensured that African-American and Mexican-American students received equitable treatment.

In 1937, the congressman from Texas’s tenth district died, opening a seat to be filled in a special election. Johnson, a virtual unknown in the district, bested a field of nine candidates. His campaign slogan was “Franklin D. and Lyndon B.,” and he presented himself as the consummate New Dealer, even endorsing Roosevelt’s Supreme Court packing plan. Once in Congress, Johnson worked hard for New Deal issues such as rural electrification. He helped bring a series of dams and water projects to the lower Colorado River in Texas, completely remaking the economics of the Texas Hill Country. Johnson’s eleven years in Congress were successful, and his ambitions and his political talent ultimately took him to the White House.

See Also: DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ELECTION OF 1938; NATIONAL YOUTH ADMINISTRATION (NYA).

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NANCY BECK YOUNG

JOINT COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY (JCNR)

The Joint Committee for National Recovery (JCNR) was the mechanism by which some black activists sought to represent a collective black voice on political, economic, and social policies in the New Deal era. The JCNR was the brainchild of John P. Davis, a graduate of Harvard Law School.

In 1933 Congress began debating the implementation of the National Recovery Administration (NRA), one of Franklin Roosevelt’s key New Deal agencies. The NRA was created to establish codes that would promote fair competition and standardize wages and hours. Davis, along with fellow Harvard graduate student of economics Robert C. Weaver, noticed that during code hearings Congress devoted very little attention to blacks in the workplace. Davis and Weaver decided to represent blacks’ interest on Capitol Hill and formed the Negro Industrial League (NIL) in order to highlight racial discrimination in the NRA’s wage codes.

The NIL only existed for the summer of 1933—it collapsed when Weaver was recruited into Roosevelt’s administration as an assistant to Clark Foreman, the race advisor to the Department of the Interior. Many hailed Weaver’s appointment as a great step forward for black Americans, but Davis felt that Foreman had co-opted the work of the NIL. Davis remained convinced of the need for a group that represented black organizations on Capitol Hill. By the end of 1933, Davis persuaded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to support his plan for the JCNR. By December 1933 the JCNR represented eighteen organizations. A year later, twenty-four organizations considered the JCNR their voice on Capitol Hill. Of these twenty-four, however, the only major group was the NAACP. The NAACP felt that the JCNR could not survive without its support and therefore tried to control the group. When
Davis rejected the NAACP’s directives, the NAACP withdrew its support, effectively ending the JCNR. Before the JCNR disappeared at the end of 1935, however, it organized a major conference at Howard University—“The Position of the Negro in Our National Economic Crisis.” This conference, in the spring of 1935, attracted New Deal administrators, labor activists, academics, political party leaders, and laborers from around the country. It received negative press from those who alleged that conference organizers promoted communism. In truth, many of the conference speakers were highly critical of the New Deal’s treatment of black America, claiming that racial discrimination undercut the support that the New Deal policies promised, but a congressional investigation after the conference found no evidence that attendees advocated a turn to communism. Several conference leaders, however, did call for a new political organization. Less than a year after the JCNR collapsed and the conference ended, this new organization, the National Negro Congress, held its first meeting in Chicago. Labor leader A. Philip Randolph was its first president and John P. Davis, still committed to the idea of a national umbrella organization dedicated to articulating blacks’ collective voice, ran the organization on a day-to-day basis.

See Also: FOREMAN, CLARK; RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS; WEAVER, ROBERT CLIFTON.

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JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY

JONES, JESSE

Jesse Holman Jones (April 22, 1874–June 1, 1956) was born to a farming family in Robertson County, Tennessee. Like so many Tennesseans seeking economic opportunity in the nineteenth century, the Jones family headed for Texas, settling in Dallas. Blessed with a keen eye for good business deals, Jesse Jones attended Hill’s Business College in order to secure at least a rudimentary knowledge of accounting and marketing, and he graduated there in 1891. He accepted a job in his uncle’s local lumber business, learning all he could about construction and real-estate development. But Jones wanted to be his own boss. Deciding that Houston offered a more fertile business climate, he invested in real estate and oil and gas properties there. Within a decade he had become one of the city’s most influential developers, responsible for founding Texas Commerce Bank, what later became Exxon, and the Houston Chronicle. As chairman of the Houston Harbor Board, Jones built the Houston Ship Channel, which eventually made the city one of the country’s busiest ports.

Jesse Jones also became the most powerful man in the state’s Democratic Party. During World War I, he moved to Washington, D.C., to work for the American Red Cross, and there he became a close friend of President Woodrow Wilson. In 1928, Jones managed to bring the Democratic national convention to Houston. When the nation’s banking system disintegrated in 1932, President Herbert Hoover needed a Democrat on the board of the newly-created Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), and Jones accepted the appointment. The RFC made loans to troubled financial institutions, and in 1933 newly-elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt selected Jones to chair the RFC.

During the next twelve years, the RFC became the most powerful agency in the federal government, dispensing tens of thousands of loans to banks, railroads, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and private businesses. Because Jones was so well connected with the Texas congressional delegation and such influential Texans as Sam Rayburn, Tom Connally, John Nance Garner, and Marvin Jones, and because he could deliver so many perquisites to their constituents, he became one of the most powerful men in the country. And because the RFC operated on a revolving loan basis, it always had hundreds of millions of dollars in its accounts, money that could be used to
fund other federal agencies. Between 1932 and 1940, the RFC dispensed more than $10 billion in federal assistance to tens of thousands of businesses, prompting one historian to label its work as “saving capitalism.” At one point during the Great Depression years, Jesse Jones, by presiding over the RFC and the money it funneled to other agencies, had substantial influence on numerous federal agencies, including the Federal Relief Administration, the Public Works Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Rural Electrification Administration.

When World War II erupted, and the federal budget grew geometrically, Jones, as the man who headed the RFC, the so-called “Fourth Branch of Government,” virtually presided over the economy’s shift to wartime production. Congress created and placed under RFC control the Rubber Reserve Company, the Metals Reserve Company, the United States Commercial Company, the Petroleum Reserve Company, the Defense Plant Corporation, the Defense Supplies Corporation, and the Smaller War Plants Corporation. More than $40 billion passed through Jones’s hands during World War II. It’s no wonder that journalists often referred to Roosevelt as “Mr. President” and Jesse Jones as “The Czar.” When the war ended, Jones retired to Houston to manage his real-estate empire and to engage in philanthropic activities. He died there in 1956.

See Also: RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION (RFC).

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JAMES S. OLSON
KAISER, HENRY

Henry John Kaiser (May 9, 1882–August 24, 1967) became a national figure through involvement in New Deal public-works projects and wartime defense contracts. Initially a salesman in New York and Spokane, Washington, Kaiser was a small-scale contractor on highway projects in western Canada and then California during the 1920s. Kaiser’s business was transformed by major public-works contracts, beginning with the Six Companies consortium of western construction firms that won the Hoover (Boulder) Dam contract in 1931. The immense project required effective coordination of a large workforce in hazardous conditions, major investments in raw material supplies, and the construction of Boulder City. Kaiser was the consortium’s key link to politicians, officials, and insiders in Washington, D.C., during the bidding phase, and he later maintained support and confidence during the lengthy construction phase. Kaiser was a prime example of a “government entrepreneur” and a model for positive working relationships between business and the government during the New Deal era. Further public-works contracts followed the Hoover Dam. When unsuccessful in bidding for the prime contract for the Shasta Dam in northern California in 1938, Kaiser won contracts to supply cement for the project, establishing Permanente Cement.

During World War II, Kaiser’s contacts and ambition resulted in spectacular diversification into shipbuilding, steel manufacturing, and the production of magnesium and aluminium. All were major elements in western economic development, in which federal support and contacts, including Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans, were fundamental. Kaiser’s public profile attained great heights, aided by his own attention to public relations and by regular and favorable coverage in Henry Luce’s Time/Life media during the 1940s. In 1944 Roosevelt even considered Kaiser as a potential vice-presidential running mate. Kaiser’s construction companies maintained a tough relationship with workers and unions, but beginning with the Grand Coulee contract in 1938 Kaiser adopted more liberal views on collective bargaining. The Grand Coulee project included a medical-care plan, and similar provisions were made for Kaiser’s shipyard workers during the war. After 1945 the healthcare plan developed into the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program, which proved his most durable business. By contrast, a postwar venture into car manufacturing via the Kaiser-Frazer company was short-lived.

Kaiser’s achievements depended on effective networking to negotiate the complex but lucrative
challenges of federal contracting. Moreover, his greatest achievements were in projects that fulfilled the goals of key New Deal policymakers, whether in public works, defence contracts, or efforts to increase competition in monopolistic industries.

See Also: GRAND COULEE PROJECT.

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MICHAEL FRENCH

KENNEDY, JOSEPH P.

Joseph Patrick Kennedy (September 6, 1888–November 19, 1969) amassed enormous personal wealth as a businessman and became both the first chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the first Irish-American Catholic to be U.S. ambassador to Great Britain.

Kennedy was born in Boston, Massachusetts, into an Irish-American family active in the local Democratic Party. After an education at Boston Latin School and Harvard University, he began a successful business career. In 1914, at age twenty-five, he became the country’s youngest bank president, heading the Columbia Trust Company. After a brief period in shipbuilding during World War I, he joined Hayden, Stone and Company, where he developed expertise in stock dealing. In 1922, he began to speculate in the stock market full-time, quickly proving himself an exceptional corporate predator and a skilled manipulator of Wall Street. Kennedy portrayed himself as both talented and lucky, but questionable ethics assisted his progress. The Bostonian mastered the use of inside information, participated in stock pools, and often sold short, earning money from falls in stock prices. Kennedy also invested in the film industry, creating the famous Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO) corporation. Most accept that Kennedy also gleaned substantial profits from liquor trading during the prohibition years, a process that demanded dealings with organized crime syndicates. By the mid-1920s, Kennedy’s fortune was estimated at $2 million. This wealth not only survived the Wall Street crash, as Kennedy sold long-term holdings beforehand, but was enhanced as he sold short to profit from the crisis.

By 1931, Kennedy had entered politics by contributing to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s campaign coffers and collecting donations from businessmen who wished to remain anonymous. Arguably, Kennedy also helped Roosevelt secure the 1932 Democratic Party nomination; by scaring his friend, William Randolph Hearst, with tales that internationalist Newton D. Baker might be nominated, Kennedy persuaded the influential Hearst to support Roosevelt.

In 1934, Roosevelt appointed Kennedy to the SEC. The new commission was designed to regulate the worst corporate excesses, but conservatives feared development of an anti-business agency. Kennedy’s appointment proved a masterstroke. Portraying the SEC as improving conditions for business, Kennedy bolstered investor confidence, particularly by emphasizing negotiation and self-enforcement over federal coercion. He established an effective administrative system, with excellent staff, and won respect from all quarters. Quickly bored, Kennedy resigned in 1935. Roosevelt, though, retained his ally, appointing Kennedy the first chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission in 1936.

Kennedy assisted the president beyond fund-raising and winning business support for New Deal measures. His friendship with Hearst proved useful, and Kennedy also managed to temper the anti-Roosevelt rhetoric of radio demagogue Father Charles Coughlin. Yet, tensions developed between Roosevelt and Kennedy. Kennedy’s successes, helped by his penchant for self-publicity, won press
attention. Reflecting Kennedy’s own ambitions, coverage emphasized Kennedy’s presidential potential. When Kennedy resigned from the Maritime Commission in 1937, and pressured Roosevelt to appoint him ambassador to Great Britain, the president obliged. Roosevelt took the opportunity to maneuver a rival out of Washington before the 1940 election.

Kennedy’s tenure as ambassador earned him notoriety. In 1938, the threat of Adolf Hitler’s Germany loomed large. Kennedy worried that war would jeopardize economic progress. Overlooking the moral issues, he searched for accommodation with the Nazis. Even as appeasement failed, Kennedy made pro-German statements and advocated U.S. neutrality. His claim that Britain lacked the will and weaponry to resist German power upset his hosts. Furthermore, Kennedy’s position contrasted with Roosevelt’s growing internationalism. The ambassador appeared ready to endorse isolationist Republican Wendell Willkie in the 1940 presidential election. However, on returning to the United States, Kennedy met with Roosevelt. While historians debate the deal agreed to, or blackmail employed, Kennedy endorsed Roosevelt’s candidacy two days later.

Shortly after the election, Kennedy blundered. His statement that “democracy is all finished in England . . . it may be here” drew overwhelmingly negative public reaction. Amid the subsequent furor, Kennedy and Roosevelt met again. No record of the ten-minute meeting remains, but it left Roosevelt furious. Kennedy resigned the ambassadorship in early 1941. Loathed for his defeatism and estranged from his former ally, Kennedy never held political office again. Instead, he groomed his sons for political success, seeing his son, John F. Kennedy, become president in 1961.

See Also: HEARST, WILLIAM RANDOLPH; PROHIBITION.

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JON HERBERT

KERR, FLORENCE

Florence Stewart Kerr (June 30, 1890–July 29, 1974), women’s relief work administrator, was born in Harriman, Tennessee, but was early moved to Marshalltown, Iowa. She graduated in 1913 from Grinnell College where both she and her classmate Harry Hopkins were students of George Herron, a teacher of Applied Christianity. She was teaching English at Grinnell in 1930 when she was named a member of Iowa’s Unemployment Relief Council. At the creation of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) Hopkins had her appointed as one of five (later seven) regional directors of the WPA Women’s and Professional Division with headquarters in Chicago from which she supervised relief work activities in thirteen midwestern states. The most extensive of the projects she supervised were sewing and library projects for women, but she also oversaw work by men and women employed by the white-collar Federal Art, Music, Theater, and Writers’ Projects.

Kerr was viewed as the strongest of the regional supervisors and, as a longtime associate of Hopkins, she was named in December 1938 to replace Ellen S. Woodward as WPA assistant administrator for the Women’s and Professional Projects (WPP). She assumed those duties early in 1939 at a time when executive reorganization reconstituted the WPA as the Work Projects Administration under the new Federal Security Agency. She faced difficulties stemming from successive budget cuts and the necessity to adapt toward defense preparedness almost all of the work projects within her division. For example, library programs were created for the armed forces and defense-impacted area, and sewing projects produced parachutes and sandbags. She managed to retain most of the community-centered and institutional service aspects of the
women’s program that were showcased in 1940 in a nationwide “This Work Pays Your Community” promotion touted by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Kerr especially defended before congressional committees nursery and daycare centers as vital for mothers engaged in defense work. Many of the women's projects remained until final liquidation of the WPA in 1943.

From 1944 until her resignation from government at the war’s end, Kerr directed the war service program of the Federal Works Agency. She then became an executive with Northwest Airlines, based in Minneapolis. In the mid-1950s she resigned and returned to Washington where she died.

See Also: ROOSEVELT, ELEANOR; WOMEN, IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON.

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MARThA H. SwAIN

KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD

John Maynard Keynes (June 5, 1883–April 21, 1946) was a brilliant, colorful, and outspoken English economist whose General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) provided the academic rationale for governmental use of a compensatory fiscal policy in countering the peaks and valleys of economic cycles. Keynes was born in Cambridge; his father, John Neville Keynes, was a noted philosopher and economist, and his mother, Florence Ada Keynes, was mayor of the city.

John Maynard Keynes was educated at the finest British schools, Eton and then King's College, Cambridge, becoming in his youth a part of the Bloomsbury Group, which consisted of a dozen privileged aesthetes, including Virginia Woolf, Lytton Strachey, and Clive Bell. Unsettled as to métier, Keynes took a position with the Foreign Service, but soon tired of his assignment at the India desk.

In 1915 Keynes joined the British Treasury staff, distinguishing himself in the effort to manage national financing of World War I. He gained international fame as a key member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference during the drafting of the Versailles treaty in 1918 and 1919. Deeply concerned about the vindictive peace treaty and the impossible level of reparations imposed on Germany, he published in 1919 The Economic Consequences of the Peace, a book sharply critical of the treaty and the heads of state who drafted it.

Keynes continued to write and offer advice on public economic issues during the 1920s, publishing at the end of the decade what he considered to be his magnum opus, the two-volume A Treatise on Money (1930). Critics noted that it failed to address adequately key economic issues of the time, including especially the relationship between production, employment, and money. Keynes immediately began to address the criticism through another project, which became his General Theory.

Deeply concerned about the economic crisis of the 1930s, Keynes quickly became persuaded of the wrong-headedness of the widely held business cycle theory of the time that advised policy makers to let “natural” adjustment of money supply and interest rates ameliorate the crisis without governmental intervention. In Keynes’s view, when times were so bad that potential investors were unwilling to borrow and initiate new enterprises, even with interest rates near zero, the government should step in and stimulate demand by borrowing and investing. Keynes advocated these views in an open letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt published in the New York Times on December 31, 1933, and in a meeting with the president in June 1934. Yet, neither the letter, the meeting with the president, nor the publication of the General Theory were significant in shaping New Deal economic policy. When, during the recession of 1937 to 1938, Roosevelt’s advisors moved him toward acceptance of a rationale for a compensatory fiscal policy, they did so principally on the basis of their independently-derived observations and experience.
Though Keynes had little direct influence upon New Deal policy formation, his General Theory provided the most coherent after-the-fact academic explanation for the crisis and recovery of the 1930s and 1940s, and it became the foundation of postwar economic policies and perspectives. In 1944 Keynes was the chief British Treasury representative at the Bretton Woods Conference held in New Hampshire to provide a foundation for the postwar world economy. His influence there helped in the design and establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Keynes was knighted in 1942; his ideas, as interpreted against the backdrop of the Great Depression, informed a generation of economic thinkers and made him the best-known economist of the twentieth century.

See Also: ECONOMISTS; KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS.

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DEAN L. MAY

KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was a brilliant, well-born British economist who during the Great Depression laid the foundations for an alternative to classical economics, which dominated economic thought and policy in the Western democracies from the late 1930s through the end of the century. In the public mind, Keynes is most commonly thought of as offering the rationale for a compensatory fiscal policy to regulate the swings of economic cycles. The centrality of his thought is underscored by the efforts of scholars only in the last decade of the twentieth century to evolve what they call a post-Keynesian economics.

In the conclusion to his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936) Keynes maintained that “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.” The twists and turns in the story of the role of Keynesian economics during the Great Depression and its enduring connection to that crisis in the public mind are fascinating and revealing.

Though he became well-known early in the century through his critique of the Treaty of Versailles and considered his major work to be his two volume A Treatise on Money (1930), Keynes is best known for his General Theory, an uncharacteristically turgid and poorly organized tome that explained in highly theoretical language how a calamity such as the Great Depression could have happened and what policies governments might employ in countering the extremes of business cycles.

From the beginning of his career Keynes was keenly interested in the practical world and quick to offer advice to politicians and public officials. He did so frequently and eloquently during the 1920s and the Great Depression. He was particularly concerned about the state of the American economy, which seemed more fragile than the British economy and which was more sharply affected by the stock market crash of 1929.

In April 1931 Keynes made a radio address to the people of the United States, warning that businessmen and financiers were too optimistic and that the Depression could easily last another five years. A month later he came to the United States to deliver a lecture at the University of Chicago in which he argued that in the United States regulation of credit would be more effective than public works spending in countering the Depression. In December 1933 Keynes wrote for the New York Times a somewhat condescending open letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, warning him to avoid such reform measures as those undertaken by the National Recovery Administration, that, as Keynes saw it, were shaking business confidence and thus impeding recovery. In June 1934 Keynes came to the United States again, this time meeting personally with Roosevelt, presenting calculations on the level of spending needed to achieve recovery. Accounts of the meeting suggest that the two were mutually unimpressed.

Clearly, advice from Keynes was abundant. Yet hardly anyone formulating policy at the time was
listening. Nevertheless, the essential components of both his analytical framework and policy recommendations were developed independently by administration officials, especially presidential advisors Stuart Chase and Harry L. Hopkins, several of their staff, and Reserve Board Chairman Marriner S. Eccles. All drew from their practical experience, the work of a broad range of economists and advisors, and most importantly, all were pressed by an imperative to respond to the obvious human needs that the crisis engendered. As Eccles later put it, “we came out at about the same place in economic thought and policy by very different roads.” Thus, one might be understandably suspicious of Keynes’s conclusion concerning the ideas of academics that “the world is ruled by little else.”

Nonetheless, Keynesian economics ultimately became, in the minds of some, almost synonymous with the New Deal. Why so? Because Keynes offered a powerful theoretical analysis of the economic conditions underlying the crisis of the 1930s at precisely the moment when Western democracies were desperately in need of an authoritative and coherent explanation of the Depression, and of hope that there was a way out consistent with their ideology.

Of initial concern was the duration and depth of the Depression. Prevailing business cycle theory, offered by eminent scholars such as Jacob Viner and Wesley C. Mitchell, proposed that cycles were an inevitable, even necessary, part of the progression of capitalist economies. During downturns the decline in prices, wages, and interest rates would reach a point where investors could not resist the potential profits these conditions offered and would start borrowing, investing, and propelling the economy back onto an upward trajectory. Similarly, in upturns, high prices, wages, and interest rates would restrict investment and lead to a downturn. The implication for policy was that governments should intervene as little as possible and let “natural” forces right the economy in their own due time. Yet during the Great Depression the downturn went deeper and lasted longer than anyone had imagined, and still no “natural” forces were leading to recovery. It seemed that the economy might not be self-correcting and could reach equilibrium at levels far below full employment and adequate living standards.

The use of public works to offer jobs to the unemployed and build public infrastructures at minimal cost had become legitimized during the 1920s. Herbert Hoover had implemented such programs before leaving office and the policy was continued in the New Deal under Harold Ickes’s Public Works Administration. Yet federal spending for relief was regarded by both Hoover and Roosevelt as an expedient to mitigate suffering, a galling necessity (and hence a symbol) of bad times. It was difficult for them to accept spending, other than on well-planned and needed public works, as a deliberate and continuing instrument of economic policy. Moreover, how could one reasonably argue that tax money given back to taxpayers, who would have spent it had the government not taken it in taxes, could provide a stimulus to the economy?

These concerns could be pushed to the background as long as there seemed to be progress, however halting, towards recovery. But when the recession of 1937 struck, the nation was faced with not a Hoover but a “Roosevelt Recession,” which had to be addressed. The domestic political implications were clear to New Dealers, but so also were the implications for the worldwide ideological struggle among fascism, communism, and liberal democracy.

As the recession deepened during the winter of 1937 and 1938 there were widespread complaints in the press that the administration was adrift and had no coherent policy, a criticism that could justly be applied to the various pragmatic, need-driven programs of the early New Deal. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., urged a return to a balanced budget. Eccles, Hopkins, and others urged a resumption of spending. The president finally resumed spending, but only after being presented with arguments that the policy was consistent with American historical experience and with liberalism, and that the resulting growth would bring in enough to pay back the deficits incurred.

That decision was announced in April 1938. By August there were clear signs of recovery and it was assumed by all that the renewed spending program had caused the recovery. But by the time the reces-
sion struck, the General Theory was being read and avidly embraced by young American economists within and outside of the administration. Several addressed the recession crisis by restating Keynes’s ideas in a brief, accessible manifesto, An Economic Program for American Democracy, published in November 1938. The book was, in effect, a simplified, policy-oriented, Americanized distillate of Keynes’s General Theory. It immediately became a best seller. Eccles was so impressed with its argument that he used his personal funds to buy copies for every member of the U.S. Congress. The Washington Star called it “the first authentic attempt to tell compactly and in simple language the complete economic and social ideology of the New Deal.” The Boston Globe concluded that “for the first time the effects of haphazard spending and investment policies of the New Deal are dispassionately analyzed and given academic sanction.”

Of course, as economists and other policy makers were beginning to understand, the base of that academic sanction was Keynes’s General Theory. In it Keynes provided elaborate explanations for why it was possible for the economy to reach equilibrium at levels well below full employment. His analysis of “liquidity preference” explained that in some circumstances potential investors might wish to retain rather than invest their resources. Thus, contrary to classical economic theory, interest rates could fall to zero without attracting new investment. His description of the “propensity to consume” explained what proportion of incomes citizens would, under various circumstances, re-inject into the economy through consumption. His “multiplier” concept borrowed from economist R. F. Kahn to offer clearer answers to the question of how much stimulus would be given by a specific amount of public investment as it moved through the economy. The multiplier concept offered the possibility of predicting levels of increased economic activity and tax yields, and thus assurance that an invigorated economy could eventually pay the deficits such investment created.

None of these ideas appeared early enough in analytical form to affect New Deal policy, including even the resumption of spending in 1938. They did, however, as the Boston Globe reporters understood, provide academic sanction and legitimization of that policy. Informed observers quickly came to conflate Keynesian economics and the later New Deal. As Eccles put it, New Deal policies, now bolstered by Keynes’s academic sanction, offered “some assurance that we can go forward in the future.”

Keynes, the economic theorist, had little direct influence on the formulation of policy. The world, in fact, was ruled by others. But his work suggested that the United States was on the right path and thus brought hope and promise to a generation of young academics disheartened by the ideological choices that leaders of Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan had made in their efforts to cope with the Great Depression. As the United States spiraled into recession in 1937, Western civilization seemed to hang in the balance. And in the minds of those persuaded by Keynes, the “academic scribbler,” by explaining what was happening, had tipped that balance in the direction of the liberal democracies. Having thus grasped a hand of rescue at so critical a time, it is understandable that over six decades later Keynesian economics continued to be the predominant paradigm for economic thought and policy in much of the world, including even most societies that had once embraced fascism and Marxism.

See Also: ECONOMISTS; KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD.

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DEAN L. MAY
KEYSERLING, LEON

Leon Hirsch Keyserling (January 22, 1908–August 9, 1987) was a leading New Deal economic and legal adviser. After working briefly in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), he served as Senator Robert F. Wagner’s chief legislative aide from 1933 to 1937. From 1937 until 1946, Keyserling was the general counsel for federal housing authorities. His last government appointment was as a member of President Harry S. Truman’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).

Born in Charleston, South Carolina, the son of Jewish immigrants, Keyserling graduated from Columbia University in New York in 1928 and received a law degree from Harvard University in Massachusetts in 1931. He returned to Columbia for graduate work in economics with institutional economist Rexford Tugwell. Keyserling soon followed Tugwell to Washington, working first for the AAA and then for Wagner. In helping to draft the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, also called the Wagner Act, Keyserling incorporated a purchasing power rationale into its preamble. In addition to quelling industrial unrest, the Wagner Act sought to restore equality of bargaining between employers and employees so that workers could bargain for higher wages that would in turn sustain consumer demand. A strong labor movement could coordinate wages and profits to bring about economic recovery and prevent a return of economic decline. Keyserling believed that only trade unions organized by industry with majority representation could serve as an effective check on corporate power. Having seen the failures of the labor provisions in section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Keyserling sought to insure that the Wagner Act endowed workers with sufficient rights to representation on the shop floor and created the National Labor Relations Board to enforce those rights.

In addition to the maldistribution of income, the other major problem that Keyserling and other New Dealers saw was the failure of the heavy goods industry, which was responsible for so much unemployment. The Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, which Keyserling helped to draft, was intend-
it knew that the Polish government was not willing to grant them entrance visas. The family of Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish youth living in Paris, was among those left in a precarious situation on the border between Germany and Poland. In retaliation, Grynszpan assassinated Ernst vom Rath, the Third Secretary at Germany’s embassy in Paris. Vom Rath died in the afternoon of November 9, and the news reached Adolf Hitler that evening, which was the anniversary of his attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic in 1923. Hitler met with his propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels, and soon thereafter orders to wreak havoc on Jews were given to the Nazi paramilitary force, the Sturmabteilung, or SA.

This night resulted in widespread destruction of Jewish homes, businesses, and synagogues. The SA also took action against spiritual objects as they forced rabbis and other Jews to desecrate the Torah and to stand inside of synagogues and read from Mein Kampf. The SA smashed windows and set buildings ablaze. Over one hundred Jews were killed in this night of violence. The SA, assisted by Schutzstaffel (SS) troops, also engaged in the first major round-up of German Jews. They seized approximately 25,000 Jewish men and placed them in
the concentration camps of Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen. The attacks on the Jewish communities of Germany resulted in the destruction of over two hundred synagogues and more than seven thousand Jewish-owned businesses. The Third Reich declared that the Jewish communities had to pay a fine in the amount of one billion reichsmarks as punishment.

While many Jews had earlier believed that Hitler would eventually be taken out of power, Kristallnacht signaled a different kind of Germany, one that threatened their lives directly. The push to emigrate intensified, but would-be emigrants faced many barriers. The Third Reich blocked their bank accounts, and countries would not accept immigrants who could not provide for themselves. In 1939, 185,000 Jews emigrated, but often they could only obtain entrance visas for another European country. Once the German occupation of Western Europe began in 1940, they were back under the control of the Third Reich, and many of these refugees were shipped to killing centers in the east during the Holocaust.

In response to the pogrom, on November 15 President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that he had taken the unusual step of recalling the American ambassador to Germany for consultation. Roosevelt stated that the recent events in Germany had shocked him, but reiterated that additional visas would not be made available for Jewish refugees. Within the week, however, Roosevelt did agree to extend the visas of approximately 14,000 Jews who had entered on tourist visas until they had fulfilled citizenship requirements. One of the Jews who benefited from this decision was Albert Einstein.

See Also: Anti-Semitism; Europe, Great Depression in; Hitler, Adolf.

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